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W.B. BELLS

AMERICANS MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PART 3

FEBRUARY 4, 18, AND 25, MARCH 3, 17, 25, AND 31

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BACKGROUND NOTES

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The purpose of this Select Committee is to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of (1) the problem of United States servicemen still identified as missing in action, as well as those known dead whose bodies have not been recovered, as a result of military operations in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and the problem of United States civilians identified as missing or unaccounted for, as well as those known dead whose bodies have not been recovered in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; (2) the need for additional international inspection teams to determine whether there are servicemen still held as prisoners of war or civilians held captive or unwillingly detained in the aforementioned areas.

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Congressman G. V. Montgomery (D-Miss) (center), Chairman of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia and a Congressional Adviser to the International Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict confers in Geneva, Switzerland with U.S. Ambassador to the Conference, George Aldrich (center right). Also participating in the discussion are J. Angus MacDonald, Staff Director of the Select Committee (left) and Frank Sieverts (upper right), adviser to the U.S. Delegation.

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING
PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,
Washington, D.C.

The select committee met at 3:25 p.m. in room H-227 of the Capitol; the Honorable G. V. Montgomery, chairman of the select committee, presiding.

Present: Representatives Montgomery, Gonzalez, Schroeder, Ottinger, Harkin, Lloyd, McCloskey, Gilman, and Guyer.

The CHAIRMAN. The select committee will come to order.

The purpose of this open hearing today—and our witness is Dr. Roger Shields—is to establish for the record the basis for classifying missing Americans. In other words, how does the Defense Department arrive at classifying a person missing in action, prisoner of war, or presumed killed in action. We felt this would be good information for the select committee and needed as a part of the official record.

Dr. Shields, we are very glad to have you here today and to testify before our committee. You have been most helpful in working with the committee and we have had full cooperation from the Defense Department. Dr. Shields.[1]

TESTIMONY OF DR. ROGER SHIELDS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PW/MIA AFFAIRS

Dr. SHIELDS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You might have to talk up a little. Since we do not have the benefit of a microphone system, it will be necessary to speak louder than usual.

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes sir, I certainly can do that. I hope if anyone in the back can't hear, they will have someone tap me on the shoulder and I will speak up so they can hear.

It is a privilege for me to once again represent the Department of Defense before this committee.

Your efforts on behalf of our missing servicemen in Southeast Asia are appreciated and your progress to date has been heartening. I do want to reaffirm the Secretary of Defense pledge of the Department's full cooperation with you in this undertaking.

[1] Biographical data of Dr. Roger Shields appears on p. 457.

You have requested information concerning the classification process for our missing. Today, I am prepared to discuss the guidelines that govern the classification of our servicemen in a missing status; that includes missing, missing in action or captured, and the subsequent compilation, maintenance and use of the casualty files pertaining to the missing member.

Although I will give the presentation, I have with me representatives from the four services. These dedicated professionals are well known to the families of our missing men, and I want to introduce them to the members of the committee. They are the experts in this field and are available to answer your questions.

Our Army representative is Col. C. J. Bobinski, the director of the Army's Casualty and Memorial Affairs Division.

Representing the Department of the Navy is Comdr. Jack Colgan, a Special Assistant to the Chief of Naval Personnel.

Maj. Robert Dietrich handles the prisoner and missing cases for the Marine Corps and Col. Archie W. Gratch is the Air Force assistant for casualty matters from the Air Force Personnel Center at Randolph Air Force Base, Tex.

I do want to emphasize that these men are thoroughly willing and able and dedicated. Not only these men but those men working with them have firsthand experience in Southeast Asia and in combat there, so they are experts in every regard.

We have prepared copies of casualty case files for use by the committee members during the hearing. There are four files for each of you, representing a case of a missing member from each service. These are actual cases and the folders you have been given contain the substantive details surrounding the loss incident and all other information pertaining to the individuals. However, some material that does not pertain to the missing man, such as general correspondence with the families, Members of Congress, and concerned citizens inquiring about these men, was not reproduced. The service representatives do have the complete, original, case files with them here today for your perusal should you desire.

Although standing and select committees——

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you something right there. Most of the information, or all of the information in these individual files, has it been declassified?

Dr. SHIELDS. With regard to the vast majority of our files, all of the information has been declassified. In some instances the source, for example, of a particular piece of information has not been declassified, but the information itself has been.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if there were classified materials in a serviceman's file about which the family was concerned, they could see the information if an individual member of this committee were to request the classified information.

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And some of it is very, very personal, and I could understand how to the family it really wouldn't gain anything. But it could be made available to the affected family by working through committee members?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes indeed, Congressman Montgomery, we would have no problem with that at all.

The CHAIRMAN. So necessary information this committee wanted declassified or made available to us on a classified basis——

Dr. SHIELDS. We would be happy to provide it. I do want to stress however that all of the substantive information has been given to the family members. There are cases, for example, the name of a particular individual, source of intelligence, who asked that his name not be used in conjunction with that information because of possible compromise. In those cases we retain the name of the informant in a classified section and only the substance of the information he gives would be passed on to the family members.

We will be happy to present complete files for your use should you desire.

Although standing and select committees of the Congress are exempt from the provisions of the Privacy Act, the Department of Defense requested the views of all of our families pertaining to the use of their missing men's files, and the families of these men posed no objection. However, to preclude any possible intrusion of privacy, we request that during the question-and-answer period you refer to the cases by branch of service rather than the individual's name.

I would now like to discuss the general procedures followed by the military departments in dealing with their members who became missing. The initial responsibility rests with the field commander of the man, who initiates search-and-rescue activities, when possible, to recover the missing man.

If the individual serviceman cannot be immediately rescued, an initial report of casualty is sent to the parent service headquarters containing circumstances of loss and a summary of the efforts to date. At this point the man is carried simply as missing.

If the man is not rescued and further search-and-rescue efforts are not feasible due to a number of factors such as location, enemy action, weather, and so forth, a determination is made as to whether or not a man should be carried as missing in action, a prisoner, or killed in action with body not recovered.

The problems for the services are different because the circumstances in which a serviceman might become captive or become missing in action are different in the different services.

In the case of those who might be missing as a result of air activity, there are special problems connected with determining their status. They are different from those for someone who might have been engaged in ground combat or in naval operations. So, there are special problems that each service must address for itself.

The law stipulates that the responsibility for this determination of status rests with the Secretaries of the individual military departments and in that regard it is a statutory responsibility.

We have made every effort to insure that the standards applied by each service are as uniform as they possibly could be within the broad scope of the differences in the nature of the problems faced by the individual services.

Generally, following the incident, the operational commander evaluates the circumstances and makes the determination that the member is in fact missing. Simultaneously, a search is initiated, and the parent service's headquarters is notified. Upon receipt of the notifica-

tion that a member of their service is missing, the services notify the next of kin and initiate a casualty file.

All pertinent information such as circumstances of loss, search progress reports, family notifications, and so forth, is then placed in this file.

After the formal search is terminated, the procedures vary slightly between the services: The Navy and Air Force operating in a similar manner while the Army and Marine Corps follow another general pattern. The primary difference is the echelon where the decision authority to determine the status of the missing member is vested.

For the Navy and Air Force the operational commander either continues the man in a missing status or based on conclusive evidence of death, issues a death report. Take, for example, a Navy pilot who crashes immediately after leaving a carrier and sinks with his aircraft. If, after an extensive search he is not recovered, there is conclusive evidence that the man is dead.

The Army convenes a formal board of officers to investigate the circumstances of loss within 7 days after an individual has been reported as missing. The board then recommends the status of the missing soldier as continuation in missing status or if they conclude that there is sufficient evidence to change the individual's status to deceased, the area commander will issue a report of casualty.

However, final determination of status is accomplished at Headquarters, Department of the Army. The Marine Corps has an informal one-officer investigation the results of which are forwarded within 15 days to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. After review at Headquarters, Marine Corps, a change in the individual's status to deceased can be made. This decision is never made below Headquarters, Marine Corps level.

The placing of an individual in a captured status is more involved. Ideally, this should have transpired by the belligerents providing the opponents' lists of those personnel captured as required by the Geneva Convention. This was not done by the other side in Southeast Asia.

We, therefore, had to make that determination on the information we possessed. If a man had successfully ejected from his aircraft, landed on the ground, and established radio contact with those in the air—reporting he was all right, but was being surrounded and was destroying his radio, we could assume he was captured. There was always that lingering doubt of course that he may have resisted capture to an extent which resulted in his death at enemy hands.

In the case where, for propaganda purposes, his picture was released or a radio broadcast made describing his capture, the decision to list the man as prisoner was much simpler. This was also the case when the man's family received a letter from him.

I consider it noteworthy that during the course of the conflict there were no differences in our handling of the cases regardless of whether they were classified prisoner of war or missing in action. We did realize that the prisoner of war classification was the lesser evil as far as the families were concerned but this stemmed not so much from the classification as from the receipt of more definitive and positive information about the man which justified the change from missing to prisoner.

In an attempt to standardize the criteria, a working group was created to develop broad policies that were applied after November 1967.

The overwhelming consideration was that our returnees would be able to provide us with additional information at the time of their release or that this information would be provided as the result of a negotiated agreement with North Vietnam and its allies.

With respect to the other side, their final rosters listed 566 military, 25 U.S. civilians and 9 third country nationals, including 2 military and 1 civilian in China, to be repatriated. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) listed 55 servicemen as having died in captivity. These rosters provided the first specific information regarding 52 servicemen to be repatriated whom the services had previously listed as missing in action. It was interesting to note that 36 of these men were lost in late 1972 and early 1973.

To look at these statistics in another way, at the time of the prisoner repatriations, the services carried 593 servicemen as prisoners of war. The other side listed 513 of these as prisoners and 27 as having died in captivity, for a total of 540. This left 53 for whom there was no accounting by the other side. In other words, the services determined the actual classification with an accuracy of 91 percent.

With the return of the acknowledged prisoners of war, there remained 1,363 American servicemen missing in Southeast Asia, including China. In addition, there were over 1,100 Americans who were listed as killed in action but whose remains had not been recovered.

This represents approximately 4.3 percent of the total deaths resulting from the conflict. If we compare this to World War II, we find 22 percent of the total casualties in that conflict were not recovered. Coincidentally, this same percentage applied to those not recovered from the Korean conflict. The improvement in Vietnam is due in part to improved methods of search and rescue and in part to the nature of the conflict.

In fact, one of the most remarkable aspects of the conflict was the recovery or rescue of our personnel following their loss. A Navy study shows that 38 percent of the Navy aircrews were recovered, with an additional 28 percent classified as prisoners, 17 percent were classified as missing, and 16 percent killed in action. Air Force records reflect a total of 2,541 combat rescues. This includes 174 in North Vietnam, 776 in Laos, and 1,591 in South Vietnam.

Some of the most heroic deeds of the conflict were associated with search and rescue efforts. The massive resources and efforts devoted to search and recovery of our men in Southeast Asia resulted in the rescue of many who would have otherwise been lost. Some search efforts were unsuccessful due to hostile environment, terrain, or lack of definitive information on the location of the loss. Generally, these are the types of cases which we are now trying to resolve.

I would now like to cover the policy regarding informing the families of the circumstances regarding their loved one. First of all, it is not difficult to understand why many of the relatives of our missing servicemen feel that the Government possesses information about the fate of their missing man which has never been passed on to them. I

want to assure you, Mr. Chairman and this committee, that this is not the case. The Department of Defense, including all of the military services, has followed assiduously the policy of providing to the families all information that it acquires relevant to the fate of its missing servicemen.

In those cases in which relevant information pertaining to those who are missing is classified, the information is periodically reviewed to insure that the classification is still appropriate and, if the classification is not justified, the information is declassified and provided in its entirety to the family members.

In those cases in which the information cannot be declassified in its entirety, due, for example, to the need to protect sensitive sources, the relevant information is extracted and separated from the classified portion and passed to the families of the missing men to whom the report refers.

However, you should be aware that we did not make a practice of informing individual families of general and unsubstantiated reports of Americans still held prisoners in Southeast Asia which cannot be associated with a particular individual or group of individuals. We have noted that such reports have been received and the families of our missing have been made aware of the existence of such reports.

I would now like to give you a very brief overview of the four cases you have before you and the service representatives can provide amplification of these cases answering any questions you might have. We, in support of some of the cases, have brought some equipment with us.

The beeper which was used in air rescue, and which was often taken by some as an example of survival, is here with us today and we will be happy to demonstrate the way that works and the role it plays. It did play a key role in one of the cases you have before you.

The Army case is of a soldier who was the leader of a five-man long-range reconnaissance patrol that was engaged in a fire fight. The missing man was wounded in the neck and fell to the ground. During the battle one member of the patrol was killed and two others seriously wounded. In addition, their radio was hit and destroyed. The only man without wounds carried the other two wounded men out of the area, hid them, and then evaded to get help.

Help returned the next day and recovered the two wounded men. They were unable to find the missing men or the body of the soldier who was killed. No additional information has ever been received on this case.

The Navy case involves the loss of an F–4 fighter on a night bombing mission over North Vietnam. Again no further information has been received other than that which is in the folder before you.

The Marine case involves a man who was lost in rather unusual circumstances. There had been a fire fight and this man was with the guard force for the evacuation of the dead and wounded Marines from the fight. He viewed the remains and became ill. He then walked over to the edge of the woods and has never been seen again since that time. There were no shots or sounds. No further information has surfaced on this man.

The Air Force case is a little more involved. It is the case of the pilot of an F–105 that was hit in the target area, the aircraft was on

fire and he ejected. His flight leader and other pilots observed him in his parachute, and later lying in a field. His radio beeper was activated about 20 minutes after the man landed on the ground. Rescue efforts were conducted until dusk but were not successful.

There has been further intelligence information on this case that includes the recovery of a picture taken from an enemy prisoner with the man's name in Vietnamese on the back. The photograph was of the man lying face up on the ground. In addition, we have a report from another captured enemy soldier who claims he saw the incident from the ground and heard that the pilot had been killed.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my formal statement. We are now prepared to answer any questions you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Shields, for that splendid report. It's most helpful to the committee.

First, I believe it would be of interest to the committee to see a demonstration of the beeper. That doesn't take very long, does it?

Dr. SHIELDS. No, it doesn't.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the committee would be very interested in it.

Dr. SHIELDS. I would like to point out that the reason we brought this is in reference to the Air Force case in which the man was seen lying on the ground. We received information later on that he perhaps had died and a photograph of the man lying on the ground. We also have expert medical witnesses with us today from the services who are experienced at viewing these photographs and who help us make an assessment of the condition of individuals. If after viewing the photographs you would care to ask the doctors some questions, they are here to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, because of the Privacy Act, you are requesting that we not use the name of the individual serviceman when referring to the sample case files before us.

Dr. SHIELDS. If you would simply refer to the case as the Air Force or Marine case we can answer the questions on that basis. Captain Hawks, an experienced pilot who flew in combat in Southeast Asia, can show you how the beeper works and how it might have been activated even though the man may have been dead.

Captain HAWKS. This is a standard survival radio we carried. We need two of them to activate the beeper. It is a very simple operation. All you have to do is flip it up to this position. Anybody looking at the radio could inadvertently activate the beeper. It also has a voice capability so they can talk to the rescuers.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if that is picked up in another aircraft——

Dr. SHIELDS. The point being, Mr. Chairman, that the North Vietnamese in this or other instances could have picked up the radio, being unfamiliar or else doing it on purpose, have flipped the switch. The beeper could have been triggered without any meaning at all concerning the fate of the man.

Mr. LLOYD. What frequency is that?

Captain HAWKS. 243.0. We have four. We have three other frequencies available. They are identified as Bravo, Charlie, and Delta.

Mr. LLOYD. The question I have then is if you got the beeper tone on the thing as you did before, then you have that thing going then

instantaneously with a helicopter or aircraft which would promptly start interrogating on these other frequencies for a voice communication; is that correct?

Captain HAWKS. Well, sir, this gets into the rescue. Everybody normally starts out on 243.0 frequency.

Mr. LLOYD. That beeper is 243 running?

Captain HAWKS. It's running on whichever frequency is selected.

Mr. LLOYD. In other words, it's D channel, A channel—it's on B channel, we'll say, what ever frequency that happens to be, to 35, 5, or something. But the pilot of the plane would know what frequency that was coming in on and would immediately come back as a voice interrogation; is that correct?

Captain HAWKS. That is correct.

Mr. LLOYD. The question I now have is: Was there an indication that the pilot of the aircraft, helicopter, or plane, interrogated by voice on that? Did he say?

Captain HAWKS. Yes, sir.

Dr. SHIELDS. Not in this case. There was no voice communication.

Mr. LLOYD. You are missing the question. The question is: Did the pilot question? And the answer appears to be "Yes." You had no response. So you would have to assume, one, if the individual was alive to turn it on he probably would have been able to respond in some manner even if wounded. If it just came on, an enemy soldier could have picked it up and inadvertently kicked it on.

Captain HAWKS. We are normally told to come up on beeper for 15 seconds and then come up on——

Mr. GUYER. What range?

Captain HAWKS. Twenty-five miles or over. Line of sight.

Mr. GUYER. It's not heard on the ground.

Captain HAWKS. Well, yes, sir, if they had a receiver.

Mr. GUYER. And it would attract the enemy too by the sound then?

Captain HAWKS. Well, you can turn it down, sir, so that it's not too loud.

Mr. LLOYD. His question—excuse me for interrupting. If you would yield.

I think his question means once you have turned this on, and you have just the one radio on, and you have it on the beeper, that doesn't make a sound through this radio.

Captain HAWKS. No, sir.

Mr. LLOYD. You have to have another receiver in the immediate vicinity to do what you answered to him. You are apples and oranges on this thing.

Dr. SHIELDS. There have been instances where the men did operate their beeper but chose not to come up on voice frequency because of proximity of the enemy. The point being that it's very hard to interpret anything from that indication. The beeper could have been activated purely by accident, could have fallen on a rock and could have been activated that way without any individual doing it.

Mr. OTTINGER. Is it activated automatically on ejection from a plane or something like that?

Captain HAWKS. Well, sir, early in the conflict there were some sets that would activate. Later on it primarily became the option of the

individual, and I personally never flew with one that would activate at the time of egress. I didn't want that going off at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. In how many instances of missing-in-action cases—maybe the Air Force could answer—was the beeper activated and yet there was no voice contact?

Colonel GRATCH. I would say about 35 or 40 percent, and very often we couldn't determine whether——

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the cases of servicemen that have been classified as missing in action, the ones we still don't know what happened to them.

Colonel GRATCH. I would say of the 438 that we presently have in MIA status, approximately 25 percent—I have to check my figures on this—we had some sort of a beeper signal or some tone.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to be absolutely sure before we put this in the record. Twenty-five percent would be a very large number I would think. That would be over 100 that activated.

Colonel GRATCH. You see, sir, what happens, the enemy has a number of these transmitters. It was not uncommon at all to go on any missions and hear these beepers go off at all times. A man would go down, a search aircraft would come back in the area and we would begin to hear beeper signals. We could never home in on anything. We could never establish any communication, voice communication, with the members on the ground. But that was a very common thing—to pick up these emergency frequencies.

The CHAIRMAN. It could be the enemy frequency too.

Colonel GRATCH. Could be the enemy possession of our equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly don't want to give a possible erroneous impression that in 100 of 400 cases it was actually the serviceman who activated the beeper.

Dr. SHIELDS. We can furnish statistics for the record on that.[1] But in some instances a child may have picked it up and 2 or 3 days later may have been playing with it and triggered the switch.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you are saying that in some instances the beepers were activated as much as 2 days after the crash was known to have taken place?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the time limit, too, would be very important.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I may have missed this. If you turned on that beeper, how long would the battery enable it to operate before it died out of its own accord.

Captain HAWKS. I think 8 hours is supposed to be guaranteed life on this particular radio for continuous use now.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Taking this Air Force case for example, where the man was observed on the ground with a parachute, the beeper went for 20 minutes and then was heard sporadically thereafter for several hours. He went down in an area where there was apparently no reasonable way of escape for him. Enemy soldiers were observed in the immediate area while the planes were still overhead. That is 1965—and as of that time there would have been reasonable cause to believe that he was taken prisoner.

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[1] See p. 348.

He was carried MIA until the time of the exchange when he was not returned. Just looking at this record, once he is not returned under the circumstances in this file, I would have difficulty in knowing on what basis he was carried as MIA rather than presumed dead. I am speaking of the Air Force file.

The facts on this file as I understand it are consistent—either that he was killed after the plane landed, or he was taken prisoner. Could have been either way.

Colonel GRATCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Clearly it was a justified MIA until the time of the prisoner exchange.

Colonel GRATCH. After all our data was evaluated, in all probability we would have looked at this particular case, or many of them, but we were hindered by the court actions and waiting for the final outcome concerning what was a legal aspect, so no action was taken on that basis.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. This is the kind of file where the precise coordinates where he went down are known. Have we made specific inquiry to the North Vietnamese on this particular case, the Air Force case?

Colonel GRATCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. When and what, if anything, was their response?

Colonel GRATCH. On June 13, 1974, the file was provided to the Four-Party Joint Military Team.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. June of 1974. That is a year and 5 months after, at that time both sides were saying the agreement was no longer valid.

Dr. SHIELDS. This would have been shortly after we had the remains of 23 men, who were reported as having died in captivity, were returned to us. This would have been subsequent to that. We felt we should have a priority on these cases and we felt that the first priority was to take care of the cases of the men who died in captivity. This would establish a basis for cooperation and moving on the cases like this.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. It seems to me this is the kind of case that this committee, having established contact with the Vietnamese, should make a further inquiry. Presumably, the records in that village could confirm either that the man was killed after he landed or he was taken prisoner and died in captivity. Clearly their records would disclose what happened to this man.

Now, how many of these files are there in question? Until the time of the prisoner exchange you could reach the conclusion either way, but after the prisoner exchange we would have precise data at this time to direct precise inquiry to them on at this time?

Colonel GRATCH. Again I would have to research our total 438 missing to give you an exact figure which I can do.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. The Air Force figure is 438?

Colonel GRATCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. How does that break down in North Vietnam, in the populated area?

Colonel GRATCH. Of that 438 figure, we have 47 in South Vietnam, 202 in North Vietnam, 148 in Laos, and 5 in Cambodia.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I just suggest to the committee that on this kind of file where a man was shot down at a given coordinate in North Vietnam, that at least in those cases, we ought to be able to direct a specific inquiry to the North Vietnamese and be given specific answers. This is a classic case, it seems to me, of one they could furnish us information on.

Dr. SHIELDS. If the individual in those photographs is in fact dead, and it's possible to tell from the photographs, this is a clear case of a set of remains which should be returned to our control.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't have to answer this question if it would not be proper to do so in open session, but this case he is speaking of now, was this one of the cases that we gave to the Hanoi representatives?

Dr. SHIELDS. I don't believe it was. It was not included in the case you handed over.

Mr. GUYER. Will you yield? I was wondering if we would be permitted to have the names of those in the hard file.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly you can have them. You mean the ones we gave to the North——

Mr. GUYER. The ones Dr. Kissinger gave to Le Duc Tho.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those good cases as such?

Dr. SHIELDS. Those are good cases. At different times we passed over a number of files, one, to provide an example to the North Vietnamese of the information which we could provide and two, to test their willingness to cooperate. We felt that it would be inadvisable to hand over to them in a huge bundle all of our cases. That would not provide a good basis for work. So we handed over specific cases, such as you did in Hanoi, in order to provide a basis for cooperation so that we might then go on to other cases.

Mr. GUYER. In that regard is there the possibility that had you given 15 or 20 cases of people you believed were alive on the testimony you had seen? For example, the voice being heard, or picture seen in the paper, or somebody reporting they had seen them. Would that be an invitation to retribution?

Dr. SHIELDS. We felt at one time that perhaps it might be. It put us in a dilemma because if we made public the extent of the information which we had, of course that would have told the North Vietnamese whether we had precise information or whether we didn't. There may have been cases that were very similar to the ones we handed down with the only difference being that we didn't possess the information.

Other men may have landed alive on the ground, and may have in fact been taken prisoner, but we were not there to observe it, while in other cases we were. So we felt for sometime that it would be very difficult and might pose a danger for those individuals if we handed these cases over.

After a certain point, though, we felt that in the interests of all of the men and in an effort to find out whether we would be able to establish a basis for coordination that we simply had to go forward.

Mr. GUYER. I think there was a curiosity on the part of the relative that maybe their loved ones might have been among those handed over.

Dr. SHIELDS. We have stressed that the files we handed over were only illustrative. They were not meant to be an exclusive roster of the information we possessed. We felt it might be better to hold back some of that information for use at a later time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Shields, how many files do we now have missing within the various branches of service?

Dr. SHIELDS. As of December 31, the number was 834.

Mr. GILMAN. You have a file on each one of those?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes. In addition to that, Mr. Gilman, we have files on other individuals whose statuses have been changed, for example, from missing to killed in action. We make no difference in the cases of those individuals who were killed in action, as a result of a finding of death, and those individuals who still are carried as missing.

Mr. GILMAN. Is there a central repository for all of these files in the Department of Defense?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes. In addition to the services who maintain files on their individual members, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center [1] maintains a file on all of the men in whom we are interested.

Mr. GILMAN. Every bit of information in the individual file here in Washington in the branch of the service is also in the Joint Casualty Resolutions Center files?

Dr. SHIELDS. All of the information that pertains to the status of the missing man. For example, information concerning changes in grade, eligibility for promotion, letters to family members, and these kinds of things would not be in that file because they have no bearing on our efforts to act.

Mr. GILMAN. Is all of the intelligence information that all of the intelligence agencies have now in these files?

Dr. SHIELDS. When you say "all," I give you a hopeful "yes." The files, as you can see, are thick and we have a great many of them, but "yes." We review those files constantly to make sure that we do have the same information in all files.

Mr. GILMAN. For some time there was some criticisms that there was a great deal of massive information piled up in the various branches that had not been sifted through and placed in the files. Is that now overcome and taken care of? Is everything now filed away and in the man's file?

Dr. SHIELDS. Congressman Gilman, I think most of those charges in the first place were based on erroneous information. There were entries, for example, in Joint Casualty Resolution Center files that resulted from the error made by the individual who was filing the information. We certainly are not perfect and there were such errors made. But we never had quantities of information which had been unevaluated or which had not been placed in those files.

When the Joint Casualty Resolution Center was established in January of 1973, their first task was to begin to compile this information. So as far as we are concerned, with a few slight exceptions which resulted from human error, they always had the information at the Joint Casualty Resolution Center which the services possessed. In some instances the Joint Casualty Resolution Center has some information which had been collected in the field and had not been forwarded to the services, but these were rare occasions.

[1] See pp. 287–305.

Mr. GILMAN. Has your Department now turned over to our committee a complete list of all of these people with the relevant facts involved?

Dr. SHIELDS. You have all of the list. I don't know the extent to which you have all of the information. You certainly do not have all of the files.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, do we have just the pertinent facts, the most important facts in each file so we can make a determination?

Dr. SHIELDS. It has been turned over.

Mr. MACDONALD. We do have the data processing list, the two principal lists that you had been concerned with. We have all 36 cases of those still carried as prisoner of war. In addition we have at least a half-dozen cases of those still carried as missing in action.

Mr. GILMAN. Do the lists we have comprise the 856 plus the additional 400 or 500 who have been reclassified?

Mr. MACDONALD. It included every missing in action, prisoner of war, and every killed-in-action, body not recovered.

Mr. GILMAN. Do we have the pertinent information so our committee can look over the list and make a determination as to which ones we feel are harder cases than the others? Can we make some determination from the list you have?

Mr. MACDONALD. That can only be determined from looking at the individual case file. The data processing list provided to the DRV and PRG included name, rank, serial number, race, coordinates, and date of loss, vehicle in which flying or driving or ground action, and so on. From that you can't tell whether it's a hard case or not.

To determine whether it's a good hard case one actually has to look at the files such as you have in front of you.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. MacDonald.

Dr. Shields, how many files have we actually turned over to the Vietnamese?

Dr. SHIELDS. We have turned over basic information which would be essential to an accounting on every individual who was in a missing status or who was prior to the repatriation of the prisoners. And in addition to that we have passed on further, more elaborate information, in a number of cases but not in all.

Mr. GILMAN. How many are in that first category that you stated?

Dr. SHIELDS. The basic individuals in whom we are interested?

Mr. GILMAN. No, you said you turned over information on all of the people you have as missing. How many individuals did you get information on to the Vietnamese?

Dr. SHIELDS. I think Mr. MacDonald has that number.

Mr. MACDONALD. I think you caught me with one of Dr. Shields' papers. I have a memo from him on that subject. Data processing lists were provided on five occasions. Each successive list tends to include the previous list; 104 the first time in April of 1973; 1,444 in May of 1973; 1,114 in May 1973; in 1974, a year later, 2,558 names were provided and these comprised the killed in action body-not-recovered, POW's, MIA's, in other words, the entire group.

Dr. SHIELDS. This is everyone in whom we are interested in any way.

Mr. McCloskey. Another list is 2,000.

Mr. Gilman. This information is turned over to the Vietnamese by our joint military team?

Dr. Shields. That's correct.

Mr. Gilman. How many of these names did you provide additional information on?

Dr. Shields. We have a long list of folder information here. For example, let me count the dates.

On 18 specific occasions between August 6, 1973, and February 26, 1975, turnover of information to the DRV. So there were a total of 52 most we passed at a time.

Seventeen individuals were covered with regard to the February 26, 1975, turnover of information to the DRV. So there were a total of 52 folders concerning information on 89 individuals given to the DRV and 30 folders with information on 38 individuals given to the PRG.

And when I say folders, I am talking about very exhaustive information, more than the basic data which had already been passed on.

Mr. Gilman. So we are talking about roughly 90 to 100 folders were turned over to the North Vietnamese or the DRV with elaborate information, is that correct?

Dr. Shields. That's correct.

Mr. Gilman. Then the remainder of them just had the name, rank, and serial number?

Dr. Shields. No, basic information concerning the loss. For example, in the case of the Army, the man's serial number, the coordinates of the crash as best we were able to ascertain them, and other information that might be pertinent.

So it's more than simply a name. The basic information which was what the North Vietnamese would have needed to identify a specific crash site, for example, with individuals.

We felt that they may have identified the plane crash, but had no idea who was involved. They may have recovered remains, but had no idea who these men were. With the information we gave them, they would be able to say this corresponds to this airplane and these individuals, and that they would have been able to respond in that manner to us.

Mr. Gilman. Then do they have all of the crash coordinates of all of the crash victims, as far as we are concerned? The Vietnamese have all those crash coordinates information?

Dr. Shields. As best we were able to ascertain them. But in some cases—for example, the Navy case you have before you—you simply have a general area, and this may have even been an off-shore crash in the water.

The Chairman. Mr. Ottinger?

Mr. Ottinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your taking me out of order. I have a bill on the floor, and have to get back.

When you appeared here last time, I asked you, Dr. Shields, about any outstanding Freedom of Information Act cases on behalf of families of missing in action seeking additional information in their files.

I believe, if I am correct, that you said there were none, but I take it there is at least one outstanding at the present time. Without prejudicing your case, I am wondering if you could just tell us what the problem is.

Why can't you turn over the information that is sought?

Dr. Shields. Well, the Freedom of Information Act protects us from unreasonable requests. One request, with which you are familiar, asked essentially for every document, every piece of paper we had in this entire area. That involves literally millions of documents.

The request also limited the amount of the money which could be charged to $700.

We fulfilled the request and went back and said, "If you would like to be more specific, we would be very happy to work with you on this, and if you have problems with the charges, we will discuss them, too."

That, in a nutshell, is the problem. You see the documentation with regard to four simple cases, and this is only the core of the information in the folder. We would have to review files to pull out personal information on individuals—the Privacy Act, of course, is involved here—and we felt that it would take every individual we had working in this area, and in addition to that, perhaps hundreds of others, to perform the task, and it still would have taken months and months, if not years, to accomplish.

Mr. Ottinger. There is a feeling on behalf of at least some of the families that full information has not been disclosed. They feel, as you know, quite uncomfortable with that.

Couldn't some arrangement be worked out so that a sampling at least could be gone through, or something of that nature, so that individual cases, for which releases were obtained from the family to overcome the Privacy Act problems, could be viewed and the families could get some assurance that what you said here is accurate?

Dr. Shields. Mr. Ottinger, we have, throughout the history of the conflict, provided full folders and files to individual Congressmen and Senators, on behalf of family members, who have reviewed these to do exactly what you have suggested, to assure the families that they did, in fact, have all the information.

So we have no objection whatsoever to doing that again. And I'd be happy to do that, as you require.

Mr. Ottinger. Would it be possible for a representative of the families to actually see the dimensions of this problem, without going into specific cases which might violate the Privacy Act, to see how the papers are stored and what is there?

Dr. Shields. Individual family members have reviewed their own cases in many, many instances. For example, once a year the National League of Families holds its annual convention, and families who request that folders be brought to that convention have those requests honored. They go through the files with one of the casualty officers from the services.

They are able to look through the entire file at that time, and this has happened many, many times.

I suppose if the National League has its convention again this year, we will do the same thing.

Mr. Ottinger. So that, in connection with the dispute that is ongoing and is presently in the courts, you were willing to make some kind of settlement that would give reasonable access to the people who are bringing the suit, so they can obtain assurance that they were getting full information?

Dr. SHIELDS. We, of course, face the problem of assuring individuals that no more information is there, and we can't give assurances of a negative. That's why the role of Congressmen such as you, Mr. Ottinger, has been very helpful in the past.

I might add that it has not always pleased the families, but there are your colleagues on the Hill who have gone over the full records, had access to every piece of paper we have with regard to an individual, who assured themselves that we have, in fact, passed all the information we have on. We are willing to do this, and we have done it in the past, and we will be happy to cooperate with this committee in doing that in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you leave, Mr. Ottinger, another question, and then we will move down to the right.

There is a very good possibility the committee will be able to meet with Secretary Kissinger in the near future. I am not pinning it down, but we will be able to meet with him as a full committee.

Mr. OTTINGER. I am pleased to hear that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Schroeder?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I have to leave, too, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. You have really provided some interesting information.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you leave, let me ask this question very quickly.

Are these frequencies different for each individual, also? Or is it the same frequency?

Captain HAWKS. Sir, as I said, this particular radio has four different frequencies on it. The standard—which everybody uses—is the international guard channel, is 243 megacycles. This is what everybody comes up on initially. They do not leave that frequency unless directed to go to a different frequency by the search and rescue commander.

This would enable them to, for example, go down to the delta channel frequency here, so that they could get off the main guard channel in case there is another operation going on elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. They could take this beeper off one of our flyers who was killed and take it a hundred miles away and turn it on, and we'd pick it up again? We wouldn't know which flyer it came from, is that correct?

Captain HAWKS. Yes, sir.

Dr. SHIELDS. This is why the voice channel is so important. You ask the man to respond by voice, and then each individual has his own personal authenticator which he uses, and which is known to personnel in the aircraft overhead, to guarantee that it's that individual responding and not an enemy soldier who is fluent in English, for example.

Mr. HARKIN. Getting back to what Mr. Gilman was talking about, the hard cases, I have never been able to get clear in my mind just what are the hard cases, and how many hard cases there are, and whether or not you have got some kind of a ranking system.

Now, I have been looking through some of the cases you have got here; for example, the Air Force case.

It seems to me pretty conclusive evidence. But then you get down to the Marine, and that becomes what I call a harder case.

Then you get down into some individuals, like from my own district, that were captured, wrote letters home, and they have the letters, but they were not repatriated. That seems to me a harder case.

That's how I am determining the hard cases. Do you have a ranking system like that? Do you put them in different categories?

Dr. SHIELDS. We have made every effort in our own mind to develop a hierarchy of cases. It is a sensitive area, as family members will point out, we don't possess all the information. The case of the Marine you refer to is perhaps a more difficult case.

In his case, it may very well be that the PRG, the Viet Cong, or North Vietnamese soldiers, know precisely what happened to him, if he's dead, where he's buried, and if he didn't die what happened to him.

But that information would be unknown to us. So the rankings which we have are the efforts to determine in which cases the other side would know most about an individual; it's a very difficult project.

For example, in the case of the Army individual, we feel that the individual in question may have been wounded very seriously and undoubtedly was.

Now, when we went back to look for him, he was not there. In the opinion of many of those who were on the scene when he was injured and became missing, he would not have been able to walk away and evade on his own power. So we would assume an enemy soldier did in fact recover his remains, if he were dead, or did capture him, if he were alive.

But we have no hard evidence of that fact. The only evidence we have is the fact that we went back into the area and he was not there.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield, to pin it down just a little bit more?

Mr. HARKIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Take North Vietnam. Can't you give us a figure of the hard cases of a man who was in captivity, they had his voice on the radio, showed a picture of him in Life Magazine? How many of these, Dr. Shields, are there?

Dr. SHIELDS. We can discuss with you, if we could, in closed session. Some of the information there might be very sensitive; the method in which it was gathered, and some of these things, might be revealed. So if we could, in an executive session, we would like to talk about these.

But again, I would stress the fact that it's very difficult to do anything more than use that as internal information because in some instances we really don't know what happened.

A man, for example, could have evaded—and we know in some cases they did. They were in contact with the enemy and our first feeling was that the man was captured. We found out later that the man evaded.

And in evading, he could have died, in an area in which the enemy would not have known anything at all relating to his case.

In other instances, we have information, as in one celebrated case we passed in May of 1971, in Paris. We gave a sample of 14 cases, incidentally, at that time, referring to Mr. Gilman's comments about

exposure to retribution. Although we were concerned, we did go public with 14 cases, with the permission of the families, at that time.

We passed a booklet to the Vietcong and North Vietnamese in Paris, that showed 14 individuals, photographs, a short story as to what happened to that individual, and why we felt that the other side knew something about them. It showed a map of the area, similar to the one here, and pinpointed the area of loss.

In one of those cases, the man was in a parachute harness, hanging from a tree. We were in contact with him. We tried to send a helicopter in with a para-rescue man coming down on a jungle penetrator, but fire drove them off. We had to come back a few hours later, because we were not able to follow up on a rescue attempt immediately.

The harness was empty. The man was not there. The harness was still in the tree.

Now, we might surmise that the enemy in fact approached the man, unbuckled him from the harness, and captured him, because he was alive at the time, and reporting a very painfully broken arm.

But we don't know. He may have unbuckled the harness and evaded on his own.

So, whether that is hard or not, depends on your own interpretation.

Mr. HARKIN. I am thinking in terms of category. You list Navy pilots crashed at sea—you still list them as MIA's. I see a difference between that and the one you just outlined, and I am just wondering, when we are talking about hard cases, I don't know what we are talking about sometimes, because I don't know how many you are talking about, and I think that's what Mr. Gilman is getting at.

I can't, at least, ever seem to get a handle on that. What are the hard cases? What you just outlined is kind of a hard case. The man talked to you on the radio, that type of thing.

Dr. SHIELDS. If you would follow this, Mr. Harkin, in a number of other cases, you would find out that what we thought at one time was hard may in fact not be hard, because of subsequent occurences.

This is why I say, we only have a gradation that covers all the space and the spectrum.

For example, the Navy Commander Ronald W. Dodge, who was captured in North Vietnam, is a celebrated case and I am not giving out anything here. We have a photograph——

The CHAIRMAN. The war has been over 3 years now. We have been in Hanoi. I just don't see why—what the secrecy is.

We have seen the "Hanoi Hilton." I can't figure out how we could be hurting anyone by just laying the information out.

Dr. SHIELD. Well, families have asked, specifically, that we not talk about their own individual cases. We have asked if we could bring that out, and families have said "no."

In other cases, the information we possess would, without question, give away our intelligence sources.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not asking you to do that, just asking for some hard cases and figures.

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Harkin, would you yield?

Mr. HARKIN. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. LLOYD. The question I have, the four cases we have, couldn't we discuss those? There's no informational outlet that I have read in here

which would indicate any great classification. I'm not trying to force the issue.

Dr. SHIELDS. There are a number of cases in which there are no problems—absolutely.

But again—the question of hardness and degree of hardness—we have the case of Commander Dodge, whose photograph was printed in Paris Match Magazine. He was identified. He was there and captured, but not on the list of men repatriated. He was not listed as having died in captivity. The North Vietnamese have given us no information.

We would say that is a hard case. We also have the case of the individual who was on the ground and who said, "I am surrounded by enemy soldiers, and I am going to destroy my radio and I'll see you later." Now, that may be hard to you, but in cases that we have seen like that, the individual did evade, and did in fact return to our control later on, and we felt at the time that there was no question about his capture.

So, what we would have said at one time was a hard case and without any question they would have known about, turned out in fact not to be the case.

We have only circumstantial evidence. That's the problem. What about an airplane that dives into the ground and is demolished? Enemy soldiers all over the area. Now, whether that's hard or not would depend on how much of that aircraft was recoverable or how many other aircraft impacted in that area and whether there were any remains that could be identified.

We have instances in which we have recovered identification cards or we have seen that the North Vietnamese recovered identified cards. We would say that they know something definitely and specifically about that individual. But in other cases——

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe, Mr. Harkin, the staff can work up and we can develop some type of classification system and approve it by the committee, and then go back and ask Dr. Shields to comment on it.

Mr. HARKIN. Yes, we seem to be going around.

I have one more question, Mr. Chairman.

This person is listed as MIA, let's say declared dead. What happens to the file on that person?

Dr. SHIELDS. That file is maintained at the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, without regard to status change at all. As far as we are concerned, he is a man to be accounted for. Unless we know what happened to that individual and we are satisfied that we do, we feel an accounting is still due, and even if we do know and his remains have not been recovered, we still feel that he's an object of our search.

Mr. HARKIN. So just because the status was changed does not mean you don't keep an active file?

Dr. SHIELDS. It makes no difference at all. In fact, the one member of our Joint Casualty Center who was killed was involved in a field search, looking for a man declared dead some years earlier.

Mr. HARKIN. Are there, in fact, three files kept?

Dr. SHIELDS. There would be the service file, the Joint Casualty Resolution's file.

Mr. HARKIN. Those are the same?

Dr. SHIELDS. Essentially, with the difference being the information regarding pay status, financial accounts, eligibility for promotion, which the Joint Casualty Resolution Center is not interested in.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harkin, why don't you preside, and I will go and vote, and then I will come back and take back over, and then the others can go vote. I think it would be easier.

Mr. HARKIN. All right. Is there a DIA file?

Dr. SHIELDS. A DIA file would simply contain intelligence. It would be an intelligence file. It would not be exhaustive. That information would be passed on and would be put in the two primary files.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Lloyd?

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. The only question I have is—and I think perhaps we ought to clarify, and I gather from you, Dr. Shields, that you had agreed with the chairman that we will be more definitive in what we can and cannot discuss on this.

Now, if we need a closed session for that, perhaps that is where we ought to go.

It's my coinsidered opinion that the experience at the present moment is extremely frustrating, because I am not getting a handle on what you are doing, not in any way that I have a good deal to learn about it, and certainly I'm just starting to read your files and be the recipient of the information which you are willing to share with us.

The key factor, of course, is that we really do want to identify these people; we really do want to go forward. As the chairman said—and I stand four square with him on this, and I'm sure that this can adequately be explained—but at the present moment my reaction is one of, why can't we really get into it? What we are doing at the present moment is really after the fact.

I recognize from all that we have been able to discover by the visit of the four Members in the immediate Hanoi area, and what we have been briefed by staff and by yourself, that I don't really see that we are dealing in an area that any longer, as a result of the termination of the war status, as a result of the repatriation of those who were prisoners already, and as a result of a change in the attitudes of those in Southeast Asia, particularly as to their desires for a more normal interface relationship with the United States, et cetera, that while they are not wildly excited about going out and looking for either the remains or making discussions or giving—not making, but giving information regarding prisoners, whatever might have been in their hand, nevertheless, I don't see the overriding, compelling necessity of great secrecy, even though I could perceive where this could be devastating to individuals who had acted contrary to what Hanoi might have perceived her best interests at that time.

Nevertheless, I think we could probably find an area of more openness wherein our investigation we will be more able to create——

Dr. SHIELDS. Let me clarify myself, Mr. Lloyd. I think that I have been misunderstood. I perceive that there has been a misunderstanding.

We have no problem with you coming in and looking at every one of our individual files, acquainting yourself thoroughly with all the information about all of these men. You are exempted from the Privacy Act.

With regard to handing that information to the North Vietnamese or the PRG or to the Pathet Lao or the Cambodians, we have no problem with that whatsoever. We are prepared to do that in an instant. So we have no problem with that.

The problem that we have——

Mr. LLOYD. Who is the enemy? Who are those bad guys that we want to keep the information from?

Dr. SHIELDS. That's what I am saying. We have no problem with that at all. We have done that. We are not anxious to keep the information from these people at all.

In fact, if you will look at the record, you will see that we have given substantial amounts of information about——

Mr. LLOYD. What I am getting at, then, finally, the only thing I can extrapolate from this is you really are trying to keep the information from those who really ought to know, I think—the families, wives, et cetera, of the people.

Dr. SHIELDS. What we are trying to keep from some family members are specific information regarding another man. We have a law, a Privacy Act, which precludes us from giving that information publicly. Let me give an illustration.

We have been told we may be in violation of the Privacy Act by showing the files to the parents of an individual who was missing, because he did not sign a waiver authorizing them to look at it.

One, we have a law. Two, many families say some of the things in the files are private, we don't want them discussed publicly, but we don't mind you giving the information to the North Vietnamese, not at all, that's fine.

And we are prepared to do that, prepared to let you look at that. What we will not do is publish it in the newspapers, because we would be in violation of the law.

Before the Privacy Act, we wouldn't have been in violation of the law, but we still maintained that confidential relationship with the families.

That's all I'm saying. That's the crux of everything that I have been trying to say.

Mr. LLOYD. In the final analysis, perhaps part of the solution—I'm assuming some ability of compromise on the part of these families, recognizing the frustrations of others who are being held back from information as a result of their reluctance to make revelations.

Perhaps what we need to do, then, is to provide, in your governmental entity, or perhaps to this staff, the go-between between families A and B, when B has information that they want which A already possesses, and to say to A, "B wants the information; we are prepared to give it to them; however, your A's reluctance prevents us from doing so. Would you give permission?"

Is that an unreasonable statement?

Dr. SHIELDS. I don't see any reason why that couldn't be done. But I fail to see where one family would feel, for example the files you have here, why an entirely unrelated case would be important to them.

Mr. LLOYD. OK. But maybe we need to go back and contact them, only from this committee's point of view. I must go.

The CHAIRMAN. Are we talking about one or two families?

Dr. SHIELDS. I'm not sure what we are talking about at this point. I think the Congressman said, now the war is over, why do we protect this information.

I said, we had no problem with your committee in looking at all this information, with passing on to the other side all the information in our possession. The only think we don't want to do is open up every man's file for public perusal in the United States. It's against the law, for one thing, and really serves no useful purpose, So I am at a loss, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very evident that we have contradictory and illegal laws when we can give information to former enemies, but can't release it in the United States. I am agreeing with you.

Dr. SHIELDS. As you said, we may be in violation now, because we have been told that, in the cases of the men who are missing and didn't sign a waiver, families may not have a legal right under the law to see that file. We are still letting them see it.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I'd like to go back and outline a future course of procedure, Mr. Secretary, and as I outline it, maybe get you to say "yes, we can do this," or "no we cannot."

As I listen to your testimony, there are really only two reasons to withhold any facts. One is if it would disclose a secret intelligence source—and I assume you can flag every file quite easily that might show such a source, is that correct?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes; without any question.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. And out of 1,300 such files, how many would you estimate would come within that criteria?

Dr. SHIELDS. They would be very few, and really would not involve the withholding of substance, only the source.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. But can you flag the few that meet that criteria? Then of course you have a few where the family has told you they don't want the facts disclosed.

Dr. SHIELD. We have many.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Many?

Dr. SHIELDS. Many.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Of the 1,300, how many would you estimate, say a ballpark estimate.

Dr. SHIELDS. I would say in the vast majority of the cases, we have been asked that we not discuss these publicily.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. So we might assume then, to start with, that on all of the files we should consider them not to be made public without the consent of the family? Is that fair?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. You, on a number of occasions, gave files to the North Vietnamese or the PRG. All of those turnovers, until this committee made contact with the Vietnamese, we were either at war or we were conducting negotiations in which both parties were contending the others were in violation of the agreement. Isn't that correct?

Dr. SHIELDS. At the very beginning of the negotiations, we had a very amiable relationship and we did go to Hanoi right after the signing of the cease fire agreements. We did see the graves of some Americans who died in captivity, but after that, you are correct.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I want to ask you a specific question on that, because Defense has stated, and State has stated, that the North Vietnamese started to violate this agreement, I think, in the summer of 1973. Secretary Kissinger has maintained that the North Vietnamese violated the agreement at some stage after January 27.

I want to ask you this specific question. With reference to Admiral Moorer's testimony before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations. February 26, 1974, did he not testify to us that the South Vietnamese had expanded the area and the population that was under their control at the time of the cease-fire, January 27, 1973?

Dr. SHIELDS. I would have to go back and answer that for the record, because I am not familiar with his testimony.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Well, I'm going to ask you to review Admiral Moorer's testimony, because I have read that testimony and it indicated on a map of Vietnam—South Vietnam—from January 27, when the agreement was signed, I think they had control of something like 76 percent of the countryside of Vietnam; they expanded their control to 82 percent, which would have been a violation of the Paris peace agreement, as I understood it.

But, if you will review the record and supply some answer for the record.[1]

What I am saying is that, during the period of the negotiations, from January 1973 until Saigon fell in April 1975 both sides had reason to contend the other was violating the agreement.

This is the point that I want you to speak to in your answer, as to whether or not, to your knowledge, the South Vietnamese violated the agreement between January 27, 1973, and the precise date is July 23, 1973, which the Vietnamese told us in Hanoi that the talks broke down.

In these four files that you have given us today, there is no enemy order of battle information, there is nothing by which the enemy might have any idea as to what units were involved on the dates in question.

Do you have that information for each of these files? Take the marine file, for example. When this young man was on a patrol and was left behind. Do you have intelligence information connected to his file that would indicate what the enemy unit was at that time?

Dr. SHIELDS. I think in some cases we know which major enemy units were operating in a given area, but oftentimes we found that our forces were encountering local guerrilla units that may not have been active; but we should know, yes.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. That's my question. When we go to the North Vietnamese now and ask for information on this individual that was captured, we ought to be able to tell them that it's our understanding that it was your third battalion and fourth brigade that was operating in this area. so they have some way to go back to who their commanding officer was and trace the information. I don't see that in these files.

Dr. SHIELDS. That's correct.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Is this a fairly simple thing for DOD to go back and take the battalion records of the day and look at their intelligence figures?

As far as I can recall, every one of our infantry units kept a record of what units they thought they were up against on a given day.

Dr. SHIELDS. We have already discussed this, and have initiated just that kind of search. In my preliminary talks with some of our military people on that, they indicated the information would be very

[1] See p. 306.

tenuous, because of the small unit—for example, long-range reconnaissance patrols.

Mr. McCloskey. Let's grant it would be tenuous, but I don't want to go to the North Vietnamese and say, "Tell me who this was," unless I can give them some idea of who I thought was in that area. I don't think any of our military people could go back to Danang and tell me who was operating on hill 55 southwest of Danang on any given date.

I went to Vietnam, and every time I asked who had been operating in that area a year before, they didn't know.

Dr. Shields. I am sure that there would be gaps in the record, but we are looking at that, and we will certainly make available the information that we turn up.

Mr. McCloskey. Let me go to the procedure. We are in a position now, I think, to turn over files to the North Vietnamese in some order, and I think it would be appropriate, for example, if we turned over to them first every file in North Vietnam where we had pinpointed the coordinates of a crash site. And we ought to be able to get to them, written in Vietnamese, the coordinates, name of the man, description, relative information pertaining to where he was shot down and when, and ask them if they can go to that town and give us the town records as to what happened to him.

We have a second set of situations, the infantry contacts where we ought to be able to research and find out who the tactical units were that might be able to give us some information.

Can we put these 1,300 files in that kind of order so that we can tender them as a committee to the Vietnamese in that kind of category?

Dr. Shields. Without any question, the committee can categorize these cases.

Mr. McCloskey. You can give us the hundreds of files where we have coordinates in populated areas, the 50 files where you have people you only know within 20 miles where they might have gone down?

Dr. Shields. We certainly have the hard data where we are absolutely convinced they know, and the nebulous where we have a last-known location. There's gradations between.

These files I mentioned having already been passed on were passed exactly on that basis. The easiest kinds of cases we felt we could give the North Vietnamese.

Mr. McCloskey. Until the committee exacted of Defense this moritorium on changes of status, how many of these remaining 80-odd cases were you prepared to recommend that there be a change of status to killed in action?

Dr. Shields. We had never operated on that basis. We never got to the point where we had initiated a general review of cases. We probably would go on a chronological basis.

Mr. McCloskey. Just looking at these four cases that you have shown me, it seems to me that a reasonable person looking at these four, in at least three of them would reach the presumption that the individual is dead on the facts that we now have.

Now, is there some way that you can divide the cases—as you have given us four here, presumably at random—into those cases where the person is presumptively dead, and our committee can examine those

and determine what our committee thinks about it; and in the cases where the family disagrees, give the family the opportunity to be heard, so that in the contested cases we can give a fair hearing, as a congressional committee, on this subject? Is that possible?

Dr. Shields. We can only give you the cases in which we think the information, coupled with the passage of time without any more information, is very negligible.

Mr. McCloskey. I'm taking this case of the marine, from this file you have shown me. There's been no attempt to reclassify since 1970, is that correct?

Dr. Shields. That's correct.

Mr. McCloskey. What we have is, now that there has been an exchange, he has not turned up alive, it would seem to me that it would be fair to look at these facts and if his family would object to the change of status, we could give the family a hearing and even go further with the North Vietnamese.

Dr. Shields. Mr. McCloskey, I think you'd be talking about virtually every case that we now have outstanding.

This case is—all of these cases are typical cases. We have very few cases in which we talked about hard information.

First of all, hard information that a man was alive. We have the case of Commander Dodge, whom we know was captured. We have his photograph in captivity.

We have a case of an army sergeant who wrote a letter home and the letter was never delivered, it was taken off the body of a dead enemy courier.

These are the two cases in which we know a man positively entered captivity. In the other cases, we think that they may have good information about remains, but if we talk about hard cases where we know a man was captured and we still have questions about him being alive—in Laos, for example, a case of a man who was photographed. These are three of four cases we are talking about.

Mr. McCloskey. I appreciate that.

The Chairman. Will the gentleman yield?

This is exactly the point I was attempting to make earlier. There are probably 20 cases or less in which there was strong evidence that servicemen were actually captured on the basis of pictures or a recorded message. Is this a true statement?

Dr. Shields. Well, when you are talking about a voice, you are entering into another different category. We had a number of cases——

The Chairman. Take North Vietnam, then. Less than 20 cases in captivity?

Dr. Shields. Aside from men having died in captivity, whose remains we now have, we know of a very small number, certainly less than 20, probably less than five, in which we know a man entered captivity, as distinguished from a man who said, "I'm all right, I'm on the ground, and I'm going to try and evade," because then you don't know.

The Chairman. This helps the commitee. When we got to Hanoi, we would talk about it, but we didn't have a figure. We didn't know whether it was 25 or 50 or 500. But you think it was actually, in cap-

tivity, less than five that did not come out in 1973, when the other prisoners were released?

Dr. SHIELDS. In North Vietnam. We can give you specific figures on that. But I would say, off the top of my head, that we are talking probably about two or three.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Can I go ahead, Mr. McCloskey? I'm on target here right now.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In Laos?

Dr. SHIELDS. In Laos, I think we are talking about one man that we know for sure. Another man where the evidence was—two men; one was a civilian, but we heard some negative information on him later.

One man, an Air Force officer, who was captured.

The CHAIRMAN. Less than five in Laos, too?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. South Vietnam, just a handful again. Just a handfu again.

The CHAIRMAN. Cambodia?

Dr. SHIELDS. Probably some civilians, journalists in Cambodia, and again a handful at most, in which we have not had subsequent information that they died.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCloskey?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, this is really a question as to procedure. If I have the testimony correct, from the files that have been given us today, perhaps 800 were recommended change of status to presumptive finding of death on the facts that are before you. Am I correct?

Dr. SHIELDS. That would depend on the results of the review. We have always said that each man's case is reviewed on an individual basis.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. But do you see any problem? I'm just talking about this committee as a court of last resort to guarantee equity in these final decisions. Do you see any problem in making that review at the present time, to be prepared with your recommendations, and in those cases where individual families contest the validity of this decision, that the matter be referred to this committee for final decision?

Dr. SHIELDS. Mr. Chairman, by law, it can only be referred to the Service Secretary. The committee would only be able to recommend and give its views. By law, by statute, the Service Secretary is the one individual who has the authority to make that change.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. We have asked you to defer any such changes until after we make our report. That is the status of it at the present time?

Dr. SHIELDS. That's correct. Except when family members write and request a review, or when we receive new information that indicates that a man is dead—recovery of the remains, for example.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Could I go out of order, Mr. Chairman, and ask a question of the director of the League of Families, at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any objection?

Mr. GILMAN. No.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Colonel Hopper, do you have any idea of how many families or relatives might contest a presumptive finding of death at the present time?

Colonel HOPPER. No, I can't give you a definitive answer on that.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. There are more than 30 or so cases?

Colonel HOPPER. That would contest it? I would say there would be a majority, yes.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. A majority of the 832 would contest the presumptive finding?

Colonel HOPPER. Yes.

Dr. SHIELDS. Some, I might add, would contest it retroactively, if given an opportunity, where a change has already been made.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. That goes back to the 1,400, rather than the 832.

Dr. SHIELDS. That's correct.

Mr. GILMAN. Where in the file do you indicate that efforts have been made in turning the information over to the Vietnamese? Do you indicate that in these files?

Dr. SHIELDS. We make notice of that.

Do we have that in the Service files, or is that in the joint casualty file?

Colonel GRATCH. We annotate our case files when they have been turned over, make a notation on the case file that this information has been turned over.

Mr. GILMAN. Will you supply us with a listing of the cases? Can you indicate to us whether that file has been turned over and on what occasion it was turned over?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes; and I would stress again, you have been given basic data, which Mr. MacDonald has already, with regard to every individual in whom we are interested.

Mr. GILMAN. Does that basic data indicate when the case was turned over to the Vietnamese?

Dr. SHIELDS. Well, only on one occasion would they all have been passed over; that would have been June 13, 1974.

Mr. GILMAN. You said earlier that——

Dr. SHIELDS. There were some earlier than that.

Mr. GILMAN. And then an elaboration?

Dr. SHIELDS. That's correct.

Mr. GILMAN. Could we have that detail?

Dr. SHIELDS. We can provide it for you.

Mr. GILMAN. Fine.

Dr. SHIELDS. We have not done so yet, but we certainly have that information, which we can provide without any trouble.[1]

Mr. GILMAN. In the past, when we turned over files, was the information in the Vietnamese language?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes.

Mr. GILMAN. Now, you say you have ascertained from the intelligence agencies, or made requests of them, of all information that they have available?

Dr. SHIELDS. Many, many times. We have reviewed each individual case many times to make sure that we do have all the information.

We sometimes—and this has caused us a problem—sometimes we have put in a file a nebulous report of unconfirmed authenticity or validity, which may, or may not, apply to that case, simply in the

[1] Retained in committee files.

hopes that we will receive something subsequently which will validate that intelligence report.

Family members, in looking through their records, will see that, and will receive the erroneous impression that it pertains to that man, when in fact it may not.

Mr. GILMAN. How recently have you made a request for a round-up from the intelligence agencies?

Dr. SHIELDS. I have a personal briefing in my office virtually every week, in which we go over all current intelligence information and even rehashing of old cases in which a case will be reevaluated.

And that is done virtually, as I say, every week.

Mr. GILMAN. Prior to your submitting to us this full list, could you make a final request of these intelligence agencies to see that we have all of their current information?

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes, we will.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Guyer?

Mr. GUYER. This will probably be repetitive, because I missed most of Mr. Gilman's comments, but I was wondering, too, whether we might have in our possession as a committee a compendium or capsule of all information on those unaccounted for, with any statistics you have—we don't care about all the letters back and forth, but the statistics as to day, time, and place of personnel last seen, and hopefully that we have access then to that country, that we can go in there and view their records.

I think their records are as important to us as the crew crash sites. If we can establish the individuals and the places and circumstances, I think we can have a checkoff with some degree of accuracy that we are getting someplace. Also arriving at some figures that will be helpful to us, and that shouldn't be too hard to do, with the number that we are talking about.

Dr. SHIELDS. Well, ultimately you would be talking about over 2,500 individuals, so the files you would present would be very large.

We never passed on total files in cases, other than a small number at a time, because we did not want to overwhelm the North Vietnamese or the PRG with information, simply saying, "Here, take it."

Mr. GUYER. I think you can simply put on one or two type-written pages a complete résumé that would serve our purpose and be sufficient to make some kind of a spot check. One that would help us arrive at some reliable conclusions.

Dr. SHIELDS. We can give you the copies similar to those we turned over that had that information on it, that the North Vietnamese and their allies, already have.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I'd like to just add to that: On the cases of the infantry units, if you can go back to the unit of the day in question, find out who they thought the enemy was that they were up against, so we can add that.

Dr. SHIELDS. We have already initiated that, and hopefully it will turn up some information.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you further explain your statement on page 9 that is of interest to the committee? That, as I understand it, in World War II, less than 22 percent of the total casualties were not recovered, and then also that same figure held in Korea. Because of

the improved research and recovery, that it was only 4.3 percent in the Vietnam war.

Dr. SHIELDS. Mr. Chairman, it was not only because of the improved recovery efforts. It was certainly in part because of that, but it was also because of the nature of the conflict.

We did not have large scale infantry actions in which divisions opposed divisions and in which case large numbers of men, as in World War II, became missing.

We had small unit actions, as in the cases you have before you. Again, these cases are typical in every way, in which a long range reconnaissance patrol of 4 or 5 men—not more than 10—would be engaged by the enemy. One man would become missing.

So it was because of the helicopters, for example, which were able to cover long distances quickly and give us the mobility to bring out the remains and put in people quickly to search for the missing, that we were able to come up with a very small number of cases.

And it is precisely because of this, again, that we are dealing now with the most difficult cases of all. The easy cases have been resolved, in large part.

And that is why, when we talk about categorization, a review of individual cases, I think will bear me out, that it is very difficult to say yes, this is hard, they know or, no, they don't know. Each case is an individual case.

That sounds trite, I know, but as you go through these cases, you will find out that is in fact exactly right. No two cases virtually are identical.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the 22 percent that were not recovered in World War II, how many have came back or walked out? And the same thing applies—my question—to the Korean war.

Dr. SHIELDS. This 22 percent figure represents the current figure. Those who are listed as dead from World War II and from Korea, but who have never been recovered and about whom we have heard nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. Have any of them come out of Korea? I'll put it like that.

Dr. SHIELDS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have any hard information that there could be any Americans alive in North Korea? I ask it to relate to the situation in Southeast Asia.

Dr. SHIELDS. We do not have any information that would indicate that any men now are alive in North Korea who were captured during the Korean war, but there were individuals who, after the Korean war, just as after the Vietnam conflict, should have been accounted for and were not.

The CHAIRMAN. But we have not had any hard information that there are any Americans alive in North Korea?

Dr. SHIELDS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that come under your jurisdiction?

Dr. SHIELDS. It would certainly come into my office, without any question, and I would be aware of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any more questions, Mr. Guyer?

Mr. GUYER. I have a relevant question, Mr. Chairman. That is, rather than asking what the figure was to bring it up to date, was there any improvement in that figure, over a 5-year period, where you could

have had 35 percent unaccounted for and you got it down to this? Would that be a fair statement?

Dr. SHIELDS. I think that the figures probably remained much the same throughout the conflict. I think you will find the differences are in geographical locations. The percentage of recoveries in Laos was much higher than the percentages of recoveries in North Vietnam because it was closer to our lines of communication, less densely populated. We just had a better chance of effecting a recovery there than we did in North Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned there were some doctors here with your team today. What information might they have for the committee?

Maybe, since they are here, we might ask them about survival possibilities following an aircraft crash and/or capture.

Dr. SHIELDS. In the Army case, for example, there is a description of the wounds suffered by the man who became missing. It indicates a very severe wound to the neck, which to the layman, might have indicated death. I think that has relevance to Mr. McCloskey's point.

With regard to the photograph in the Air Force case, some individuals who are untutored in the medical care area would look at that and say, certainly, that man is dead. But on the battlefield, it's very difficult for the layman, and even for the trained medical technician or physician, to make that assessment.

And we thought that you might have some questions, for example, looking at this photograph. We have gone to the doctors in the Air Force case and said: "Can you give us a medical assessment based on those photographs as to whether that man might be alive or dead," and the doctors can give us information on that.

And we thought that you might find that helpful and might want to pose some questions to the doctors on that basis.

This is Colonel Robinson who is our key doctor—physician in this area, and supported our efforts in this area also with regard to returned prisoners.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, give us any information you have on these pictures.

Dr. ROBINSON. The resolution of the photograph is not very good as you can see on the picture. All one can say medically is that he has sustained considerable trauma, looks like the right eye is quite swollen, possibly had a facial or skull fracture. If you notice the legs are partially submerged in what apparently is a rice paddy. One cannot draw any real conclusion as to whether this individual is alive at this particular moment or not. It's impossible to say positively that he is dead.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what I see of the picture as a layman, it's possible that if he is alive, he is——

Dr. ROBINSON. In extremis.

The CHAIRMAN. In extremis and in shock, and probably did die. Is that correct?

Dr. ROBINSON. Quite likely. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the medical treatment of these men by the enemy, in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos?

Dr. ROBINSON. I would defer that to Captain Vohden who actually had a serious wound in North Vietnam.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I direct a question to the doctor?

We have often heard the allegation that only the men, all the men that came out were in good physical condition and how do we account for that, that most of the prisoners came out in fairly good condition? What happened to the ones who were not in such good condition?

Dr. ROBINSON. Individuals seriously wounded did not make it. That's true. We can give you some pretty good reasons why the individuals in the North came out amazingly well as opposed to previous conflicts. We were dealing with a different type population—college grads that went into combat in extremely good physical condition, Air Force and Navy pilots, highly motivated, career motivated in excellent physical condition prior to being inserted into combat. That is the principal reason why these individuals fared better than previous prisoners.

Now the individual in the South had much more severe treatment. More exposure to gastrointestinal diseases and then diets were certainly inferior. The diets were grossly lacking in protein. They developed many more problems than the prisoners that were kept in the North.

Captain VOHDEN. Ray Vohden, Captain, shot down in North Vietnam in April of 1965. As far as the medical treatment is concerned, I would say it varied considerably from year to year and with individuals. In my case I was given medical treatment. Whether it's good or bad, it's difficult to evaluate. After 1 month they cut a piece of bone out of my leg and they put my leg in a cast. My leg stayed in a cast for 18 months. After the cast was taken off I walked on crutches for the rest of the time. There are other individuals who had broken arms and so on that have lost bone out of the arm and I would say those that were injured the worst and that came back home were shot down in 1965.

There is one other individual who was shot down in 1968 who lost his arm or part of his arm since he came home.

I think—again, these are my personal opinions right now. I think maybe in 1966, 1967, and parts of 1968, when the war was very, very hectic over there, I think there are probably a number of individuals who had injuries as severe as mine and others who had injuries in the earlier part of the war that never made it.

The CHAIRMAN. You are saying the medical service was not good in those years and it improved in the 1970's?

Captain VOHDEN. Well, all I am saying is that in 1965, they didn't have many prisoners and they were able to give me some penicillin. I received penicillin for the first 10 days I was there, probably saved my life. I think if a man was shot down in 1967 who had an injury as bad as mine he probably didn't get penicillin because at the time the bombing was very intense, they didn't even have penicillin for their own people.

The CHAIRMAN. I had it just the reverse then.

Mr. Gilman? Anybody want to ask anything?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes. Captain, while you were in captivity were there any more prisoners who died in your prison area?

Captain VOHDEN. Were there prisoners who died?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes.

Captain VOHDEN. Yes, sir, there were.

Mr. GILMAN. Were all of those as far as you know reported to our people?

Captain VOHDEN. As far as I know all of the prisoners that were actually in the prison system were either returned, or their bodies were returned, or they were reported as died in captivity.

Mr. GILMAN. While you were in captivity you didn't learn of any other prisoners at all that were not reported back to our people?

Captain VOHDEN. No, sir.

Mr. LLOYD. I have been gone a while, Mr. Chairman. I haven't been up but I do have one question while you are being kind to me. One question. And that is: I am persistent. I rushed out of here after my question and as I say my thought processes are still on that area—of the disclosure of information. Has what I have suggested about contacting families A and B been done? Or have you considered doing it? Or in the final analysis would you consider doing it?

Dr. SHIELDS. I would think that we would have no trouble doing it. The request has never been made so far as I know. The only cases where one family member wanted to know about the case of another and what was in the file of another would be in the case where they were crew members and the circumstances were the same.

Mr. LLOYD. No, I am sorry, Doctor. I am going back to the situation where you told me that information could not be given out because families said no, we do not want that information released, and it pertains or bears on another family's case, and all I am saying is, coming back to the question, and you have answered the question, no, you haven't done that, and I gather that your answer is, yes, you would consider doing that. And so I think that ought to be instituted or inaugurated such that these individuals where we have family requests and if the impediment of the release of certain specific information is another family's request or within families—I can see where a man is married and he signs a release form as far as his wife is concerned but doesn't sign a release form as far as his father and mother is concerned, that that information ought to be made available.

Dr. SHIELDS. Mr. Lloyd let me go back to the beginning here. If you are talking about family members of the individual, parents are given that information.

Mr. LLOYD. OK.

Dr. SHIELDS. And wives as well.

Mr. LLOYD. OK. I really am more interested in the one where a family has said with regard to a missing in action, I do not want the information released. Yet that information if released would at least give more information to another family. That is the situation that I am really—and that was what I thought you had identified for me earlier.

Dr. SHIELDS. Then I must have misled you. Because any time any information is pertinent to more than one family that information is given to all the families and would be put in each individual file. Information that would bear on a specific individual case would be in that file.

Mr. LLOYD. Back to my individual question. I don't understand what the holdup is of release of information. Because if the enemy knows, and you told me it had been released as far as the enemy is concerned, and if you know and it's available to us, why then can't everyone know?

Dr. SHIELDS. Well, first of all, there is a law, the Privacy Act which precludes us from doing that. Even if there weren't a Privacy Act, many families object to it. Let me give you a specific case. There was a case of an individual who was captured. We know he was captured and we never heard anything more about him. Some family members want to use his case as an example of men who were captured but not returned and to publicize this across the country. The family of the individual concerned said I don't want that case publicized. I don't want that information made public. So please don't do it. The other problem, of course is that no one has requested that these files be made public. This is a serviceman's file. They have been given to the individuals who have an interest in it, who need to know if we were going to pursue an accounting, and I am not quite sure that I understand what would be gained by opening these files up and giving them to the world, for example.

Mr. LLOYD. Well, I am not asking you to give them to the world. What I am trying to do and perhaps you and I are on different levels—apples and oranges again—I am under the impression that there are people who feel that they have not—in this room right now there are people and some are nodding their heads—they don't feel they have had a full revealing of all the facts.

On that basis, if there is information, and you may say all the facts have been released, but they feel that if they could look at other charts or other files, that they could assure themselves that such was indeed the case. If I were in that position and it was my son, I would have to feel that that is the stand I would like to take and not to the detriment of any other family but only to the solving or to the satiating of my own frustrations that I really am getting all the information, I have free access.

I think as I have been able to ascertain it, this is one of the basic questions which the families are asking. And all I am trying to do is, because of their unique involvement, because of husbands, sons, et cetera, I am saying why can't we somehow open this information just to the families. Not all the world, I am not trying to do that, but just to these families; and not even for publication but to these families. So that I believe you 100 percent. I want them to believe also and if I were that emotionally involved, which I am not, but if I were, I think I might want that kind of a revelation.

Do you find fault with that?

Dr. SHIELDS. Well, Mr. Ottinger spoke to that point earlier and said could we, as their representatives, for example, review all of this information. I pointed out that that has been done through the course of the conflict by a number of Representatives and Senators. We have given them entire files and they have reviewed them.

The family members have reviewed their own files, all the pertinent information which we have. I am not sure what else we can open up to them. We have over 1 million documents and it would be very difficult for us to put these people in a room and say look at any of these you want. My problem, of course, is how to assure these families

in a way that would be consistent with their interests, that would help them really achieve the end. We have already——

Mr. LLOYD. Let me interrupt you.

Dr. SHIELDS. Yes, sir.

Mr. LLOYD. I appreciate what you are saying but as I understand it, and I may also not have been empathetic in addition, I don't know, but I think that the people of the United States, not only with regard to this very specific area, but with regard to the total broad spectrum of bureaucratic government, at the present moment don't have the faith that they had, say, 10, 15, 20 years ago, and I am not saying that you have done—in no way am I casting aspersions— but what I am saying is why can't we bring some of these families in with releases, et cetera, such that at least some of the people can start looking at, if there is a million files. And if there is a wife or mother or father who says to me, it's important enough that I have to look through the million files, I for one find no fault with that, and I think we ought to provide the mechanisms that, if they wish to put in that kind of time, they are afforded that opportunity.

I find no fault with it and I think that it will do a great deal to relieve the frustrations and tensions even though I know, and I am betting you they are not going to find anything that you are not going to tell them. That they have the opportunity to do it themselves I think is critically important to the situation, and that is what I am trying to achieve.

Dr. SHIELDS. I appreciate very much your objective. The Freedom of Information Act, of course, achieves exactly what you are suggesting. Families have written under the Freedom of Information Act and they have had access to documents. They can do that many times. These families have open access to these service casualty officers anytime they want, to their own records, to my office. We have gotten them such details as a man's intelligence reports. But I think administratively to turn them loose in our files would be impossible to do—from an administrative standpoint.

Mr. LLOYD. I am sorry. Why is it impossible?

Dr. SHIELDS. Because we have files in Thailand, we have files in my office, we have files in the prisoner of war and missing in action task force—over 1 million documents. Now I don't know any organization anywhere that would let someone in a room with 1 million U.S. documents and say, have your fill, please go your way.

Mr. LLOYD. This is maybe where you and I differ in concepts. I may well have shared your attitude some years ago when I too was in the service. But having been out of the service, and having dealt with the amorphous mass called the general public, I find that if you give them guidelines that are reasonable, that somehow they have a capacity to get to the right place at the right time. I really feel at this point that one of the things that we need to do, one of the things this whole committee is all about, if you would, is to be a conscience on the part of this Congress, which indeed—each of us sitting up here represents a half-million people. We are the United States only because they have so appointed us and, as such, I think we have an obligation to that United States to say, indeed, we have laid to rest probably one of the most infamous wars the United States has ever been in. That is part of what

we are trying to do right here, and I think at the present moment, though I appreciate the problems that you face, if indeed it's a matter of money, time, or a million files, I think we ought to provide that opportunity.

What we have arrived at is the true point of departure where you and I don't agree.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me make one comment. Why don't we continue for about 7 more minutes and then we would like to go into executive session. Mr. Gilman has a matter to present to the committee. If the committee would wait, it would be a great help. Go ahead, Dr. Shields.

Dr. SHIELDS. This would involve first of all opening up personnel files which, again, we are restricted by law from doing.

Mr. LLOYD. We can solve that.

Dr. SHIELDS. I don't believe you can, sir, unless you pass a law making them public, because I know, for a fact, there are families who would not tolerate for one instant other families going through personal files. We have already experienced—maybe your constituents—who would not approve of us giving you their address. So we have done that and we have told families that we will guard their privacy even before the Privacy Act. In addition to that, I just see this as an administratively impossible thing to do, to keep files and make them available anytime and anyplace.

We had hoped that your committee would do this in an orderly way and your committee would be able to reassure those family members. We have given this to Congressmen.

Mr. LLOYD. How would we assure them when you haven't been able to reassure them? I don't find the logic in that.

Dr. SHIELDS. I am sure if we could give them a million files, and if they found nothing, most would come back and say you are holding back.

Mr. LLOYD. I agree with that. That is really what this is all about. Perhaps I demonstrated naivete in addressing myself to this, but this is what this is really all about. I am not convinced in my own mind that perhaps any of these people are alive any more, or any of these people are available, and I don't kknow about that. I would tend to believe that they are not. The point I make is I want to make sure in the minds of these people, and in the minds of the public of the United States, that we really have turned every stone. We have to remember one thing, bureaucratically no matter how impossible this task may seem, we involved ourselves in that conflict, and the lives and fortunes and futures of individuals, and that is what we are dealing with.

Dr. SHIELDS. Mr. Lloyd——

The CHAIRMAN. I have to interrupt here. Mr. Guyer?

Mr. GUYER. I don't want to disagree with either of you. I think that for the sake of our committee—we are getting into a labyrinth of voluminous information. That is not our answer. I don't think the answers will be found in your records at all. They are on the other side, in Southeast Asia.

Dr. SHIELDS. That is what I was going to say.

Mr. GUYER. The sooner we get into their files and locations the better. I am not happy when someone says we have looked and this is all we know. I don't believe they have told us the whole truth.

Dr. SHIELDS. The family members will not be reassured until units have been on the ground in these areas looking for our men, until we can say we have grave registration teams out and this is what we found. Anything short of that will not satisfy these families.

Mr. GILMAN. We have made requests of China, Laos, and Vietnam. Have we made any requests of the Soviet Union for information?

Dr. SHIELDS. We have asked the Soviet Union to intercede in our behalf.

Mr. GILMAN. Have we requested the Soviet Union if they had information?

Dr. SHIELDS. We have not asked them specifically if they had information.

Mr. GILMAN. Can we make a formal request of that nature?

Dr. SHIELDS. I am sure we could—that Mr. Sieverts could answer that more precisely but I am sure we could make that request.

Mr. GILMAN. With your permission I would like a formal response from the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sieverts is here.

Mr. SIEVERTS. I can comment right now, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gilman, that in addition to what Dr. Shields has referred to, which is the numerous occasions on which we have asked the Soviets to intercede with North Vietnam and with North Vietnam's allies in Indochina on this subject, we have also asked specifically about other kinds of cases of U.S. military personnel lost in or in the vicinity of the Soviet Union. Putting those two together we have what amounts to repeated requests to the Soviets for information on Americans missing in the vicinity of the Soviet Union. So I don't think there is a need to go through the additional formality, which is all it would be, of saying specifically to the Russians, well, in addition to all our other requests, do you have information on men missing in Indochina.

Mr. GILMAN. Would that create any problem to make such a formal request?

Mr. SIEVERTS. No; it would be merely a formality coming on top of a great many efforts we have already made with the Soviets on this subject.

Mr. GILMAN. I can't help thinking we pursued the avenue with Red China for a long period of time and received no response and finally then did. I would be willing that we make such a request once again and I would urge the State Department to make a formal request on our behalf.

Mr. SIEVERTS. We have made the request, as in the case of China, for the cases of men lost in or near the Soviet Union. The request was recently renewed, within the past month, concerning cases going back many years, of men lost over the Soviet Union. Similarly, requests were made in China. As in the case of China we asked the Russians if they could intervene with North Vietnam, and in both cases we have had similar answers, that the United States would have to talk with the North Vietnamese directly on that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Shields, on behalf of the committee, I would like to thank you and the other personnel that have been working in this field for a good while, the military personnel. I know you and the other persons are totally dedicated to trying to write the final

chapter on Vietnam, which is the missing in action. And I know sometimes you probably get frustrated with the problems you have in your job, but you have been dedicated and I would like to also say that applies to the military personnel over in the Defense Department who have been in this field for a number of years.

It is tough, it is not rewarding, and I for one appreciate it, and the committee does, and we will work with you in any way we can and appreciate very much you being here today and testifying before the committee. You have been helpful.

Unless there are other comments from the members, we will go into executive session for just a few minutes.

[The hearing was adjourned for executive session at 5:25 p.m.]

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING
PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,
Washington, D.C.

The Select Committee met at 2:45 p.m., pursuant to call, in room H-227 of the Capitol; the Honorable Gillespie V. Montgomery, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Representatives Montgomery, Gonzalez, Moakley, Ottinger, Harkin, Lloyd, McCloskey, Gilman, and Guyer.

Staff members present: J. Angus MacDonald, staff director; Dr. Henry Kenny, professional staff assistant; Dr. Job Dittberner, professional staff assistant; and Jeanne Shirkey, administrative assistant.

The CHAIRMAN. The House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia will come to order.

We have two witnesses today. The second witness will be Mr. J. Angus MacDonald,[1] staff director, and the first witness will be Adm. John S. McCain, Jr.[2]

I might state that the admiral is a personal friend of mine and some of the members have served under Admiral McCain. We appreciate very much, Admiral, you taking your time in coming before the committee.

As we all know, he is a distinguished naval officer serving our flag for 40 years; he served in battleship, submarine, amphibious forces, and also on international staffs. I recall hearing him speak of being a congressional liaison from the Defense Department, so he is very familiar with the Hill.

I'm sure you'll understand members coming in and out; however, we are fortunate that the House is not in session this afternoon.

Admiral McCain served as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Naval Forces in Europe as his next to last assignment with the Department.

From 1968 to 1972, 4 years, a crucial period of the American involvement in Southeast Asia, Admiral McCain was Commander in Chief of the Pacific better known as CINPAC.

During this period as Commander in Chief, he had another role; he was an MIA, missing in action, parent.

His son, naval Comdr. John C. McCain III, was shot down over North Vietnam and held as a prisoner of war for 5½ years. Admiral

[1] Biographical data appears on p. 460.
[2] Biography of Adm. McCain appears on p. 455.

McCain comes from a very distinguished military family. His uncle and great uncle served in the Army and reached the rank of general. His father was an admiral serving in World War II and his son, the third generation of McCain's is on active duty at this time as a naval flyer.

Admiral McCain, it is an honor to have you testify before this select committee today and we would like for you to make any comments that you woud like pertaining to the Americans classified as prisoners of war or MIA's.

STATEMENT OF ADM. JOHN S. McCAIN, JR., U.S. NAVY (RETIRED), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC

Admiral McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I deeply appreciate the honor of appearing before this committee. I would like to expand on your statement regarding my son.

My son, John, was a prisoner of war for 5½ years; 2 of the 5½ years that he was prisoner of war were spent in solitary confinement.

He comes from what has now become a famous group that is known as the "Hanoi Hilton." I don't have to tell you that Johnny, along with many other POW's have some very strong opinions on the subject that you're about to embark on. It's a very fine thing this committee has taken on its shoulders, the responsibility of clearing the books as far as the missing in action are concerned. There comes a time when this must be done.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that you have to be very careful not to impinge upon the rights of the missing in action families. This, as you can well understand, could affect the monetary emoluments and other benefits the Government pays them.

I was Commander in Chief of the Pacific from July of 1968 to August of 1972. During that period of time the major portion of the battle in Vietnam took place.

One of our greatest concerns at that time was these 1,051,000 young men who might fall into enemy hands and then become prisoners of war or become missing in action.

I want to assure you, Mr. Chairman, that every morning in the office of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific we discussed this subject of the missing in action. It is a subject which is most difficult to understand and resolve.

During this time, from 1964 to 1970, General Wheeler was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From 1970 to 1974, the chairman was Admiral Moorer. Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam—COMUS MACV—was General Westmoreland from 1964 to 1968. General Abrams moved in, and from 1968 to 1972 General Abrams was the primary commander in that area.

The question of the missing in action is difficult to resolve except in one essence. I want to emphasize and reemphasize this: The North Vietnamese did not live up to their obligations in accordance with the Paris Peace Accords. The United States, and presumably the North Vietnamese, were prepared to send teams into these various crash sites and other sites in which our own armed forces were shot down, or in some other fashion disappeared from action.

This is one of the facts that has personally irritated me. There was a delivery of three bodies from the North Vietnamese to us. I want to say that one point in connection with that is that the North Vietnamese did not permit us, mainly the United States or the armed forces of the free world, to send people to the sites from which these three bodies came. Furthermore, this particular problem has never been really resolved.

Another thing I want to point out to you is that we cannot lose sight of the larger picture involved in this whole determination of those missing in action, and this big picture.

It was not a gesture of goodwill. It is simple proof of the fact that the North Vietnamese did not abide by the accords they signed in which we, and they, were prepared to send teams into these various areas to examine these areas as far as the missing in action were concerned.

In any war, regardless of where it is, or how it is, you're going to have a number of missing in action. This is one of the sad facts in connection with this war, too, the war in Vietnam.

We were more than aware of this at the level on which I was operating. You can also rest assured that General Abrams, God rest his soul, he has now passed on, was more than aware. He and I talked on many occasions about the missing in action.

How this problem will be ultimately solved, I leave that up to the judgment of you distinguished gentlemen on this committee to make that determination.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to answer any questions that anybody on the committee might wish to ask.

The Chairman. We thank you, Admiral McCain.

As I understand, also for the record, you had responsibility for all Southeast Asia as far as American forces were concerned, and that included Laos and Cambodia.

Admiral McCain. That's right.

I had everything as a responsibility from the west coast of the United States, the entire Pacific Ocean, right on through to the Indian Ocean. My area went as far to the west as a line that goes straight south from the juncture of Pakistan and Iran. For want of a better word, it was quite a job.

The Chairman. Yes.

Admiral McCain, our main mission in this committee is to find out what happened to these Americans. Of course, we hope all of them are alive. I refer to the 834 classified as missing in action of which 36 are still classified as POW's.

What is your opinion as former CINCPAC commander and also as a parent of one of the POW's? What is your opinion of the possibility of any Americans being alive or large groups are being held as prisoners?

Admiral McCain. My feelings are this, Mr. Chairman. I don't think that there is any question about it. There are a number of missing in action which are not apparently on the books. The big problem is to make sure that they're not being held back by the "kindness" of the North Vietnamese or the Vietcong.

Your committee has been assigned a most difficult task, but one that is most important. Mr. Chairman, one other thing I'd like to say, that

must not be lost sight of. Anytime that you take a man who is missing in action and declare him dead, you've got to remember that the families of these missing in action people do draw certain rights and benefits from the Government of the United States as long as it is presumed that these men are alive. I think this is an important factor in this whole problem that we are facing.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the status should be changed and classify them all as presumed killed in action?

Admiral MCCAIN. No; I don't. I didn't mean to talk so quickly. I don't mean that.

I mean where some legislative body in the United States, or some judicial body, says that these people are dead, great care has to be taken. The families that are living back here in the United States lose the rights and the benefits that they would otherwise derive were they alive.

Have I made myself clear on that, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I'll let other members further prod into that.

Going back to my original question, do you think any Americans are alive in Southeast Asia based on the experience you've had with intelligence from Southeast Asia?

Admiral MCCAIN. Yes; I understand what you mean on that. That's a hard question to answer. I've been mulling over the answer to that question while you've been talking. As a matter of fact, I think there is no question about it that there are some who are still alive in Southeast Asia.

Now what status they're in, living there or not, I don't know. I haven't the slightest idea.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this a large number?

Admiral MCCAIN. No; small numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. How many?

Missing in action or deserters or what?

Admiral MCCAIN. They could be.

They could be deserters; they could be those who have been taken over by the enemy and given other means of livelihood so to speak, and coerced to join the North Vietnamese or Vietcong communities.

The CHAIRMAN. They could have been taken as prisoners and then brainwashed, so to speak, to the point they would work with and cooperate with the North Vietnamese or Vietcong?

Admiral MCCAIN. To some degree, yes.

I think that pressures could be brought to bear on them in South Vietnam that they might—well, I don't mean that.

I am thinking in terms of South Vietnam; I also keep thinking in terms of North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, in that area. It is conceivable that those governments might take these men—put them in work camps—and put them in some capacity where presumably they believe they are doing something of profit for that particular country.

It's my own personal conviction that if we have any missing in action over there, they're very, very few. When I say very few, I mean maybe 20 or 30. Something of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. In all Southeast Asia?

I would hope we would not give the families false hopes that there are large numbers.

If they are alive, of course I want you to tell it like it is, which you will, but I would certainly not want the record to show that you thought that there were large numbers if this is not your true opinion.

Admiral MCCAIN. I do not think that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Admiral MCCAIN. I think it would be a small number found alive under the best of conditions, if there is such a thing, working for Communists.

I would think there would be a very small number, indeed.

Mr. OTTINGER. Will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. OTTINGER. Do you have any evidence at all that there is anybody alive?

Admiral MCCAIN. No. Congressman Ottinger, the most difficult proposition in that section of the world is to get intelligence and know what's going on. There are jungles, rivers, all sorts of things. The hardest job I know of is getting what one might call accurate intelligence from these people.

Mr. OTTINGER. We would dearly love to be able to find that there were still some people alive.

Admiral MCCAIN. I agree with you, thoroughly.

Mr. OTTINGER. If we had any evidence of that nature, we'd pursue it right down to the last iota and I just wondered whether you had any information in that regard.

Admiral MCCAIN. We did pursue it. I can assure you of that, as far as circumstances permitted us. I want to point out to you the impenetrability of that country we're dealing with out there.

It's my own firm conviction that we do not have, in that area of the world, too many missing in action.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moakley and then Mr. Guyer, and then you again.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, getting back to the line of questioning that the chairman was pursuing, I want to know first of all what you meant, there may be people working for the Communists that were former prisoners.

Admiral MCCAIN. I mean by that let me go back to another point.

My son was a POW for 5½ years. Nothing would have delighted the Communists more, and I mean purely and simply delighted them, than to have my son make some sort of statement that was in favor of communism. They would have broadcast that worldwide.

Nothing would have delighted them more than to have had my son working in some capacity for the Communists; and my son is just an example.

There are others out there, many others. Mr. Moakley, if anybody says to you sir, that there's been any deterioration in the youth of this land, I want to disabuse that fact. I got to know a thousand soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and they are outstanding young men. They are going to come along and are going to follow behind gentlement like you and myself, and they are going to do an equally fine job with this extraordinary Government of ours.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Admiral, I can realize that during the conflict it would have been to their benefit to get people saying that they were being treated wonderfully by the Communists.

Now the hostilities are over, and we're trying to account for our missing in action and I'd like to just, as I say, pursue what Congressman Montgomery was saying about the number of people you think that may be alive, and why you think they may be alive, and if you have any solid facts to show that any people are alive.

Admiral McCain. I have figures here on the POW's, missing in action, and killed in action. This is for bodies not recovered in this case. Here I have a figure for POW's in every status. I also want to say to you about both of these lists, that from my own personal experience, that if we really have a number, I hate to use the word "substantial," because it is hard to define—but for any a number of MIA that died—we know about it.

I don't think that we have a substantial number of MIA; I mean just as easy as that.

Mr. Moakley. Admiral, you also said that you felt there were a lot of MIA's that weren't carried on the books, and I know that they are carried on our books.

I just wonder if North Vietnam is playing games with some of these people whether they be prisoners of war, or missing in action, or killed in action.

Admiral McCain. Yes, sir.

I wouldn't put it beyond the North Vietnamese in any sense of the word. I'll tell you a story I heard, off-the-record.

Mr. Moakley. Nothing is off-the-record here.

Admiral McCain. Well, I'm going to tell you one on-the-record, Mr. Moakley.

I just got through on a trip out to the Far East. Of course, one of the biggest points of interest in my life was what was going on in all these places.

I started out with Korea, then went to the Philippines, Thailand and Burma. While I was in Rangoon, the Ambassador from Thailand in Rangoon had a reception for the King's birthday.

They introduced me to the Ambassador from North Korea, and this man looked at me and turned on his heels and just walked right off. The other two men, the Ambassador from Red China, who had an interpreter with him at all times, and the No. 2 man in the Russian Embassy. They stuck to me the whole time I was at the reception. Their big argument at the time was "Who was going to take over Taiwan?" A very interesting subject to listen to from their viewpoint.

This man from Russia spoke in English as well as you and I, Mr. Moakley; and as I say, he was the No. 2 man from the Russian Embassy.

The Red Ambassador, Red Chinese Ambassador, could not talk English. He had this interpreter right at his hand who was putting down every word that a man named McCain had to say, and so forth.

But to go back to this business of the MIA's, as far as I believe, there are some left, but how many, I don't know.

Mr. Moakley. When you say some left, you mean some left alive?

Admiral McCain. Yes. I mean some left alive.

Mr. Moakley. Has this information come to you from any substantial source as the basis of your information?

Admiral McCain. No. It has not.

Mr. Moakley. Just a feeling, then?

Admiral McCain. Just a feeling.

Mr. Moakley. Now, we have a problem, too, talking about prisoners of war, whether the status of any has been changed.

If that is more information that the captain is giving you, I'd be glad to hear it.[1]

Admiral McCain. What the captain was saying to me was that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has no information that there are any of these people alive.

Mr. Moakley. As I was saying, admiral, the committee has often wondered whether the status of some of the POW's and MIA's have changed so that we aren't getting the correct information.

Do you have any information on that?

Admiral McCain. No. I don't believe the status has changed in this regard. I think what the captain just said to me is true and that is that we have no real substantial evidence that you can put your finger on in this regard.

Mr. Moakley. I have no further questions.

The Chairman. Mr. Guyer?

Mr. Guyer. Mr. Chairman, thank you, sir.

Admiral, you were stationed at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral McCain. Yes, at one time.

Mr. Guyer. Weren't you superceded by Admiral Gaylor?

Admiral McCain. Yes; that's right, but when I turned to General Nazzaro I said, "Joe, I can't travel around in a C–118; it takes a week to get to Tokyo from here." He said, "Fine, I'll fix you up."

He gave me a C–135 and I traveled 1 million miles in that plane and went every place. You can rest assured that some place in the neighborhood of about once every 3 or 4 weeks I was with General Abrams in Saigon to discuss——

Mr. Guyer. That was my next question; whether you had recently been in Vietnam personally to have an overview of what has going on in those last days.

Admiral McCain. Yes. I was in there during the last days. There weren't any last days if you want to know the truth. As far as the United States is concerned, Mr. Guyer, it was a catastrophe.

Mr. Guyer. I'm talking about calendar wise; in other words the cease-fire was in January?

Admiral McCain. Yes.

Mr. Guyer. Now we're trying to find out information as to the nature of things in Vietnam and we realize there are question marks and walls of silence and absence of communications.

Did you have any access to pertinent information?

You've alluded several times to statistics which we might not have.

I'm curious. I just want to know whether these statistics are still in excess, whether, if we do get a break of any kind, we can compare those figures and records with ours.

Would you say much of the answers are still there?

Admiral McCain. North Vietnam——

Mr. Guyer. I mean, today it is just one country.

Admiral McCain. Presumably just one country. I'm not going to join that team in a hurry.

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[1] Capt. Kenneth Coskey, USN, the escort officer, passed a note to Admiral McCain.

Mr. GUYER. Well, what I mean is, the records could be anywhere.

Admiral MCCAIN. That's right—they could be. I don't think such records exist, as you're speaking of, on this business of MIA or POW's and North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia. This whole set up out there now is Communist dominated in every sense of the word. I don't believe that there is anything more, or much more, that can be said than what I told you.

I would like to say, sir, this does not mean that we shouldn't pursue with the greatest of vigor what might be the ultimate outcome of these things and how they stand up.

Mr. GUYER. Did your son, at any time during his imprisonment and after his release, pass along to you any personal knowledge of people that were alive to his knowledge?

Admiral MCCAIN. No.

Mr. GUYER. Not at all?

Admiral MCCAIN. The big point that he made to me was that one that I made to you. That was that when they turned those three bodies over to us, this was not a gesture of good will or anything of that sort. It was simply proof that they had not abided by the Paris accords.

Mr. GUYER. When General Kingston was here, he described his role in the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and indicated that it took 1 year to visit 10 crash sites.

Do you think these three sites to which you have referred would hold some key to something we should know?

Was there some reason why they didn't want you to visit those three sites?

Admiral MCCAIN. There might be, but in the first place, I never heard that it took 3 years to visit——

Mr. GUYER. Not 3 years; 1 year to see 10. I think that's in the record.

Admiral MCCAIN. All right; 1 year to see 10, then.

Mr. GUYER. Yes.

Admiral MCCAIN. This piece of information has never been available to me. I have great respect for General Kingston, but I question that length of time.

Mr. GUYER. I think my testimony is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That's correct.

Mr. GUYER. He was here in person, appeared before the committee, presented visual slides and on-site information.

Admiral MCCAIN. Mr. Congressman we have the helicopters, and we have the means, and we did retrieve a lot of these people who were shot down. We knew what we were doing all the time we were dealing with these people.

I was somewhat surprised to hear this other statement that you just made. I want to back away from that one point; I may well be wrong and the general may be right.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection, Dr. Shields you were going to make some comment?

Mr. SHIELDS. General Kingston's point, I believe, alluded to the fact that our men were lost in territory not controlled by friendly sources.

For that reason, the sites which we wanted to go see, which we could have seen were not available to us; and that's why it took 1 year to visit 10 sites, because there were physical difficulties involved.

Mr. GUYER. I understood that.

My last question, and it's strictly exploratory; with your eminent experience in the service, with which we are very impressed, if you were to trade hats from a naval commander to a Congressman, what kind of procedure would you recommend we use as a committee to achieve our goals? That's what we're really trying to do.

Admiral MCCAIN. Yes. I understand. My first operation would be to get the Secretary of State off dead center, and get him into some sort of negotiations with these people, and find out how they stand.

Mr. GUYER. We have a meeting with him on March 5.

Admiral MCCAIN. The Secretary of State should be operating in this area. He should be doing it with great vigor, and he should be doing it concentratedly.

Mr. GUYER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. That is our opinion, too.

Mr. Lloyd?

Mr. LLOYD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

In that practice I concur wholeheartedly. As we have often pointed out, we seem to be having some difficulty in keeping that rolling along.

Assuming that the people are held as you have indicated, Admiral, what do they hope to gain?

Admiral MCCAIN. I think we are up against a real problem with this world and the United States is in a very dangerous situation.

I'm talking about Soviet Russia, talking about Red China, and I'm talking about these nations to the South of Red China such as Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and others.

I think they would hold these people there, as part of an overall program they have for defeating the Western countries.

Mr. LLOYD. Do you see them using these people in negotiations in the future?

Admiral MCCAIN. I certainly do.

Mr. LLOYD. In what manner?

Admiral MCCAIN. In this manner: For want of a better example, let's say some North Vietnamese were sitting here in my place. If they were to sit before this committee and tell you that they have got one or more of your very fine young men, down here—and if you will declare the war is over, then there are no more problems down here. We are a part of the world, but not as we would like it to be. When I say would like to be, I want to emphasize not the kind we want it to be, but the part that continues to generate communism world-wide.

They might say just this to you. I'd like to know what your answer would be to that; and that would be a beaut.

Mr. LLOYD. Continuing the thought further, do you foresee these countries using this committee hoping to manipulate this country?

Admiral MCCAIN. This is a very profound and good question from my viewpoint. My answer to it is, "yes." They'll use any means that's available to them to influence the public of the United States. They will do it just as quick as it takes for you and me to walk out of this room together shaking hands.

Mr. LLOYD. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Guyer?

Mr. GUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I listened with a great deal of interest to your remarks.

Your reaction that there are some live Americans over there is probably and apparently shared by many others throughout the Nation.

What leads you to believe that some people are still alive in prisons?

Admiral MCCAIN. The main point, not the only thing, but let's say the main point that makes me believe that is so, are some of the things that I have read in reports that have been handed to me.

I wish that I were still Commander in Chief of the Pacific, because I could then, without your aid, obtain all sorts of information to substantiate a stand like that.

I believe from my experience out there that the Communists have been trying to embarass our country. I think they will try to use any captives in any fashion which they can.

Mr. GUYER. You suggested that the Secretary of State should get off dead center and start doing something.

If you were sitting across the table from the Secretary of State, what would you recommend that he do?

Admiral MCCAIN. I would say to the Secretary of State that to visit Moscow and Peking are all fine; and that in your viewpoint it might lead to great things. But, Mr. Secretary, I think that what you have got to do is to go to every international body that we have. You have got to start putting pressure on these people.

When I speak of international bodies, I'm talking about all multilateral and bilateral arrangements that we have throughout this world. We have a number of them which I know that you're aware of.

Such things as SEATO are, unfortunately, no longer in existence. I've heard very great criticism of that since I've been back.

When you sit down at a table with leaders of other countries, be it military or civilian leaders, and you get into conversation with them, you get on practically a first-name basis.

That can carry a great deal of weight in the determination of what's going on. I would tell the Secretary of State that I feel the time has now come for him to take defensive action as far as many of the multilateral and bilateral treaty arrangements are concerned world-wide. Put the pressure on Peking and Moscow to do the job so that we can get these people clear of the situation that now exists in Southeast Asia.

Mr. GUYER. Thank you, Admiral.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ottinger?

Mr. OTTINGER. From your answer to the question that Mr. Lloyd asked I infer that you think we're in a position to do nothing but get used by the Vietnamese or misused. Do you think we would do just as well, to disband the committee at this point?

Admiral MCCAIN. No, I do not.

I think this committee, as I think I started out by stating, I think this is the committee that absolutely is necessary and can serve a great service to the United States in its international position.

I want to reaffirm this point with you, Mr. Congressman, that in our dealings in the world as a whole, it is a tough world. It's tougher than going outside this building and walking down the street.

Mr. OTTINGER. I'm sure that's true.

I think we're all puzzling very hard about how we can achieve results. We certainly don't want to be misused.

What we want to do is open up the possibility of getting some answers.

Admiral MCCAIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. OTTINGER. Put yourself on this side of the table. We're going to meet with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State is going to eyeball us and say:

I'm not going to deal with those guys. I dealt with them long enough. You can't trust them; there's no sense in pursuing it.

When they get good and ready to come around, they'll come around.

That's more or less what he told us before. He said: "You guys go out there and talk with them, that's fine; but I'm not going to have anything to do with them."

What do you do at that point?

Admiral MCCAIN. That's a statement that I've never heard before. I was about to use the word "stupid," but I don't think that's appropriate, in my position, to say.

Mr. OTTINGER. I think you've got to recognize that he's had a terrible time dealing with the Vietnamese during the war, and that experience has soured him.

Also, this was a terrible lack of success in the particular area in which he had a lot committed. He'd like to forget that Vietnam existed; that's the impression you get.

I don't know if we could move this off the dime via the Secretary of State if he persists in the attitude we have seen so far.

Admiral MCCAIN. I think you're taking the first step now. The person that has got to take action on this sort of thing, from my humble viewpoint, is the President of the United States.

He's the one that's got to move the situation. As far as the war in Vietnam is concerned, if it hadn't been for certain powers back here, we could have won that war without any trouble at all. Whether you think so or not, we could have won.

Mr. OTTINGER. No sense in going back into that history.

Admiral MCCAIN. No, why not? Pardon me, sir.

Mr. OTTINGER. Are you suggesting that maybe we ought to try it again, now?

Admiral MCCAIN. No; I'm not suggesting that we ought to try it again. I'm saying to you there was a time when if we had approached this as we should be approaching world affairs anyway, it would have been a different matter entirely.

Mr. OTTINGER. Let me ask you something else.

The Vietnamese told us that there was a joint economic commission set up in connection with the negotiations on the Paris Accords.

Admiral MCCAIN. Right.

Mr. OTTINGER. Those negotiations resulted at least in a tentative agreement which was never publicly disclosed, for our giving very substantial aid to the North Vietnamese.

Were you aware of any of those negotiations?

Admiral MCCAIN. Not intimately so. When I say intimately, no one sent me a long-winded dispatch from Washington, D.C., telling me this.

Mr. OTTINGER. One of the incredible things indicated is the difficulty in dealing with Mr. Kissinger.

You know, we haven't been able to get the details from our own Government. Such information as we have comes from the Vietnamese, and that's not a comfortable situation to be in.

Admiral MCCAIN. I agree with that.

Mr. OTTINGER. But you don't have any knowledge about these negotiations, yourself?

Admiral MCCAIN. No, sir. If I may be so bold before this distinguished committee, I'm not so sure that the Secretary of State has done his job completely.

When I was there, the Secretary of State took seven trips to Peking. Not once did he go to Tokyo, to Taipei, or to Manila.

If you were one of these countries out there, the only thing you can draw as a conclusion, is that the United States and the general overall trend of events is going to be towards Peking. That's exactly what's happened—this whole business that occurred to us. It just makes me sick, because there was no cause for this, either.

Mr. OTTINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCloskey?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Admiral, I'm sorry to have missed your earlier testimony, but I was at another hearing.

Admiral MCCAIN. That's all right.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Knowing what you know of the terrain of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos, in your judgment, could any American pilot shot down in that terrain be alive today and not be a prisoner of either the Vietnamese or Laotian Governments?

Admiral MCCAIN. I doubt it. We're white and they're a different color, entirely.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. What I have in mind——

Admiral MCCAIN. I'm not making any aspersions against the blacks in this country—God knows they're just as fine as any Americans any place else. Don't get me wrong on that one.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. When I was young and in the service, we had what was called the school of survival. During the 1960's, the training instruction given to Americans who might be captured was to make every effort to escape, survive, and ultimately return.

For some time, I had hope that if any Americans were shot down in Laos, they may have been able to find some place in the mountains or in one of those river valleys and escape and survive.

But now in 1976, it seems very dim indeed to hope that any of them could have survived. Had they been able, they would have tried to avoid capture and escape down one of the streams or rivers.

What I'm trying to pin down is: if any American soldier is still alive in Southeast Asia, he would most likely be a prisoner of one of these governments. Do you agree with that?

Admiral MCCAIN. This gets back to the question, Mr. Congressman, that was raised before you got here—and that is: "What the chances are of having survivors or missing in action, in Southeast Asia?" My response to your point is that I think that if we have missing in actions, or any one who falls within that category, that if I were their families, I wouldn't give up hope. I think there is always a chance that the people would show up.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Do you understand my question now? It is: "If there is someone still alive in Southeast Asia, would not that person have to be a captive of the Laos or Cambodian or the Vietnamese Governments?"

Admiral MCCAIN. I understand that.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Do you agree with that?

Admiral MCCAIN. Yes.

I agree, with the exception that in my time, I have observed that the American youth is very capable of overcoming some extraordinary difficulties—and they do.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Well, take for example the Japanese soldiers that stayed on Guam for over 20 years in the underbrush.

Our training as Americans was to avoid capture and escape. After undergoing that training in the Navy, I think any American shot down would be motivated to try and get out by this time.

Would that not be your judgment?

Admiral MCCAIN. I think that's right. I don't see how you could apply mathematical principles to something that doesn't lend itself to mathematical analysis.

I don't think there is any question that they would try to get out.

I also think that a good enterprising American youth, and that's what we've got, and plenty of them, that they could probably make an escape of some sort or other.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. The problem that disturbs me with your testimony about the Vietnamese is that we know the Vietnamese place great emphasis on saving face. How could they now, in your judgment, hold a prisoner alive and yet tell us absolutely that there is no one in their captivity?

What have they gained by that?

Admiral MCCAIN. Mr. Congressman, they belong to a philosophy called communism. They belong to a philosophy that is entirely foreign to the way you and I were raised in this country, and the way people in the Western civilization were raised.

One of their purposes is to get control of these people in any fashion they can, and they will do it.

During the time you and I have been alive on the face of this Earth, we have watched the decline of the British Empire; it's gone. I can name to you, very nearly by sight, the number of places that Soviet Russia has moved into. This is all communism, and all wrapped up in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and other places like that, too, because of the manner in which these people have lived.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. If the Vietnamese have had someone alive and disclosed that to us now in a negotiating context, wouldn't they have to concede either that they were incompetent and didn't know that a subordinate had someone in custody or, alternatively they would have to admit they had deliberately lied?

I've never seen a Communist admit that he lied.

Admiral MCCAIN. You belong to a different school than I do.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Have you ever seen a Communist admit he was a liar?

Admiral MCCAIN. No, but I've seen them lie.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I think we all have seen them lie. But probably we are guilty of a little lying of our own from time to time.

Admiral McCain. No. I had a unique job, Mr. Congressman. I was up there with the United Nations for 2 years. I didn't ask for it and it was a unique job. Ambassador Goldberg was Ambassador then. I would have liked to have been there with Ambassador Moynihan, if you want to know the truth.

I heard somebody from the State Department not so long ago make the statement that the Russians had never violated any treaty or any agreement that they had made with the Western world. I checked the man off. There was no use sitting down talking to some sort of figurehead about something of that sort.

Where does he get the impression that those people never violated these things?

Mr. McCloskey. But do you know of a single Communist that ever admitted that he lied?

Admiral McCain. I haven't talked to very many Communists.

Mr. McCloskey. Do you know of an example of one in history who has ever admitted that he lied?

Admiral McCain. I can't offhand recall right now.

I just want to tell you one thing, Mr. McCloskey; I don't believe in them, and I believe they'll lie.

The Chairman. We've got one more witness, but Mr. Gonzalez has not had his chance to ask questions.

Mr. Gonzalez. I just have a few questions.

The Chairman. Fine.

Mr. Gonzalez. Adiniral, thank you for being here.

I gather that you feel that there is some possibility that some American military may still be alive in Southeast Asia?

Admiral McCain. I do, but I don't think it's a large number in any sense of the word.

Mr. Gonzalez. But you do think there is a possibility that one or two or three or some small number could conceivably be?

Admiral McCain. Yes; yes, sir.

Mr. Gonzalez. You have no evidentiary information to that effect?

Admiral McCain. No.

Mr. Gonzalez. Apparently, as was verified by the members of this committee that met with the North Vietnamese, the fact is slowly developing that our representatives and leaders have committed our Nation to some kind of reparations.

At the time that this treaty of Paris was being concluded the foreign press had a specific report to that effect. There was nothing generally reported to the American public officially. However, some of our officials privately conceded that such indeed had been a premise.

Our officials now seem to feel that the treaty of Paris or understanding of Paris, it wasn't really a treaty, has been violated by the North Vietnamese.

The North Vietnamese are saying that though that may have been the case that we also are in violation of those agreements because we have not complied with the promise to offer reconstruction. I prefer the word reparations because I think reparations is a lot more equitable.

Now, given that set of circumstances, is it your opinion that the North Vietnamese would care to discuss any information they have of a definite nature either about surviving Americans or Americans who have died but who have not been accounted for?

Would there be any reason in your opinion why they should even want to give us that information?

We're not bargaining from a position of strength. Is it your opinion that they would use that as a means of negotiation for something else and only for something else?

Admiral McCain. No, I don't. I don't think that the North Vietnamese, the Vietcong, the Communists, the Laotians or any of the group out there, are about to enter into any sort of negotiations with us unless they can see some sort of gain that might not be apparent to us.

Mr. Gonzalez. You feel that each one of these entities, Cambodia, Laotian, Vietnamese, Chinese, are monolithic structures, or do you feel that there's differences in that group, or do you believe they work in concert?

Admiral McCain. I think that, like all groups of people, there are differences. I don't think that those differences are meaningful, however, and I think that these people, as a group, would certainly take a definitive stand against the United States as a group on any particular problem that might arise.

Mr. Gonzalez. What if, as some thinkers anticipate, China, instead of now seeking confrontation with the Russians, would decide, geopoliticians would decide for the time being they are not quite prepared for that, and would decide to move southeast.

Would this not then engender some fear in such a people as the Vietnamese?

Admiral McCain. Do you know what the Red Chinese are really afraid of right now?

They are afraid of what Russia is doing in her maneuverings and manipulations in Southeast Asia. They are scared to death of it.

Another thing that you've got to remember about this, and this problem has been raised before, too, is the possibility of Red China crossing the straits of Taiwan and going into Taiwan.

They are not about to do these things.

One point in issue is that the Red Chinese are frightened to death about their own northern border which is about 3,500 miles long with Russia. No. 2 is that you can't forget that Japan has a certain amount of bearing and influence in all of this although she may not be warlike or anything else; taking all our money, I might add; that is an issue, too.

They are apprehensive about what we might do with the 7th Fleet.

Mr. Gonzalez. So, therefore, you would foresee no meaningful disclosure on the part of any one of these groups whether Chinese, Laotian, Cambodian, in the line that we're interested in unless somehow it would rebound to their benefit in some way?

Admiral McCain. I agree with that, thoroughly.

Mr. Gonzalez. Therefore, if we were to prevail on the Secretary of State to meet and either cajole, that is offer something in friendship or threaten, how could we do it if we would be doing it from a position of weakness rather than strength?

Admiral McCain. You'd better get particulars rights. If you think we're got strength, we need an Army, Marine Corps. I didn't come here to discuss what we need in the way of Armed Forces.

Mr. Gonzalez. I understand.

I'm just trying to figure out what it is that we can reasonably expect in whatever effort we decide to make, in pressing the Secretary of State to take a definite step.

Admiral McCain. Yes.

Mr. Gonzalez. I agree with you.

I don't think there is any reason why anybody, much less those who have won the war, would want to enter into a conversation with us unless there was something that we could offer.

They're not coming in to comply from a position of weakness, at least I don't think that's their attitude.

Admiral McCain. No.

I don't know why, but it always catches me just like the chairman of the accommodations.

You have got to have strength, Congressman Gonzalez, in order to face these people and get what we need.

Mr. Gonzalez. Admiral, I agree in strength, and being strong.

Admiral McCain. Yes.

Mr. Gonzalez. Obviously some decisions have been made by our leaders including the commanders in chief that doesn't seem to position us.

I don't know what we can do about that immediately. In the meanwhile, we also have some doubts about the readiness or the degree of strength in our country and in the Congress itself. I don't know what can be done immediately.

I don't see how in the world we can reconstitute an Air Force that in about 4 months will have the level strength that it had before we operated in the Korean war.

Admiral McCain. I'm not with the State Department right now—and I don't know precisely what it might be.

We spoke of the Paris Peace Accords—let's say the same sort of conferences were to be initiated in Paris; Paris is a good place. Paris is always a peaceful place. I don't know whether you've been there.

Mr. Gonzalez. I've been there briefly.

Admiral McCain. I've been there a couple of times. In a place like that, you sit down at a conference table and the United States says to these characters from the Communist side that you had better go along with what we are proposing right now. At least make that step.

We haven't even made that step.

Mr. Congressman, can you tell me one step forward that we've made in the United States in this very precarious world in which we're living? We're about to give away Panama Canal. It's just another example of things. We can't continue to live like this.

Mr. Gonzalez. I don't know about Panama as long as Dan Flood is in the House.

[Laughter.]

Mr. Gonzalez. I have directed these questions to you because you have been in a position of very high command. You've been there where the action is.

Admiral McCain. I'm very humble about it, Mr. Gonzalez.

Mr. Gonzalez. Nevertheless, you have been there.

Assuming we would have concerns that were hypothetically discussed, it seems that unless we did have that strength we would be back where we started, because the other side obviously knows the dimensions of our strength.

Admiral McCain. I don't know how this might go. I don't know what the reaction is going to take place between Red China and Soviet Russia. I don't think anybody at this table can answer that question.

To try is at least a matter of record. We haven't even made the try.

Mr. Gonzalez. Well, given the set of facts that we do have, is there reason to believe that we have Americans both civilian and military, still over there? We desire to obtain even minimal information.

Admiral McCain. Right.

Mr. Gonzalez. What is the best way to proceed? With the limitation of the legislative branch in general, and this committee in particular, what is the possibility of success in even obtaining an inventory of those, who are dead but not accounted for as of yet and perhaps some living?

It seems hopeless, then.

Admiral McCain. No. It's not hopeless. I think that a committee like this could well be the seed for generating activity along the lines that might ultimately free these people, I think the second point is that this committee could generate questions that would have a worldwide impact.

This committee is going to have a worldwide impact on these things that have taken place out in the Far East.

The third point is this: I have read so much about the CIA, DIA, and NSA. These things always have a bearing on this subject. How do you use intelligence sources in order to give to a committee of this caliber, and of the standing that you distinguished gentlemen represent, the background with which to go ahead with further inquiries into this thing?

I might add, if you proceed, you're going to find that you're going to be given the means and the weapons by which to bring the Secretary of State into line on some of these things. It is not an easy job that you have.

Mr. Gonzalez. No; I would think the first requisite would be at least to develop some type of cooperative effort, but our problem is exactly that.

From the beginning we had just as much reluctance and accessibility to information and reluctance to give it from our own branches of Government as we've had from the Communist.

Admiral McCain. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gonzalez. Both are a problem; both have one thing in common.

Admiral McCain. My own personal reaction is that having been in the job that I mentioned previously, congressional liaison, I think it's up to the Department of Defense to get the information, and to make it available to committees like this. You can get on with the business which is rightly our business and I put myself in the category with you gentlemen, if you don't mind, on this one.

Mr. Gonzalez. I appreciate that.

Admiral McCain. I feel very strongly about it.

Mr. Gonzalez. However, I believe that the Department of Defense has done fairly well. I don't really have a complaint, but I find reluc-

tance both from the President as well as the Secretary of State, and at least that's my opinion.

But thank you very much for your patience.

Admiral McCain. I'm delighted and honored. I know you see cartoons everyday in the Washington Post newspaper. There's a cartoon in that Washington Post about this business of leaks. I think that is one of the things that has had a great effect on those in the executive side of the Government when it comes to talking.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Let me add one thing to Mr. Gonzalez' comment.

As chairman of the committee, we've had the cooperation from those below the Secretary of State, working in Under Secretary of State capacities, and we have had good cooperation from the President of the United States.

We have had no problems. Every time I have called the White House we have been able to see the President and talk to him; and I wanted to get that on the record since you brought it up.

Our problem has been seeing the Secretary of State, himself.

Mr. McCloskey. Could I just add something from our side. I think that one matter that has come up in our proceedings during the last 5 months that should be commented on. While we have had absolute cooperation, from the Assistant Secretaries of State, there seems to have become a personalization of the Department of State. The Secretary has not divulged to those underneath him some very significant facts. I think the attempts of the Assistant Secretaries to cooperate with us on the subject have been frustrated by the fact they have not been told by the Secretary of State what they should be advised of.

I think we might comment on that in the final report. There are facts apparently known only to the Secretary.

Mr. Gonzalez. May I comment on that.

Apparently the Secretary doesn't communicate with the President, either; at least that's the impression I have.

Now, I haven't been one of those privileged to meet with the President.

The President has agreed to meet only with a select number from this committee. I haven't been one of those; so that may also give me the impression of the lack of cooperation.

But I fail to see why the Secretary of State, being the President's appointee shouldn't be amenable if the President is.

That's what I'm referring to.

The Chairman. We have one more witness. Admiral McCain, thank you very much; you've been most helpful and we appreciate very much having you here today.

I thank you. You've been most helpful to the committee.

Admiral McCain. I'm honored to be here.

I never expected after retirement to be invited back to such an important operation. Thank you very much.

Pursue what you're doing—I think you're right.

The Chairman. Thank you.

While Mr. MacDonald, the Staff Director is getting in position, I'd like to mention again to the committee that we are tentatively scheduled to meet on March 5 at a working breakfast with Secretary Kissinger.

I might say that I have written the new CIA Director; I talked to Director Bush yesterday on the phone about coming before our committee and ways we can obtain information from the CIA on intelligence sources in order to followup on our mission here.

We have followed up on trying to get in touch with officials in Cambodia. We're writing, contacting everybody we can trying to get some feel of what Cambodia——

Mr. Gonzalez. Pardon me.

Did you announce on March 6 we would have a breakfast?

The Chairman. Fifth; that is a Friday, but there's a possibility we could be in session.

The fifth is tentative and there is a very good chance that we can meet with Dr. Kissinger.

Let me say for the record, I have certainly been pleased with the work of our staff director, Angus MacDonald,[1] who came to us following a distinguished 31 years with the Marine Corp. He retired in 1973.

Angus has kept a good balance and selected a good staff. In fact, I think it is an outstanding staff working on this situation.

Angus received his masters degree and his thesis concerned POW's in the Korean War. He has a brief presentation to make.

Mr. MacDonald, you may begin.

STATEMENT OF J. ANGUS MacDONALD, STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. MacDonald. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I'd like to enter for the record certain documents dealing with the history and the chronology of the Four Party Joint Military Team.

I will merely address my remarks to the points of immediate interest to the committee.

The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.[2]

Mr. MacDonald. Thank you, sir.

The Paris peace treaty was signed on January 27, 1973. A separate protocol provided for implementation of article 8 which deals with the exchange of prisoners of war which was to be accomplished by a Four Party Joint Military Commission that was given a 60-day life span. The Commission was to dissolve when the final prisoner had been exchanged.

A Four Party Joint Military Team was to implement article 8(b) which dealt with missing in action and repatriation of remains.

Article 8(c), dealing with civilians, was to be handled on a bilateral basis between the Vietcong, or PRG, and the Government of South Vietnam.

The concern of the Four Party Joint Military Team was solely to implement article 8(b) and protocol so described.

The U.S. delegation to the Four Party Joint Military Team really took two separate tracks. One concerned repatriation of known remains; the second concerned providing information to the other side.

Although these actions took place concurrently, I would like to discuss them separately.

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[1] Biographical data appears on p. 460.
[2] See p. 220.

With respect to recovery of remains, the DRV had announced on January 27 that they had the remains of 23 Americans who had died in captivity in North Vietnam.

The PRG announced that 40 Americans died in captivity in South Vietnam. Negotiations for recovery of these remains began in April 1973, and it was 11 months before the negotiations were consummated with return of 23 remains from North Vietnam.

The 24th set of remains, reported by the DRV to be American, was located in a cemetery together with two other American graves.

Since that particular individual allegedly died in a crash of an aircraft rather than in captivity, the remains were not turned over with the other 23.

To the best of my knowledge, he is still in that cemetery in Hanoi, and he remains unidentified.

The PRG made some initial overtures to turn over the remains of approximately 40 Americans they held in South Vietnam.

They reneged and to this date the remains have not been turned over.

The second area in which the Four Party Team functioned was in the exchange of information.

The DRV claimed that they had not participated in combat in South Vietnam and, therefore, had no personnel missing in South Vietnam. No DRV requests for information were made to the American delegation by the DRV.

Our side began to provide information in two ways. First was the provision of data processing lists which contained sufficient data to enable the DRV and the PRG to begin their search for information.

There is a booklet [1] on the table in front of you. If you'll turn to tab A you will see four different dates, beginning with April 1973, and continuing through April 1975.

These are dates on which data processing lists were provided to the other three delegations, including the South Vietnamese. In the third column, you'll note the number of persons included on the list; beginning with 104 on April 17, 1973.

The next two lists in May of 1973, contain 2,558 names. The list turned over in June of 1974 consolidated the two lists provided in May 1973 and also totaled 2,558.

The final list in April 1975, is slightly smaller. There were 2,401 names on that list.

The decrease in names resulted from the deletion of bodies recovered and over water crashes, far distances out at sea.

The enemy would have no opportunity, really, to have any information about them.

If you'll turn the page, you will note a memorandum signed by the Chief of the U.S. delegation to the Four Party Team.

It's followed on the next page by the Vietnamese translation, and on the next page by the title block of the list of 2,558.

Of direct concern to you is the last page under tab A. This represents the first page of names on the list that you saw. The headings are really the only areas that should be of interest.

[1] See pp. 269–281.

Note that it indicates the name, service number, grade, service, date lost, race, sex, vehicle, and last location.

If you'll glance down the vehicle column you will see the first entry—A6A, an attack aircraft. The next MIA was in a UH1C, helicopter.

The third entry is a dollar sign. It happens to have absolutely no meaning. Instead it is a random ghost entry of no significance.

The eighth entry is a Ford truck.

Over 80 percent of our MIA losses are aircraft-associated.

In those cases the type aircraft is shown. If the MIA was in a truck or Jeep, that vehicle is shown. When the vehicle column is blank, it indicates a ground combat action.

Perhaps of greatest significance is the next column, the grid coordinates identifying the location where the incident occurred.

The first entry in that column happens to be OW, or Over Water.

The coordinates are expressed in terms known to the other side. They do have maps and are capable of reading the coordinates without any difficulty.

The coordinates are expressed in 6 figures which, under normal circumstances, would indicate accuracy within 100 meters, assuming that the basic coordinate is correct.

Unfortunately, this degree of accuracy does not apply to all of these coordinates. Those located by means of aerial photography, precisely on the ground, probably meet that accuracy requirement with no difficulty.

Other coordinates, where the location is sighted from high-performance aircraft or a patrol on the ground, are probably reasonably accurate, except in some cases a person reporting the location didn't really know where he was; therefore, the reported coordinates are not accurate.

Sometimes even 50 meters is not good enough to find a specific location, particularly after a number of years and a traumatic aircraft crash.

For example, in some cases the coordinate represents the runway the pilot was last seen taking off from, or it may represent some place 30,000 feet over Vietnam where a pilot was last reported by radio, and perhaps never heard from again. In that case, the coordinate could be 50 or 100 miles from the actual crash site.

Unfortunately, the data processing lists given to the Vietnamese were not precise and accurate. Recognizing this, the U.S. delegation to the Four Party Team began early, with assistance from the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, to get definitive information.

If you will glance at tab B you will see a series of dates beginning on August 6, 1973, and going through February of 1975.

The second column shows the number of folders turned over either to the DRV or PRG. The third column shows the number of individual cases described in each folder.

For example, two individuals might be shown in the case of an F–4 aircraft. The crash of a transport aircraft might reflect 10 or 12 individual cases in a single folder.

By February 1975, a total of 87 folders involving 107 U.S. individuals was turned over to the DRV and PRG.

Of the 107, 2 were later returned to the U.S. delegation.

Initially the DRV accepted those 2 folders, but they were turned back with the admonition that the U.S. delegation should deal directly with the Government of Laos.

In the end folders on 105 individuals were actually turned over.

If you will just turn the page in your booklet you will see an example of one of the case summaries given to the DRV or PRG.

Note this was an actual case in which we have changed the name to John Doe and removed the picture. Normally the picture is here (pointing). The descriptive summary is in Vietnamese. Turning over a couple of pages you see the dialog in English.

Both copies were provided to the Vietnamese. The fifth page is a Xerox copy of the map sheet which indicates fairly precisely the location of the loss. In this case it was precise.

One hundred and five of these cases were turned over to the PRG or DRV.

Unfortunately Cambodia did not participate, therefore, none of the folders were directed to that government by the U.S. delegation to the Four Party Joint Military Team.

We did learn, however, that in November of 1975 the Department of State provided to a senior Cambodian official at the United Nations in New York a complete listing of all American servicemen and civilians currently carried unaccounted for in Cambodia.

With respect to Laos, none of these folders had been turned over with the exception of the five this committee turned over in December of 1975. In addition, one specific case involving 13 missing persons was given to the Lao. The case is generally known as "Spectre 17" in which 13 of the crew are still unaccounted for.

We would hope one day we might gain an accounting for them.

However, I understand that an effort was made to provide some additional documents to the Pathet Lao.

To date we haven't been able to locate that list. As I understand, the Lao prepared their own format, differing slightly from those shown in your brochure.

The JCRC [1] attempted to conform to the format provided by Laos. I have no idea of the precise number of cases that presumably were turned over.

I think the most significant factor at the present is that DOD does not have the conduit of the Four Party Military Team by which to transmit specific cases to the other side.

The JCRC has been preparing narrative summaries on all missing persons on a continuing basis. At the present time more than 900 of these have been completed.

They involve personnel who have been presumed dead, who have been determined dead, and who are still listed as missing in action.

Some relate to killed in action and bodies not recovered. There is no priority for any single category of missing Americans. Ultimately the case files and narratives will be prepared for every single American on whom there is sufficient information. This would include all missing Americans except those for whom there is no information other than the date and a rough coordinate.

[1] See pp. 287–305.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. What is the time frame? When will it be completed?

Mr. MACDONALD. I hesitate to speak for them because the JCRC program is a continuing project. Last year they prepared some 800 cases. It will continue until the very last hard case is prepared.

There is some delay, of course. Narratives are prepared in English first and then there is the requirement to translate to Vietnamese.

We're going to do it before we finish our work. It is a continuing process, sir. However, until we receive the remains it would be difficult to tell whether the Vietnamese are merely going by the hard cases that we know of or also are providing information on cases about which we know nothing.

In many cases the coordinate was the end of the runway; I'm sure they have absolutely complete information on the aircraft wreckage in some of these cases. Certainly they know where the pilot's remains would be in such cases.

What I meant to suggest, sir, was that this committee can serve as a conduit for JCRC. Some 40 cases were turned over in Hanoi, but those were duplicates of cases previously provided through the Four Party Joint Military Team.

Duplication resulted from the quick nature of that trip and the inability to get appropriate new cases at that time. We have requested that some of the new case summaries be provided to the committee so in its future visits, the committee can serve as a conduit of information.

Mr. GUYER. Mr. MacDonald, do you have an updated figure of those missing all together?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.

Mr. GUYER. As distinguished from known dead, but not recovered?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir; 793 military personnel are currently carried in active, missing-in-action status.

Thirty-six are still carried as prisoners of war. The total is 834 active cases of personnel still missing.

There were some 565 presumptive findings of death since January 1, 1961.

Mr. GUYER. And not recovered?

Mr. MACDONALD. And not recovered. All of these deal with persons or bodies that have not been returned.

And there are in terms of killed in action or bodies not recovered, that is determined dead, 1,119 Americans.

Mr. GUYER. 1,119?

Mr. MACDONALD. 1,119 killed in action, bodies not recovered, or ones determined to have died while in missing status. The total number of Americans who did not return from Indochina is 2,518.

The CHAIRMAN. Before we lose any more members, move to the categories of the missing Americans.

Mr. MACDONALD. You will recall that at the last hearing the Chairman asked the committee staff to prepare a matrix showing categories of hard cases. You'll find under tab C the chart we developed.

We are actually talking about hard cases. We made no attempt to determine whether the person was alive, possibly alive, or probably alive. We were concerned first with cases where we have strong evidence that the circumstances of the individual's loss are such that the other side must certainly know what happened to him.

Whether alive or dead is not a criterion. It is "Do they know about him?"

The second category is less hard. It is based on having some evidence that the enemy could know the fate or burial site; that is they could know what happened.

We list a third category in which our records give no indication that the enemy has any information. But as the asterisks indicate, in many cases where the Department of Defense records are blank except for date, name, and coordinate, the other side might have very extensive information. The fourth category is one in which the enemy is very unlikely to have information; that would include over-water loss, some distance at sea, and it also includes many losses that occurred under nonhostile conditions.

We have quite a number of Americans who were killed in action or missing in action, nonhostile, such as drowning in a river in South Vietnam. This would be classified as missing in action, nonhostile.

Many of these the other side would not know about unless by chance they happened to recover the individual or his remains.

We have not yet filled in this form. This is a working copy. Only when we have been able to do such an imperical study can we come up with an answer that we would have reasonable confidence in, although it would never be precise. We do wish, sir, that you would give us time to work this a little more and to test it out.

Once that we are satisfied that we have a good matrix here, a good model, we will fill it in by number, not by name.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have personnel classified as missing in action who were not actually in combat?

M. MACDONALD. There were many in a nonhostile status. I assume that some on the present MIA list are in a nonhostile status. I can check that out.

The CHAIRMAN. You might check that out.

It would be good information for the committee to know.

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In a nonhostile status, yet they are carried as missing in action.

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir, in the war zone, missing but under nonhostile conditions.

Strangely enough, many who are considered to be nonhostile missing were actually captured by the enemy.

Mr. GUYER. Do all of the relatives know their cases' status as compared to these figures just described?

Mr. MACDONALD. They certainly know whether the next of kin is carried as a prisoner of war, that is one of the 36 cases, or in MIA status. They also know if a presumptive or determined finding of death has been rendered by the military secretary. They are certainly aware if the man was killed in action but not recovered.

Mr. GUYER. At what rate are families requesting KIA status?

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, it has closed down markedly, of course; I might have a figure on that.

Mr. GUYER. I understand when you went from 1,300 originals to 800 some, many of those were because the family requested that they be transferred to another category.

Mr. MACDONALD. The only ones now being considered are those where the primary next of kin requests a case review. If the review officer, the board, and the military secretary or his designee concur, presumptive finding of death may result.

In most cases a presumptive finding does result.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gilman?

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MacDonald, can you tell whether we have a file on all of those listed as POW's and missing?

Mr. MACDONALD. Those are available to us, sir. I personally hold in staff spaces all of the files on the 36; and we have some additional; they number perhaps a half dozen of those carried in MIA status.

We have not yet completed our analysis of the 36 prisoners of war, but could do that shortly if you'd like to see them.

Mr. GILMAN. We don't have any other files in our possession, is that correct?

Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir.

We don't have the capacity to handle that many at one time, either physically to store them or to process them; so we have asked not to be inundated but rather take them on a systematic basis as we need them.

Mr. GILMAN. All are available at the Department of Defense?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.

If you want a specific case, either your administrative assistant or the staff, whichever you prefer, could procure it. It would certainly be within 1 day's time.

Mr. GILMAN. Has the committee staff gone through all the Department of Defense files on the missing?

Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir.

It was not the intention to go through all the files. We are reviewing all 36 files of those still listed as prisoners of war. Then, selectively, we will go through a given number of missing in action cases.

It would almost be an impossible task to go through 2,500 folders.

As you recall, some go about that thick [indicating].

We're looking for things specifically of interest to the committee or, perhaps, peculiar to the family. We take a specific look and try to identify things that might be useful to the committee in terms of what recommendations we might make when we render the final report.

Mr. GILMAN. What depository is there for files here in Washington?

Mr. MACDONALD. There are two. The parent services, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force service headquarters maintain the basic file which contains all available intelligence information, although the sensitivity, of course, would be excised, the necessary information would be there. The files might contain Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports which aren't classified. They would include the investigation by the commanding officer concerning the combat action in which the man was lost. All other information available would be included as would all correspondence between the next of kin and the military department.

But it certainly does contain all intelligence data that relates to the status of the individual POW or MIA.

The second file is maintained in Washington by the Defense Intelligence Agency This file lacks the correspondence of next of kin. It

does contain all intelligence data including all sensitive material. Identification of sensitive sources is usually removed, but the useful information would be in the service file and the third file which is maintained by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center in Thailand. The JCRC file will have generally the same intelligence information, but in addition it will contain operationally oriented information to aid in the recovery operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You haven't had any trouble with classification from the Defense Department?

Mr. MACDONALD. No. None at all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, quite frankly, I don't know why this information would be classified other than for the Privacy of Information Act, or because of sensitive intelligence matters.

Mr. MACDONALD. Last year the JCRC declassified some 27,000 or 28,000 pieces of information in the dossiers. They have about 47,000 more to go.

It's a time-consuming process because each item has to be declassified individually.

Mr. GILMAN. Are you satisfied that all of the information available in Washington is now in the files of the individuals?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.

With a possible exception resulting from an inadvertent error that may occur.

I know there have been some problems, some families feeling things have been removed from the files.

In some cases, things were removed. Take for example an intelligence report referring to possibly any one of five people. Such a report would go into the five folders.

When that document is specifically identified as pertaining to one of the five, the copies would probably be removed from the other four folders. It would be better to leave the report in all of the folders but to indicate that positive identification had been made in the specific case.

I think the family is concerned when they note a missing document. I can understand why.

I did ask that specific question of the commander of the JCRC when I spent 5 hours with him recently. I asked him if he had purged any of these files, and he said absolutely not; although he did go through and remove irrelevant documents. Anything relevant to the individual, or possibly so, remained in. He assured me that there has been no purging.

Mr. GILMAN. Just one more question.

Am I correct, then, the Vietnamese now have at least a listing of all of the men who are listed or at least presumed to be missing along with some basic information?

Is that correct?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.

They do have at least a set of coordinates, which might or might not be good, and the name and date missing.

Mr. GILMAN. In addition, they have some 100 files or more?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Those that have been turned over by our committee and that have also been turned over by the joint military?

Mr. MACDONALD. Four-Party Military Team, yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Right.

Mr. MACDONALD. Incidentally the JCRC has now assumed the function of the Four-Party Team.

They left Saigon on April 30, 1975.

Mr. GILMAN. Aside from the files the committee turned over in Laos, there has been no other submission of files to Laos, is that correct?

Mr. MACDONALD. As far as I know, they have no files of this nature.

They do have the data processing run which I think was recently given to them. I just learned this, but I believe that some information has been provided to them in a format they requested.

I am tracking it down and will certainly report to the committee.

Mr. GILMAN. Are we in the process of following up and making certain that we provide to Laos, in their language, sufficient information on the missing in that country?

Mr. MACDONALD. Indeed, sir.

As a matter of fact, I believe that there are about 150 folders that would be available for Laos, and at least 10 for Cambodia. I think a total of over 925 narratives have been completed.

That does not mean all have been completed. Unfortunately, the translations, such as in tab B, are not all completed. When the narrative is completed in English, however, it does lend itself to more rapid development of the data into a full case study.

Mr. GILMAN. Have you turned any over to Cambodia?

Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir.

No case summaries have been provided to Cambodia.

The names of all missing Americans, military and civilian, were provided to the Cambodians at the United Nations.

Approximately a week later, they came back to the U.S. representative and said that they hold no prisoners of war and have no information on the missing.

The CHAIRMAN. That was through the U.N. in New York?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was recently?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir. November 1975.

Mr. GILMAN. Are we pursuing the possibility of turning over further files to Cambodia through the U.N.?

Mr. MACDONALD. Sir, I think we ought to turn them over to Cambodia in any way which might be effective if their Ambassador would accept them.

Mr. GILMAN. I would say it would be an effective conduit. Should it succeed in opening the door to Cambodia as has been so often tried in the past. I think this committee can serve as an effective conduit until such time as formal machinery exists. But until the formal machinery is here, I think the committee can serve a useful role.

Thank you very much for your thorough presentation.

Mr. GUYER. I want to thank Angus also for a thorough job.

I am sure that most families have their own files.

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes.

Mr. GUYER. Our people in Ohio provided me with a package about that thick [indicating] of everything they could find about their people which numbers some 50 or more. They have copies of newspaper pictures and records of when they were last seen.

What I'm curious about, will there be a checkoff to them personally to show that each case has been explored? Will they get an answer back of some kind or other on that particular loved one? That they will hear from them in detail or give them some report, rather than just checking through the file?

Will they have their personal file checked against your exploration?

Mr. MACDONALD. Sir, I think that could be an overwhelming job. The staff intends to work on the general level rather than specific cases.

Mr. GUYER. My case is a little simpler. If you have 2,518 total names that we're talking about——

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.

Mr. GUYER [continuing]. That's not an overwhelming job if you provide those names with such data as you have. In my judgment, this could be only 5,000 pages if you had two per person. I mean if such were reported as to that person to their family so each one will have some personal report; either say we can't find out about them or it is still unresolved or something.

Just don't come back with statistics. Statistics don't impress people. Loved ones are more than statistics.

Mr. MACDONALD. I see what you're driving at, sir.

I fear you're intruding in an area in which I'm not sure we really have any business. The committee is just to indicate a status——

Mr. GUYER. No, no. I'm not saying that.

If Ohio has a master file of people who are listed in these three categories as we have indicated and we put that information in the hands of the people who are suppose to cooperate, we would expect they would make a report.

Mr. MACDONALD. Oh, yes, sir. If we do receive a report, the families certainly will be apprised.

Mr. GUYER. That's what I mean.

Mr. MACDONALD. Oh, excuse me. I'm afraid I was not communicating.

Absolutely—any information we receive. Certainly if remains are returned, then we have an identification problem, followed by notification and re-interment. This is a fairly clear-cut problem.

But in cases where only information is provided by the Indochinese, and nothing more specific, the information will have to be assessed by the intelligence community and by the parent service to determine whether or not the Vietnamese are merely reporting back to us what we told them or whether they did actually conduct an investigation. A conclusion must then be drawn—is the information logical and acceptable?

Once that's done, I would expect if the information is prima facie in nature it is very likely we would find it acceptable.

Mr. GUYER. It is difficult, for there is a certain disparity between our records and theirs; one of the things we would like to clear up, to see whether in some archives or on some shelf in their headquarters

they may have a list or file which has not yet been provided us, to be compared with ours.

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir. I'm sure they have information on people about whom we have no information.

As a matter of fact, the chairman suggested to them that they might accommodate us by accepting a United States or third-party liaison team to assist in their investigation.

We have not yet gotten a response. The response time has been too short, but an effort is being made to try to help them do the job for us. I'm sure that we'd be happy.

Mr. GUYER. Good.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gonzalez?

Mr. GONZALEZ. Well, I too, wish to compliment Mr. MacDonald on a splendid job done both by the chairman and his wise selection that has enabled it to really get off the ground and to do a very thorough job. I sincerely compliment you.

The 36 prisoners of war category—did you define that presumably they were prisoners of war?

Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir.

They were declared in that category, prisoner-of-war, by their parent services at the time of loss.

If you will look here under tab D [indicating]. Take a look at the second sheet.

Walter Estes and James Teague; just glance at that, sir. This indicates that there were wire photos of military identification cards belonging to both individuals. The photos were made by the Vietnam News Agency in North Vietnam.

Mr. GONZALEZ. I was noticing that.

Mr. MACDONALD. They said that these air bandits, eight total, were captured in Haiphong.

They announced the capture. We assume by capture they meant captured alive. The North Vietnamese photographed the ID cards and published them.

The classification of these two individuals as prisoners of war was, in my view, entirely correct.

We had every reason to believe initially, at least, that they were alive in enemy hands as bona fide prisoners of war.

It happened that another pilot named Estes was a prisoner of war. That showed up when we had the returnees and that added to the confusion.

In fact, neither of the individuals has been seen or heard from since the day their aircraft were shot down. Nevertheless, they have definitely been categorized as hard cases.

Mr. GONZALEZ. As what?

Mr. MACDONALD. As hard cases.

There's no way the enemy doesn't know what happened to them.

Mr. GONZALEZ. There's no question that they were captives and there's no information since that date?

Mr. MACDONALD. There is no information since the day they were shot down except the Vietnamese newspaper articles which included photos of identification cards on both individuals.

By the way, they were not in the same aircraft.

Mr. GONZALEZ. So their current status is POW?

Mr. MacDonald. Yes, sir.

They were declared POW's; no reason to change. There is no prima facie evidence that they died in captivity, indeed that they ever were in captivity, but the other side has their ID cards and must know what hapened to them.

Mr. Guyer. Isn't that another thing in their story that they've given us their full cooperation, but they can't help but know?

Mr. MacDonald. No, sir.

I don't believe they ever claimed that.

Mr. Guyer. Well, conversation to us said that——

Mr. MacDonald. That really means nonmotion on their part; their investigation of cases will suddenly bear fruit when it serves their purpose.

Mr. Gonzalez. Can't we say, well now the least you can do is trace that news story, the origin of that release; obviously there was a release story.

Mr. MacDonald. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gonzalez. And what about this; wouldn't that be one specific case we could do?

Mr. MacDonald. Yes, sir.

These two cases were included in the 107 turned over.

Tab D here really covers just a few pages of the 1972 press conference held by Mr. Laird. The 14 cases which you see here were later incorporated into the 20 that Dr. Kissinger gave the DRV; not 82 but 20.

Secretary Kissinger did also provide to Le Duc Tho film clips showing about 80 individuals most of whom were identified as being American prisoners of war.

It was these 80 film clips plus the 20 case summaries that he presented to Le Duc Tho.

They have information on these two cases which are among the 105 actual case summaries the DRV and PRG hold. To date they have not provided any information, and they should have that information.

You see, the conduit stopped with the withdrawal of the American delegation to the Four Party Joint Military Team on April 30, 1975. DOD has had no way of providing information to them since this.

Mr. Gonzalez. Is it feasible to think in terms of reconstituting the team?

Mr. MacDonald. That is an excellent question.

The team was asked to remain in Saigon with the fall of Saigon; and the DRV assured them that they would be safe.

To our great lament, in April the U.S. delegation came under heavy artillery and mortar fire and were ordered to move into the embassy downtown.

Then on the 30th, the last day, they were ordered to evacuate. The President ordered the evacuation of all Americans and the team was pulled out because at that time the DRV delegation said they could not control the combatant forces and could no longer guarantee the safety of the U.S. delegation.

Mr. Guyer. Well, the same team has offered to go back, that were shot at before.

Mr. MacDonald. That was a Joint Casualty Resolution Center team that was shot at, sir.

Mr. Guyer. And two killed.

Mr. MacDonald. Yes; one American and one Vietnamese, and several were wounded.

Mr. Gonzalez. It seems in good faith, as some believe, to reconstitute the team and get going.

Mr. MacDonald. Sir, JCRC has been obtaining basic preparatory information, and would be in a good position to continue operations.

I think it would take the initiative of the committee to explore this matter. I wish I'd been aware of it sooner, but only in developing this study of the team did I learn of the DRV and PRG's apparent interest in continuing to work with the U.S. delegation.

I think you put your finger on it, sir.

All they can do is say no if we make an offer to send another team. Such a team might function in a liaison capacity.

Mr. Gonzalez. I agree.

The Chairman. That's a good point.

As a matter of fact, I had that question in mind myself.

With respect to the Four Party Joint Military Team, is there a possibility they could be invited back into Vietnam?

Mr. MacDonald. I think so, sir.

We would probably call it something else, but they said it could remain in 1975. It was the U.S. option to pull out because the delegation was in danger.

Perhaps we could give it a try; of course, we don't have the original Four Party members.

Mr. Guyer. What happened to the original ones?

They all pulled out?

Mr. MacDonald. The original team?

Mr. Guyer. Yes.

Mr. MacDonald. Yes.

On the 30th, the entire delegation was removed.

The Chairman. We should certainly follow up on that.

Did you discover any connection between the Four Party Joint Military Team and the Joint Economic Commission in the study you made?

Mr. MacDonald. There was no legal relationship between the two within the Paris Peace Agreement.

The protocol did provide for the formation of the Four Party Team, so it had direct relationship to the Paris Peace Agreement.

The Joint Economic Commission apparently had its genesis in oral dialogue between the National Security Adviser to the President and Le Duc Tho.

The JEC is not mentioned in the agreement or any of its protocols, but it became apparent during the FPJMT negotiations in Saigon that the Vietnamese delegation was looking over its shoulder at the JEC in Paris, although they were charged only with implementation of article 8(b).

They attempted to bring in protocol disputes and problems concerning diplomatic immunity in effect for various delegations. They also alluded to the progress of the Joint Economic Commission in Paris. In addition they tried indirectly to gain recognition of the PRG as a de facto government within South Vietnam.

Reference to the Joint Economic Commission was brought up as early as June of 1973, before the U.S. delegation pulled out. The Joint Economic Commission was mentioned again later in 1973 and I would think that the dissolution of the Joint Economic Commission was probably why there was no response at all to any cases turned over to the DRV and PRG in the Four Party Team.

Mr. GUYER. Do families know who are among the 36?

Mr. MACDONALD. Oh, yes.

All are aware of the next of kin in that category.

I might add, at least 12 of them should not have been classified as POW. Evidence at the time indicates several should have been classified as missing in action.

This kind of complicates things.

I talked personally to Mrs. Estes on two or three occasions. I think that her son was properly classified as POW, but I saw no evidence that he survived the first day. I've gone through this case personally.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. MacDonald.

The committee will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 the hearing was adjourned.]

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING
PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,
Washington, D.C.

The select committee met at 2:30 p.m., pursuant to call in room H-277 of the Capitol; Hon. G. V. Montgomery, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Representatives Montgomery, Gonzalez, Ottinger, Harkin, McCloskey, and Guyer.

Staff members present: Angus MacDonald, staff director, Jeanne Shirkey, administrative assistant, Dr. Henry Kenny, and Dr. Job Dittberner, professional staff assistants.

The CHAIRMAN. The Select Committee on Missing Persons will come to order.

We have some housekeeping business first. The committee staff director has recommended that we take Ms. Anita Lauve on board as a consultant to work with us in regard to the French experience of dealing with the missing in action. She is very knowledgeable in that field.

Under the rules, I have to mention it to the members at an open meeting. She can be of help to us in learning of the dealings the French had with the North Vietnamese after the Indochina war pertaining to their missing in action.

Without objection, we would like to bring her on the staff for a limited time, or for the time she is needed.

We have two witnesses today to testify. We invited these two people who are parents of missing in action to come before the committee, and we appreciate them coming from Louisiana and Florida, respectively.

In the near future, the select committee plans to hear from returned prisoners of war who have matters of direct interest to relate to the select committee, pertaining to the missing in action. These are former prisoners of war, and they will appear next week.

Also, we are trying to schedule a hearing with the Central Intelligence Agency within the next couple of weeks. As I understand it, the staff director has discussed this with officials in the Central Intelligence Agency. We will do all we can to obtain information from the CIA in open session, and information that we just cannot have in open session, of course, we will have to go into executive session. There will be hearings in the very near future on the intelligence resources pertaining to the Americans that are missing in Southeast Asia.

Our meeting with Secretary Kissinger, as far as I know, is still on schedule, set for March 12, for a working breakfact with the Secretary of State.

The remains of the two marines have been taken to Thailand, to the identification teams of specialists that we have at Samae San. The remains are there, is that right?

Mr. MacDonald. Yes, sir; they are.

The Chairman. We are very pleased now to invite Mrs. Varnado [1] to take the witness chair. We appreciate very much your coming up, and I did personally ask you to come before the committee.

Mrs. Varnado is from Louisiana and she has been to Washington a number of times. Her son—it's a very interesting case—is classified as missing in action. I think it's well that the committee hear from Mrs. Varnado and that we have the opportunity to examine the case of her son. To set the stage, Mrs. Varnado, I believe it would help if Mr. MacDonald would read part of the report on your son.[2]

Mr. MacDonald. Sir, Chief Warrant Officer Varnado was reported missing in action on May 2, 1970, in Cambodia.

At the time he was reported missing, he was last seen as aircraft commander on a military mission. The aircraft was fired upon by hostile ground forces and landed under its own power in hostile territory.

The name of Chief Warrant Officer Varnado was on a list provided to U.S. negotiators on January 27, 1973, indicating that he had died in captivity on September 21, 1970. Statements were also received from returned prisoners of war who saw Mr. Varnado in a prisoner of war camp and were aware of the extent of his injuries and physical condition. The prisoners of war were of the opinion that he did not survive.

Based on this information, the Department of the Army on April 11, 1973, changed Mr. Varnado's status from missing in action on May 2, 1970, to deceased on September 21, 1970, in a prisoner-of-war camp in Cambodia.

His remains, to date, have not been recovered.

The Chairman. Mrs Varnado, we are very glad to have you here today, and we would certainly like to hear any of your comments. And then I'm sure some members would have some questions and thoughts, after you have finished your testimony.

You might have to speak up. We don't have an amplifying system, so speak up so the people in the room can hear your testimony.

STATEMENT OF MRS. WILLENA C. VARNADO OF LOUISIANA

Mrs. Varnado. We have been an MIA family for almost 6 years. I just am here to tell our story, that, as Mr. MacDonald said, Mike was on a mission in Cambodia and his helicopter was fired on, and he landed the helicopter.

I believe all exited the ship according to the information we had, and Mike was captured, was a prisoner for some time, and of course, when the war was over, they notified us that Mike had died in a prison camp—died in captivity.

The Chairman. Who notified you?

[1] Biographical data of Mrs. Varnado appears on p. 460.
[2] Summary of incident appears on p. 235.

Mrs. Varnado. The Army. They came and notified us in January 1973.

Of course, that is a terrible thing, to be told that your son died in captivity. We had memorial services in April—I don't remember the exact date. I know it was Easter Sunday, in April 1973, we had the services.

As far as we were concerned, it was a closed chapter. Mike was dead. We tried to pick up the pieces and go on living as best we could. We tried to accept that—although my husband never has accepted the fact that Mike is dead.

Then, last year they came and awarded the medals—Mike's medals—and immediately after they came and awarded the medals, we had a call from Casualty in Washington saying that they wanted to come down and update the records on Mike.

You can imagine how we felt, you know, when you get a call from Washington saying they want to come down and talk to you and update the records, after you have been notified 2 years ago that your son died in captivity.

So they did. Colonel Bobinski came and talked to us. And we just had the idea, after he visited with us in our home, we felt sure that Mike was alive, from the information he told us, and from his feelings as we perceived it.

Ten days later, and two telephone calls later, we got a letter from him, which gave this report. I would like to read it to you, this particular part about the telegram. It says:

> The source of the report, believed to be an indigenous native, stated that around 5 July 1974, a telegram from Khieu Samphan, Deputy Prime Minister of the Royal Government of National Union, was received by the National United Front of Kampuchea (Bureau Politique), in Peking, stating that Mike had been captured and was being held by Communist forces in the Khmer Communist area of Kratie Province, Cambodia, as of July, 1974.
>
> The telegram was shown to Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who read it and returned it to the Bureau. The source said the telegram was only a few lines long and did not mention the health of the prisoner or any plan to move him from Kratie.
>
> It gave only the name and the grade of the American, and stated that he had been captured and was being held by the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces in Kratie.
>
> Cables of this nature regularly go from Cambodia to Hanoi, then to Peking, but this was the first time in three and a half years an American name was seen.

Of course, after giving us this information, then they say that the intelligence refutes all of this information.

What we could not—just can't understand—is why, if they refute the information, why they came back and gave us this information. If they didn't put any credibility in it, why come back and tell us anything, or why the Director of Casualty flew down from Washington to talk to us in our home in Louisiana, and when they came and told us Mike had died in captivity, then sent the Service officer; and we don't understand why all the build-up of this, and then they refute it.

The Chairman. Who is "they", now? The Defense Department?

Mrs. Varnado. The Army or the Defense Department.

The Chairman. Why did they refute it? Maybe you can clear it up a little more, Mr. MacDonald.

Mr. MacDonald. The initial reports concerning Warrant Officer Varnado were based upon returning prisoners of war who had indi-

cated he was in a fairly serious medical condition when last seen, although none of them had seen him actually expire. An additional report tended to indicate that it might have been Warrant Officer Varnado who had expired in that particular camp at about that time frame.

Then, when the Paris Peace Treaty was signed, his name appeared on a list of "died in captivity" furnished by the DRV forces. On this basis, he was determined to have died in 1970.

When this other report came in, it was obviously emanating from a sensitive source in Peking, China, the only way that it would have been possible to know that Prince Norodom Sihanouk had actually seen the message.

When the Army made an attempt to go back and trace the source and get an evaluation of the credibility of that source from the agent, they could no longer contact that particular indigenous individual. Apparently the intelligence community had lost all contact with him.

Although I understand that the Army had posed a series of detailed questions in order to test the nature of the source, as I understand it, the source was described as not yet having established a record of credibility. He had previously provided information to the intelligence community, some of which was reliable and verified, other of which was inaccurate and proved to be so.

Because of this, we were unable to test the source. Therefore, this remains as a single report indicating a possibility that Mike Varnado was still alive, and on that basis I believe that the Army then felt that there was insufficient evidence of prima facie nature to warrant a change in status.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the status has not been changed, then?

Mr. MACDONALD. He is still carried as having died in 1970. The only report since that time is this report that apparently emanated from Peking.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that the DRV——

Mr. MACDONALD. They are the ones, yes, sir, that turned over the list of died in captivity.

The CHAIRMAN. His name was on that list? It didn't come from Cambodia?

Mr. MACDONALD. The Cambodian nation provided it to the DRV and the DRV provided the list of all those who had died in captivity.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any other comments, Mrs. Varnado?

Mrs. VARNADO. Just the fact that Colonel Bobinski told us, when he came to us in March of 1975, that they had had this information since December of 1974. They had checked and rechecked the source to be sure of the reliability of it, and he gave us that reason, gave us that as his reason for not coming to us earlier with the information.

Then he cautioned us, too, about giving out any news releases—that it might jeopardize any chances of survival of Mike if we gave out any news releases.

Well, if they didn't place any credibility in the report, how could you jeopardize any chances if they didn't believe this?

We have a lot of questions. Where would this indigenous source in Cambodia get a name like Michael B. Varnado, and his number, and everything?

How would they get this information, unless they did see some records, or they did know something about the situation?

Mr. MACDONALD. Mr. Chairman, may I add one point that has not been brought out?

A second name was mentioned in that cablegram, Army Specialist Fifth Class Harris. He was shot down in a helicopter in 1971. There were reports that he had been killed in the crash, but again, there was no prima facie evidence that he was.

I believe what Mrs. Varnado is bringing out is that here were the names of two Americans shot down approximately a year apart, both mentioned 3 or 4 years later in a message from Cambodia and received in Peking, China; the spelling of the names was correct. In the case of Harris, his first name, Glen—G-L-E-N—one N—rather than the usual two N's, and that was the correct spelling.

The uniqueness of an agent in Peking being able to pick up the identity of two Americans, with the correct spelling of their names, is what makes the case so confusing, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Guyer, do you have questions?

Mr. GUYER. First of all, I want to thank Mrs. Varnado for making what has to be a very laborious journey to come here, having double sustained the anguish and deprivation and sorrow that goes with the loss of this enormity.

I am a little like you, Mrs. Varnado. I do not quite understand why the Department of the Government—whether it's State or Defense or Army, or whatever it might be—would rekindle the hopes, unless they had some strong substance that hope was there.

I do think they owe it to you, if they thought any outside information might have been floating around, that would be casually coming to you, as it would be a real shock if there were public knowledge that you had not been given privately.

But I would hope that they would have explored the reliability of the source.

The only thing I can take from this is that I see no intelligent reason why these people would suddenly select your son's name and say he is alive as of 1974, unless there was some purpose to suit their ends.

Or it could be reliable, and then it would be our fault it was not verified. It still leaves some question marks in my mind.

Mrs. VARNADO. It leaves a lot of questions in our mind. If he died in prison camp, they must know where he died and where the body is, and why don't they produce it?

Mr. GUYER. That's right. I think you are entitled, and through us you should be receiving some help along that line, because there should be no mystery as to his whereabouts if he died in a prison camp and it was known.

I do not know who the people were who have seen your son and as to what the gravity of his condition was or how they described it.

Mrs. VARNADO. One was the copilot, Maslowski, and Crowson, who was maybe the crew chief.

My husband talked to both of those men by telephone. I have not talked to them. I'm not sure which one—I think maybe it was Crowson—that felt that Mike was not dead. He had been the last one who saw him, and he told my husband that Mike's hopes were too high,

his will to live was too great, his spirits were just real good, and although he was injured, wounded, he just never had any idea that Mike, you know, died.

Mr. GUYER. Were any of the men killed by the impact, do you know?

Mrs. VARNADO. I believe one.

Mr. GUYER. But most of them were able to either walk away or be carried away?

Mrs. VARNADO. One escaped.

Mr. GUYER. Were they taken to a camp in Cambodia, or was it moved up into North Vietnam?

Mrs. VARNADO. I guess it was South Vietnam, with the Viet Cong.

The CHAIRMAN. It was South Vietnam?

Mr. MACDONALD. It was Cambodia, sir.

Mrs. VARNADO. Well, Cambodia, or South Vietnam, or something.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to take the colonel by surprise, but Colonel Bobinski is in the audience today. I think he was the one that talked to you, wasn't he, Mrs. Varnado?

Mrs. VARNADO. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe he can comment—all we are trying to do is get as much information on the record as we can. Do you care to make any comments on that, Colonel?

Colonel BOBINSKI. If I may, sir, one of the questions Mrs. Varnado asked is as to why I was sent down.

Up in the very beginning, in 1972, I was a special assistant in DA for prisoner of war and missing in action affairs, and subsequently took over the directorate.

Between the time that I started as the special assistant, until the time I took up the directorate, I had established a very close rapport with a number of the families.

When the information came to our attention in December, we presented the information to my boss, and to Dr. Shields, and the intelligence community. We asked then that the information be thoroughly evaluated, and once the information came back from the intelligence community indicating that whatever information we had on board now certainly refutes the information that was in the telegram, I then recommended that we had been above board with the families from the very beginning, and that certainly the Varnados would be entitled—and the Harris family, who is the other family involved—should be entitled to any information we might have, regardless of the fact that we dispute the validity of the information.

Because, should it come to light at a later time, through the media, then we in the Department of Defense would be left red-faced for not having told the families this.

And we fully realized we might raise the hopes of the family members, and we tried to express our nonsupporting information that was in the telegram, and I believe—and Mrs. Varnado can correct me if I am wrong—that I stated several times that we really didn't hold too much faith in the information that was provided to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Based on the information you had, that's why the status was not changed?

Colonel BOBINSKI. Yes, sir. The fact that Specialist Crowson and Maslowski indicated that they had seen Mike, I think the day they were departing the camp, Mike was being taken to a hospital, and

indicated that he was quite happy to be going to a hospital so that he might get his wounds tended to; and subsequent to that, of course, we received the information that Mike had died in captivity.

But Specialist Crowson, I believe——

The CHAIRMAN. And then the name came out from the DRV on a list? His name was one of those on the list that had died in captivity in 1973?

Colonel BOBINSKI. Yes, sir, which was presented to us in Paris; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Even before that, you had declared him as killed in action with the other information that you had?

Colonel BOBINSKI. No, sir. Mike was not declared until the list came out, and we established his date of death as of, I believe, September 21, 1970, which was shortly after the incident.

Mr. GUYER. Was there any mention made as to what they did with the bodies of the men?

Colonel BOBINSKI. No, sir, there was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it a prison camp in Cambodia? And the crash of the helicopter was in Cambodia?

Colonel BOBINSKI. In talking to Maslowski, one of the returnees, he had thought they had landed in South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Right on the border?

Colonel BOBINSKI. Yes, sir. It was in Kratie Province, and not having a map, I can't give you the approximate location, but Maslowski thought they were in South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ottinger?

Mr. OTTINGER. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harkin?

Mr. HARKIN. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Guyer?

Mr. GUYER. What was the fate of the rest of the crew, or those on board?

Colonel BOBINSKI. Mr. Maslowski and Specialist Crowson returned. The other names escape me. There were a total of eight individuals on board the aircraft.

Mrs. VARNADO. Captain Young.

Colonel BOBINSKI. Yes, Captain Young. I don't have the incident book with me. I can't recall.

Mr. GUYER. But three or four came home?

Colonel BOBINSKI. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, Specialist Karreci came out earlier.

Mrs. VARNADO. And I believe the Richardson would be Bob Richardson, who is still carried as an MIA; and Price.

Colonel BOBINSKI. Price. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Varnado, we have tried to get in touch with the Cambodians. Mrs. Schroeder on this committee was in Peking, and we asked her to represent the committee and go to the Cambodian Embassy and make some contact with the new Cambodian Government. They would not even talk to her on the phone.

When we were in Hanoi, the four members of this committee tried to get in touch—they have an embassy in Hanoi—and they didn't answer the phone.

We have tried to go through other sources, and it's not just this committee, it's also other governments that cannot get in touch with the new Cambodian Government.

Mrs. VARNADO. I realize that, I mean, from what you hear on the TV and radio and read in the papers, they are just cut off from all the outside world, aren't they?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Colonel, have we been in touch with Prince Sihanouk and received some information from him saying they were not holding any prisoners?

Colonel BOBINSKI. Is Dr. Shields here?

There has been some contact with the Cambodians. Now, it wasn't at my level.

Mrs. VARNADO. Senator Mansfield—we have a copy of a letter he wrote, and an answer from Prince Sihanouk, last summer. And, of course, he said they are not holding anybody in his country, or something to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Prince Sihanouk said this?

Mrs. VARNADO. Yes.

Colonel BOBINSKI. The Varnados have been in contact by telegram.

Mrs. VARNADO. We had a telegram from Prince Sihanouk in 1971, and then we answered it, and I sent a letter to him addressed to Mike, and asked if he would help to get it to him, to Mike. And he wrote back and said it had been forwarded to the proper authorities to get it to Mike—or—let's see.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Chief of State, acknowledges receipt of your letter dated November 4, 1971, asking him to forward your letter to your son, Warrant Officer Michael B. Varnado. The Prince asked me to assure you that your letter has been given to the authorities competent to handle the matter. Best wishes.

I can't pronounce his name—S-i-s-o-w-a-t-h M-e-t-h-a-v-i—Director of the Cabinet.

Colonel BOBINSKI. Mr. Chairman, for the record, if I may, I will provide Mr. MacDonald exactly where Maslowski and Crowson came out, through what country and what time.[1]

But, as I indicated, Mr. Maslowski thought they were in South Vietnam, but I will provide that for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Mr. Guyer?

Mr. GUYER. I am just curious what the real purpose of our hearing is today. Whether we are going to try to keep faith with further exploration and inquiry, or whether we are at a terminal point so far as the record goes.

Is the Department looking further into it, as we are?

Colonel BOBINSKI. Yes, sir, we had developed a list of questions through our intelligence communitv that go back through the intelligence community overseas, in an attempt to contact the source. Some of the questions, for example, were whether or not the telegram that he saw was written in French, whether it was in English, or whether it was in the native tongue, and a number of other questions which escape me for the moment.

[1] Specialist Maslowski was released February 12, 1973 at An Loc, Republic of South Vietnam. Specialist Crowson was released February 12, 1973 at Loc Ninh, Republic of South Vietnam.

But it was a rather detailed list of questions that go back to the source.

Mr. GUYER. I would rather hope this could be one of the cases that we would personally pursue, since so many of them do not have any suggested kind of optimism, but here we do have a case where there was some evidence, and we do not know what kind of motivation would have inspired that.

So I think we owe that to the family not to put them through any more ordeal, but at least, since it does have a question mark, if we get access to the country and files, we ought to certainly keep you advised and work with you on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mrs. Varnado, that's why we had you up here, to bring the case before the committee and to regenerate some new interest in the case.

And, of course, we can make no promises, or give any hope, but we will do the best we can, and we will follow up with the Cambodian Government whenever and wherever we can get in touch with them, and also through the DRV.

Do you have any other comments?

Mrs. VARNADO. No; I don't guess I do.

Mr. GUYER. Are there any family requests that you think we can be helpful as a committee to cooperate with you, that have not already been done?

Mrs. VARNADO. No, sir.

Mr. GUYER. You and your husband still have not agreed as to the conclusion? You mentioned that it is difficult for him to accept this? Have you reconciled to it?

Mrs. VARNADO. No; I am in a state of limbo. I just don't—I try not to think about it. It's something you just have to put out of your mind; because you have to go on living. And I can't accept the fact that Mike's dead, and I can't accept the fact that he's living, you know.

You just can't think about that 24 hours a day, although you can't get away from it 24 hours a day. But I just am in a state of limbo.

It would be much easier if we did know, one way or the other. If he's dead, we could accept that. If we knew he was living, you know, we could hope.

Mr. GUYER. But it would give you more peace of mind if you knew his whereabouts or burial, or whatever.

Mrs. VARNADO. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is certainly what we are trying to do. We are taking the approach that they are alive, and if we can't pick up that information, we are trying to get information of what did happen to them. This is one of the cases that we are working on.

Mrs. VARNADO. Good.

Well, is there nobody that can do anything about the ones who died over there? I mean, if they say one died in a prison camp, why can't they verify it? Why don't they return the remains?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is what we are doing, that is what we are working on every day. That is why we went to Hanoi.

I agree with you. I don't know why they won't give us this information. It is not gaining anything for anyone. And it slows down the whole process of dealing with the North Vietnamese.

I agree with you, why don't they give us the information? What good is it to them? They are not going to bargain with them.

But they just move slower than we do. So far, Mrs. Varnado, the things the North Vietnamese have told us they would do, they have done. But they haven't told us yet that they are going to give us all this information.

But that is what we are pushing, that is what we are pursuing, and we hope we can get that answer.

Mrs. VARNADO. You will be going back over there soon?

The CHAIRMAN. I think so. We are going to try to go back to Hanoi during the Easter recess. We know the North Vietnamese have a lot of information about these particular cases. And since Warrant Officer Varnado was on their list of died in captivity, I am sure they have some information on that.

But we don't know that much from Laos, whether they have anything or not, or whether Cambodia has any information or not. I just don't think they kept any records in my personal view.

But I do think the North Vietnamese and some of the former Viet Cong do have some information.

We appreciate very much your being here.

Mrs. VARNADO. Thank you. I appreciate the chance to come and tell our story.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Our next witness is the father of a serviceman missing in action. He is Col. Vincent J. Donahue of Florida.[1] Colonel Donahue is a retired colonel in the U.S. Air Force, now director of security for Pan American Airlines in Florida. During his Air Force career he was often involved in military security and law enforcement.

Colonel Donahue's son, Morgan, was lost in a midair collison over Laos in 1968. In an attempt to locate his son, Colonel Donahue has expended considerable time and money since 1968 trying to find out on his own something about his son. He has traveled to Laos several times and has made many efforts to gain information about any Americans who may still be held by Communist forces in the area.

Colonel Donahue, you may have a seat there, and Mr. MacDonald, will you read to the committee the information we have on Colonel Donahue's son?

Mr. MACDONALD. Morgan was one of seven crew members abroad a C–123 aircraft that apparently collided in midair with a B–57 on December 13, 1968, at 3 o'clock in the morning in the Tchepone area of Laos.

Thomas M. Turner, the C–123 aircraft commander, and the only recovered crewmember, stated that while he was descending he saw another parachute and two or three fires. He was unaware of the other aircraft involved, and did not know if it was one of the fires he saw or not.

He never heard any other crewmembers come up on the radio. Search and rescue forces did not observe any chutes, hear any beeper signals, or detect any other indications of the other six C–123 crewmembers.

Negative results were obtained from extensive electronic and visual searches, and search and rescue operations were officially suspended at 9 o'clock, December 15, 1968.

[1] See p. 460.

No further information regarding the aircraft incident has been forthcoming.

It is principally Colonel Donahue's efforts in Laos since that time that I think would be of direct interest to the committee.

Colonel DONAHUE. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to greet you and Mr. Ottinger and Mr. Tennyson Guyer—which I think is a most distinguished name, if I may say so.

A former POW in the group this afternoon has asked me if he may tape this presentation. Without the permission of the Chair, apparently this is not possible. So I address the question to you, in his behalf.

The CHAIRMAN. A member of the audience?

Colonal DONAHUE. A former POW who is with the family group as a whole, and lends them moral support. He is here today and would like to tape my testimony, if possible.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't have any objection.

Mr. GUYER. I have no objection.

Mr. OTTINGER. No objection.

Mr. GUYER. It's public information.

The CHAIRMAN. You can tape it, if there's no objection.

Mr. OTTINGER. I have no objection at all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

Colonel DONAHUE. I have one other request. I have some reproduced excerpts from two widely distributed periodicals which, with your permission, at the end of my testimony, I would ask that I be allowed to distribute to those present.

One of them is a summary of the MIA situation from Newsweek, and the other is an advertisement, copies of an advertisement paid for by members of the National League of Families.

The CHAIRMAN. Any objection?

Are you asking to put this in the record?

Colonel DONAHUE. If you will so endorse, we would be pleased to have it in the record, sir. As far as I know, neither piece of information has ever been entered in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. This is 800 pages? We have only a certain amount of money to print the hearings.

Colonel DONAHUE. No, no, just 2 pages.

Mr. OTTINGER. Could we just see the information?

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you go ahead with your testimony, or do you want to read it right now?

Mr. GUYER. I think, in the interest of time, let's have the testimony first, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF COL. VINCENT J. DONAHUE OF FLORIDA

Colonel DONAHUE. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin what I have to say with an expression of appreciation to you and the members of your committee.

I am aware that this is an additional duty laid upon you by the Chief Executive, and I am sure that you all have more than enough to do as it is, so we appreciate your time and your sincere efforts to be of help to the families.

With your permission, I would like to preface any question and answer, inquiry, or interrogation period—it makes no difference to me—with a résumé of the MIA situation as seen from the viewpoint of an MIA father.

There is an old line about not knowing how the Indian feels unless you have walked in his moccasins, and there may be strong feelings expressed in my words, but there is nothing of a personal nature, nothing of a political nature about them. They are, I think, representative of the way the families feel about the handling of the entire POW/MIA issue.

With your permission, I would like to read for the record my presentation, and then make myself available for any questions you or other members of your committee may address to me.

The CHAIRMAN. How long is your statement?

Colonel Donahue. It will take me 20 minutes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe it would be better if you would summarize it and then give the members the opportunity to ask questions.

Colonel DONAHUE. All right, sir, let me begin with the original part of this presentation.

I first wish to refresh your memories as far as certain utterances of a very high official of the U.S. Government is concerned. His first words, on January 24, 1973, were, and I quote:

"The return of American personnel and the accounting for the missing in action is unconditional and will take place within the same time frame as the American withdrawal."

Second utterance by the same individual, in an address made to the National League of Families board of directors in February 1974, and I quote:

"There is a good possibility of Americans still being held alive in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."

Mr. OTTINGER. When was that made?

Colonel DONAHUE. February 1974. I think the league reports will reflect the exact date. Colonel Hopper, I am sure, could give us the exact date.

On November 24, 1975, the same individual addressed the members of the Economic Club in Detroit, Mich., which was after the Communists had given the United States its first military defeat and had overrun Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, at that time he said:

"We, the United States, have brought peace to our Nation for the first time in a decade and a half."

I refer to the self-styled "Lone Ranger," Henry Kissinger.

I think, Mr. Chairman, regardless of who uttered them, regardless of political persuasion or position, that they are specious words, Machiavellian words. They are anguish-inducing words. They are heartbreak-causing words, and they have served no purpose over the years other than to cause the next of kin of the MIA's to be incensed.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Donahue, I hate to interrupt you here, but going back to what Secretary Kissinger said, what did he say about it—that there are some Americans alive there? Did I understand you to say that?

Colonel DONAHUE. Yes, sir. In 1974, in February, he addressed the board of directors of the League of Families assembled here in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. February 1974?

Colonel DONAHUE. Yes, sir; and at that time, his direct quote was, "There's a good possibility of Americans still being held alive in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think we should have that for the record——

Colonel DONAHUE. Excuse me, sir. The statement of Dr. Kissinger was made to the board of directors of the National League of Families in a meeting with Secretary Kissinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this is not what he told the committee in the past.

Mr. OTTINGER. We certainly would ask him about this when we next meet with him.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; when we next meet with him.

Colonel DONAHUE. It's documented.

The CHAIRMAN. In his statement to us, I had the impression that he felt there were no Americans being held alive as prisoners in North and South Vietnam. In Laos, I think he said he did not know, and he did not know in Cambodia.

Colonel DONAHUE. If I may comment on that comment, Mr. Chairman, too frequently the statements of the next of kin and their beliefs, their presumptions, are dismissed as hearsay, and yet I would say that the opinions of Mr. Kissinger are also hearsay, because he has no first-hand knowledge. He knows only what the enemy tells him. It is vital to realize and to understand that there has never been an organization activated, chartered, funded, and given a mission, with the directed, mandatory support of all members of the intelligence community, to resolve the MIA issue. Even the members of this august body deal with the DOD and deal with State and deal with the enemy, and get only hearsay.

So when Mr. Kissinger makes a statement to the effect that he believes there are no more Americans alive in that part of the world, we do not have demonstrable evidence; we do not have remains; we do not have eyewitnesses.

And I think, as Admiral McCain, former CINCPAC, does, that to believe the Communists, who would destroy us, despite their bland, ingratiating, gentle ways, is insanity.

You can read about this type of personality in a book by Ruth Benedict, "The Chrysanthemum and the Sword," written about the Japanese after World War II. The enemy tells us what pleases him to tell us.

We held up Hanoi's plan of conquest of Southeast Asia for 10 years. The North Vietnamese hate us. They would do anything to torment, divide, humiliate, and embarrass us.

When someone asks me why would they hold back on American MIA's knowing what they are, and what they stand for, and how without Christian principle they are, I would ask you the reasonable question, why would they not hold back?

From the very beginning, Mr. Chairman, the MIA issue has been mishandled by State and by DOD, going back in my own case—which is representative—to the letters we received from the personnel center at Randolph. At that time, the casualty officer was an Air Force lieutenant colonel by the name of J. G. Luther.

And in his first letter, which touched upon already provided information about the MIA status of our son, he instructed us not to dis-

close what had happened to my son or his fate to anyone. And it began there.

We can take this up through 1975, when Lt. Col. Kain, who worked with General Ralph "Chappe" James, USAF, leaked to the news media the damndest calumny that has ever been uttered—that the families did not want their next of kin declared dead, presumptively declared dead, because they wanted to continue receiving the pay and allowances of these men.

I think that since we are a cross section of the American population, that except for a few people who have been overcome by the dimensions of the problem, there is not a family member in the league who would take $1 million or more for the finger or the toe of the loved one, let alone his very life.

And now we get to a Major Silverbush, who is assigned today to the Air Force Casualty Office at Randolph AFB. As a casualty officer, he has the responsibility of visiting the families, the next of kin of the MIA's, to offer consolation, sympathy, or possible assistance in the name of the Air Force.

Major Silverbush—and this can be demonstrated; the league can prove it—has attempted to persuade MIA families to ask for a PFOD. He is playing God, that is: "You can start your life over again, have your son or your husband or your brother or your father, declared dead and move on and establish a new life for yourself."

You all know Dr. Frank Sieverts. He and I are adversaries because of our positions on the MIA issue. His words, that I am about to quote to you convey, I think, the State Department's position in this matter.

In July of 1974, the National League of Families held its annual, sorrowful conference in the Hilton Hotel in Omaha, Nebr. I talked to Dr. Sieverts in the lobby, and during the course of that conversation—and the words are indelibly scored in my mind—he said:

"If I had my way, I would have all of the MIA's presumptively declared dead immediately, and thus I would bring an end to the anguish and pain of all of these nice family members."

Is he so naive or stupid that he thinks that by the stroke of a pen in the hands of a chairman of a PFOD panel or board that he is going to answer the ultimate question in the hearts and minds of the loved ones of the MIA's?

Frank Sieverts said that to me, and I kept my cool, and I am proud of myself.

I did not greet Mr. McCloskey; when I greeted the other members, he was not here. I would like to, sir, and I would like also to refer to a recent comment by you to the effect that, although at one time there may have been some MIA's alive in the mountains or in the hills of Laos, that the fact that any of them are alive today would be very, very slim—the probability would be very slim.

These words, in effect consummate what I have been saying here. Had our Government acted promptly and properly in this matter, and had we not engaged in years of rhetoric and tennis-balling the issue back and forth, these men who were alive at that time might still be alive today—if indeed if they are no longer alive.

DOD, of course, is an instrumentality of the State Department. I spent almost three decades in the U.S. Air Force. I know whereof I speak. If you are a colonel and you are a general, particularly where anything controversial is concerned, you don't go to the bathroom without getting permission and clearance from the Department of State.

And yet, DOD is an entity in itself. So, despite the fact that it lowkeys the MIA issue, despite the fact that the generals and colonels are disloyal or do not demonstrate loyalty downward to those men who made them generals through their efforts and bearing of arms, the MIA issue is admittedly damned poor publicity for recruiting purposes, for obtaining officer training school candidates. DOD too, would like for this issue to go away and never hear of it again.

DOD constantly puts the families down. As I say, the allegations are hearsay, or, in the case of a mother who is not here today, whose story required some sympathy, a sympathetic ear, a shrug of the shoulders, a rolling of the eyeballs, a touching of the head put her story away, and she has faded from the scene, although she to this moment will attest to what she saw and what she heard and what she believed.

It really costs you to be a member of this unhappy group. My own wife had a coronary last fall which the doctors attributed it to stress, stress born of the loss and the lack of resolution of the case of her first-born son.

She is recovering, but unfortunately the stress situation is still there, and I fear for her, while I also die a little bit every week, every month myself.

I have lived my life. My son hasn't. My son, whom I loaned to the service, has a right to his life if he is a MIA, and the service, instead of coming out in 1973, immediately after the Paris peace accords, with a PFOD program which was to PFOD all MIA's within a year—this is loyalty downward?

Fortunately, the families, at their own expense, were able to take this issue to the Federal courts. The law under which the PFOD's were being accomplished was declared to be unconstitutional. The PFOD's were stopped. The regulations were changed, and the PFOD's can now be resumed, although, by a tacit agreement apparently between the families and State and DOD, they are in abeyance.

But the sword of Damocles is hanging. We don't know when the doorbell is going to ring and there will be a couple of men in uniform, one a chaplain and one a personnel officer, come to administer the coup de grace where my son is concerned.

Of our Chief Executive, the Commander in Chief, who expects unquestioning obedience and loyalty from the Armed Forces, I think he, too, must realize that the Armed Forces, the people in trouble, specifically the MIA's, warrant his loyalty and his attention.

I think his interest to date in this problem has been an avuncular one. He listens, he nods, he puffs his pipe, makes a few comments, and then puts the matter out of mind until the next unavoidable meeting is forced upon him.

What I am giving is the impression from the other side of the fence: How it feels to be and to exist as a MIA parent.

And, unfortunately, Mr. Ford has placed all of his trust in the Secretary of State, and has assigned him this problem. And, other than for the three utterances that I quoted for you, Mr. Kissinger has not seen fit to vigorously or aggressively address this problem

since he walked away from the Paris Peace Accord tables, to which he had affixed his signature to the documents concerned.

Every other issue in this country seems to have had priority. I have nothing against amnesty, for example. I think there must be a time of healing and coming together. But not until those who went and fought are brought home.

According to Selective Service, in June of 1975—2,911 out of the 5,555 signups for the clemency program had deserted or defected again and were out of the program. But they were physically well, they were intact, and hurrah for them. They were free men, which the MIA's are not.

And Senator Charles Goodell today has the affront to ask that the program be reactivated so that clemency can be universally administered.

But going back to DOD and the personnel center at Randolph, to close that phase of what I have to say I am not just recounting another MIA horror story. There are stories that family members could tell you that you wouldn't believe.

We have a young man here today, for example, who spent 5 years in Hanoi, whose mother did not—was informed that he was an MIA; he was second of a small group released, for whatever the motivation, by the enemy.

Those in his camp who were released by the enemy came out of that camp to freedom. They knew he was alive. They knew he was well. But when they were debriefed by State and DOD, it was made known to them that it was State and DOD's prerogative to inform his family that he was an MIA, not a POW.

When he got out a couple of years later, he learned that DOD and State had never bothered to inform his mother that he was a POW, so that she had that period of anguish to live with.

That's only one of many. What I am trying to tell you here is, whether by misguided conviction, by order, or by design, the DOD personnel involved, and specifically in the case of the Air Force, the Casualty Center people at Randolph, do not believe, will not believe, that any MIA's or POW's were alive, "unless they are deserters." And that the Center, and DOD seek a declaration of finding death in all cases.

Something that troubles us, just for the record, is that recent media disclosures have now informed us that some of our key Government officials secretly promised North Vietnam up to $3.5 billion to rehabilitate that country after the hostilities ceased. This is almost three times the amount that the United States expended in Japan, a country of four or five times the population of Vietnam.

We have always helped those we have defeated in battle, but this new wrinkle of helping the victor in the battle, I don't understand, and I don't think the MIA's can hope to understand until the issue is resolved.

Let me address the committee, please, in reference to the select committee.

Tragically, the lifespan of this committee is but 1 year. And equally tragically, the amount of time available and money allocated are grossly inadequate.

In relation to the billions of dollars of taxpayers' hard-earned money which Secretary Kissinger has committed to Israel and Egypt, with more millions to follow, for what at best can be described as an uneasy peace, certainly the budget of this committee seems meager indeed.

The sobering and frightening aspect of this committee from the viewpoint of those of us on the other side is that you all, with your severely delimited charter, will eventually, if you continue to function as we see the committee function, you will inevitably submit a report to the Chief Executive which will contain a note of finality. Unless you are skillful enough, courageous enough, smart enough, and lucky enough to outmaneuver Hanoi, outmaneuver State, and outmaneuver DOD, the case for the MIA is absolutely, utterly hopeless.

Should the final report of the committee be negative, when you submit it to the President, it follows that he will probably, or in all probability, address the Congress, explain what has happened, that the problem is not amenable to solution, and that the time has come to close the history book on the ugly chapter of the entire Vietnamese involvement, which persists because of the MIA issue.

Immediately thereafter, DOD will cut the string that holds this sword of Damocles, and the PFOD's will begin on a chronological basis. Even if they were not expedited, within a year or two, just the routine processing, this action will eliminate the MIA problem for Hanoi, for the committee, for DOD, and for State. Within 18 months there won't be any MIA's officially alive; ergo, there won't be any problem.

Sometimes, Mr. Chairman, we family members feel like ants on a great big log floating down the Mississippi River and trying to steer that log. And that's a bad, hopeless feeling to have.

Unfortunately, if the MIA problem goes away for Hanoi and for DOD and for State, it will never go away for those of us who lost our loved ones, as I say, from the stroke of a bureaucratic pen.

I would remind you—I think you probably already know it—of something Mr. Kissinger has never told the American people, and that is, once our Government has declared our MIA's deceased. PFOD'ed, the enemy no longer has any responsibility to account for them. So if they are forsaken, abandoned, betrayed by their country by a presumptive finding of death, they will have left to them nothing but slavery and degradation, and, I'm sure, their hope they will die as soon as possible in capitivity.

I fear that nothing will come of what I am about to say, but I am obligated by my heart and by my conviction to at least speak these words.

I have to recommend to the committee two courses of action either of which could conceivably resolve the MIA problem. These are options probably known to Mr. Kissinger, but he has never seen fit to take cognizance of them.

The first recommended course of action incorporates a very ugly word to Americans, a repugnant word, it is the term "ransom." However emotionally loaded that word may be, I think it is important that we remind ourselves that during the administration of John F. Kennedy, the ransom technique was used with the approval of this

Government through private business channels to buy out prisoners with pharmaceuticals, with tractors, with commodities, and other things needed by Cuba.

As practitioners of the law are wont to say, the precedent was thereby established, set in concrete, if you will, for all time.

And in the case of our MIA's today, the MIA's of the Vietnamese conflict, the $3½ billion which Mr. Kissinger proposed to back up his article 21 of the Paris peace accords are ostensibly to rebuild North and South Vietnam. These dollars are truly a grand plum which Hanoi wants so badly that it would surely be willing to cooperate where the MIA's are concerned to acquire them.

No money for rehabilitation. We don't rehabilitate the victor who brought on himself what happened. But ransom.

You are from Mississippi, and I heard this story in Mississippi, Mr. Chairman. About the young country boy on a Saturday night. He went to town to a honky tonk, and he had a small roll of bills in his pocket which he thought was bigger than it was, really. He approached a lady of the night at the other end of the room and asked if she would bestow upon him her favors for $50.

She was delighted at the thought. So they had a drink before leaving the premises to go elsewhere, and he happened to see that he didn't have quite as much money in that roll as he thought. So he reopened the issue and asked if she would mind spending the night with him for $25.

She became very indignant, and she said, "What do you think I am?"

His answer was, "We have already established that; we have already demonstrated that. Now we are just talking about the price."

So I think that it's a little late in the ballgame, since the Bay of Pigs, for us to get religion and to become hypocritical overnight. If ransom is going to get these men out, and in no other way will they be gotten out, Good Lord, let's press on, buy them out, one by one, until they are all home safe.

The world knows what we are since the Bay of Pigs. We talk out of both sides of our mouths. This is no time to change, until the men are home, and then maybe we can reembark on that course and stay on it.

The second approach is for the President and Commander in Chief to read up on his history books and to learn, if he doesn't already know, or to relearn if he has forgotten, that for almost this entire century, the whole world has benefited from the largess of the United States, which has been excoriated and put down all around the world.

After World War I we had the Hoover plan. Herbert Hoover at that time spread our money and our wealth throughout war-torn and pestilence-ridden Europe.

World War II saw the Marshall plan, which was international and then the Berlin Airlift, which kept West Germany from being absorbed, amoebalike, by the Russians.

Then the multifacted AID program, which has scattered our money around the world in so many ways and in such large amounts that nobody can actually tell you exactly how much and where.

I know, since we have started giving, we have given Indira Ghandi $10 billion, for which she spits in our eye.

The United States has responded to virtually every famine and every natural disaster. Witness the earthquake in Guatemala. When we are finished helping the poor Guatemalans, we will be another $2 or $3, or $4 or $5 million out of pocket.

And we have never tied a string to any of this aid. We have never asked for anything in return.

I think the time has come now for the Commander in Chief to stand up, and in a loud and clear voice, address all of the heads of state of the world and ask for a one-time payment on that loan, interest free, in the name of a humanitarian cause. That payment is to be their voices in unison, directed toward Hanoi, expressing extreme displeasure with Hanoi's failure to live up to the Paris peace accords, and to demand that Hanoi immediately release our MIA's and account for our dead. North Vietnam is working on erecting a facade of a peace-loving nation. She wishes to become a respected member of the community of nations of the world—these are voices to which Hanoi will respond.

But the President must do it. He must personally get involved as the Commander in Chief, and not delegate it to the Lone Ranger.

I would like to close the presentation I have here with words which really mean a lot to me. They are not lengthy.

I think if Mr. Ford were to implement either of these two options, there will come to him and to all Americans that peace which comes from service to one's fellowman—in this case, those who have not yet returned from Southeast Asia to their homeland.

Mr. Ford's actions will reflect the single greatest attribute which all of us have been taught that man can have, one which we have been taught since we were children, love for our fellowman.

A poet named Leigh Hunt many years ago wrote a poem entitled, "Abou Ben Adhem."

It had to do with a man who awoke one night and discovered an angel in his room, writing in a golden book the names of those who loved the Lord. Hunt wrote:

> And Abou said, "Is mine one?
> "Nay, not so," replied the Angel.
> Abou spoke more low, but cheerily still;
> "I pray thee, then, write me as one that loves his fellow man."
> And the Angel wrote, and vanished.
> The next night, it came again, with a great wakening light,
> And showed the names whom love of God had blessed—
> And lo! Ben Adhem's name
> Led all the rest.

How much more noble and uplifting this course of action by the President, rather than for him to shoulder the blame throughout eternity for inscribing upon the tombstones of the MIA's the word "betrayed." And by so doing, also letting the enduring memory of those brave, patriotic warriors create a bier for the coffin of American integrity.

So much for my prepared presentation, Mr. Chairman. I am at your disposition.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Colonel, for that sincere and straightforward testimony that you have given today.

I will be brief. I only have a couple of comments, and maybe one question, so the other members will have the opportunity.

Actually, everyone on this committee asked to serve on it. They had other obligations. They are like the other 425 Members of the House, they are vitally interested in the missing in action, but they have taken the time, and we are all totally dedicated to try to come up with some answer on the missing in action.

And, quite frankly, the League helped form this committee.

But the missing in action, in my opinion, was on the back burner. The Defense Department, the State Department, the Excutive Branch were not doing much.

We are trying. We have held up the changes in status until this committee can write its report.

And, quite frankly, as the chairman, I just don't have any idea yet what the report will be. We still have a good 6 months left to work on this issue. We feel like we are moving well, and that if it can be done, if the answers can be found, this committee, with a few breaks and cooperation, we can come up with some of the answers.

President Ford, in my opinion—I think the committee will agree with me—has really been totally cooperative. We have been able to see him much easier than we have other Government officials, and he admits it's a frustrating issue. But he has been totally, so far, cooperative with us, and we have tried to keep him updated on the situation.

You stated that—and this is the only question I have—you stated in in your testimony that there are some Americans alive in Southeast Asia. Do you have a feel for it, and will you tell us what your opinion is? Where you get the information? Can you give the committee some type of figure, how many in North Vietnam, how many in South Vietnam, how many in Laos, and how many in Cambodia do you think could be alive?

Colonel DONAHUE. Unfortunately for families who have missing in action members in other parts of Southeast Asia, I have devoted my time primarily to the MIA situation in Laos.

In 1969, I made my first visit to Vientiane. At that time, I was able to get to and see and spend 2 hours with Soth Pethrasi, who at that time was the delegate of the Pathet Lao to the tripartite government that eventually yielded to the coalition government.

For 2 hours, I was given a lecture on dialectic materials. But I was seeking information from him. There was nothing I could do about it, and I couldn't lose my cool.

I came back a year later. I received the same treatment.

The third year, my wife prevailed upon me to take her with me, and during the course of our third meeting with him, Pethrasi became a little nostalgic. He reminisced a little bit, and he said he had lost a son at Dien Bien Phu, and knew how we felt.

And he said, "Yes, we have over 100 American MIA's." This was the chief delegate of the Pathet Lao in Vientiane talking. Today he is one of the ministers in the Pathet Lao Government. I don't know if it's transportation, education, war, or agriculture, but he is one of the ministers of the Pathet Lao Government in Vientiane now.

Subsequent to that time——

Mr. OTTINGER. Excuse me. You said he said he had more than 100 prisoners of war?

Colonel DONAHUE. American prisoners in Laos.

Mr. OTTINGER. Not MIA's; prisoners that they could identify?

Colonel DONAHUE. He could have identified them. You see, sir, as you know, except for the nine men who ostensibly came out of Laos, nothing is known about Laos. It's a land where the wheel is being invented. Even our POW's in Hanoi never saw anybody who was introduced into those camps from Laos.

To our POW's, and to most Americans, Laos is as remote and unknown as the surface of the Moon used to be.

Pethrasi said, "We have 100 Americans." He said, "But we cannot tell you who they are until we have won our just war. After all, you are imperialist, warmongering, bombing, war criminals," and so on, but, because he had mellowed due perhaps to my wife's quiet tears and my third visit, he did commit himself to say—and my wife was a witness, and the Reverend Roffe—R-o-f-f-e—who lives in Orlando, Fla. now, who was with the Evangelical church in Vientiane for more than 40 years, who functioned as our interpreter—was a witness to Pethrasi's words.

Pethrasi was a colonel in the Pathet Lao Army, but he functioned as the civilian head of the Pathet Lao delegation to the tripartite government at that time.

Mr. OTTINGER. Can you pin down that date for us?

Colonel DONAHUE. Yes, sir, I will have Earl Hopper bring you the date, from my log and airline tickets, and everything else, at home.

Pethrasi was, at the time, the highest placed Pathet Lao in Vientiene.

Mr. OTTINGER. What was the approximate date?

Colonel DONAHUE. It was in July or August. I remember because it was difficult for my wife, and at the time I felt I should never have taken her.

Mr. OTTINGER. What year?

Colonel DONAHUE. 1972. I was pleased—I was elated to hear him say this. But I also had concern for him, because I felt that if his lords and masters in Hanoi knew he had made such a statement, he would be liquidated.

Nothing came of it, because there were only the four of us present—my wife, myself, Dr. Roffe, our interpreter, and Pethrasi. And as he gained stature in the Pathet Lao Government, we lost contact with him and my correspondence to him has been returned by his government.

Mr. Chairman, in no way was I impugning this committee. You are our knights in shining armor, you are our only hope. There is nothing between us and PFOD's on a large and final scale, other than you gentlemen.

I just feel badly that you are already heavily committed timewise, and underbudgeted and understaffed, because it precludes you from doing the job that you could do.

I am sure that you are more than a match for Hanoi and more than a match for State and more than a match for DOD.

But the time to be on the jousting field is not yours. You don't have it. This is an additional burden you have taken on because you are good citizens and leaders.

The CHAIRMAN. Really, one of our concerns has been that the State Department, in effect, has turned this over to us. We haven't had any problems with their holding us back.

We certainly haven't had any problems there, or with the Defense Department. We have been doing the best we could, and nobody is pulling any reins on us. However, we are not getting much advice, either, from the State Department.

Mr. GUYER. I have a brief timespan, and I'd like to make a statement.

I have been working with the League of Families for quite some time. I am going to make a report to our Ohio people when I get back, and I agree with you that rhetoric is not the answer, and we have had a lot of it.

But in defense of the committee, I have never been on a committee, either of the Ohio Senate or the U.S. Congress, that met more frequently. I think the record will show we have been together probably over 35 times, with two trips out of the country, and there is a real dedication.

All of which has not brought about the results we want.

I want to honor you, sir. First, because of your circumstances, nobody has a better right to say what you did. Because of your experience, nobody had a better right to feel and pass along what you have given us.

We have been begging for recommendations. We are a factfinding, but not a policymaking committee, and sometimes we feel we are shuttlebugs, going back and forth, reporting, asking questions, and so forth and so on.

But I am enormously grateful to you, sir, for your speaking in behalf of so many who I know must feel as you feel, and I am astounded at the enormity of your information and the knowledgeability that you have, because there are few people who have sat there that have passed along that kind of encyclopedic information.

I hope we can do something within the time frame of this committee. Calendars become quite discouraging, and I know the long wait is not very rewarding.

Back home, we had a figure made up in barbed wire, erected as a memento of what the suffering still is. At Christmastime that one was on display in a bank in my district. And I know that words alone will not suffice or bind up the wounds or make things go away.

I want to thank the lady from Louisiana who came to us, for speaking from a mother's heart.

I am going to be interested to have the recapitulation of the entire proceedings today. I have nothing to ask. I know you can't learn with your mouth open, and I tried to absorb today what you people have said. I thank you for the opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. McCloskey?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Colonel Donahue, what year was it that you met with Reverend Roffe and Pethrasi?

Colonel DONAHUE. On three occasions, 1969, 1971, and 1972.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Was it in 1972—July or August 1972 that he made this representation?

Colonel DONAHUE. Yes.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. How do you spell his name?

Colonel DONAHUE. S-o-t-h—the h is silent. The second name is P-e-t-h-r-a-s-i—and again the h is silent, so it's pronounced "Petrasi."

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Now this conversation, where did it occur?

Colonel DONAHUE. In his compound, in his living room.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. The Pathet Lao compound?

Colonel DONAHUE. Yes, sir. I would say it encompassed 5 or 6 acres. He had a large staff of Pathet Lao soldiers.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I am going to try to be brief on this, because I have got to go. Part of the reason I am going is a meeting with one of the State Department people on this subject.

But at any time in your visit to Laos, other than this statement by Pethrasi, did you come across any other indication, or did anyone make a statement that they knew, of Americans alive anywhere in Laos?

Colonel DONAHUE. Yes, sir, I have other information along the same lines. While I happen to be a police administrator by education——

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I will have to ask you to be brief. What we want to do is pursue any facts that you have, or any information that you have.

Colonel DONAHUE. I would like to identify one man to you. His book may be in the Library of Congress. He was an Australian, an accredited Australian journalist and freelance photographer. His name is John Everingham. He wrote a book which, as best I recall, is entitled, "My 26 Days With the Pathet Lao," or words to that effect.

He was on a journalistic assignment to a royal Laotian village, and during the course of the evening's activity, shooting pictures and making notes for a feature article, he was invited by an indigenous male to a nearby village, about 10 miles away. Together they went over hill and dale on foot, to what turned out to be a Pathet Lao village—this is Everingham telling me.

He was immediately thrown into a hotbox, despite protestations, equipment, and credentials. He was kept there 3 days, until released by a North Vietnamese officer who had checked him out and learned that he was whom he purported to be.

Subsequently, Everingham lived with his erstwhile captors, at their invitation, for 23 more days, and during that period of time, according to Everingham, he was told by the Pathet Lao that they had more than 100 American airmen as prisoners. They would have to be MIA's because no word appeared on POW's—no word on POW's has ever come out of Laos.

Mr. OTTINGER. Can you give us a date on that?

Colonel DONAHUE. That would be in 1973.

Mr. OTTINGER. Is Everingham still alive?

Colonel DONAHUE. John Everingham should be. He is a young, virile man in his late twenties, early thirties.

Mr. OTTINGER. Do you know where we can reach him?

Colonel DONAHUE. Unfortunately, I don't. I hope his book is in the library. Representing the Australian press, he probably could come from only one of the two or three big cities there.

James Glerum, station chief, CIA, at Udorn, Thailand. I come from Cocoa Beach, Fla. Jim's family lives in Vero Beach, 50 miles away.

When I went into Laos initially, which was just before 1970, Jim was most helpful. I didn't have a visa. I didn't have a passport. I wanted to get to my son's station, which was at Nakhon Phenom, Thailand, which I did. Jim then helped me with an airlift into Laos, via Air America. I spent about a week there, and then they brought me back.

But Glerum, as station chief of the CIA, having personal confidence in me and knowing I had a DOD clearance, recounted Special Forces operations that he had directed, out of Udorn and Savannaket, Thailand, into central Laos to reported American POW camps.

But central Laos was a hot spot of activity. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was going strong. Many of his people—Glerum's—didn't come back. But he said, "We hit camps that had been occupied by Americans apparently just hours before." He didn't know what kind of a jungle telegraph, grapevine, or what system the enemy used, but every time his troops hit one of these primitive camps—unlike Hanoi or Son Tay—the occupants had been spirited away.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. When was the conversation?

Colonel DONAHUE. January 1969. The Pathet Lao had been taking Americans and imprisoning them in these "bamboo camps"[1] and moving them around on apparently 2 or 3 or 5 minutes' notice.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Colonel, I have to go. Have you given our staff every example of such information?

Colonel DONAHUE. No, I have more.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Could you do that?

Colonel DONAHUE. I shall, yes, sir.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I just say this. I think we ought to follow up on each one of these kinds of matters.

I have to go.

The CHAIRMAN. No problem. We can follow up on that.

Mr. OTTINGER. Unfortunately, I also have to go. But I do want to express my deep appreciation for your coming, and for your helpful testimony.

Colonel DONAHUE. I am privileged to be here.

Mr. OTTINGER. And to say to you that we are going to spend every effort to get answers. I think that, with the state of the nations, and our relationships with them being as difficult as they are, your second suggestion probably would not bear fruit. That is, to have the President call on all nations and call our due bills with them and have them put pressure on Hanoi. I doubt that they would cooperate with that at this time.

But I do think that, with respect to your first suggestion that really is what we are trying to do. That is, you suggested that we offer to pay ransom. And, whereas neither the Vietnamese nor our people would like to call a spade a spade, in a direct manner, to try to avoid the opprobrium, what we are seeking to do is to arrange an exchange whereby the Vietnamese would get the things they want, in return for facilitating an accounting for our missing in action.

We are having a terrible struggle with our own administration in getting them to go along. There is great concern on the part of the families themselves that we not make any gestures to the Southeast Asian nations without being sure we get results on our own mission, getting an accounting.

But, that is an impossible interpretation of what it is we are trying to do. We are trying to wipe the slate of the past clear, clean, to say, "What do you want? Here's what we want." See if we can't get results.

[1] See pp. 338–342.

And I think there's some promise of that if we can get the cooperation of the administration in moving forward.

I'd like to say that I think your fears about the results when we finish our business probably have merit to them, and that, for my own part, I think that until we have exhausted all the avenues—and I know there are members of the committee who may not agree with me on this—we should not allow the committee to expire until we have some confidence that we have gotten the information, that we know that the Vietnamese should have, and the Laotians—and with information that you have, hopefully we can make some progress with the Cambodians.

But until we have confidence that we have pursued these paths to the extent they can be pursued, and they either bear fruit or they don't bear fruit, I am hesitant to write a final report of this committee.

I am fearful that the short duration, even though that is what we went to the Rules Committee to ask for, I think that there is a real opportunity to get results, and until those results, such they may be, from the Vietnamese and from Laos and the Cambodians are obtained, I myself would not favor our writing for Congress an end to this pursuit.

I don't have any idea—I haven't discussed this with most of the members of the committee—how they feel about it, but I am very, very much concerned because I do think there is information to be had, and I hate to see us abandon this effort until we feel we have exhausted everything we can do.

Colonel DONAHUE. Your words are very encouraging, Mr. Ottinger, because in reality, there probably is left to you only a 4-month period in which to accomplish your mission, because of recess and because this is an election year and much has to be done. Again, we are in effect being outcrisised, which has happened to us all along, to the MIA families.

So the fact that you are entertaining the thought of asking that the life of the committee be extended until you can speak more confidently, with conviction, is reassuring to us.

We appreciate it, and I only hope it comes to pass.

Mr. OTTINGER. If I thought the effort would be fruitless, I wouldn't do that, but we have now a real indication that—from the Vietnamese—that they are anxious, in the kind of words that you are talking about, that they are anxious to deal, an indication that they have something——

Colonel DONAHUE. I can believe they are anxious to deal.

Mr. OTTINGER. That they have something to deal with. And if we cannot achieve that result within the time frame, and there still is the possibility of getting the information that they must have, I think we ought to go ahead and get it.

And that is my own personal feeling in this matter. I know the chairman feels that he gave his word, and he is somewhat uncomfortable about going for the extension, but we are going to do everything we can.

We are going to be meeting with the Secretary of State. We are going to put as much ressure as we can on him.

Colonel DONAHUE. I would offer one caution, if I may, Mr. Ottinger.

Whenever a number—either of remains or living—is offered by t
Vietnamese, I feel that that number should never be fixed upon b
American legislators, because the Vietnamese have a way then of se
ting that particular number in concrete and there are none beyon
that.

In other words, they never go the whole way initially. And if yo
settle for, say, 200 bodies, or what have you, or 10 or 15 MIA's di
covered out in the boondocks, they lock onto that and when it appear
in the American press, that's the figure to which they feel they ar
committed.

So we must—I think we have to be wary.

Mr. OTTINGER. We would like to have an accounting for every on
of our men that did not come back. But we also are realistic, and recog
nize that, in the heat of war, there are going to be some that, after the
period of time, for which that will not be possible.

But when there is a clear indication that there is information then
to be had, and I think myself that until we have gotten from them all
that we feel that can be gotten from them and satisfied ourselves on
that, we should not close this chapter.

Colonel DONAHUE. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gonzalez?

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Colonel DONAHUE. Mr. Gonzalez, may I say hello? I am a member
of the San Antonio Lions Club, and have been since 1949, and pay my
dues every month in absentia. I spent the best years of my life in
Texas.

Mr. GONZALEZ. I deeply appreciate that. I felt there was some aspect
to you that was San Antonio.

Colonel DONAHUE. I think—I don't know if it's Pearl or Lone Star.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Yes. Well, I hope that you will still consider San
Antonio a base. I have been active with the Lions off and on. Of course,
since I have been in the Congress, I haven't had too much time to be
regular about it. But I have been designated honorary member of the
San Antonio Lions Club.

Well, I apologize for arriving late.

Colonel DONAHUE. I am grateful you could come.

Mr. GONZALEZ. I had a chance to look at some of the testimony, and
some of the background, before. Your specific suggestions are of in-
terest to me.

On the question of ransom, for instance, what are your ideas of the
mechanics? In what way would the ransom be offered, to whom? For
instance, in the case of Laos, how would you suggest that it be done?

Colonel DONAHUE. The contact which the members of this committee
have already established, I am sure, would be receptive to this type of
information, not perhaps at the initial mention of it, but when they
fall back and discuss it. They may come up with a more euphemistic
term than ransom—repatriation may be more face saving, or whatever.

But the message in that part of the world is, money will buy any-
thing—your mother, your brother, your sister. The only thing that
keeps these people from being more helpful to us, those favorably dis-
posed, is because the enemy will liquidate a whole village. He just
won't recover those hiding or holed up in a village, but he will deci-
mate the entire village population.

But money in the proper amount, per capita, I think could move
those in power.

I prefer the other way, if possible, that is for the President of the
United States to stand up as the Commander in Chief of the greatest
nation in the world and assert himself by asking for support from the
heads of state of all of the nations of the world, where the MIA's are
concerned, to which we have been funneling money, help, and sup-
port without a single string, since World War I.

Only because North Vietnam is sensitive to world opinion, only be-
cause it is seeking to build this facade of being a member of the com-
munity of nations that make up the world, do I have faith in this
approach.

Mr. GONZALEZ. I gather that you feel that the leadership, the Presi-
dent or the Secretary of State, or others, have not been adamant
enough, they have not really pressed——

Colonel DONAHUE. Sir, to answer your question specifically, I think
the President has been dilatory, and I think the Secretary of State
has been completely preoccupied with, from his internationalist point
of view, matters of greater moment, forgetting the fact that this coun-
try is only as good as the grass roots people, and the grass roots peo-
ple in turn are only as good as their Government enables them to be.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Well, I think—and this is really just an impression
that I have—that given, one, an open society such as ours, and two,
the division of labor on our side, we don't have a coherence or a
monolithic structure such as these entities have; so therefore they can
play us, they can have a promise made to Senator McGovern one week,
then they might send a cooing cablegram to Mr. Montgomery, then
they might make an announcement, "Well, Senator Kennedy, if your
aides come over, we will deliver x number of bodies."

Now, whether there is any method of preconceived game plan on
their part, or not, it does appear to me that they are capitalizing and
are very well aware of our structural deficiencies and strengths, also.

Therefore, given that situation, I felt that at the very outset, when
we were organizing the committee, the first priority we had was, one,
what is it that we as a Nation have been committed to? I had the
distinct feeling all along, as a Member of the Congress, and just a
plain, ordinary citizen, too, that we weren't really informed, and I
kept raising the question about the side understandings or memoranda
or codicils to the Paris Agreements.

And the reason I did that is, in the beginning, at the time the an-
nouncements were coming through and the headlines were being made,
"Paris Agreements," "Cease Fire," President Johnson died. It coin-
cided, both the announcement and his death.

And I had access to some foreign press, the Spanish language and
French language press. In their reports of this understanding, they
were absolutely emphatic and very definite that a commitment had
been made by us in terms of reparations, reconstruction—call it what-
ever you will—you know, actual money.

Colonel DONAHUE. Yes.

Mr. GONZALEZ. So I had the impression, reading the foreign press
accounts, that this must have been a very big issue with the other side,
confirming what you said about how money talks. In Spanish, we

speak of Don Dinero—Poderoso Caballero—Mr. Moneybags, a very powerful gentleman.

On the bus en route to the Johnson place of burial, I asked one of the most powerful Members of this body what truth there might be to stories of reparations—because the American press had said nothing about reconstruction or reparations or anything; not a word. If you look at every one of our dispatches, you will find there wasn't a word.

And he knew, and he answered affirmatively. He said, "Yes, I'm afraid we have made a commitment."

I said, "How much?" He said, "I don't know, but I guess it's somewhere in the range of $2–$3 billion."

Well, after that, there was absolutely nothing that I ever saw in writing. So I kept asking the question. I would interrogate members of what is now the International Relations Committee, then the Foreign Affairs Committee. They had had Mr. Kissinger before them, and he had reported, and they told me categorically that that question had been asked and that the Secretary had said "No, none whatsoever."

So the first time the committee met, I raised that issue, and the answer was, "Oh, we hope to get together with the Secretary." So when we did, that was the only question I asked, and the Secretary—and I phrased my question, "Memorandums, side memorandums, side understandings, codicils"—none. He said he had reported to the proper committee everything that had been promised.

Yet, when the committee gets serious and it confronts and has a dialog with the Communist leadership in Vietnam, that's the first thing they say, going further and saying, "Well, we have proof of that commitment from your former President."

Now, who is telling the truth? This committee now is desirous of meeting again with Secretary Kissinger, and I guess to ask him that.

But to me it's moot; that is, somebody is lying, and we have not been told all the truth, and, therefore, if you start getting into the question about who breached faith first, you will never get out of that argument.

I think the naked truth is that, on both sides, the Paris Agreement is considered dead. So that leaves us in the predicament, as I see it, of negotiating in a sort of a vacuum, and at a disadvantage.

So I think that events will overcome, that a vacuum won't exist forever. If the Chinese decide they will not have a confrontation, at least now, with the Russians, obviously they will move in southward and eastward, and then I think these nations will have some feelings about whether or not they would like to see American faces again.

Now, whether we can have the wit, the will, and the circumstances to play upon that and gain some access, I don't know. I am not smart enough to know.

But I think that it is fertile field for the committee to go into. I am very much interested in what you say, based on the trips that you have taken and the conversations that you have had with these people. I have asked repeatedly the different individuals appearing here—we have had several very high ranking military and former military—and I have asked that question, "Do you feel and/or do you know, and even if you don't know, do you think, that there are still any of our military alive or any that might have died in captivity for whom an accounting has not been given, but for which an accounting is possible through cooperation?"

And the answer has been that they have a gut feeling, but no evidentiary facts.

Colonel DONAHUE. I have at least five more names that I can give you, some of who are in the immediate vicinity.

The individual who showed me the reports of U.S. military sightings in Laos under the Project Bright Light, which was the code name for MIA sightings—he lives right here in Alexandria. I have given Colonel MacDonald his telephone number.

In Vientiane and in his office, he laid this out for me.

I have given Colonel MacDonald the latest address of Edgar "Pop" Buell, who was a legendary figure in Laos for many years. He got out in one piece. He was with the AID program, and a personal friend of the Meo General Vang Pao for many years. In fact, he introduced me to Vang Pao. He is living in Thailand now, a refugee from Laos, if you will.

But he is tremendously knowledgeable, with firsthand knowledge of the MIA sightings, the existence of MIA's.

To sum up the answer to your question, I am a police officer by education at the graduate level, and by 30 years of experience, and I have a private investigator's license, which I can't use because it would be a conflict of interest at the moment.

But if you employed me, chartered me, charged me with the mission of ascertaining to your satisfaction and to my satisfaction whether there were living MIA's in Laos, after five trips there I would give you my bill and I would give you an affirmative report. Unless in the last month or two they have been executed and buried.

And that is an objective observation. Because now we are talking business, as opposed to emotion.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Well, we hope nothing like that has happened. But I think the essential thing here—this is my thinking—is that Laos then is not such an impossible and inaccessible terrain as I have been led to believe.

Colonel DONAHUE. I would give you another name. An agronomist who was with the AID program and is now back in the States. One Stanley Snyder of Denver, Colo., whom I met and spent time with, because I was interested in learning whether there was an opportunity for individuals living on, foraging on land or from the land, to survive.

He was there to teach the Laotian people to crop two or three times a year, instead of one crop with which they are satisfied.

And he reiterated on each of my visits to him—I saw him four times—that a man trained in survival, young and healthy, who got out of his aircraft with a good parachute and hit the deck safely, would have no trouble surviving in Laos.

The small game, the natural foodstuffs, water down at the foot of the mountains, if he lands in the mountains. The tigers in northeast Laos are more afraid of human beings than the human beings are of the tigers, as far as that goes.

But all of these men were armed. Their emergency kit included arms, fishing tackle, foodstuffs, and medication, and so on, enough to get them started.

But I know perhaps I have taken too much time. I would like to give someone—perhaps the good Colonel MacDonald—these names and addresses for followup purposes by the committee.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Well, I would think the majority, if not every member, of this committee would be delighted.

I have just one question in connection with that, because we have had testimony to the effect—I know I asked the question and the answer was, "Well, it would be a remote possibility in Laos, because the features of a Caucasian would stand out in a remote village, and sooner or later the word would filter through."

Colonel DONAHUE. Well, let me answer that one. Living here in Maryland, across the river, is the daughter, Judy, a United Airlines stewardess, of Ralph C. "Smokey" Stover, who was Chief of the White House Police for 27 or 28 years. He is now my neighbor.

His daughter, Judy, participated in the Tom Dooley field hospital venture on three separate occasions in Laos, and she talked of the "war lord" situation, almost, the remoteness of these villages, 20, 30 miles apart, the head man being the ultimate arbitrator. No radio, no TV, no newspapers, no communication.

These young ladies volunteered, 6 months at a time, to teach the Laotian people the rudiments of personal hygiene, first aid, and so on.

When the Pathet Lao troops, the soldiers, a small detachment would always be supervised by a North Vietnamese noncommissioned officer. The larger units of Pathet Lao, were supervised by a North Vietnamese officer. When they were detected approaching the village, the villagers would hide the Dooley Foundation girls, not only because the girls would have been taken away or executed, but because the village and all in it would have been wasted.

What I am saying, and what she said, and what Pop Buell told me, is that it's perfectly possible for Americans to be alive in such villages, to become part of the way of life of those villages. They are not prisoners, but they can't be allowed to leave, because by leaving, they will surface the village which has been offering them shelter and succor over the years, and the village would be annihilated as a consequence.

Even Pethrasi told me, "My soldiers don't go up in to the northeast. Too remote and nothing up there."

Mr. GONZALEZ. I see. Well, thank you very much. I think you have been very informative, and I know I reiterate what my colleagues said, we are grateful for your taking the time.

Colonel DONAHUE. My time and my privilege. I have every faith in the committee, and although I am not politically astute, I am informed, and familiar with the makeup of the committee, the records of those who make it up. Our dilemma, our terrible impasse, could not be in better, more objective, more affirmative thinking hands, and I say that in all sincerity.

The CHAIRMAN. We are trying, Colonel. If there is no other business to come before the committee, the committee now stands adjourned until the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the meeting was adjourned until the call of the Chair.]

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING
PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, in room H-227 of the Capitol at 3:55 p.m., Hon. G. V. Montgomery, chairman, presiding.

Present: Representatives Montgomery, Gonzalez, McCloskey, and Gilman.

Staff members present: J. Angus MacDonald, staff director; Jeanne Shirkey, administrative assistant; Dr. Henry Kenney; Dr. Job Dittberner; and John Burke, professional staff assistants.

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order. Our meeting with Dr. Kissinger has been postponed until, we hope, some time next week. We are still pushing every way we can to meet with Dr. Kissinger.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Well, that's pretty good—you might be able to ask him about the Egyptian deal.

The CHAIRMAN. We will find out about that today. We have received a memo informing us that the remains of the two marines that were killed on April 30, 1975, during the evacuation of Saigon, have been recovered. They have been identified and the remains have been returned to the next of kin, as I understand it. Our committee contributed to the recovery of these remains. We started talking with the North Vietnamese in Paris about the two marines; we followed up on it in Hanoi; and that is where they told us that they would turn these remains over to Senator Kennedy; and Senator Kennedy's staff personnel did pick up the remains of the two marines.

Our witness today is Rear Adm. William P. Lawrence. Admiral Lawrence served two combat tours of duty in Vietnam as a Navy pilot. During the second combat tour he was shot down over North Vietnam. That was on June 28, 1967. For the next 6 years he was a prisoner of the North Vietnamese, spending all of his time in the prison camp known as "Hanoi Hilton."[1] I might say that when we were in Hanoi last December we did see the "Hanoi Hilton," Admiral Lawrence.

Tomorrow is the 3d anniversary of his release from the prison in Hanoi.

Admiral Lawrence is currently assigned as the director, aviation programs division, in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Opera-

[1] Detailed information relative to POW camps in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia appear on pp. 312–347.

tions for Air Warfare. He has been decorated many times for his courage and service.

We have called Admiral Lawrence as a witness to tell us about the communications system the POW's developed. His testimony fits into our work as part of our continuing investigation to learn whether Americans still might be held captive in Indochina, and I intend to ask you this question, Admiral Lawrence, after your testimony.

Thank you for coming today and we would like to hear from you.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. W. P. LAWRENCE, U.S. NAVY

Admiral LAWRENCE. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your introduction.

It is a pleasure for me to be here and I hope that what I have to say will serve a useful purpose for your committee. You have covered my biographical [1] highlights, so I won't repeat that. Next I will give a very brief account of my shoot down just for purposes of orienting the committee about my experiences.

I was flying off the carrier *Constellation* in the Tonkin Gulf—what we used to call Yankee Station—and I was leading a strike over Nam Dinh, which is about 40 miles south of Hanoi in the Red River Delta. After being hit by 85 millimeter flak at 12,000 feet my airplane went out of control and I ejected at fairly low altitude shortly after my rear-seat crewman had ejected. He was LTJG Jim Bailey who, as a matter of fact, is from the chairman's district down in Mississippi.

I was captured immediately on landing. I say that, because Mr. MacDonald asked me to provide my perception of the survival opportunity in the area where I went down. I would say that any POW that was shot down in the Red River Delta had a very high opportunity for survival, because the area is so densely populated that you would probably be seen immediately upon descending in your 'chute.

So the escape-and-evasion opportunity was minimal, as well as the opportunity for rescue by U.S. forces. Your opportunity for basic survival was very high due to the fact that more than likely you would be quickly taken into custody by the Vietnamese.

As I say, I was captured immediately. It was obvious to me that the peasants, under the supervision of the militia, had been instructed to give me fairly decent treatment in the sense of not abusing me or jeopardizing my life. I assume that the government had instructed them to do this in order to use me for interrogation purposes.

They made an effort to transport me to Hanoi expeditiously, and although I was shot down in the early part of the morning, I did arrive in Hanoi that same day, by truck transportation over very rough roads.

I might also point out that my rear-seat man was brought to Hanoi in the same transportation. They made no attempt to conceal from each of us that the other had survived. So this was significant to me, too, in the fact that this enabled me to bring information into the camp that he was, in fact, alive when he was shot down.

It was also obvious on arrival in the camp that they were quite interested in obtaining information from me. At that stage of the war,

[1] See p. 457.

in 1967, we had escalated the bombing in the north and they were quite concerned about what the future targets would be.

So for the next 2 weeks I was under very intensive interrogation, quite extensive torture, which sought to obtain information from me primarily about the targets that I felt would be attacked in the days ahead. I bring this point out about torture not to dramatize my situation, but to point out that I feel that this was probably where some POW's did not survive, because by the type of torture which was rendered, if it was done by an overzealous Vietnamese, he well had the capability, because of the instruments that he used—the straps and the bars and so forth—to take someone's life. I think many of the POW's that were sighted on the ground, that were never later identified in the system or located in the system, may have died during that initial period of their captivity.

They kept me completely alone for those 2 weeks. They did not allow me anywhere near any other Americans—and that included my crew man. I think this was for a very definite purpose, in order to not allow any other American POW to realize that I was there, or what was happening to me.

After that 2 weeks I was brought into the main camp and, although I lived in a cell by myself, I was very quickly brought into the camp communications network, which I found to be very extensive and effective. By tapping on the walls, we used a code to pass information covertly from one room to the other, and then around the entire camp.

There was a limited amount of talking going on, but tapping on the walls was the primary means of communication.

At that time we were not passing any notes, because we knew that the reprisal, in the event that we were caught communicating, would be very severe—and passing notes represented too much of a risk.

In spite of the very thorough patrols that were maintained by the guards, and the very severe threat of punishment, we persisted and did have effective communication.

That leads to the next major portion of my presentation, and that is about the evolution and function of our memory bank system.

It was a very natural pastime, when you had no books or written material, to rely fully upon your mind to occupy yourself. I think every POW went through various phases of mental activity. I think when you were first shot down, you tended to think about your family and loved ones; you tended to reminisce a lot about your past, to evaluate yourself on the basis of how you had conducted your life and so forth.

In a period of a few weeks you kind of exhausted that as a constant pasttime and you tended to bring yourself more into the real world of camp life. You would think about events that were occurring in the camp and go over these many times. You found that just automatically you were committing to memory the significant events of the POW world. There was a very strong imperative for the use of your memory in our communications system as we were passing messages around the camp. Frequently you would receive information from an adjacent room and it might be several hours or as much as a day or so before you could pass that communication to the next room for relay around the camp. It was essential to have an efficient memory to make our communications system work.

It was very natural in exercising your memory to try to retain names of other POW's. A great portion of our communications activity was to pass information on the names of POW's who were in that camp or known to be in the system. I think most POW's—and I certainly was in this category—very early in captivity started formulating and maintaining a list of other POW's in the system. At every opportunity, when I came in contact with a new POW that was adjacent to me, I would compare my list with him.

We had a very precise way of maintaining this list of names. Basically it was in alphabetical order, in groups of five. Mr. MacDonald asked me to give you an example of how I would go over this list. I used to go over my list maybe about three times a week. Even today I can remember some of these five-name blocks, like Bailey-Baker-Baldock-Barrett-Beam. You know, this is in my mind now just like the Lord's Prayer.

So we did work very hard to maintain the name list throughout our captivity.

Another major function of our memory bank—as we stayed there longer and we started becoming better organized, we promulgated policies on behavior. These policies basically supplemented and amplified the Code of Conduct which governs the behavior of the prisoner of war. Every POW was charged to memorize these policies and then pass them on to new POW's as they came into the system.

We usually had some method to aid in memorizing these policies, such as the use of acronyms, which are quite familiar in our society. That was another major activity of our memory banks, maintaining policy matters.

We used our memory banks considerably for education and recreational purposes. For example, it was very common to study languages in the POW camp. During the course of this study you would build a list of words in the foreign language. I became quite interested in languages as an educational pursuit, and I would have lists of nouns and verbs. As I built up my repertoire of words, I would break them down by household articles and so forth.

It was my practice every morning when I would wake up to go over a list of about 500 words in French or Spanish, just to commit them to memory.

We would grasp at every opportunity to memorize a new poem, not only just to learn the poem, but just as a means of keeping your mind productively employed and exercised.

We used our memories to help us in recreation. One of the main forms of recreation there was to tell each other movies. As our communications system improved and the Vietnamese relaxed somewhat in their relentless efforts to prevent us from communicating, we did have the opportunity to tell each other movies. Many times men would receive these movies from an adjacent room that had been tapped to them over a period of several weeks, and they would firmly commit them to memory and then pass on the movie to the people who lived in their building.

The main thrust of what I have been trying to say is that in the absence of any writing material or books, you are solely reliant upon your mind and your memory to enable you to function in that environment—and basically to survive. If you didn't use your mind productively, you would not survive that type ordeal.

Finally, in 1971, after the raid on Son Tay[1] in November of 1970, the Vietnamese moved the entire POW population with the exception of a very small number that remained in outlying camps. The main bulk of the airmen who had been shot down over North Vietnam were brought into Hoa Lo, which is commonly known here in this country as the "Hanoi Hilton." At that time we had somewhere between 300 and 350 Americans in Hoa Lo.

We very quickly established communications throughout that camp, and we went on a very definite effort to formalize our memory bank system, where we promulgated a very standard set of policies; we had standard items of information that we charged people to remember. Most of the POW's lived in large rooms containing 25 to 40 men each. In our organization, the men in each room were designated as squadrons, and all the squadrons together comprised our 4th allied POW wing. Each squadron had a very formalized memory bank where certain men were designated to maintain specific items of information. Basically they were policies, but another main task we performed at that time was to compare notes very thoroughly on POW's in the system.

Very early in 1971 we came up with the most accurate list of names that we could possibly derive, based on getting the inputs of every one of those 325 to 350 POW's.

We also very thoroughly analyzed the events that had occurred in the past. We more or less formulated a POW history. At that time we tried to do away with all of the hearsay and rumors that had transpired over the years and develop accurate information on the significant events that had occurred during our POW experiences. For example, you have heard quite a bit about the Hanoi march which occurred in June of 1966. We tried to very carefully document specifically what occurred on that march and who was in the march and so forth. That is an example of one of the events that we tried to ensure was correctly expressed and depicted and then retained in a memory bank.

From 1971 until our release in 1973, we had a very highly formalized memory bank system that we kept refining as the time went on. I feel that when we were released in 1973 we had as accurate a list of names as possible, we had as accurate a portrayal of the events that occurred during the POW history as possible. Although there were POW's who were maintained in North and South Vietnam with whom we had no communication, I think after our release, by comparing our information with their information in our debriefings and so forth, that the Government today has the most accurate information possible from the total POW community.

We basically had three categories of names. First we had a list of those POW's who were known to be in the system at the time of release. I think we had an accurate list of those men who were known to be POW's, but disappeared at some time during captivity and never were seen again.

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[1] See pp. 330-331.

I might comment on this category of people. The Vietnamese very carefully never let us see another POW die in captivity. They always pulled the man out from us before—and he never died in our presence.

In the third category of names, I feel we had a very accurate list of those men who had been seen on the ground prior to arrival in Hanoi or, say, immediately after shootdown, but then never appeared in the POW system.

In summary, we had accurate information on those three categories of people.

With that I will terminate my formal testimony and then make myself available for questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral Lawrence, for this most helpful testimony. I will just ask a few questions and then call on my colleagues.

In your opinion—and I have asked other witnesses this question—speaking first of North Vietnam—Do you think there are any Americans still held captive there?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Well, of course, this is an opinion based on my best educated analysis of the situation. I feel that the North Vietnamese released all of the American prisoners, because the list of names that we had coincided with the list of people who were released, died in captivity, et cetera.

I perceive that they had a very strong incentive to release all of the Americans in order to facilitate the peace agreement. They knew that in order to achieve a peace agreement and to obtain the approval of the Americans to withdraw from Vietnam, that they had to release the POW's. So it is my opinion that they did release all the Americans in Vietnam. I have seen no indication from the actions of the North Vietnamese that they still have any Americans still alive in North Vietnam.

I cannot speak any more authoritatively on Laos and Cambodia than anyone else in this room. My personal perception is that I have seen no indication on the part of the present governments in Laos or Cambodia that they hold Americans.

I cannot say with any degree of authority that there are no Americans there.

The CHAIRMAN. Back to North Vietnam, what reason would there be, if they are holding American prisoners—this is really a hypothetical question—Is there any reason for them to hold Americans in North Vietnam, as far as you could see in your position as a POW or as an officer in the Navy?

Admiral LAWRENCE. I think the only reason that they would have is to give them some leverage in forcing us to do some things that they would like for us to do, such as provide them aid—basically, primarily, to provide them aid. In other words, for political purposes—I think that would be the only reason that they would want to hold POW's there.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they have told us they were not holding them, and we have still got to account for these hard cases that the committee is now working on to find out what did happen to these Americans.

You mentioned deaths in captivity. From what you said, these men were sick and becoming weak and the North Vietnamese moved them out of the prison system. Did they report these men as having died in captivity? Did the list of those who died in captivity coincide with the list maintained by our returned POW's?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Yes, those men that lived with us and then disappeared and were never seen again, were not released, and were reported by the Vietnamese as having died in captivity.

The CHAIRMAN. Of those ones that you knew about?

Admiral LAWRENCE. That's right. And, as I say, they very carefully kept them segregated. This was a very tragic thing to us, because the men that needed the greatest help from us, because they were having emotional and physical problems, they would not allow us to have access to them.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gonzalez.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Admiral, for being here today and for your courage.

I believe the Chairman has asked the very specific questions that would arise to mind. The big question right now facing the committee is, if indeed the North Vietnamese have any more information concerning men who have died but for whom we have no verifiable information as to circumstances or condition or the possibility that any would be alive. I believe your answers coincide with what we have been told by others before.

But, in your judgment, and grasping the limitations of a committee of this nature, do you believe, from your assessment of the Vietnamese and his manner of reasoning and so forth, that they would have any reason, if—assuming they have information—they would have any reason to give that to us just on an information basis? Or do you believe they would do so only on the basis that they would have some negotiation, some quid-pro-quo they would like to bring about?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Well, if there is one thing I learned in 6 years of very daily confrontation with the Communists, I found out that a Communist is a very hard-boiled pragmatic person. He strips emotion out of every situation and he looks at it strictly in terms of gain and loss. He will only go into a situation where he perceives that there is a gain—and he stays away from situations where he perceives there will be a loss.

I think he would tend to look at the POW issue in that vein. For example, the North Vietnamese thinking in 1973 was probably like this: Is releasing the POW's in 1973 going to bring me a gain?

He might say, now, would holding some of them back surreptitiously, covertly—will that be to my advantage maybe in some future negotiation for aid or something and can I get away with it?

My perception is that at that time in 1973, he perceived that it was to his advantage to release them all, not to jeopardize the negotiations and future actions following the peace agreement.

I think you have got to realize this about the Communist—he looks at it strictly in terms of gain-loss, very pragmatically and with consideration to humanitarian concerns.

So as far as making an assessment on Laos or Cambodia, I really can't. It is conceivable that they may say OK in some distant time ahead, maybe revealing the fact that we have POW's will enable us to have some negotiating advantage with the United States.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Is there such a harmony of interest there, that if indeed and in fact some men were still surviving, say, in either Laos

or Cambodia, that this information would be known to the Vietnamese, or would it be possible that they could be ignorant of that fact?

Admiral LAWRENCE. I think the North Vietnamese have fairly close relationships with the elements in power in Laos and Cambodia. I think perhaps their close involvement with them militarily would perhaps enable the North Vietnamese to have pretty good information about any POW's captured in those countries.

Mr. GONZALEZ. I see. One last question. Apparently, there seems to be—and this is my interpretation—it seems to me that the Communists are trying to tell us that the Paris Agreements, such as they were, would not have been entered into unless the United States had made a very firm commitment that there would be some reconstruction aid. Apparently, from what we are told by our own leaders, no such firm condition was ever made. It is implied—I don't think we were told—except Secretary Kissinger did say flatly that every single known agreement was revealed to the committees here in the Congress.

It now turns out that the Communists are pretty definite in saying that a very specific assurance in a given amount was made.

Do you feel that this might have been one of the principal reasons why they were willing to enter into the Paris Agreement at the time? Or was there some other main driving force or motivation for the agreement?

Admiral LAWRENCE. I think the main motivation was to terminate the American presence in Vietnam. I think that was the main motivation for their entering into the agreement.

Mr. GONZALEZ. But, Admiral, looking at it logistically and practically, because, as you say, they are very practical people—once we accepted the terms, which had been wholly unacceptable to preceding American negotiators, that we would accept their presence in South Vietnam and leave the status quo ante, that is, 100,000 North Vietnamese troops and all—I guess that would have insured ultimately the elimination of the American presence, so that later the charge and countercharge as to who disrupted or dishonored the agreement really becomes kind of academic, because we went to war on the basis that the aggressor had crossed that line and invaded the South, and we were fighting for the self-determination of the South.

In Paris we agreed that whatever it was they had at the moment stayed there, and what we accepted at that moment was considerable—it was pretty substantial, I would think, at least from what indications we gleaned at that time.

So it was pretty much a foregone conclusion that it would be a matter of time before the South regime and our presence would be eliminated.

But do you foresee any series or combination of events that would incline the North Vietnamese to want the American presence, even though perhaps indirectly rather than physically, in the immediate future?

Admiral LAWRENCE. I don't think they want an American presence in there in the sense of becoming involved in their internal affairs. But I think they would have an aspiration to establish somewhat of a relationship with the United States as, say, we might have with Red China—or Russia. I think they are very happy to derive any benefits that they can from our trade and our technology. We see indications that they might want us to help them in oil exploration. So I think they would be very happy to normalize relationships with the United States to benefit from trade and so forth.

But I don't think they want us to maintain a presence in the country.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Do you believe that, given that desire, it would be possible to base some type of relationship—or renew—for instance, a couple of commissions that were there that we pulled out—they weren't kicked out, we unilaterally pulled them out.

Do you think it would be possible that such things as those could be reestablished on the basis that the goal would be some mutuality of interest in the resumption of trade and the like matters, and then, in the same spirit of friendliness, so to speak, ask for a resumption of these joint commissions, including a search commission?

Do you think that is feasible?

Admiral LAWRENCE. I think it is certainly feasible to reestablish a commission there.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Well, thank you very much, Admiral. You have been most patient. And I think you know we all admire you—and thank you very much for upholding the honor.

Admiral LAWRENCE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gonzalez. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Lawrence, I join my colleagues in welcoming you here today. It is with a great deal of interest that we listened to your remarks and the information that you presented.

I don't know if I missed that portion of your testimony—and I regret that I did miss a portion due to the debate on the floor—in which you may have accounted for the number of men in your memory bank as compared to the number of prisoners who were finally released.

Admiral, did you make some analysis of that comparison?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Yes. I stated that I felt that we had a very accurate list of men who were known to be in the system at the time of release. I think we had a very accurate list of men who had been in the system, but at some time disappeared and did not return.

Mr. GILMAN. How many disappeared, Admiral?

Admiral LAWRENCE. I don't know the number right now, but it seems to me that we had right around 12 to 15—maybe Ray Vohden could make a comment on that. But I used to keep a list of about 12 men who had been known to be in the system and they disappeared and then they were not released.

And then there was another category of men who had been sighted by other POW's, say, subsequent to their shoot down en route to Hanoi, but they were never seen again in the system. And that was a very small number, but that was a third category of people.

Mr. GILMAN. Approximately how many men were in that category?

Admiral LAWRENCE. I would say that it was less than half a dozen in that category.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you recall the names?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Yes, by this very careful cross-checking of everybody's information in the system, we did come up with a list of those men.

Mr. GILMAN. Does the Navy have that information?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Yes. Of course, after release, those men who had maintained memory banks of names provided this to our debriefers. This information was put with a list of names from South Vietnam and from the other camps in North Vietnam.

You see, there were men who were captured in South Vietnam and Laos that were brought into North Vietnam, who were never commingled with us. So after release we had to very carefully compare our list with theirs. But this was all done in the debriefing.

Mr. GILMAN. How many men died in captivity at Hanoi?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Well, I could not give you an accurate figure, because I am sure there were men who were shot down, who were brought into the camp and they died before they were ever placed with other Americans. None of us were even aware of their presence.

But there were approximately 12 or so—12 to 15—whom we actually saw in the system at one time, and they were withdrawn and we never saw them again and they were not released.

And I made this point, that the Vietnamese, when they perceived that a man's physical health or mental condition was deteriorating—they tended to segregate him from the other POW's. I don't know what their rationale was, because they knew that we were more than eager to help a man that was having a health problem. But for some reason they segregated him. And I think this was a major factor in those men not surviving, because they didn't have the support and assistance of the other Americans.

Mr. GILMAN. To your knowledge, were there other prisons in and around Hanoi?

Admiral Lawrence. Oh, yes, there were many prisons in North Vietnam. They were established and then closed—for example, the Son Tay, which is out about 30 miles west of Hanoi, where the raid was conducted—that was a camp that was opened in 1968 and it was closed in the summer of 1970. And there was a camp up on the China border that was opened in early 1972 and closed just before the peace settlement. So they had many camps that were in operation.

There were about 3 camps in Hanoi that stayed in continuous operation, but I think altogether there would have been about 10 or 12 camps in North Vietnam that were open at one time or the other in our POW history.

Mr. GILMAN. Admiral, with the exception of these 12 or so men, were most of the men in good health in your camp?

Admiral LAWRENCE. No, I think at various stages in the captivity, we had men who were not in very good health, but they survived the ordeal and they stayed with us, fortunately. And I think the main reason they did survive was that they had support from the other POW's.

But those men that very badly deteriorated, particularly emotionally, were those that tended to be segregated.

Mr. GILMAN. We are often asked the question about why all of the men that were released appeared to be in good health. The families often ask us, what happened to the men who were not in good health—and I guess you are answering that the Vietnamese sorted them out and put them away some place.

Admiral LAWRENCE. That tended to be their practice.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the gentleman yield? Just for the record—

I know we had our problems on survival training for our prisoners in Korea, that a number of our prisoners died because of the training and other problems—or lack of training, I guess I should say.

Was our survival program, the training you had, do you think it was adequate, and that you did have the desire, such as the Turks had in Korea, to keep fellow prisoners alive?

Admiral LAWRENCE. I think, considering all the factors involved—I think that our survival training was adequate. It really should be better. And, of course, we have made recommendations in that regard. I think our survival training certainly helped us to endure that ordeal.

But I think there were many other factors involved. I think the character of the average POW was the most significant factor, you know, he was a man who basically was in good physical condition, he had very fine traits of character, a very high degree of patriotism. You know, I have told many groups that I have addressed, if there was any one factor that was more important to my survival than anything else, was my love of country, because it gave me that determination to want to come home, of course—but it also made me feel that what I had done in Vietnam was worthwhile, and that sense of self-respect and pride stayed with me during my whole captivity.

And I think that was very characteristic of the POW community that we had.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Very good answer.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You mentioned earlier, Admiral, that you felt that the peasants had been instructed not to jeopardize your life when you were captured.

Do you think that was the prevalent instruction throughout the country? Was it your impression that most of the peasants were so instructed in North and South Vietnam and some of the other adjoining areas?

Admiral LAWRENCE. I really can't speak authoritatively on any place but North Vietnam, but it was my perception—it was based on discussion with many POW's—that the peasants had been instructed to keep us alive, because the Vietnamese knew that we were of more value to them alive than dead. In the early stages they wanted to keep us alive for information that they might be able to obtain from us. It was very obvious to me that the peasants who were in contact with me had been instructed, you know, not to overly abuse me and so forth. There was some degree of abuse, but it was very carefully administered by the peasants.

I think in the early days it was for informational purposes. I think as the war proceeded, particularly in the bombing that occurred, say, after about 1970—I think the Vietnamese had perceived that we had definite hostage value in negotiations. And I think that was the incentive there to keep us alive.

But I think there were some areas of North Vietnam perhaps where they didn't have the degree of discipline over the peasants, where there could have been cases of POW's being killed by peasant hostility and anger.

Mr. GILMAN. While you were in captivity, or subsequent to that time, did you hear any reports that some of our servicemen were taken to China?

Admiral LAWRENCE. No, I sure didn't. I heard of cases of men being shot down very close to the Chinese border and being given to the North Vietnamese. In other words, there was no attempt by the Chinese to come over across the border or anything to take them.

I never heard of any instances of men being taken to China from North Vietnam.

Mr. GILMAN. I believe you stated that at the Hanoi prison there were prisoners who had been shot down in Laos and brought into Hanoi, is that correct?

Admiral LAWRENCE. We had several prisoners in our midst who had been shot down in Laos. But late 1970 and 1971, they were moved away from us and put with prisoners from the south and other prisoners from Laos.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you know where they were taken?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Yes. They were taken to a camp that I guess was not too far from Hanoi, as I recall. But they basically were placed with the South Vietnamese POW's, both the soldiers and marines as well as other airmen that were shot down in Laos.

Mr. GILMAN. Did these men show up after the men were released?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Yes, they did. And I might add, something I didn't say before, but the North Vietnamese made enough moves between camps that enabled us to maintain very good information about other camps. I never fully determined whether this was by design or just by inefficiency on their part.

For example, there was a group of Americans who were captured during the Tet offensive in 1968, in February of 1968, around Hue and brought to Hanoi. And one of them was a Foreign Service officer, Mr. Manharat, a senior State Department official. And for some reason they took an American airman out of a camp and sent him down and put him in the same camp with those people. So he gained communication with them, and he got information as to who they were, and so forth, and how they had been captured. And later on he joined us and gave us all this information. For example, the men that were shot down in Laos—Colonel Guy, for example—lived with us for a while, and then he moved over and lived with other prisoners shot down in Laos and South Vietnam, so he was able to pass to them about us.

So there were enough moves between camps, so that it was quite a cross-fertilization, so to speak, and it facilitated our exchanging information of name lists and location of other camps and so forth.

Mr. GILMAN. Were there any reports of movements of American servicemen where you were not able to identify these names?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Yes; we had cases of Americans being sighted who we never determined their identity. We had one case of this in North Vietnam. I can't remember the precise date, but I believe it was in 1968, a man arrived in the camp, very badly burned, and was bandaged—and then he was removed from the camp; we never saw him again. And we checked very carefully through our system when we got together—we asked everybody that we possibly could about that man—we remembered the precise date he had arrived in camp—and our assumption was that he just died in captivity due to his extensive burns.

But there were cases where other Americans were seen but were never identified nor seen again.

Mr. GILMAN. What is your estimate for the number of men in that category?

Admiral LAWRENCE. It would be less than half a dozen.

Mr. GILMAN. Admiral, do you know if there was a common burial ground at the camp for American servicemen?

Admiral LAWRENCE. They never gave us any information about the place of burial. They never discussed this with us or never even alluded to the fact that they had such a burial ground. They never even mentioned that other POW's died in captivity.

Mr. GILMAN. From the time that you were incarcerated in the Hanoi prison, were you removed to any other prison area?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Well, within the Hoa Lo complex, which was quite large—it occupied a full very large city block—and there were several prison areas—I was moved around in that area many times.

And then, just prior to our release, when they tended to put everybody together chronologically, since we were released by the order of shootdown, they moved me to another camp just prior to release.

So I did live in one other camp beside the "Hanoi Hilton."[1]

Mr. GILMAN. What was the name of that camp?

Admiral LAWRENCE. We called that camp "Plantation."[2]

Mr. GILMAN. And where was that located?

Admiral LAWRENCE. That was north of Hoa Lo—several blocks north of Hoa Lo.

Mr. GILMAN. Within Hanoi?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Yes, it was right in the center of Hanoi, not too far from the Red River. These names that we gave to the camp were not necessarily descriptive of how they actually were.

Mr. GILMAN. During your stay at the Hanoi prison, did nationals other than the Vietnamese visit you?

Admiral LAWRENCE. No, only just immediately prior to our release; within a week or two prior to our release, other nationals did come in the camp.

I think at one time, just through prisoners looking out windows or something, say, a month or so prior to our release, we identified what we thought were some Europeans in the camp. But to my knowledge they did not talk to any of the prisoners in the camp.

But just prior to release, a week or two, we did have some foreign newsmen that walked through our camp.

Mr. GILMAN. At any time, did you come into contact with any civilians, journalists, and missionaries?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Of course, we had many visitors to North Vietnam. I never spent any time with these visitors. I think they perceived that I was one of the less charming of the Americans.

But many POW's did, during the time of their captivity, meet with American visitors, journalists, and so forth. And this happened throughout the time up there.

Mr. GILMAN. Did you come into contact with any of them as a fellow prisoner?

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[1] See p. 334.
[2] See pp. 322, 336, and 337.

Admiral LAWRENCE. Well, we had some non-American military people who were with us. And Ernie Brace is one whom I think you all have heard about—he was a civilian shot down in Laos in May of 1965 and spent 3 years in Dien Bien Phu, and then he was brought into the system with us.

Of course, we had those people who were captured down in Hue. And then just immediately prior to our release, we had a Bobby Joe Keesey, who is that famous guy that somehow got a ride into North Vietnam and the airplane crashed or something. He was a civilian.

So there were other than American military there, and we did get communication with them.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCloskey.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Admiral, just a few questions. How many men that were shot down in Laos reached the complex of prisons that you were familiar with?

Admiral LAWRENCE. There were very few that were shot down in Laos—I can only recall four right now, four Americans—and we had some Laotians.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Laotian pilots?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Yes, we had three Laotian air crewmen who were in our system. One had been flying with Ernie Brace, and two were shot down over North Vietnam.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Do you recall any discussion then or subsequently as to any Americans that were captured by Pathet Lao and turned over to the North Vietnamese as opposed to people who might have been shot down over Laos and captured by North Vietnamese?

Admiral LAWRENCE. The men that were shot down in Laos that I talked to, had communication with, informed me that they were all captured by North Vietnam.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. That is the one problem that bothers me about the people that were shot down in Laos. I guess it was Colonel Hopper referred me to a news article in June of 1972, when the Pathet Lao announced that they would release prisoners at some future time, American pilots that were downed in Laos. And they didn't participate in the Paris agreements.

I gather from your earlier testimony that your opinion went to Vietnam.

Admiral LAWRENCE. Right.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. And that you really had no opinion as to whether any one might have been shot down in Laos and kept by the Pathet Lao and might still be alive, although I think, in answer to Mr. Gonzalez' question, you indicated the affinity between the two commands, as you saw it, might very well indicate that the Vietnamese would have knowledge if the Pathet Lao were holding some of them.

Do I sum that up properly?

Admiral LAWRENCE. Yes, sir, I would hasten to add, you know, that communication in those very rugged areas, of very sparse habitation, would not be very good. And I think it is certainly conceivable that Americans could be held in—could have been held in those remote areas, because I don't think the governmental control in those areas of Laos is really very effective.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral Lawrence, for being such a fine witness today and giving us your feeling and opinion on this very serious matter before our committee, and we appreciate very much your taking the time to appear before the select committee.

The committee will stand adjourned.

[The committee adjourned at 4:55 p.m.]

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING
PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,
Washington, D.C.

The House select committee met at 9 a.m., in room 340, Cannon Building, Hon. G. V. Montgomery presiding.

Present: Representatives Lloyd, McCloskey, Moakley.

Staff members present: Mr. J. Angus MacDonald, staff director; Ms. Jeanne Shirkey, administrative assistant; Dr. Henry J. Kenny, Dr. Job Dittberner, and Mr. John Burke, professional staff assistants.

The CHAIRMAN. The select committee will come to order.

Mr. George Bush, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has asked Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the Deputy Director of CIA, to appear as a witness before this select committee.

General Walters has served in the Army for 35 years and for many of these years he was associated with Army intelligence. He has developed considerable experience in the intelligence area.[1]

In 1972 General Walters was nominated by the President to be Deputy Director of the CIA. He has served in that capacity for 4 years.

With General Walters is Mr. George Cary, legislative counsel for the CIA, and also Mr. Robert Chin, who is the legislative representative.

We are very glad to have you, sir.

General Walters, we appreciate very much your coming here today to testify before the select committee. It is unusual for the CIA to testify before a congressional committee in an open hearing. But the importance of this matter required this kind of hearing.

We do appreciate your cooperation and that of Mr. Bush to set up an open hearing.

We shall hear your testimony first, then follow with our questions.

The members of the select committee understand very well that if some questions touch on sources or other matters too sensitive to be made public, you may wish to refer your remarks to an executive session, if it is needed.

It is the Chairman's personal feeling that we can stay in open session and avoid the necessity of an executive session.

[1] Biographical data of Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters appears on p. 458.

I think your prepared testimony as I have read it has been straightforward and I would hope that we can receive all the information you have to impart in open session. However, we do understand that we could get into some problem areas.

I am sorry we don't have a PA system. So you probably will have to speak up and at this time you can proceed with your testimony as you see fit.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL VERNON A. WALTERS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY: GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, AND ROBERT CHIN, ASSOCIATE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, CIA

General WALTERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and Honorable Members: the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. George Bush, in answer to your request has asked me to appear before the select committee today and represent the Director as spokesman for the intelligence community on the subject of intelligence efforts to determine the status of the men still carried as prisoner of war—PW—and missing in action—MIA—in Southeast Asia.

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community recognize the importance of the select committee's vigorous efforts to complete the accounting for Americans missing in Southeast Asia.

In response to the committee's invitation, the intelligence community has prepared an unclassified report on various efforts that the intelligence community has made to account for the missing persons, PW's, MIA's, and those killed in action whose bodies have not been recovered.

The select committee has already heard expert testimony on many aspects of this problem; I will not dwell at length on any one aspect of any one case.

You are already in touch with the experts in Defense Intelligence Agency—DIA—Department of State and elsewhere, the offices with the details on any particular case.

I will present several additional items of information declassified for the first time, but this will not directly resolve any of the outstanding cases.

I hope that my testimony today and the written report that I will submit on behalf of the intelligence community will help the committee to resolve the outstanding issues for the brave families who have borne the pain of uncertainty for these many years.

Normally members of the intelligence community prefer there be no questions in open session since any line of questioning leads so easily to discussion of sources and methods.

In the statement which follows I will refer to sources and methods only in a very general way, to give a picture of the intelligence community's effort.

Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to discuss in closed session further details should the committee desire, and I will answer questions in open session to the extent possible.

We hope that this birds-eye view of the problem will be of use to the select committee and to the families involved.

I would like to add, on behalf of the thousands of dedicated persons who have been involved in this effort over the years, that the many thousands of man-hours of effort and the tens of millions of dollars spent have not been wasted—even though more than 800 MIA cases remain unresolved.

We have the satisfaction of feeling that, within the limits of national policy and human ability, everything that could be done has been done.

Director Bush, in discussing my appearance, recalled with pleasure an informal meeting with your committee on September 17 of last year.

As you will recall, he was then still Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office to the People's Republic of China in Peking.

The Director has asked me to extend to you his personal and official assurances that he will cooperate with the select committee, both in his role as spokesman for the intelligence community and in his role as Director of the CIA.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit for the record more detailed remarks than time will allow me to present in this brief oral summary.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.[1]

General WALTERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. These remarks, which have been coordinated with responsible elements of the intelligence community, summarize in a factual and realistic manner all of the reliable, substantive, and pertinent information bearing on the current PW/MIA problem.

There is no easy way to recount the intelligence effort of the past several years. The war in Indochina was immensely complex, and the problem of missing persons reflected that complexity.

Americans still carried as PW's and MIA's were lost not only in close ground combat actions, but also in aerial combat.

They were lost in four markedly different geographical areas—North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

They were lost in combat with four related but distinct enemy organizations—the North Vietnamese nation state, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, the Pathet Lao faction, and the Khmer Rouge guerrillas.

This confusion of factors complicated the intelligence problem to an inordinate degree.

On the other hand, the presence of American forces gave us an opportunity to expand our intelligence gathering capability.

During the early phases of American involvement in the Vietnamese war, very few Americans were captured and detained by Vietnamese and Pathet Lao Communist Forces.

Intelligence efforts to locate these few PW's and to lay the groundwork for their rescue or release were coordinated by the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, located in Saigon.

Intelligence collection directives which governed the activities of American intelligence assets in Southeast Asia gave high priority to

[1] Prepared statement of Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, Deputy Director, CIA, appears on p. 190.

acquisition of information on captured or missing Americans, but through 1964 our intelligence collection capability was relatively limited.

In step with the buildup of U.S. forces in 1965, intelligence acquisition capabilities also increased substantially.

In April 1966 the intelligence community assigned top priority to collection of information on PW's and MIA's.

All U.S. installations and organizations worldwide were tasked, as a matter of priority, to obtain information about the missing.

In June of 1966 in retaliation for the bombing of North Vietnam, Hanoi announced that captured airmen would be tried for war crimes. That announcement naturally shocked American public opinion.

In June and July the entire system of collecting, disseminating, and processing information on missing personnel was reviewed and streamlined. Interagency cooperation expanded and was gradually formalized.

The major elements of the community on PW/MIA problems were the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence branches of the military services, the National Security Agency—NSA—the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State.

A brief listing of the types of sources developed by these various agencies gives an indication of the scope of the collection effort.

CIA and the military services cooperated in directing intelligence agents against key requirements such as the location of prison camps, information on movement of prisoners, and identification of the prisoners.

The large network of debriefing and interrogation centers developed in liaison with local government intelligence agencies in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia produced a most useful product.

This mechanism interrogated several tens of thousands prisoners of war, and also debriefed approximately 150,000 refugees and ralliers.

The best sources were debriefed or interrogated in depth; they provided very valuable information on the Communist prison system, techniques, and policy of exploiting prisoners, location of prisons, and less frequently, actual identification of prisoners.

Photo reconnaissance produced immense quantities of imagery, an expensive but effective tool when used in conjunction with interrogation reports.

Photography could often be used to evaluate information from persons who had been in areas where their information could not otherwise be checked.

Photos were also used for operational planning of rescue attempts.

With the cooperation of many Government agencies, a massive collection effort was launched worldwide to pick up all overt and unclassified media coverage and photography of the PW's and the prisons where they were held.

This effort was coordinated by CIA, but the end product was analyzed and disseminated by DIA.

Many men were confirmed in captivity as a result of this effort.

Escaped American prisoners and released PW's were valuable sources of information on the prisons they had been in and persons who were left behind.

After the buildup of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, a huge volume of captured documents flowed regularly into a joint document analysis center.

Hundreds of documents were found that helped explain the Communist prison system, outlined plans for exploitation or movement of prisoners, and occasionally furnished a lead to the location of a prison camp.

Communist radio broadcasts were carefully monitored for information about PW's. Alleged confessions by the PW's, a favorite device with North Vietnamese Communists as well as with other Communist governments, were carefully examined for general information on the condition of the PW's.

Communications intelligence was used to confirm shootdowns and truck movements and to provide information on movement of PW's.

Indigenous ground reconnaissance teams operating in contested and hostile territory supported many aspects of the PW/MIA intelligence effort.

In Laos, teams maintained safe sites on hilltops. Civilian and military pilots were given the locations of these safe sites and on numerous occasions pilots were able to avoid capture by making their way to a safe site to wait for exfiltration.

On one occasion in 1964 a Navy pilot downed in northern Laos escaped from a Pathet Lao prison and made his way to a safe site where he was recovered.

The teams also participated in many search and rescue efforts; some successful, some unsuccessful.

One team investigated a crash site and brought out the remains of a civilian pilot, thus changing his status from missing in action to killed in action.

Indigenous reconnaissance teams followed standard procedures of checking out, if possible, all crash sites, prison sites, and reported sightings of Americans.

Some teams specialized in collecting intelligence, and produced disseminable information on sightings of American PW's.

As a result of the activities I have just described, an extensive data base was compiled.

This base included:

Thousands of debriefing and interrogation reports.

All the escapee and releasee debriefings.

Information from sensitive sources.

Unclassified information from the media.

Pictures and research on prison locations.[1]

Photographs and movies in which PW's, gravesites, or prisons were shown.

Eyewitness reports from those who participated in combat actions in which other Americans were lost.

Intelligence analysts, collating and interpreting this data, remained particularly alert to any leads concerning our missing personnel.

The data base was also used in preparing papers for the American delegation to the Paris peace negotiations, and in exerting diplomatic pressure for improved treatment of PW's.

[1] See pp. 312–347.

It is this same data base that now enables us to pinpoint those cases of missing personnel about whom the present Indochina governments certainly must have hard information.

Information in this data base has been provided to all the services and members of the intelligence community, as needed, and all pertinent information released to the service personnel offices for the benefit of the families concerned.

Mr. Chairman, I have referred to the complexity of the intelligence problem, the buildup of our collection assets after 1965, the types of sources and information obtained, and the resulting data base.

Now I would like to summarize the results of extensive analysis of this data base in the effort to determine whether any Americans are still alive in captivity in Southeast Asia.

I will summarize country by country, in the order: Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam.

Cambodia: Personnel who returned to the United States during Operation Homecoming said that everyone they saw or knew of in captivity had been accounted for either as returnees or on the list of those who died in captivity.

An Army deserter was reported to be living in Cambodia as of May 1974. He deserted in 1967 and was associated with the Vietnamese Communists for several years both in Vietnam and Cambodia. He reportedly left the Vietnamese Communists in October 1973 and joined the Khmer Rouge.

No new information has been received to confirm his whereabouts since May 1974.

Several U.S. personnel known to have been captured in Cambodia prior to April 1975 have never been accounted for. No reliable information has been received on these persons for years.

After the evacuation from Phnom Penh in April 1975 two U.S. civilians were not accounted for. There is no confirmed information on the status of these individuals.

Laos: Returnees during Operation Homecoming had no firsthand knowledge of any Americans captured in Laos other than the nine who were released by the DRV in Hanoi.

U.S. personnel known to have been captured in Laos have not all been accounted for. The new Communist government of Laos has not provided information on missing Americans.

In September 1974 an American citizen and an Australian citizen disappeared in central Laos. The last reliable report said they had been sighted alive near Ban Phontan in late February 1975.

An American pilot was released in the prisoner-of-war exchange of September–November 1974. He had no knowledge of other Americans in captivity in Laos.

North Vietnam: Careful analysis of all debriefings of returnees from North Vietnam during Operation Homecoming established that all men known to the returnees to have been in the prison system had been accounted for.

The returnees knew of men who had been seen in captivity on the ground but not in the prison system; many of these were not accounted for and are now on the list for which we have asked the DRV to account.

There has been no substantive reporting, confirmed or confirmable, of Americans still being held captive in North Vietnam.

Many rumors have been carefully analyzed. Some have related to men already released.

After the fall of Saigon, nine Americans captured during the spring of 1975 in the central part of South Vietnam were taken to Son Tay Prison in North Vietnam for interrogation. They were later released from Hanoi.

Their debriefings provided no substantive information on additional Americans held in captivity in North Vietnam.

South Vietnam: All persons known by returnees during Operation Homecoming were accounted for.

An American soldier captured in Quang Nam Province in 1965 was held with some of the returnees. The returnees said that from 1967 to 1969 they had seen this individual working with the enemy.

There were reports of an American, possibly the same individual, operating with the enemy in northern South Vietnam as late as August 1973.

There are still a number of Americans in Saigon. There have been reports that a few of them are in jail.

These cases of Americans in Saigon are being handled separately from the PW/MIA cases since the names and circumstances are well known.

There are cases of men known to have been captured in South Vietnam for whom there has been no accounting. We have no new substantial information on any of these cases. In summary, there are cases where we are certain that the Communist governments of Indochina could account for the fate of persons known to have been alive since 1973 and in captivity or under Communist control. But we have no firm evidence that American PW's from the period before 1973 are still being held.

The above presentation deals with PW's.

How would we summarize the situation regarding men missing in action?

The intelligence community has very little new information to offer on this subject.

You may find useful a summary of what we think the Communist governments of Indochina should know and be able to provide concerning our men missing in action.

The select committee has heard expert evidence to the effect that it is highly improbable that all MIA cases can be resolved, given the nature of the terrain and the formidable challenges in ejecting from a high performance aircraft.

The following summation by no means alters that conclusion.

Again, we will follow the order Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam.

Cambodia: The Government of Cambodia has repeatedly claimed that it has no knowledge of any U.S. PW's held in Cambodia.

Given the extreme upheaval of all the national institutions in Cambodia, it is quite possible that this is a fact.

Central records concerning PW's, and other captives of the Khmer Rouge may not exist today.

At any rate, we do not have much hope of obtaining PW/MIA information from the present government.

We have no reports of such central records.

Laos: Prior to the Communist takeover in Laos the Pathet Lao enjoyed continuity and stability in their administrative capital at Sam Neua. There were confirmed reports of at least three American PW's held in caves there. There were unconfirmed reports of several others.

From time to time the Pathet Lao gave evidence of having an organized prison system.

On September 26, 1973, a U.S. Embassy official met with a high ranking Pathet Lao official who stated that the Pathet Lao Central Committee in Sam Neua had been gathering information on U.S. MIA's, but that they would probably be able to provide information on only a small fraction of the 300 MIA's in Laos.

The above indicates that the Pathet Lao must have some central records and some information on MIA's.

The following evidence points in the other direction, implying that Pathet Lao forces removed from Sam Neua were not required to report such information to a central headquarters.

A Lao cadre who witnessed the downing of a USAF AC–130 on December 21, 1972, and who later rallied to the non-Communist government, said that he had inspected the crash site, supervised burial of remains, and then sent reports to the province commander.

The reporting was on his own initiative. He said he had no requirement to mark the crash site, the grave sites, or to report the incident.

He said the Pathet Lao did not have an organized system for accounting for enemy crash sites and grave sites.

This is considered a credible report.

Perhaps it would be reasonable to conclude that the Pathet Lao may well have useful records of events which took place in the immediate vicinity of Sam Neua, but much poorer records of anything which occurred at a distance.

NORTH VIETNAM

There is no question that the North Vietnamese have knowledge concerning the fate of some unaccounted-for U.S. personnel lost over North Vietnam.

A wealth of information on specific aircraft downings was published in the North Vietnamese press throughout the Vietnamese war.

At times only the fact that the aircraft was downed in a specific province or district was broadcast, at other times the fate of the pilot was mentioned.

A locality or unit was oftentimes commended for capturing a U.S. pilot or downing a U.S. aircraft.

A Communist source interrogated during the Vietnam war stated that the DRV intelligence and security services maintained central listings of all U.S. PW's detained in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

This source also reported as a DRV requirement that all data pertaining to the death and burial of an American prisoner, whether in the DRV or the South, was to be forwarded to Hanoi as quickly as possible, together with sketches of the burial site.

It was reported that the Policy Office of the DRV Ministry of Defense, Enemy Proselyting Department, was required to examine and store all PW personal effects, documents, military clothing, hand-carried equipment, and dog tags.

When the body of an American was recovered, or when a PW died in captivity in the DRV, all personal effects were turned in to the policy office for storage and the Office arranged for burial of the American.

Based on this information and the known Communist proclivity for detailed reporting, it is believed that the DRV/PRG holds significant amounts of accurate information on former and current American MIA/KIA in Southeast Asia.

SOUTH VIETNAM

The Provisional Revolutionary Government, and possibly the DRV, should have information on Americans lost in the South prior to 1973, although the extent of this information is unknown.

In early 1973 the PRG released some Americans and provided a list of those who died in captivity, claiming this was a total accounting for all the Americans captured by the PRG.

The PRG delegation to the Four Power Joint Military Team—FPJMT—made overtures in 1973 toward repatriating the remains of the 40 Americans they had reported as having died in captivity, but they failed to do so.

Since that time the Communists have provided almost no information on U.S. MIA's and the remains of KIA's.

From the available evidence we have concluded that more Americans were captured than were acknowledged by the PRG.

It is apparent that the enemy in South Vietnam kept some records on American battle casualties, U.S. PW's, and Americans who died after capture.

Captured enemy documents included directives to local units for the collection of identification papers from the bodies of dead Americans.

The extent of these records is not known, and one should not be overly optimistic that such records will be provided and will be detailed enough to resolve MIA cases.

Mr. Chairman, I have just reviewed the intelligence community's data bank and the results of analysis of that extensive set of information.

We have tried to answer two questions: First, are there any Americans still in captivity in Indochina and, second, how much do Indochina governments know about American MIAs?

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, may I draw the threads of these remarks together into one brief statement?

A review of the intelligence community's holdings shows that we have no confirmed information that additional American PW's are still being held in captivity in Southeast Asia or elsewhere, as a result of the Indochina war.

Among the Americans unaccounted for, there are some who were known to have been captive at one time.

There is good reason to believe that the Hanoi Government—and the Saigon authorities, which are being unified with Hanoi—could quickly resolve many MIA cases if they chose to, that the Government of Laos could resolve some, but that the Government of Cambodia may not be in a position to give more than vague information.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, now, if there are any questions, I will be glad to try to answer them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General Walters, for that straightforward, very informative testimony.

Mr. McCloskey?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. General Walters, on the Laos situation in Sam Neua Province, do you have any more specific information on the three Americans that may have been held at one time in caves in Sam Neua?

General WALTERS. As I said, Mr. Chairman, we do not have any real specific information on any of these people with the possible exception of the American civilian and the Australian.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. There is no way—where would we go to try to get more precise information on the Sam Neua question?

General WALTERS. I would say the current Laotian Government, which represents the people who used to be in Sam Neua.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I have the opportunity to meet with some of the members of the Laos Government in the next few weeks in New York. I would like to present to them specifics, if I could, on the intelligence reports that we have on Americans that were seen alive.

I have seen a newspaper report for example in 1972 where a representative of the Pathet Lao Government spoke of releasing American pilots that had been shot down.

I would like to take a packet of information to these Lao representatives setting forth everything we know about these reports if I could.

Is that possible?

General WALTERS. Well, DIA, as you know—Defense Intelligence Agency—has been the instrumental Agency in handling these matters.

I have tried to give the intelligence picture. They follow the individual cases and I think they would perhaps be in a better position.

I can talk to them, certainly, Congressman, and see what they can get together for you.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. All right. What I would like essentially is just a summary. I think at this late date there is very little in the national security field that would have to be withheld from Laos.

I have another problem with the Sam Neua question. I recall at one time we developed missiles that could be launched from aircraft with a specific capacity of going inside of caves. Do you have any information about the bombing of Sam Neua Province that we conducted, with reference to locations?

General WALTERS. I think we have no information on that, Congressman.

We will check it, however, and see what we can find on it.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I know we took steps in Vietnam to avoid any bombing of potential POW sites at Son Tay and I wondered if we had any similar efforts in Laos.

I had heard there were prison camps reported.

General Walters. I will check and see on that, Congressman, for you. I am sure we took the same precautions in Laos that we did in Vietnam.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. These indigenous reconnaissance teams that worked in Laos to maintain the safe sites on hilltops, do we have any way of correlating the location of those safe sites with the potential crash sites that were reported?

General WALTERS. I am sure we do.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. How would this committee go about trying to trace down the relationship of the location of those safe sites, the reports of the indigenous ground reconnaissance teams, and the location of crash sites?

General WALTERS. We can work that out with the staff, Congressman, with DIA and staff here, and provide such information as you request.[1]

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you. I have no further questions.

Mr. MOAKLEY. You said, General, that you felt for good reason that Hanoi has more records than they are giving us. Do you know where these records were kept?

General WALTERS. I do not have any hard intelligence information. I would presume that they were kept probably in the Ministry of Defense in Hanoi.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Did we ever receive any information directly from them relative to these missing in action?

General WALTERS. From the North Vietnamese?

Mr. MOAKLEY. Right.

General WALTERS. Well, they gave us back all the prisoners and told us that was all they had.

Mr. MOAKLEY. But they didn't give any other accounting?

General WALTERS. No, they did not, Congressman.

Mr. MOAKLEY. And do you know where the records of Americans in South Vietnam were held?

General WALTERS. Well, as I explained, the system is not as efficient as it was in North Vietnam. We do have indications that there were requirements to report these things to the PRG and to Hanoi also.

But we have a feeling that this was something like the situation in Laos. In other words, if they fell near a big headquarters, it was likely excellent records were kept.

But generally in isolated cases where someone was killed, the tendency was to bury them at the place where he was killed and maybe, or maybe not, send forward identifying papers and personal effects.

Mr. MOAKLEY. This committee may go on to Hanoi to talk directly with the government. Is there any additional information you can give us which we could use to prove that we know there were records kept on these missing in action?

General Walters. Well, we have very clear indication that in North Vietnam this was highly centralized in this Enemy Proselyting Section, that they did keep good records.

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[1] See p. 350.

They are a recordkeeping people. It is part of the Communist system to keep good records. And we have every reason to believe that they have more information than they have given us.

Mr. MOAKLEY. But do we have any official evidence of this?

General WALTERS. I do not think we have firm evidence of the existence of lists in any particular government department there. It is just a pattern of the way they proceed.

Mr. MOAKLEY. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lloyd?

Mr. LLOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This committee is supposed to accomplish the identification and the resolution of the questions which remain with regard to missing persons.

Do you think we can do it in our time frame or do we have to expand that?

General WALTERS. Well, basically, all I can say, Congressman, is that we do not have hard evidence of the existence of any live missing in action.

Now, I can't tell you there isn't any. All I can tell you is there is no evidence available to us at this time.

Mr. LLOYD. In addressing that, then, on the time frame, are you telling me that we will not need more time or that we will need more time to address the problem?

General WALTERS. Well, I think a partial answer to your question lies in the willingness of the governments—and the ability in Cambodia. As I said, I don't think the ability is very great.

In Laos there is probably some ability to give us some additional information, and in North Vietnam there is probably considerable ability to give us additional information.

Mr. LLOYD. Do you feel that our approach is the correct one or do you think there is a way of maximizing this effort over and above what we may already have done?

And that presumes, of course, you know what we have done.

General WALTERS. First of all, I would like to tell you that the people in the intelligence community share this feeling and this desire to obtain any information which could possibly be obtained to relieve the uncertainty of the brave families who have borne the uncertainty for so long, and I would like to tell you that in the intelligence community everybody who has had anything to do with it has been working at it as a matter of top priority.

On the time factor, to give you my own personal opinion, the only view that I can see is if these governments were willing to provide additional information. I think insofar as we have lost access to the sites, to the indigenous team, to the local reporting, this is very difficult to do.

I doubt if any kind of photo-reconnaissance would show anything of this type.

The North Vietnamese were the ones who really maintained a prison system and camps and so forth, and they didn't do it anything like the Germans, for instance, in the Second World War.

There were only two visible camps you could see.

The other, Pathet Lao, Khmer Rouge and PRG, even less so.

So, short of willingness of these governments to disclose additional information to the United States, I would like to add that we still have out all our antennae—everywhere in the world, not just in Southeast Asia—to collect any reports of any sort concerning U.S. confirmation of U.S. KIA or of missing in action.

Mr. LLOYD. And I presume that it goes without saying that any information which was gathered or obtained or came into your hands would automatically be reported to this—to the chairman of this committee?

General WALTERS. Yes, indeed.

There is no information concerning any reporting that is being held back.

Mr. LLOYD. Are we really going in the right direction? Do you feel that we are doing it properly?

General WALTERS. I think you are going in the right direction. I think you are doing properly what is an almost impossible task because of the complexity of the war, and because of reluctance of the other side to provide additional information.

But I think the thrust and the dedication of the committee is evidence to anyone who has observed this question.

Mr. LLOYD. Thank you very much.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moakley.

Mr. MOAKLEY. General, the bottom line is that you say that it is up to the other countries to give us the information and that all the evidence shows they do have more information.

I am talking specifically about North Vietnam at this time.

If you were chairman of the committee, what steps would you take to get that information? How would you approach the government? Which is the best way based on all the intelligence you have gathered on that country?

General WALTERS. I do not know what the committee ability is. I believe there was some indication that the committee plans further contact with them in their capitals. I think that is certainly one way and I think the other way would be through using diplomatic channels to keep the pressure on them constantly, as I believe we are doing, to obtain any additional information.

These are very tough people, Congressman. They don't give out. They regard prisoners of war as a card to be played in a game.

Mr. MOAKLEY. What suggestion would you make to this committee?

General WALTERS. I do not know what they are asking for or would ask for in return for this. I have not been privy to the diplomatic negotiations or such suggestions as may have gone on in the contacts with them.

I keep track of what foreigners are doing, not the Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. We were informed by Secretary Kissinger that he would consider favorably starting talks at the executive level pertaining to the missing in action in Southeast Asia and other matters related to the countries affected—the United States and other countries in Southeast Asia.

I am yet to receive confirmation of this, but I think it is the feeling of this committee that it has to be done like that and we would certainly like to turn it over to the Secretary. It is his job.

We feel like we have opened the door and it is now up to the executive branch to carry it forward, and we are waiting on an answer from the Secretary.

General WALTERS. I think that is the case, Mr. Chairman.

If I may add a suggestion, I think no matter how tough they are, we should hold their feet to the humanitarian fire and point out the human suffering that is caused by this insensitivity and this stubbornness, more than a year after all fighting has ceased.

I think that we should by every means in our power, publicize this withholding of information, and point out that this is not the behavior of civilized nations.

The CHAIRMAN. General Walters, we tried to point this out to the North Vietnamese. We were the first Congressmen to meet with the North Vietnamese since about 1953, and the first Americans with any official authority to be there since Dr. Kissinger was there in 1973.

And we told them just as plain as I am talking to you that they are not going to get reconstruction aid from the United States and we weren't going to bargain or pay blackmail. And we tried to approach it on the humanitarian level, and I don't know whether it has soaked in or not.

General WALTERS. I think it did.

And frankly, as a personal view, Mr. Chairman, I think this aspect of the inhumanity of this thing being exposed might have more influence with them than even diplomatic moves.

Mr. LLOYD. What you are saying is you think the court of world opinion will be an overriding factor as far as they are concerned far more than any diplomatic maneuvers.

General WALTERS. That is my personal belief, Congressman.

The CHAIRMAN. General Walters, in your more detailed statement[1] you mentioned—and it is submitted in the record and it is unclassified—that the only official action or military action that the United States took in recovering prisoners was the Son Tay incident in North Vietnam; is that correct?

General WALTERS. I believe it is. I believe we thought about others, but that was the only one.

You see, there was a very unknown factor with them as to what they would do to the prisoner under such an attempt.

We observed one incident in South Vietnam where they were carrying away an American prisoner when intercepted by Americans and South Vietnamese, and it was obvious they couldn't get away with the reluctant prisoner so they bludgeoned him to unconsciousness. The seriously injured PW was recovered, but died soon after his evacuation.

So we had this factor riding in our mind of what they might do to the prisoners if rescue attempts were made.

The CHAIRMAN. Please repeat that again, so it will be perfectly clear.

General WALTERS. This was an incident in South Vietnam where Americans and South Vietnamese intercepted a group of Communist solders who had an American prisoner with them. When they found they could not get away with that prisoner, they bludgeoned him, which was a very constraining factor on physical attempts to liberate the prisoners.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General WALTERS. This was an isolated incident, but it was one we had to bear in mind.

[1] See p. 199.

The CHAIRMAN. On page 16 of your statement, you mention through the years a total of 115 photographs were included in unidentified publications. Presently six photos remain unidentified.

Would you explain that to the committee and maybe go back——

General WALTERS. Basically, one of the reasons—there are four reasons, basically, as I recall them, why these remained unidentified:

One: Poor quality of the photography.

Two: Conflicting identification of various people who claim that it is theirs.

Three: We don't know where the photography is taken, and very careful examination has been given to these six, and it's been found impossible to resolve who they were.

Fourth: Identification by next of kin cannot be supported by other information.

The CHAIRMAN. One of the problems the committee is having is in Laos, where there were a number of Americans shot down and not one live prisoner actually was given back to us by the Pathet Lao until we received Emmet Kay from them.

General WALTERS. He was a civilian. They had nine prisoners, but they had been taken by the North Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, could you explain in more detail how the intelligence sources would explain why over 300 to 400 are still classified as missing in action in Laos, but we didn't get a better accounting?

General WALTERS. I believe a very careful analysis and study has been made of this and we can find no rationale to explain why Mr. Kay was released and the others weren't, or for the difference in treatment between him and the others.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not really comparing Emmet Kay now. I am just saying we hadn't had any accounting of 300 missing in action in Laos. What is the reason? Do you have intelligence to indicate that we recovered most of them that could be recovered, that were alive?

General WALTERS. Well, it's very tough country, Mr. Chairman. I don't know whether you have been there or flown over it. It's very, very tough. It looks like an old Chinese painting. It doesn't look real.

The second thing—I explained a little bit about the prisoners or people who fell in the vicinity of the camp at Sam Neua. There may have been some tracking of them.

I think in the other areas the tendency was to bury them on the location and not particularly report it. I cannot give any reason as to why the Pathet Lao or the government in power in Vientiane still refuses to give us whatever information they have.

The CHAIRMAN. It appears that the North Vietnamese did not handle American remains in the same manner that they handled French remains.

Do intelligence sources indicate any central burial ground or cemetery in North or South Vietnam or Laos or Cambodia where these remains have been brought and buried?

You mentioned in your testimony that usually when they died or were killed they were buried at that particular location.

General WALTERS. The ones who died in captivity in the North were generally buried in cemeteries in the suburbs of Hanoi and these were fairly well kept track of. Other than that I have no additional information beyond what I have given you.

One of the factors in Laos that I might point out is we have knowledge of some 300 people who went down. A small percentage of these are believed to have survived of the people who were shot down.

What happened thereafter we do not have any intelligence. We can speculate, but intelligence we do not have.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the People's Republic of China has given a complete accounting of Americans who were lost over China or were involved in the China area, such as the two remains that they returned to us? Do you think that fairly well clears up the China situation?

General WALTERS. I do not know of any evidence that we have that there are still Americans being held in the People's Republic of China, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a possibility of Americans captured in Laos being taken across the border lines into the People's Republic of China? Do you think this is possible without the Chinese knowing this or without reporting it?

General WALTERS. I think it might be possible for them to get across the border but to keep them there for any length of time without the Chinese knowing it would be very difficult. We did have intelligence in that area trying to ascertain whether there were any, and all of the reports we received were negative as to the presence of any American prisoners taken from Indochina into the People's Republic.

There were many rumors of this sort of thing—American prisoners being in China or Russia or elsewhere. We have tracked them down to the best of our ability and we have yet to find any hard evidence to substantiate those stories.

The CHAIRMAN. Do your intelligence sources indicate that all American prisoners known to the POW's released in 1973 were set free at that time? Did the returned POW's indicate everyone they knew to be held captive was released?

General WALTERS. I think everyone that they knew of. You know they kept them in great isolation from one another. But I think all of the prisoners who were known by other prisoners who came back to be there have been accounted for.

But it is perfectly possible that there might have been some they did not see or who were being held elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Repeating some of the questions that have been asked so it will be very clear, no intelligence information is being held back from this committee; is that correct?

General WALTERS. Absolutely none, Mr. Chairman. It would be inhuman to do such a thing to the families and I am sure that we would stretch every desire to protect sources and methods if we had any information we could give those families. We do not have any additional information.

Mr. MOAKLEY. When was the last time you received any intelligence information regarding the MIA's?

General WALTERS. We continue to get rumors and reports. We check them out. But so far we have no additional intelligence, that is, evidence.

Mr. MOAKLEY. How many people do you have in your departments working on my cases?

General WALTERS. I am informed that we do not have a specific number. But all of our resources—if I may just cite my own personal experience.

I was military attaché in France and this was an ongoing priority from DIA to me. Any information concerning any American prisoners—this was one of my top priorities.

Mr. MOAKLEY. But is it true to say within the last 2 years there's been very little information?

General WALTERS. There have been many rumors, Congressman, but I believe there has been no hard evidence to change any of the previously held facts.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Have you had any dealings with the families of MIA's or POW's that have been called by people misrepresenting themselves as having some inside information on the whereabouts of their loved ones?

General WALTERS. I have not myself had such contact. I understand there are some people doing this sort of thing and if it cannot be confirmed, I think it is a very cruel thing to do.

Mr. MOAKLEY. But has your department dealt with it?

General WALTERS. It's not our agency. That would be I think more the Defense Intelligence Agency who deals directly with the families.

Mr. MOAKLEY. But has it come to your attention through the families that they have been annoyed by people saying they have additional information that you people haven't provided?

General WALTERS. I don't know of any, Congressman. In the first place this would be within the United States and would involve intelligence within the United States which is beyond our purview.

Mr. MOAKLEY. How do you think the reduction of American forces in Thailand would affect our capability to monitor the MIA information?

General WALTERS. I think it would affect it. Anything that might come up would be considerably affected. We would have to rely largely on the host government, namely the Thai Government, to tell us anything they found. It would considerably reduce our ability. But I can't tell you how much would be coming out. This is the difficulty. But the capability of getting anything would be very considerably reduced.

Mr. MOAKLEY. That's all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCloskey?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Do you have any reference to the Lindstrom report? Does that name mean anything? Reverend Lindstrom?

General WALTERS. Yes, I saw newspaper articles about it.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Was the effect of it that the CIA sent three intelligence teams into south China via Burma—and that the later report was that three Americans were being held there.

Was that report accurate?

General WALTERS. No, sir.

Let me put it this way. There was no evidence from that area or from any CIA activity in that area that there were any American prisoners being held in China or in that border area.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. My recollection is that during the Vietnam war the Chinese built a road into northern Laos that was actually con-

structed by a Chinese construction team, and I would assume the CIA monitored the construction of that road.

General WALTERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. There were Chinese in Laos?

General WALTERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Was there any kind of indication, any report at all, that Americans were shot down in that area or might have been transported into that area?

General WALTERS. I believe—and I may be wrong—that the area where the Chinese were building the roads was near the Burmese border and well to the west of any area where fighting was taking place.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. That's correct, but the scope of my question was a little broader.

Do we have any intelligence at all of any Americans being transported into that area?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. No, sir, we do not. I believe that—I might add—I have just been told it was our practice to avoid flying over the road that the Chinese were building.

The CHAIRMAN. On page 24 of your larger statement, about six lines down on page 24, you say there were cases where men were known to have survived their incident. What does that mean?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I think the incident was the actual capture. I was somewhat puzzled, Mr. Chairman, myself. I think what they mean is the actual passage from freedom into captivity.

The phraseology struck me as curious also, sir, but I saw it after it had been sent to the committee. But I believe what is meant is the actual moment of passage into captivity.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Can you give me any rough number of intelligence reports—whether verified or note—as to having observed American POW's alive in Laos?[1]

General WALTERS. I can get it for you. I do not have it.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. You don't have it on hand, but somewhere there is a summary of how many—reports from indigenous soldiers or captured——

General WALTERS. We'll get it for you, sir.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have covered it very well.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Just one question.

In the Arizona Republic dated December 10, 1974, it claimed there was a supersecret CIA report that confirmed that there were American POW's held in Southeast Asia. Did you hear about that?

General WALTERS. Sir, it must be so supersecret that the Deputy Director of CIA has not seen it.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Is that possible?

General WALTERS. No, sir.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. General Walters, thank you very much for appearing here today. I am sure there are some questions that we have overlooked. But you have been very dedicated and very sincere in your answers.

[1] See p. 215.

In closing do you care to summarize again the intelligence community's assessment of the missing-in-action situation?

General WALTERS. I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that, more than most committees before which I appear, I feel a human empathy with this committee because it involves a human problem of an extraordinary prolonged dimension and I must say that I feel I am very happy to have had this opportunity to appear before this committee which I think has really pursued this item as far as it's humanly pursuable.

I would simply like to say that I regret that I cannot tell you that there is hard evidence that there are Americans alive in that area. I would be very happy if I could. We can only speculate. But hard evidence, there is not.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no other questions or comments, the committee meeting is adjourned.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 10:05, the hearing was adjourned.]

SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS IN SOUTHERN ASIA

THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING
PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,
Washington, D.C.

The select committee met at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn Building, Hon. G. V. Montgomery, presiding.

Present: Representatives Montgomery, Gonzalez, Moakley, Schroeder, Ottinger, Harkin, Lloyd, and Gilman.

Staff members present: J. Angus MacDonald, staff director; Ms. Jeanne Shirkey, administrative assistant; Dr. Henry Kenny, Dr. Job Dittberner, and Mr. John Burke, professional staff assistants.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

In a meeting of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia yesterday, the committee voted to permit by TV and radio of the hearings this morning.

In a House resolution establishing this Select Committee on Missing Persons, we were instructed to find out if any American journalists and other civilians are still being held as prisoners in Southeast Asia. The House Select Committee on Missing Persons continues its investigations today. We will concentrate in this hearing on American journalists missing in Cambodia.

The select committee has been investigating the cases of Americans lost in Cambodia for some time. For the past several weeks, we have been trying to arrange a meeting with Cambodian officials. Thus far, there has been no response to our request.

Our chief witness today is well known to the American people and to the American public, the most distinguished anchorman of CBS evening news. Less known is the fact that Mr. Walter Cronkite has been chairman of the Committee to Free Journalists Held in Southeast Asia. This committee was organized in the late 1970's. Mr. Cronkite heads the American branch of that international committee.

Since 1970, the American committee and the international committee have spent a great deal of time and a great deal of money in attempting to gain information on missing American and foreign journalists. We are looking forward to hearing from Mr. Cronkite and to his telling us the extent of these efforts and what successes they might have had.

With Mr. Cronkite is Mr. Richard Dudman. Mr. Dudman is with the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. He was captured in Cambodia in May of 1970. He was a prisoner for 40 days in Cambodia.

We have also asked him to present testimony that will be helpful to this committee.

Gentlemen, we appreciate your taking the time from your busy schedules to come here, and Mr. Cronkite and Mr. Dudman, you may proceed in any manner that you so desire, and after comments, with no objections, this committee would like to ask questions.

STATEMENT OF WALTER CRONKITE, CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE TO FREE JOURNALISTS HELD IN SOUTHEAST ASIA; AND RICHARD DUDMAN, CHIEF WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH

Mr. CRONKITE. Of course, Mr. Chairman.

I do not have a written statement, as you know, but I hope that we can make a lucid presentation for you without that.

For the record, I am Walter Cronkite,[1] employed as a broadcast journalist by CBS, 524 West 57th Street, New York. I appear here, however, as the American chairman of the International Committee to Free Journalists Held in Southeast Asia, an organization that has a very active branch in France and in Japan where they are equally concerned about this matter, since there are at this time 21 journalists still missing in Cambodia primarily, although there is one included who became missing in Vietnam.

These include five Americans, four French, eight Japanese, one Austrian, one German, one Swiss, and one Australian. Twelve of those journalists worked for U.S. news media, three of them for CBS, four for NBC, one for Time magazine, two for United Press International, and two for Newsweek.

I will note that of these 21 journalists, there is one who we carry as missing because we have no informamtion positively of his demise, but on the other hand, there is a rather strong body of evidence that he did not survive a shelling in the northern portion of South Vietnam. That is Alexander Shimkin of Newsweek magazine.

The others there is no information about whatsoever in a positive sense, except some very strong evidence that our committee has accumulated, with great expenditure, as you suggest, and with, I think, great diligence, that they did survive. So Caucasians, at any rate, perhaps as many as 10, did survive their orginal capture, and we have evidence as late as the late summer of 1973, 3 years after their disappearance, that they were still alive and held in camps in Cambodia.

I might, for the record, tell you that the American committe looking for these journalists consists of 12 who are active, I as chairman, Peter Arnett of the Associated Press as secretary, Tom Wicker of the New York Times as treasurer. Our executive committee is represented by men from major newspapers and publishers: Barry Bingham, Sr. of the Louisville Courier Journal; Otis Chandler of the Los Angeles Times; Mr. Dudman, who is with me here; Osborne Elliott of Newsweek; Murray Gart of Time-Life; Katherine Graham, publisher of the Washington Post; David Halverstam, now a free lance journalist but with the New York Times in Vietnam; Ward Just of the

[1] Biography of Mr. Walter Cronkite appears on p. 459.

Baltimore Sun; and Frank McCullough, formerly with the New York Times and now with a west coast newspaper.

For the record also, the financing of this committee has been entirely voluntary. It has no government or outside funds. Most of these members of the executive committee, as a matter of fact, represent organizations that donated to our funding for the committee's work.

I have said that we have a lot of evidence. The evidence was gathered through two principal sources:

One, through those journalists in Cambodia and South Vietnam who were constantly on the lookout for information regarding their missing colleagues, and who picked up occasional bits of information, and primarily through three missions to Indochina by a representative of the committee, financed by the committee, one Zalin Grant, a former employee of Time-Life and a Vietnamese language linquist, who was particularly effective in his three trips out there in interviewing literally 3,000 of 4,300 returning POW's when they were exchanged—these were South Vietnamese prisoners of war, you understand—when they returned to South Vietnam in the exchange of 1973.

From this body of information the following was established. I will brief this as much as possible and the documentation, of course, is available to the committee.[1]

The missing journalists can be divided roughly into three groups.

The first consists of approximately 10 journalists who were captured between the 5th and 8th of April 1970, on Route 1 in Southeast Cambodia, about 10 kilometers from South Vietnam's borders—that is Route 1 that runs from Saigon to Phnom Penh. They were not very far from Phnom Penh and they were only 10 kilometers from South Vietnam's borders.

The second group consists of five television journalists captured on May 31, 1970, barely 2 months later, about 53 kilometers south of Phnom Penh on Route 3.

The third group are the remaining six captured later at various points or, in the case of Alexander Shimkin, believed to be killed in artillery fire.

A North Vietnamese officer who defected—this is evidence No. 1—said that on May 30, 1970—this would be after the first group was captured, the day before the second group—he talked with two of six foreign journalists who were being held by the North Vietnamese Army in a house 4 kilometers north of Kratie. Kratie City, so-called, is about 100 miles northeast of Phnom Penh. It is in the Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia that we came to know so well because that is the area that the American Army went into at one point in what was called an incursion.

This defector was given a detailed debriefing by U.S. Army intelligence specialists. He was subjected to a lie detector test and he passed it. This is the man who talked to two of six foreign journalists almost 6 weeks after they had been captured, so we know that of that first group at least 6 of the 10 who disappeared did survive their immediate capture.

Evidence No. 2: A number of ARVN—that is the South Vietnamese Army—prisoners of war released after the 1973 cease-fire said they

[1] See p. 220.

had heard while in captivity from North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Army personnel that foreign journalists were being detained within a 50-mile radius of Kratie as late as March 1973, 3 years almost to the day of their capture. The U.S. committee dispatched an investigator—that was Zalin Grant who I mentioned—to Indochina after the cease-fire to interview returning Vietnamese POW's. He talked to 3,000, as we say, of 4,300—an amazing number. He is a diligent and hard-working man who is so devoted to this cause that he really was one of the inspirations in the founding of this committee.

Many of those 3,000 had been detained by the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong in prison camps in eastern Cambodia. That is in the area where the Caucasions were said to be held.

Some 25 unrelated sources among the POW's and hearsay information about the missing journalists. I emphasize the "unrelated sources," because it would be very easy for these individuals quite clearly, in the prison camp or upon their return, to have talked among themselves and to have heard the story self-generated among their own group. But these are unrelated sources that had come from different sources, different camps, and had not had contact with one another. That was established by Zalin who was a good journalist, as I said.

Evidence No. 3: The ARVN President, Nguyen van Thanh, whose serial number is available here, saw the six Caucasions on May 1, 1972, south of Snoul, a town just outside Kratie, about some 20 kilometers south of Kratie. He saw them being moved northward by the North Vietnamese Army. Thanh asked his own guard if the Caucasions were military advisers, and the North Vietnamese guard replied, "No, they are correspondents of the imperialist side."

Another bit of evidence: A Mr. Kong San, a Cambodian national, who formerly served as a supervisor of a rubber plantation controlled by guerrilla forces, reported that he saw 10 Caucasians identified as journalists in June of 1972. Kong San saw the journalists frequently during a 2-week period while he underwent refresher training in rubber production at a Cambodian guerrilla camp 3 miles east of Kratie believed to be a CFNC regional headquarters—CFNC being an acronym for the Communist forces in Cambodia—at these regional headquarters at a map coordinate we can show you, but that is all in the vicinity of Kratie.

All of this, as I said earlier, took place within 150 kilometers of this one point. He did not see any North Vietnamese or Vietcong in that area which gives us some indication for the first time that they were held by Cambodian forces and not by North Vietnamese forces which had been the earlier indication according to these interrogations.

Now, that is the sum of Zalin Grant's information.

Additionally, we have this—excuse me. I am fighting a slight cold this morning which I don't suppose makes very interesting reading in the record.

But this bit of evidence compiled by an NBC bureau manager, in Houston, Tex., now, Arthur Lord, who spent some time out there and has been very helpful—he compiled these bits of evidence from what he called more or less well-substantiated sources.

A Cambodian Government undercover agent said he had sighted Dieter Behlendorf, a German who was captured in the first group in

April of 1970, working as a road laborer in eastern Cambodia. The agent who reported this was known to and was interviewed by James Sturdevant, who was an NBC cameraman at Phnom Penh, who later was unfortunately killed in an automobile accident in Hawaii.

A second bit of evidence: A returned South Vietnamese paratrooper told a Saigon intelligence officer in mid-1972 that near the mid-Cambodian border town of Minot, another locality in that immediate vicinity of Kratie, he saw six Caucasians marching under an armed guard. They had long hair and beards but otherwise he was unable to identify them. His guards told him they were imperialist journalists.

That story was obtained by Richard Pyle of the Associated Press in Saigon.

Another bit of evidence. A Cambodian told the CIA in early 1971 that he had spent the night in a house with journalists shortly after their capture. He identified them partly from remembering names, partly from pictures—and I have the names here of five journalists who were in television crews, which would indicate these were in the group: Wells Hangdon of NBC; a Mr. Cohen, a Frenchman; and three Japanese cameramen, Wauk, Ishi, and Saki.

He had much detailed knowledge of them available only to someone who had met them. He said they were taken the next day to the Pagoda Wapo, and he lost further contact with them.

Now, that evidence, I think, is quite substantial—certainly that gathered by Mr. Grant. That Mr. Sturdevant had gathered and passed on to Arthur Lord, we don't have quite as much documentation regarding.

Then there was a most important set of information that came to our attention through the diligence of Gavin Scott, who was a Time-Life correspondent bureau manager in Saigon. In June of 1973, as he and others were covering the meetings of the military group, the joint military commission that was set up, if you will remember, in the period of trust before the actual peace was settled upon, at Camp Davis, so-called, at Tan Sung, an airport outside of Saigon—the press met with them on Saturdays, or the press was there on Saturdays when they had their weekly meeting.

At one of those meetings, in June of 1973, the general from the Vietcong side made reference to the fact, in a private conversation with some of the journalists—at least with Gavin Scott—that he had information that there were American journalists being held on the border, the Cambodian-Vietnam border.

Well, naturally that excited Scott, and he was unable himself to go to the next Saturday session, but he sent one of his trusted employees who at that session talked to Capt. Phuong Nam of the Vietcong delegation, who was nominally their press relations officer, who had the greatest contact, at any rate, with the Western press.

And he said that yes, he had heard this, although at that time the general was beginning to deny it, but Nam said, yes, he had heard it, and he would make an effort to find out more about it.

Now, we get to the report that finally Gavin Scott was able to assemble in October of 1973, and I think that I can safely read this to you now, although we held it confidential for sometime because, obviously, of the nature of the information we didn't want to disrupt that flow of information. I don't think there is any danger of that now.

Mr. Scott reported to Murray Dart, his manager of bureaus for Time-Life in New York.

At our request Captain Phuong Nam of the Vietnamese traveled to the VC stronghold of Loc Ninh in early September 1973. He met there with a Viet Cong liaison officer in charge of relations with the Khmer insurgents. [That is the Khmer Rouge, the Red Cambodians.] The two of them traveled for about 10 days in areas straddling the Cambodian-Vietnam frontier. The Khmer Rouge manager in Svay Rieng and Mimot [both in the area of Kratie City again] told them they were aware of the existence of a bunch [which Gavin noted was a free translation] of foreign journalists who had been captured by the Vietcong and turned over subsequently to the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge commander said, "Among them is one who is an actor who is working for Time magazine and CBS."

There was no explanation, but an obvious hope, Scott noted, is that the confusion rests in the survival together of Sean Flynn and Dana Stone. Sean Flynn, the son of the actor Errol Flynn, was working for CBS. Dana Stone was also doing some work for CBS but also for Time magazine.

"The commander at Svan Rieng said further that he had actually talked to the foreign journalists, identities unspecified, earlier this year—that would be 1973. Captain Nam asked the commander about the health of the captives. He shrugged and the inference was passed on to Gavin Scott that they were in as good health as could be expected.

"Neither of the two commanders, nor Captain Nam, could come up with an exact figure on the present whereabouts"—that would be in September 1973—"of the captives. All that we could learn," Scott reported, "is that they are fairly constantly on the move." At one point earlier this summer, the captives were said to be in the vicinity of Takeo, a province capital. That is not too far from Kratie City, either. The latest word is that they are somewhere in the border area. The Khmer Rouge were described to us as stubborn and indifferent when the subject of missing foreign journalists was raised.

"They have little interest in talking about them," says our source, according to Gavin Scott's report in that regard.

That concludes the evidence we have of anything up to the fall of Cambodia to the Khmer Rouge.

After the fall of Cambodia, there is only one small thread of evidence—and I would suggest that it is quite small.

A Japanese cameraman, named Mabuchi, who had been in Cambodia at the fall, had made the long trek out to neighboring Thailand, reported after he returned to Tokyo—and it was reported to me by a CBS Japanese employee—that he had been told by officers of the Khmer Rouge—the rank of the officer is not determined because they do not wear rank in that army—that "all foreigners, including Japanese"—he did not specify journalists—"all foreigners, including Japanese, were held near Angkor Wat and would be released after relations were normalized."

Now, as I say, there is nothing really substantial about that bit of information.

I should report the bad news.

Sidney Schanberg of the New York Times—who stayed behind, as you may recall, in Phnom Penh, quite courageously after everyone else fled, including the American Embassy staff—talked with the Khmer Rouge information minister in April—that would be April 1975—and was told there was "absolutely no knowledge of missing journalists."

That, indeed, has been the answer that we have received in every contact that we have been able to make with anybody who has any association with the Cambodians, and those contacts have not been, unfortunately, many, but they have been rather consistent over the years.

We have made several contacts, to the point that the gentleman has become quite annoyed, as a matter of fact, with our persistence, with Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Peking, and when he was more recently in the United States last fall, at the United Nations.

It is interesting that, at the United Nations, he did not return my phone calls after having quite politely answered several cables and other messages from us over the years. But he did see other members of the press, and other members of the press did bring up the matter with him of the missing journalists again and again.

As he has through the years, he said that he had made every inquiry that he possibly could make with both his own forces in Cambodia—this was before the fall of Cambodia to the Khmer Rouge—to his mission in Paris, and also to the Khmer Rouge itself, that is, to the CFNC group—his group were called the GRUNK group, another acronym very unpleasant of sound, and perhaps of policy. But he made these inquiries and he had gotten nowhere.

We felt for some time—and perhaps we should still feel this way—that Prince Sihanouk, who had been very friendly to journalists when he was in power in Phnom Penh and in Peking—he has seen, I think, almost every visiting American journalist who wished to call on him in Peking in his refuge there, and he has received them all with graciousness.

He has answered the questions we have asked quite freely, and we are inclined to believe that he has indeed been sincere in making these inquiries.

We also, however, are inclined to doubt that his sources are as good in his own country of Cambodia as perhaps he would like. Whether he is fully informed as to what goes on in Cambodia, either before the takeover at Phnom Penh or later, we just aren't sure.

Contacts have been made not only by the American side, American journalists, but frequently by French journalists and Japanese journalists who have had contact with these people. We have made these contacts through Prince Sihanouk in Peking and at the United Nations, as I suggested, and through the Cambodian mission at Paris.

We have also asked—and I have not had a report, but I believe that some third-world diplomats have made inquiries on our behalf as well. We have not received any reports from them, though, of anything positive resulting from that.

The most recent attempt of any nature, any sort of official nature, was in October-November at the United Nations, when, upon the request of our committee, Ambassador Moynihan had some of his deputies call quite unofficially upon the Cambodian representative at the United Nations. This was an unofficial call, since we do not recognize, of course, their government.

He made the representation, requested information. We thought that perhaps this would be an opportunity for the Cambodians to give us information that we could present the case to them in a face-saving

manner by saying, "We understand that in wartime you couldn't possibly—particularly in the type of war you were fighting, a guerrilla war, namely—expect to have records of every prisoner of war camp, perhaps, every area where prisoners were held, but now that you have won your great victory and are in charge of Phnom Penh, perhaps you have pulled together your records and now you can make another search of them for us and advise us of the fate of these men."

The Cambodian representative politely accepted that representation and said he would find out what he could, and came back almost instantly, that is, within a matter of days, to report the Cambodian government had absolutely no record of any missing American journalists or other foreign journalists in Cambodia.

That is, at the moment, the end of our story.

I am sure that you are interested in what sort of cooperation this committee feels it has from our own Government, and I can report to you that we have here in the room, I know with us, Frank Sieverts of the State Department, who is in charge of problems of missing individuals. You all know him, of course, very well, as we do. He has been exceedingly helpful to us, and I think most diligent in the pursuit of this problem.

At a higher level, we called on Secretary Kissinger—the committee did so in a formal manner at one point. We have kept in constant touch with Secretary Kissinger, which is not too difficult for newsmen to do. He has expressed considerable interest in our problem, and after our formal representation in the fall of 1973, after we had gotten this latest report from Zalin Grant that indicated that some Caucasians at least were still alive, he promised to take the matter up on his immediately forthcoming trip to China.

He reported to us that he had seen in China not only Chou En Lai, who was then, as you know, the operating head of the Government, but he has also taken the matter up with the Vietnamese representative at Paris—Le Duc Tho. Both of these gentlemen had promised inquiries and had come back and said that they had no knowledge of anybody being held.

In Le Duc Tho's case, a positive denial that the North Vietnamese Army knew anything about the missing correspondents, although, as this evidence suggests, the North Vietnamese Army certainly at one time had them in their control. They may have turned them over to the Cambodians, but according to Le Duc Tho, they had no knowledge of them.

We had one exchange that did not please our committee. I think I might as well report it to you so that it is all out on the table.

After Secretary Kissinger in November 19, 1973, advised me that he had raised the matter of missing journalists with Chou En Lai and Le Duc Tho—and I think I can read his letter to you:

> I gave Chou En Lai all the materials which you provided and I have sent a note to Le Duc Tho asking him on a personal basis if there is any new information available to him.
>
> We have no way of knowing whether there will be a response one way or the other. Nevertheless, I think it was worthwhile to raise it with them again as a humanitarian matter as we discussed.

Then a month later we had a communication from Gen. Brent Scowcroft, who was at that time the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and now is the President's Assistant on National Security Affairs. He reported to us that Mr. Kissinger had asked him to send us the request which he had made of the Hanoi Government regarding U.S. journalists missing in Cambodia and their reply.

So this message that Secretary Kissinger told us that he had sent read, we have now learned, as follows:

> A group of American journalists representing many members of their profession from all political persuasions have come to me to inquire if anything further could be done to determine the fate of some of their colleagues who have been missing in Cambodia. Investigations and searches that they have conducted independently have led them to believe that their colleagues might be alive.
>
> They asked me whether the DRV [that is the Democratic Republic of Vietnam] was in a position to assist in this matter. I told them that we had no basis for believing that these American journalists were alive or that the DRV was in a position to assist. Nevertheless, I told them I would make one further inquiry. I do this, as I say, in a wholly unofficial capacity. These missing journalists are civilians and private citizens, not employees of the United States Government. The U.S. Government will make no public representation on the matter and will not treat this matter in propagandistic fashion.
>
> I recall that we received the DRV's assurance a year ago that you had been informed by your ally in Cambodia that there were no American captives held in Cambodia. Should we learn that these American journalists are indeed alive, we would treat this as welcome news and as a sign of good-will on the part of your ally. We receive this news in that same spirit. Any information from the DRV or any wise advice from the special advisor [Le Duc Tho] about this part of Indochina with which he has a long familiarity, would be deeply appreciated by the American people.

That reply—this was November—was as follows:

> I would like to inform you that as far as we know, there is no American being detained in Cambodia and we have no information about the persons referred to in your message.

We in our committee quite honestly felt that was something a little less than adequate. We can understand the necessity for diplomatic niceties. We understand the necessity of saying that these people were not employees of the U.S. Government. We certainly made that point every time we possibly could, that they were journalists only and acting in no other capacity. But for a message to suggest that they had no basis for believing that these American journalists were alive or that the DRV was in a position to assist seems to me to fly in the face of the evidence I have presented to you, and which was the evidence we had presented to Dr. Kissinger regarding our belief that they were alive. It seems that a more positive approach would have been more helpful.

I also question, although I cannot do so with quite such positiveness, this matter of making no public representation on the matter and not treating this in a propagandistic fashion. Maybe that was necessary because other negotiations were delicate at the time, but on the other hand, it seems to me that they might have kept the fist a little bit clenched and not so warmly outstanding.

That really is the sum of our evidence and of our effort.

The American committee, I should point out to you, is only part of an international effort. The Japanese committee has been very active. The French committee has been even more so. The International Press Institute, which is an international body based in Switzerland, has also been very active.

We have made representations, all of us, as individual organizations and as a group, to the Cambodians for permission to come to Cambodia and to look ourselves for evidence, particularly perhaps to look for graves. We have absolutely made no headway at all.

The Japanese Government, according to journalists, American and others who were in Phnom Penh—the Japanese embassy in Phnom Penh was, they thought, perhaps the most active in behalf of the missing journalists, and they had no more success than did our embassy or other representations.

In other words, the Cambodian society, as we all know, is an absolutely totally closed one at the moment, and we have come to our wits' end in making any approach that would get any sort of committee or group in there.

At the time that it became clear that the fall of Phnom Penh was imminent, we were beginning to work—this committee—on a propaganda campaign of our own, a series of measures that we thought we might take, beginning perhaps with a distinguished committee of international jurists to work for us and with us.

There were some other approaches to be made along that line.

This all was suspended when it appeared that Cambodia was about to fall, and we all had these high hopes that the new government in Cambodia would be something a little more civilized than the one that is there now, and would on a humanitarian basis at least give us some information or permit the presence of an investigating group. And now that hope is gone.

With it now a year or so since the fall of Cambodia, and no information from them, and the problem we have in our mind of finding any reason—any reason at all—why they would want to hold these people—we felt during the war that they might hold them as pawns for negotiations of one kind or another, but now that they control the country, now that it has been a year, now that there is no evidence that they are in the immediate future intending to negotiate for any sort of international recognition or help of any kind, we can't imagine why they would still be held. The only possible reason would be embarrassment over the fact that they didn't release them immediately and now they don't know how to turn them over without showing the inhumane treatment over these years.

But that is only the wildest sort of speculation.

Our committee is going to continue in existence. We have made that determination deliberately, although we acknowledge that hope is now very thin. And the reason we are remaining in existence is that we feel that as long—I think in this we share that sort of emotional feeling that every family feels for a missing man—as long as we don't know, we certainly are not going to break faith with them by saying, "We give up," if there is that one small hope among thousands of other indications. And we are not going to give up, although we don't know where to turn from here.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cronkite.

You have certainly presented very detailed information, and there is no question about your dedication to this frustrating matter that the committee also has a problem of frustration with, where do we turn from here. But I commend you on taking the time and the effort to follow up on this tremendous problem. And your testimony has been most helpful to us.

Mr. Dudman, now, I believe you have a prepared brief statement. With no objection from the committee, Mr. Dudman, we would like to have your testimony, and then, we would like to operate under the 5-minute rule for questions. We would appreciate your answering the questions to the best of your ability and knowledge.

Mr. Dudman.

Mr. DUDMAN. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I have submitted a statement for the record [1] and I will go over it briefly for you, if that is satisfactory.

I am Richard Dudman, the chief Washington correspondent of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Your staff has asked me to appear with the thought that this could be of some help to you in the work of the committee.

I was captured in Cambodia in 1970 by Communist guerrillas and held for 40 days with two other American reporters. I was on assignment there for my newspaper. The experience gives me some almost unique basis for some thought as to the chances at that time that other missing civilians may have of survival, what kind of treatment they got, and what records may have been kept, so that some day we may tell what has happened to them.

We were captured just about a week after the start of the Nixon invasion of Cambodia, which began April 30, 1970. We were captured in the Parrot's Beak area, just north of the town of Svay Rieng which Mr. Cronkite has mentioned.

With me were two other correspondents, Elizabeth Pond of the Christian Science Monitor, and Michael Morrow of a small news agency called the Dispatch News Service International.

We had understood that the route from Saigon to Phnom Penh was open, and that the South Vietnamese troops had opened the road and gone all the way to Phnom Penh.

It was our intention to drive that route and see what the situation was between these traditional enemies, the South Vietnamese and the Cambodians. We suspected there might be a good bit of looting along the way, and in fact we found evidence of that.

However, we apparently got ahead of the people we thought we were following. Our information had not been correct. We found ourselves in a sort of no man's land, and a young fellow stepped out from behind a tree with an AK–47 and pointed it at us. We got quickly out of our Jeep and put our hands above our heads, and that was the start of it.

We were held in various places and interrogated. We traveled mostly at night and were held in grass-roofed houses during the daytime. We traveled by, in some cases, truck, sometimes on foot, sometimes on bicycle. The reason for movement was that this was all a battle area where we were subjected to direct attacks by American planes and South Vietnamese and American tank columns and infantry units.

We were treated in general rather well, as well as could be expected, except for the first day, when we were in the hands of villagers. The villagers threatened us, and they tied Mr. Morrow and me blindfolded

[1] The prepared statement of Mr. Richard Dudman appears on p. 214.

behind a motorbike and forced us to run for about a half-mile over rough ground. We managed to keep our feet. At the end of that period, we were still blindfolded and our hands were tied behind our backs and we were clubbed over the head.

At that point, regular military people took over, and we were still blindfolded, but an officer identified himself as a military man from—he just said the army. We knew he was Vietnamese by his language, and we were untied and blindfolds taken off and allowed to bathe, and we were told that we would eventually be released if their inquiry determined that we were not CIA agents, and that in fact we were, as we said we were, legitimate American journalists.

We were fed the same food that the five soldiers assigned to guard us were fed. It was mostly rice with bits of meat and fish, sometimes a little vegetables. We all had dysentery from time to time, including our captors. They had some kind of a native medicine that they gave you one drop in a cup of tea, and that was sufficient to turn off the dysentery like a light. I have shown that to my doctor here and he is mystified by how it would work that well.

I mention these things just to show that they seemed to want to help us survive. They were told they were responsible for our safekeeping.

Their inquiry at one point after we had been held for about 5 weeks—they told us their inquiry had determined that we were, in fact, journalists and they had decided to release us, which they did. We found out later that there were a great many messages, mostly cablegrams and telephone calls, directed to Hanoi about us, from Americans and people from other countries, both Government people and private people, some of them of some prominence, including Members of Congress, who told them that we were legitimate journalists and should be released.

It seems to me, on reflection, that there were several main hazards to survival. One, of course, is health.

Mr. Morrow and I both suffered from boils that I found out after my release were one of the symptoms of an Asian disease known as melioidosis. It is a bloodstream infection that has a fatality rate of about 50 percent in some cases. It is found endemic in the soil of that area.

I mentioned dysentery. That is a constant hazard. We had bad water several times. Usually we would boil it, but sometimes we were told it was boiled by villagers in villages we were passing through, and found out it wasn't, and we got sick.

The food was not really adequate for a westerner. We were urged constantly to eat as much rice as we could hold. It was forced on us—not forced, but we were urged to take another helping. I found I could choke down only so much rice, and I didn't realize it at the time but I was losing weight at about the rate of a pound a day. My belt stayed about the same size, but I found out later it was coming off the shoulders and thighs, and so on, and I was down to about 135 pounds from normal 155, 160.

I don't know how this would have gone on had I been held for a longer time. It was exactly 40 days from the time of capture to the time of release, and I might have reached some low plateau and been able to maintain myself. My strength seemed to keep up fine.

Another hazard that has to be mentioned, of course, is the danger of execution. We were never threatened with it. There was one time I thought they were going to do us in. We were in the midst of an air raid. We had been separated the way they do, in underbrush and under trees, scattered around the landscape so the expected bomb attack wouldn't hit us all. I was with the one Vietcong man who urged me to crawl into a little burrow under some brush. I don't know much Vietnamese but he said "be nam hai," and I knew that meant B–52, and he pointed up and gestured that I should bury my face in the ground, in the dirt, which I did. I peeked up to see what he was doing, and he was undoing his holster of his gun. I must have looked frightened. He saw my concern and smiled in what was supposed to be a reassuring way, and made his finger like a pistol and pointed it at me and shook his head, and then pointed up toward the planes and nodded his head, as if that is what he was going to do with it. Then he unwrapped a little package of lump sugar and divided it between us and passed a share of it over to me. I had the experience of finding what a little carbohydrate can suddenly do to the system and to the whole attitude. I felt much better about the whole thing.

The third danger at that time, which I wouldn't think would be a factor now for any who have survived, is the constant danger of attack. We know by the history of the war, and I know from personal experience, that planes flying over that area, planes and helicopters, would fire on anything that was seen to be moving on the ground. We managed to keep undercover a great deal, but there were times when we were staying in a house that could be seen from above, and it was subject to an attack.

I must say, though, that the guerrillas seemed to have a way of anticipating attacks. I have discussed this with intelligence people since, and they have some explanations for this. It has to do largely with the pattern of observation planes in advance. But they would begin to learn the method of operation of the American planes and sometimes get us out of a house an hour or so before an attack began, or sometimes 15 minutes before. Several times we were called abruptly and told to race out into the countryside and disperse so we wouldn't be hit.

Now, what does this all mean about the chances of survival? I agree with Mr. Cronkite that our hopes necessarily have faded with the passage of time. We do feel, however—I do—that there remains some slight possibility for some of these people to remain alive. We do know of cases of Americans who have been kept in absolute secrecy as prisoners in South Vietnam for as long as 4 years. This, of course, goes longer than that now, but they have been kept that long and then released and walked out whole. I think of the Foreign Service officer, Philip Manhard, to whom that happened.

And so I agree with Mr. Cronkite that while hope necessarily has faded some, we can't afford to give up entirely, and we can look only for an ultimate, very frank accounting, which doesn't seem available yet, but until we get that we can't give up hope.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Dudman, for that very informative testimony, and also working with the journalist committee the past few months.

We are having a problem, as I mentioned earlier, of trying to get in touch with the Cambodians. President Ford told us the administration is experiencing problems in trying to make contact with the Cambodians at that time. So there is a problem but we are working every way we know, through Peking and other areas, trying to get that information.

I will only ask one question, and I think Mr. Cronkite and Mr. Dudman have both touched on it, but I think it should be in the record.

Considering the climate in Cambodia, the heavy vegetation, the diseases in that country, and other problems that go with Cambodia, what would be the odds that these five or six Americans that were seen alive—and we know they were alive in 1972 and 1973, as Mr. Cronkite detailed—could still be alive in March of 1976?

Mr. CRONKITE. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't even put a figure on that as to the odds. I just have absolutely no way of knowing. I don't think anyone really knows what the conditions in Cambodia today are. You hear horror stories of what the regime is doing with their own population. We hear that they have a great problem with food supplies, that they have driven people into the countryside and forced the city workers to go into the fields to attempt to grow and harvest their own food.

I would think that the foreign correspondents who were Americans I am sure were resourceful. If there was any opportunity to survive, if they were turned loose in the countryside to survive, I would think they would have a pretty good chance. But I don't have any idea what the circumstances are.

Mr. Chairman, I was remiss in making my presentation with some information that perhaps should be in the record. I wonder if I might take another couple of minutes to put it in the record for you now?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. Dudman, do you want to answer my question first?

Mr. DUDMAN. I have one thing to say about that. There are contradictory reports about what is going on in Cambodia now. There are some studies that have been made that indicate that this drastic remedy of sending the city people out into the countryside has actually worked, and that Cambodia has actually come well along the way to solving its urgent threat of famine.

They did face a problem of quickly resuming agricultural production after a long period of disruption.

If the missing Americans got through this initial period, they may not be as badly off now as one might think.

Mr. CRONKITE. Of course, we don't know anything. I believe—correct me if I am wrong on this, Dick—but we don't know much about the medical situation in Cambodia, do we?

Mr. DUDMAN. We don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cronkite, we have a time problem, like CBS evening news, and the Members would like to ask questions. You can proceed with what you'd like to put in the record.

Mr. CRONKITE. I think I can do it very quickly. I think it belongs in the record because I think it shows American Government agency interest in the matter and pursuit of it.

Zalin Grant met in September 1973, with six representatives from the Pentagon's Office of Missing Prisoner Affairs and the Defense Intelligence Agency Public Information Office. He summarized his finding saying no information was received during routine interviews with returned American prisoners according to DIA office officials assigned to the project. We think that is important because we think they did ask questions of returned prisoners in their debriefing.

They also have a file on journalists being detained. The intelligence report is sketchy and of undetermined veracities. They believe, however, the reports of sightings have been narrowed to several months after return of Vietnamese prisoners. That would put it a little later.

The State Department also has on file a second reported sighting of Westerners and Japanese in eastern Cambodia received from a Viet Cong POW in August 1973, which doesn't extend the date very much beyond that.

One other thing I might mention. The senior American officer held as a POW in Cambodia was Lt. Col. Raymond Strump of Fayetteville, N.C. and we talked with him as to whether a man held in that area could have survived the very heavy B-52 strikes in that area, and he said that he thought the chances were extremely good.

This answers part of your question, Mr. Chairman, about whether they could have survived that particular period. He said that, "Based on my experiences, if they were in a camp with bunkers, it would take a direct hit to kill them. We never had one casualty, and we experienced strike after strike. I never saw one Vietnamese or American even wounded."

The CHAIRMAN. I think that should be in the record.

Mr. Gonzalez.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me congratulate you for the excellent leadership in having put together this select committee in a very quick fashion. It may be that many of our citizens do not know the difficulty involved.

First, we have to have a resolution. It is a tough job to get a select committee resolution through the House. Then when you do, there is the matter of funding—and we have a limited time. This committee will expire this year.

The chairman has done simply wonders. He has powered all of his efforts into it. And particularly at this point I wish to compliment him because I think he has enabled us to listen to a few of the most worthwhile dramatic presentations we have had.

Mr. Cronkite, my question has to do with information since 1973. I believe the latest information you mention would give us a time reference of about September 1973. And since then you have heard nothing further from any source, not just about Americans but foreign correspondents?

For instance, was Dieter Behlendorf returned? Was he released or is he still presumably lost?

Mr. CRONKITE. No, he is still lost, as far as I know. I'd be very surprised if he had been returned and we hadn't heard about it.

Mr. GONZALEZ. He is a German?

Mr. CRONKITE. Yes.

Mr. GONZALEZ. West German?

Mr. CRONKITE. Yes, West German.

Mr. GONZALEZ. From any of your contacts in the press corps, international as well as domestic, there has been no additional information?

Mr. CRONKITE. No, nothing other than I have testified to.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Has any effort been made to contact third-party countries? For instance, my understanding is that in China, there is very friendly, almost effusive, friendship with delegates or ambassadors from some of our Latin American countries, and one or two European countries. Apparently they should be good countries of information if an attempt could be made through that type of contact.

Has any been made with foreign correspondent sources?

Mr. CRONKITE. In Peking as such, I am not particularly aware. I think we did through—I believe the Canadians were contacted at one point, and very possibly the French have done so. I don't mean the French Embassy there, but the French correspondents. And they have through other third countries—and perhaps the Japanese.

As far as American correspondents, I do not know of specific contacts. But I can assure you, Mr. Gonzalez, that American correspondents, particularly in Peking, and particularly on the rare occasion when they get into Hanoi, have this matter in mind. If we know they are going, we remind them of it and remind them with pamphlets and other materials that we have turned out, so that they have that with them and can speak intelligently of the situation with any contact they have in those countries.

I don't believe that that area has gone unexplored.

I believe, very possibly, that they are not likely to get much more information from those third countries than we have been able to get.

Mr. GONZALEZ. I am pretty sure I have almost expired my time, and I know it is limited, and some of the other members should have a chance. If when we are through and they are through we have ample chance, I have additional questions. Thank you very much for taking time to meet with us this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gonzalez.

Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cronkite and Mr. Dudman, I want to join my colleagues in welcoming you before the committee. I commend you for your diligent efforts and longstanding attention to this problem, a serious problem that has been extremely difficult for your committee, as well as for the Congress and for the administration, because of the continual frustration that we are confronted with in seeking intervention.

Did either one of you gentlemen or through your organizations ever receive any reports with regard to any illness or death of any of the journalists that are missing?

Mr. CRONKITE. No, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. As far as you know, they were all in good health, and from the reports that you had they were all alive?

Mr. CRONKITE. Well, no, let me correct that. We do not know that they were all alive at any given point. The information we had was that Caucasians had been seen—and the number varied from 2 to 5 to

6 to 10—in a couple of the reports to 10 Caucasians, which would indicate that of these 21, all but 1 or 2 Caucasians could be accounted for.

You can understand the difficulty with the Japanese correspondents particularly, that there is a problem in easily identifying them. They don't exactly stand out in the crowd in Cambodia as would tall, blond Caucasians.

So that is all the evidence we had. We never were able to get a precise count and to say that all survived and all were there in 1973 or not.

As far as health goes, the reports as to health were only that they were alive and seemed to be in good health.

Mr. GILMAN. All of these journalists were taken alive; is that correct? They were captured while pursuing a story or in performance of their duties?

Mr. CRONKITE. There, again, Mr. Gilman, we do not know that positively. We have the evidence I put before you that a count up to 10 had been made late in 1973, which would indicate that they were.

Some of them were captured in quite dire circumstances, under heavy fire fights, and it is perfectly conceivable, we have to admit, that they were killed at the time of the incident, although our evidence would seem to indicate that they did survive.

Mr. GILMAN. Yes; Mr. Dudman.

Mr. DUDMAN. If I may add something, there were some cases in which we know from people who were later released, a Cambodian chauffeur, for example, that the journalists were captured and were not harmed, not injured at the time of the capture. And we know that they were in the hands of the regular military personnel a couple of days after the capture. So that lets us know that they survived that first very dangerous period.

Mr. GILMAN. Were there any photographs taken of any of the journalists after the capture?

Mr. CRONKITE. Not that I know of.

Mr. GILMAN. And no further formal reports from any source following capture; is that correct.

Mr. CRONKITE. That is correct.

Mr. GILMAN. As part of your investigations and interviews—I was amazed at the number of former prisoners and military personnel and people interviewed—were there ever any reports that you received about any other Americans, American servicemen, who were being held as prisoners or being transported from place to place?

Mr. CRONKITE. I am not aware that Mr. Grant uncovered such, but he very well might have, Mr. Gilman. I can't answer that positively. He wouldn't necessarily have made a report to us. He was working very closely with South Vietnamese and with Americans in these interrogations, not in every case being present with them in the interrogations. He was given a great deal of latitude.

I don't have any doubt that if he had any such information he would have turned it over to them instantly.

Mr. GILMAN. Is Mr. Grant presently involved in journalism? Is he working here in the States?

Mr. CRONKITE. He is a freelance writer living in Spain at the moment, and we are in touch with him whenever necessary.

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Mr. GILMAN. You have information on how we could get in touch with him?

Mr. CRONKITE. Yes.

Mr. GILMAN. There was a report that had been received from a Webruda Kovitch of ABC—I hope I am pronouncing it correctly—in which it stated, while he was over in Cambodia, that he and several others spoke to a Khmer Rouge guard at an embassy, and they asked the guard about the missing journalists, and the guard's reply to them was that they were ground and air officers that were being held. The guard said he didn't know where or how, but that negotiations would take place for their release, and that they were willing to bargain. The prisoners badly needed food and medical supplies. He also said they were holding men missing since the U.S. involvement in Indochina only.

Did you have any information with regard to that story?

Mr. CRONKITE. I don't recall that story; do you?

Mr. DUDMAN. No.

Mr. CRONKITE. I don't believe so, sir. I can't say positively, but I certainly don't recall it.

Mr. GILMAN. Apparently a Mr. Bush and Mr. Stein of ABC made contact with him, and I assume verified his statement, and we are wondering if you have any further information with regard to that?

Mr. CRONKITE. No; I don't think I have heard that.

The CHAIRMAN. I am afraid the gentleman's time is up.

Mr. GILMAN. If I might just have one more question, Mr. Chairman.

In a recent appearance before this committee, Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of the CIA, said he felt the United States should pursue a worldwide publicity campaign, humanitarian in nature, with regard to getting this information. Do you feel this would be a proper approach, and do you have any suggestions as to the manner in which we should pursue that?

Mr. CRONKITE. Yes; I think that might prove to be helpful. I certainly don't see that it can be harmful. I would think it would be one approach to be made; yes.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. Moakley.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I'd like to thank you, Mr. Cronkite and Mr. Dudman, for the very informative presentation here this morning, and I am sure the whole committee agrees with me it is one of the best presentations we have had before this committee. In fact, it really doesn't leave much room to ask many questions. But I would like to ask one, if you know, either of you gentlemen, what the legal status is of the missing journalists you have talked about here this morning?

Mr. CRONKITE. Yes; I know it rather vaguely, Mr. Moakley. I can't be specific on this; I'm sorry. This really hasn't been a matter of the committee's concern. It is a matter for the individuals.

I am under the impression that there is some kind of statute of limitations involved in their insurance situation, which has caused both NBC and CBS to feel that the cases should be closed out at about this time, or toward the end of last year, as a matter of fact. I believe—I don't want to speak positively on this—but I believe Mrs. Wells Hangen at NBC did agree with them that they should certify her husband as lost—as dead, in fact. I think that CBS was making the same arrangements in Japan with the cameraman and soundman we lost there who were Japanese citizens.

The situation is not quite the same with others who worked for us who were stringers, as we say, who were not fulltime employees, and I don't really know what has happened in their cases.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Do you have any suggestions? I really have to commend you—I was talking to Congressman Gonzalez about it—that for a nongovernmental committee, you have really made some strides in this and had some information that we didn't have.

I was wondering how closely you worked with the State Department when your committee was actively working, more actively than it is now.

Mr. CRONKITE. Very closely with Mr. Sieverts, and he worked very closely with us. It was a very comfortable and, we thought, quite satisfactory liaison.

I believe from our standpoint of giving information to him, I hope that we communicated in every case as we got information. That was the intention.

As I told you, I think, all of you earlier when we were standing around before going up here, a committee of journalists is not the most efficient way of getting anything done, certainly, with all of us traveling around the world.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Sometimes you people can open doors that we can't open.

Did you ever find yourself in a position where you had information pertaining to missing in action or missing journalists that the State Department didn't have?

Mr. CRONKITE. Well, yes, in the case of these interrogations by Zalin Grant, and of his reports, I believe that Mr. Sievert would agree that most of this information came to them as new information. How much other material, I really can't testify to.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Do you know if the State Department followed up on any of these leads that you provided to them?

Mr. CRONKITE. We believe—I take Mr. Sievert's word for it—that they were following up on these and doing what they could through cross-indexing and cross-searching of files and that sort of thing.

As I suggested earlier, the only place that I believe that I speak for the committee, but I know I speak for myself, was disappointment there was not a greater representation, stronger representation, made at a time when we still had some leverage on Hanoi to get information from the North Vietnamese.

Mr. MOAKLEY. The letter that you referred to, Secretary Kissinger's letter, do you think it would have made any difference if he hadn't said it was an unofficial letter and had not talked about downplaying it?

Mr. CRONKITE. That would be a purely personal thought, Mr. Moakley. I have no idea whether it would have made any difference or not. It might have made absolutely none. On the other hand, it might have made a difference. I don't know what the reaction of the North Vietnamese would have been to a stronger representation.

I think in these tactical areas, these are decisions that have to be made undoubtedly by the people in charge, the skilled diplomats involved, the responsible characters. And I think it is very difficult for us to second-guess them. I can only express personal disappointment.

Mr. MOAKLEY. I see my time is up, and I thank you gentlemen very, very much for coming here this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Moakley.

Mrs. Schroeder.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I think it is fair to say that both of your reports certainly show the journalistic training you have had, and we certainly appreciate it. I think we are also very impressed by the compassion you feel for other journalists. It is beautiful that you are so dedicated—it is very impressive.

I would like to pursue just a bit further the comments Mr. Moakley started on, regarding the State Department's, quote, "official" role in this. Because it seems to me that we have many facts compiled, but the doors all appear to be closed at the moment, and we can't go any further.

My question is: If we had a little more advocacy or a little more pushing by the State Department in trying to find out some of these answers or trying to get some solutions, do you think it might be easier to get some of the Third-World nations or other people who have good relationships, or at least better relationships, than we do with the Cambodians—might it be easier to get them more involved in seeking these answers?

Mr. CRONKITE. Mrs. Schroeder, I don't know what the answer to that is, whether we would or not.

I again duck back into only personal opinion on this, not journalistic judgment.

It seems to me we could go a lot stronger on these things than we are—not just in this case but in a lot of other cases—of standing up for the rights of Americans around the world. We have lost somehow or other, over the years, that old British tradition of sending in the gunboats every time an American is thrown into a foreign jail. I don't believe in that policy, and none of us, I'm sure, do any longer, but there must be something between that and docility when your citizens are involved.

I think this ought to be particularly the case when these journalists are involved, and I hope I am not being terribly introspective in that particular matter, but this is a matter of freedom of speech and press, and unless journalists can move freely around the world, and unless we stand up for that right and fight for that right, none of us is going to have the information we need on which to make the very serious judgments that these times require.

So I would wish that we took a stronger position in these matters.

[Applause.]

I didn't mean to appeal to the throng [laughter], but just another second on that. I worry a great deal about the attitude of American consular representatives with young people who are thrown into jail on minor narcotics charges around the world, particularly in Mexico. I think this is a heinous situation and certainly should be cleared up.

But what we do in a case like this, I don't know. As private citizens we have the journalists, and although people think we have, "power," "muscle," and that sort of thing, we haven't been able to exercise it in getting any movement beyond what I have reported to you here today.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I appreciate what you have said, because I have always felt that our role in the free world is to insist that we show we really believe in a free world and free press. So I am a little shocked by our Government saying, "Well, it's really not American Government people."

It seems to me one of the main ways we have to go is through China. It seems to me that that is probably the only crack in the wall we may be able to get to.

I have been unaware of any real appeals being made to the foreign ministries of the People's Republic of China to attempt to pursue this with the Cambodians. Apparently that is the only group.

Are you aware of any real effort that has been made?

Mr. CRONKITE. No; we hadn't gotten around to the simple question of what we would recommend, and I don't come here with a recommendation from the committee itself. I don't think I would stand corrected by any member of the committee if I suggested that it seems to us the most unexplored pressure point at this point, now that Hanoi is not, although it could become again if we get into serious negotiations with the Vietnamese as to future relationships—that the one right now is China. We would like to see, perhaps selfishly, but we would like to see this as first item on every agenda as we sit down with the Chinese to make any further arrangements on anything, "First of all, what can you tell us about the journalists? We will get that out of the way first, and then we will talk about trade and other things that are concerned."

That may be quite unrealistic, but I don't know why it should be.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I agree with you fully, and I have more than used my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience, and thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Ottinger.

Mr. OTTINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd also like to express appreciation for that very lucid, helpful testimony.

We have been struggling mightily with the problem of how we can resolve this situation, and we welcome your wisdom, or anybody else's wisdom, on actions we might pursue. The action we have been pursuing primarily is to try to get negotiations going with the Vietnamese in the hope that they now have a strong desire to establish normal relations. We hope we can count on their help in coming up with information on those people they know about.

I suppose there are other things that might be productive or unproductive. We might put strong pressure on the State Department to do some grandstanding on this issue in the United Nations. We might encourage them to withhold things that the Chinese are looking for and not cooperate with the Chinese in a public way, trying to gather some world pressure on this.

It is about the only other avenue that I can think we might pursue.

And I wonder if you think at this point trying to surface this as a public issue would be a helpful thing, or would it be counterproductive?

Mr. CRONKITE. There has been concern expressed in our committee from time to time about the possibility of publicity pressure being counterproductive, that if there were hope of quiet negotiations, we might learn more and might, even more importantly, save the lives of the men if they are still alive; whereas with massive publicity pressure we might embarrass the Cambodians to the extent that they would be more likely to do away with them than if they hadn't been embarrassed. That, I think, is a rather thin possibility, but it is one that obviously must be discussed and considered.

I must tell you that we met with Ambassador Moynihan last fall and spent sometime with him in more than one session as regards a new campaign within the United Nations. This was approved by Secretary Kissinger. Ambassador Moynihan took the matter to him after our initial presentation, and Secretary Kissinger approved further exploration of that possibility, at any rate, with the first approval being the first and, as far as I know, the only contact that we have made at the United Nations with the Cambodian representative, done quite unofficially, clearly because of the lack of recognition on both side. And that was the meeting I reported to you about.

The second phase of that that had been discussed was the possibility of Ambassador Moynihan going public with it in a speech at the General Assembly. That was abandoned with the feeling—and I don't really know—I can't really tell you exactly what the reasoning was behind it, but with the feeling it would be better to go through one of the committees—the fifth committee, fourth committee; I can't tell you what the number was; I don't remember. I believe Ambassador Moynihan did make some reference to the problem there, but not a major speech exactly.

The third thought was that then, after that exploration with the Cambodians and a committee speech, he would discuss with the other governments directly involved, the Japanese and the French particularly, but also the Australians and so on, the possibility of a joint effort at the United Nations.

About the time that the Moynihan changes began to take place and nothing has transpired since then. Whether we should return to that policy and seek to do something of that kind I think is a matter that we ought to explore.

Mr. OTTINGER. I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that at some point we will hear from the State Department—I think there are a number of things that the State Department ought to get on record as well as off the record. We are at a juncture now where the options open are few and quiet negotiations don't seem to have been very productive. Perhaps it would be useful for us to explore their thinking and maybe put some pressure on them—to go public with this. I don't think most of the world realizes that there are still this many people, journalists and people who were involved in the war, who are missing in action or POW's.

I think the awareness of this in the world might well put pressure on the nations involved. The Chinese and Vietnamese are trying to get out in the world communities and appear like civilized people, it might be productive to put pressure on them now and surface this as a humanitarian issue, that we have many, many people suffering here needlessly, because of the inability to get information they must have.

I think we ought to explore that.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no problems with that. In talking earlier to a good friend he said "let's just lay it on the table," and I think we have to.

I'm sorry, the gentleman's time is up.

Mr. Harkin.

Mr. HARKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to just echo the feelings of the rest of the committee members who spoke before me of gratitude and admiration for the involvement of both of you in this whole area. I think the testimony of both of you has covered the area adequately in depth, and I think the questions have covered any open areas, so I don't want to take any time in being redundant. I don't have any question that is specific, but I would like to have your observation, though, in dealing with the area Mr. Ottinger just brought up, that concerns this thing of going public.

I met last fall with the Ambassador from South Vietnam while he was observer to the United Nations, and talked about the MIA problem. At that time he said, I think, he perceived it as a nonissue in that he said, "We are talking with business people who want to open up trade negotiations with Vietnam, oil companies and other companies in the Western Hemisphere who want to do business in Vietnam. They don't ask about MIA's." He said in the United Nations only the United States votes against it. The other countries don't ask us about MIA's. He said, "Of course, you are interested because your families are close to that, but we can't perceive it as an important issue in our dealings with the rest of the world and in trying to normalize their relations with Vietnam."

In light of that, and in light of what appears to be the attitude of the State Department, and taking a very hard-line attitude toward Vietnam and normalizing relations with them—if you are at all aware of what President Ford said in North Carolina regarding the MIA question—I see Mr. Dudman shaking his head "yes"—in light of what Mr. Ford said in North Carolina on the MIA question, would you care to speak on that question of normalizing relationships with Vietnam and connecting that with the MIA issue?

Mr. CRONKITE. I defer to you.

Mr. DUDMAN. It seems to me that Hanoi doesn't have much leverage on Phnom Penh, and that although it might have at one time, I don't see how pressure or persuasion directed at North Vietnam can have very much effect on what this movement in Government in Cambodia has.

It seems to me also that some of you have been speaking about pressure or persuasion directed by the United States at Cambodia—that, after all, is dealing with a government, and earlier than that a movement, with which the United States was at war. And we really haven't come very far from that state of war now.

I find it hard to see how the U.S. Government is in a very strong position to demand or urge that information come from this Cambodian movement. We are completely out of touch with them, and they obviously are more preoccupied with the after-effects of 5 years of war than they are with our very strong needs for information about some missing Americans.

Mr. HARKIN. I don't have any other questions.

Mr. CRONKITE. I might just add to that that on the other hand, North Vietnam, according to our evidence here, had these men in their hands, some of them, at one point or another. How long and how soon they turned them over to the Cambodians or the Vietcong, we don't know. There is a lot of evidence the North Vietnamese Army did have a part to play in some of the captures and some of the movement of these men.

Therefore, it does seem to me that in negotiations this should, as I say, certainly be on the agenda. Whether it is enough to say, "If you don't give us this we don't talk about anything else," I don't know. There are a lot of things to be weighed there that obviously I can't put into the mix, but I think we should ask for them from the North Vietnamese and constantly.

Mr. HARKIN. Do you think we will make any headway if we demand of the Vietnamese that they make an accounting of all MIA's before we sit down and talk about the other areas of normalizing relationships? Will we make any headway at all? Or do we have to incorporate that in with talking about normalizing relations? Does that have to be a part of it rather than separating it out?

Mr. CRONKITE. I would think it has to be a part of it.

Mr. HARKIN. I would, too.

Mr. CRONKITE. That is a personal opinion, you understand.

Mr. HARKIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lloyd.

Mr. LLOYD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, join my colleagues in welcoming both of you gentlemen, and Mr. Cronkite particularly taking your time to join with us today and trying to find a solution in answering this very pressing problem.

As has been indicated to both of you, this committee has a very limited life. And, of course, we are already running out of time.

The question I have is: Do you think this committee can accomplish the goals that we have set for ourselves, namely, a resolution of what has happened to these people, within the time allotted, which will be up at the end of this year?

Mr. CRONKITE. Well, again, Mr. Lloyd, you are asking me for something I am really not terribly conversant on.

Mr. LLOYD. I think you are probably more conversant than I am because of your involvements with your own committee.

Mr. CRONKITE. I think the committee can certainly do one thing, which would be terribly important to all of those many families of missing individuals and to this committee as well, and that is simply through your hearings be able to assure us that everything has been done that this Government can do. And if you cannot assure us of that, then move to the next step and put that pressure that a congressional resolution or other action would put upon the administrative sections of the Government to do something about it.

Mr. LLOYD. Following that up, then, do you feel this committee—and the thrust it has taken—is moving in the right direction as far as you are concerned with regard to your own committee?

Mr. CRONKITE. Mr. Lloyd, I can't answer that because, in all honesty, I do not know precisely what the thrust is that this committee has taken over these last 7 or 8 months. I'd have to review what you have been up to.

Mr. LLOYD. Then I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, maybe we do communicate that to you, to insure the fact that we are in good coordinated efforts as far as your own people are concerned, meaning the journalists.

I perceive the journalists as having, quote, a worldwide organization, a fraternal order, if you will. And based on that, even though the journalists may be representing a country which is not necessarily friendly to the United States or to our cause, nevertheless, in this fraternal quality there is always an attempt if a fellow journalist has disappeared, and even though I may be from a Communist country in Europe, as a journalist it's incumbent upon me to at least make that kind of inquiry.

Mr. CRONKITE. Oh, yes, it does, indeed. That is, it exists in the collegium of journalists, I think, in Western nations.

You have put into that mix Eastern Europe and the Communist journalists, and I don't really think we can go that far. There is not that camaraderie across the Iron Curtain. There are meetings of journalists, of course. We meet on international stories and see each other at the United Nations and see each other here in Washington. But when we try to get together on actions of this kind, we find that those journalists or so-called journalists from dictatorship nations, while they might in private conversations express sympathy, do not feel free to join in any organized effort in which they have to put their name on the line.

Mr. LLOYD. Would they be, not from the point of view of officially putting their name on the line, but would they be a reasonable source of information in this specific instance in an informal situation? They obviously will have a great deal more access into Cambodia than any of us, since our efforts have been very frustrated and thwarted by the people currently in charge, whatever the reasons may be. Is there any possibility that this avenue of working through your organization would be more productive than the official approach through the State Department, et cetera?

Mr. CRONKITE. Well, I think in all honesty we'd have to say it probably would not.

For one thing, in Cambodia at the moment there are no journalists from any nations, friendly or otherwise, as far as we know. I mean I don't know of any. I haven't seen any reports printed from Eastern Europe or other Communist nations of Asia that anybody has been in there at all.

The second part is that these correspondents from those nations usually—they are an arm basically of their government, and our contact with them is not very free, even as colleagues in international areas such as Washington, the United Nations, and such places. They are very sensitive politically, and if they feel that we have been getting into conversations with them, getting into any sensitive area, we find the conversations shut on it for the most part.

Mr. LLOYD. Thank you, Mr. Cronkite. Thank you, Mr. Dudman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lloyd.

I think Mr. Gonzalez has one question, and this will conclude the hearing.

Mr. GONZALEZ. It is just a suggestion, Mr. Chairman. I am wondering if Mr. Cronkite and his committee would be willing to feel free to give us their recommendations, if they have any, as to what areas our committee could look to—what recommendations they might have for us. That might be in order. And I also suggest our staff provide both Mr. Cronkite and Mr. Dudman with the hearings that we have had that have been printed thus far if they don't have copies.

Mr. CRONKITE. I would like to say one more thing, Mr. Chairman, in closing. I suggested that we didn't have full information on what you have been doing. I want to point out that that is our fault strictly and not yours.

I also would like to point out that our tardy appearance here at a hearing in March, the 8th or 9th month of your existence, is our fault, not yours. We were invited, I think, almost the day you came into existence, and it has taken this long for us to work out mutually satisfactory schedules.

As I say, we are an inefficient group, we journalists, and we have trouble making dates and keeping them.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dudman and Mr. Cronkite, this has been some of our best testimony before this committee, and we appreciate very much your being here today.

The committee now stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 31, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING
PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,
Washington, D.C.

The select committee met at 2:40 p.m. pursuant to call, in room H-227, of the Capitol, Hon. Gillespie V. Montgomery, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Representatives Montgomery, Schroeder, Lloyd, McCloskey, and Gilman.

Staff members present: J. Angus MacDonald, staff director; Ms. Jeanne Shirkey, administrative assistant, Dr. Job Dittberner, staff attorney; and Mr. John Burke, professional staff assistant.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We might have a vote on the House floor shortly, but I feel it best to begin at this time.

Our only witness today is Mr. Ernest C. Brace. Mr. Brace was a civilian pilot, captured in Laos in 1965. For the next 8 years he was a prisoner, held captive in Laos and North Vietnam. He was finally released in 1973.

As the members of the select committee know, over 300 Americans are missing in Laos; another 250 were killed and their bodies were not recovered. Only nine were returned from Laos, and Mr. Brace was one of those nine. We know the Laotian Government should be able to account for some of the missing and killed. We have talked with officials of that government about obtaining an accounting for these missing Americans.

So far we have received no information. If we go to Southeast Asia during the congressional Easter recess we plan to meet with Laotian officials again in April, if the trip can be put together.

Our witness today should be able to shed some light on the prisoner situation in Laos and the odds for survival as a POW.

Thank you very much for coming, Mr. Brace, to testify on your experiences. You may proceed with your statement.[1]

STATEMENT OF ERNEST CARY BRACE, MISSOULA, MONT.

Mr. BRACE. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I have a prepared statement[2] which I will submit at the end of my talk, but I will just talk for a few minutes about my experiences.

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[1] Biographical data of Ernest Carey Brace appears on p. 460.
[2] Prepared statement of Mr. Brace appears on p. 211.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the full statement will be printed in the record.

Mr. BRACE. Thank you.

At the time of my capture, which was in 1965, I was flying for Bird & Son, an aviation company working out of Chieng Mai, Thailand, providing support for border patrol lines on the Laotian-Thai border and the Burma-Thai border.

When I did not have a mission with the Thai Border Patrol Police, I would cross over the border to Xieng Lom to pick up supplies and distribute them to what we call the special operations group in Northern Laos.

On the morning of May 21, 1965, I picked up some Lao soldiers, a Thai special forces radioman, and a woman with a child on her back, and I proceeded to Boum Lao, about 75 miles northwest of Luang Prabang.

Upon arrival, I circled the strip, observed the white "L" on the ground, a signal that it was all right to land.

I landed on the strip, about a 600-foot dirt strip, one way in and one way out. We were hit by small fire and grenades upon landing, and the woman started screaming, she had been hit in the hip. The aircraft was spewing fuel from both wing cells. I tried to turn around and get out, but the Lao soldiers had thrown open the door and locked it against the wing strut at about 90 degrees to the fuselage. This made it impossible to take off. The soldier that jumped out was cut down about 25 feet from the wing tip. I looked to the left and saw a soldier with an automatic rifle pointed at the aircraft. So I shut down the engine and told the people to get out of the aircraft.

The woman got out, she was screaming, she raised her dress and I could see where she had been hit in the hip.

The other Lao soldier ran into the bushes, but was brought back in a few minutes by one of the troops over on the airstrip.

The Thai special forces man and myself—radioman Chi Charn Harnavee—surrendered without any resistance to the soldiers that came running up.

At first we thought they were Pathet Lao. We were in Laotian territory, about 150 miles from the Vietnam border, about 75 miles northwest of Luang Prabang.

We were tied with our elbows behind our back, a rope was put around our neck and we were taken to a clearing about 500 feet from the airstrip—500 yards, excuse me. There they had another prisoner, a young boy of about 15, tied to a tree. They had chopped his finger off with a machete and then grabbed his hand, dressing it—while we were there they did this—and they let him go, return to his village.

The Thai special forces man was able to get a few words to him and later on he told me that the boy had been helping the Americans—I had seen the boy at the strip prior to this—and they had marked him by chopping his finger off, and told him to return to his village.

So we now had three prisoners in the group, we had the Lao soldier, Sergeant Harnavee, the Thai special forces man, and myself.

We stayed there for 3 days. We heard helicopters come in and pass the strip, and heard the helicopters land down the valley a ways. We could see the aircraft up through the trees.

All of the time we were tied to trees or else tied and made to lie in an erosion ditch in the jungle.

On the 3d day they got us up early in the morning, gave us rice balls, and a tube of rice to put over our shoulders and led the three prisoners, myself and the two others, off.

We walked about a half day to a place called Moung Hoc, spent the day there underneath some huts. There was some air activity over the area, but no bombing or strafing.

The next morning we got up early and walked for 2 more days, stopped at the village of Moung Sai for the night, and we ended up at an old French fort on the hill there, and we were interrogated by the Pathet Lao.

At this time the troops that had captured us turned us over to what I would call a "rag-tag" guerrilla-type unit at the town of Moung Sai.

The troops that captured us were wearing good jungle uniforms, brand new jungle boots, and had AK–47 rifles. The weapons they had taken in the attack on the airstrip they turned over to the local villages. They did not keep the M–1's or carbines captured for themselves.

Later on we found out, in talking to these troops, and actually because of their pride, that they were North Vietnamese Army Regulars operating within Laos in 1965.

We stayed in the town of Moung Sai for 3 days, were interrogated by what I was told was a Pathet Lao officer, they referred to him as a Neo Lao Hak Sat, which is their words for the Pathet Lao faction.

The Buddhist in the town interpreted what the men wanted to know.

I was placed in a position on my knees, in front of a desk, and my fingers were on the desk and he walked around banging the desk with a cane and asking various questions that they wanted to know about my activities as a civilian pilot in Laos.

They told me that I was a spy pilot, and if I did not confess to certain things, I would be shot.

On the third morning they took me out—actually the second morning there—they took me out and put me in a bunker, had a firing squad there, and said if I didn't sign the confession I would be shot, that I had been found guilty of being a spy pilot by the peoples' court, and I would either sign this or be shot at that time.

I told the Buddhist that I felt if I did sign it, it would give them everything they wanted, and they would no longer require me, so I refused to sign it, I denied I was a spy pilot. I told them I was carrying a woman with a baby, I was carrying rice, kerosene, and salt to the village.

After some negotiations back and forth between the Buddhist and the Pathet Lao officer and myself, they finally allowed me to answer four questions they had based upon U.S. politics. Kennedy's policy toward Southeast Asia, compared to Johnson's policy toward Southeast Asia was one of the questions. Was it a Peace Corps or a Central Intelligence Agency was another question, and two other similar questions that I can not recall at this time.

I agreed to write a little bit about each of those, and wrote a short sentence on each one, which they accepted.

The next morning they came up to the stone fort where they were keeping the Thai, the Lao and myself, and told the Thai to get up and bundle the few clothes we had in a rag that they gave us. They took us out with a rope runner behind our back, and we started walking again with the original group that captured us, which we later determined to be North Vietnamese Regulars.

We left the village of Moung Sai, walked north, and I thought at first we were going to Phong Saly. But we turned east and crossed the Nam Ou River at the town of Moung Khoua.

There is an old French fort there. I knew the area intimately because I had worked in this area for approximately 1 year prior to my capture.

After crossing the Nam Ou River, we proceeded due east toward the Vietnam border and then I realized that we were probably headed for Dien Bien Phu at least.

On June 7, 1965, I attempted to escape from a village about 4 o'clock in the morning. I woke up, it was dark outside, the soldiers were asleep in the hut, and I had to go to the bathroom, so I walked to the door, untied my rope from where they had tied it on an overhead pillar, walked to the door and looked out and I couldn't see the guards, so I stepped on the porch and walked over to some bushes, and went ahead and did my business, pulled my pants up, and I still didn't see a guard, so I walked out of the village.

A door opened and a man saw me and started yelling, so I started running. I got off into a ravine on the side of the path, where I hid for about 4 hours. But my feeling was that if they knew you were in an area, and in talking to other persons later on, if they know you are in an area, they will find you. They knew I hadn't run too far, because they were chasing me, and when they left the path to go over the side of the hill, they came down in a way that went right over me, headed down the hill, and then they turned around and came back up and spotted me in the erosion ditch.

They took me back to the village, tied me to the post, slapped me, hit me with their fists, until I fell into unconsciousness.

My nose was broken and I lost some permanent bridgework I had, and later I was to lose one of the teeth that had been knocked loose.

We remained in the village that day, and the next day we walked again. We crossed to North Vietnam, and I saw the border markers on the road, west of Dien Bien Phu, where the road started in those days, clearly indicating it was North Vietnam, and the date was July 11, as I had it, just keeping track of the time from my capture.

They put us on a truck, the Thai and myself, and we drove 4 hours after dark that night, turned up into a valley and then they split the Thai and I, and we were put into two small cages. His cage was about 100 yards away from mine down a karst. I thought at first it was a temporary place where they were going to keep us. It turned out we remained there for almost 1 year.

I slept on the ground on a piece of canvas for the first 6 or 7 months of it, and finally they gave me a bedboard. I didn't have a mosquito net for the first period.

I was let out of the cage once in the morning and once in the evening to use a hole in the ground. I had a rope around my neck; when I was let out they would hold it while I did my business and then put me back in the cage.

At night I would be tied down with my feet tied to the post at the end of the cage, and my neck rope stretched outside, and tied to a post outside of the cage, and my hands tied and stretched down my belly and tied to the post at the foot of the cage.

The bombing activity picked up in late 1965 in that area, and the valley was actually harboring a motor pool of some sort, because you could hear them rev up the trucks at night working on them. There was an old stone quarry apparently that was run by the French, because there were stones in the valley graded and sorted into piles of different sizes.

They were pretty well overgrown with elephant grass and bamboo.

The Thai and I were the only prisoners in this camp. I could assert this because they had gong signals; if I had to go during the day, you had to ring a gong to get other guards to come over, because one guard was not allowed to let me out of the cage.

They would bring the chow up to a fork in the path that I could see and then bring me mine and take a plate down to the Thai.

The unit was changed about every 6 weeks. And there would be a combat unit that came in, and they would usually have American cigarettes, sugar, radios, pieces of parachute cloth, whatever, and apparently what they had done is smoked off a Vang Pao base in Laos.

With what little Lao-Thai I knew at that time, I could ascertain that Vang Pao was their primary enemy and this is where they came from.

They would swap the units out and every time they turned me over to another unit the treatment would get worse, because nobody wanted to say the guy just sat there, he hasn't done anything, don't worry about it. They would come and point at me and talk for a while, and when they left, the other unit would watch me real close at first.

I had many opportunities to escape from that cage, but I found that if you are in a situation where you are getting two meals a day, and other than having a rope around my neck and being taken out twice a day to use the hole in the ground, all I had to do was sit. I was getting fed, I had a blanket, a roof over my head, so to speak, and I found it harder and harder to go.

When the bombing picked up in late 1965 they decided to move my cage and they moved it from inside the semicircle permiter of the camp out to the outside circle and put it up against another karst of limestone ridge there in Vietnam.

When they rebuilt the cage, they built it pretty sloppily, and put my bedboard in there on the rocks, gave me a mosquito net, and then in April of 1966 I was finally able to bring myself to escape.

It was a rainy windy night, a lot of noise. The guard had put a piece of thatch over the front of the cage to keep the rain out. He usually sat in a lean-to about 15 feet from my cage, usually one guard by day and two by night, all of the time, with AK–47's. So that night he put a piece of thatch in front of the cage to keep the rain off me.

I managed to get myself untied, and I took every rope I had except my neck rope, which I tied to a bar of the cage, my blanket, bamboo

tube, a pair of cutoff sneakers they had given me, and I crawled out the bottom bar of the back of the cage. I went down the ravine into the bushes, over the ridge line, and crawled most of that night.

About dawn I was coming up on another camp. I could hear dogs barking and some people talking. And I started to skirt the camp, and then I came up and was apparently very close to it, and I saw another cage similar to mine. There was a lantern hanging on the front of the cage, and a lean-to in front of it. I couldn't see who or what was in the cage, if anything, but I am certain it probably contained a prisoner at that time, being the south end of the Dien Bien Phu Valley.

I will say that in Hanoi, when I had contact with other prisoners, when we had Camp Unity, I asked around through the communications system whether anybody had been held in a bamboo cage in the jungle in early 1966 near the Dien Bien Phu Valley and there was nobody in the prison system at that time that fell into those circumstances.

But I did feel at that time there was another prisoner at that point. Whether he was Thai, Lao, or American, I have no idea.

I headed out the next morning and spent the next day sleeping, the next night crawling, and got onto a path and made my way to the top of a hill. I had a little food, some wild grapefruit I had found, wild tomatoes.

I spent 2 days on the top of the hill, and I ran out of water and my lips were so swollen I couldn't eat the grapefruit.

So I came off the hill, and tried to steal some food in a village and got caught, recaptured again. I had been out for 4 days and was captured on the fifth night.

And it had taken me the 4 days to cover, including the 2 days on top of the hill, it took about 4 hours to drag me back to where I had been held prior to my escape.

The unit that captured me was not the unit that held me, it was another unit, and they took me to their camp and in that camp I didn't see any sign of any other prisoners.

The unit that I was given back to took me back and they were pretty mad about this escape, naturally, so I went through a pretty bad beating the next day. They put me back in the cage, put the stocks at the foot of my bedboard, put my feet in the stocks, lying down, and cut two holes in the bedboard, one on each side of my neck, and an iron hoop was put around my neck and pinned to the bedboard.

I received minimal food for the next 2 weeks and stayed in the pinned-down position for approximately 2 weeks. I stopped urinating, defecating, whatever, and when I finally did have to go, they picked me up, actually, because I couldn't walk, and carried me out and let me go, on my knees, and I actually had blood and fatty globules in my urine for a while.

An officer that spoke a little English came to the camp shortly after that, interrogated me about the escape, and he told me he was taking me to a new place. I asked him if he was going to put me with other prisoners, and he said he didn't think so at this time.

He took me down, put me on a truck—they had to carry me—they shoved me in the corner of a stake truck and Sergeant Harnavee was on the truck. That is the first I had seen him since we arrived in the valley, almost a year prior to that.

I asked him how he was, and he said OK. He was in stocks now too, because I had escaped and they told him he was being punished because of the escape attempt.

We drove that night for about 2 hours and then we pulled off into another valley. They pulled me off the truck, rolled me in a blanket, tied me to a post, and walked up a narrow streambed, and put me in another cage.

At this time I was handed over to another unit. That unit decided they had to get me walking again, so they didn't have to carry me, so they exercised me during the day, I could walk up and down in the cage.

This cage was a little larger than the first one and there was room to walk between the bamboo slat bed and the front of the cage. The front of the cage was open, and there was a lean-to where the guards sat. The stocks were a little better than the ones I had been in, they had been designed with a little more thought in mind. They had a large bolt at one end with a nut on it and they had a bamboo pin they would drive in to lock it down. They had built the cage very carefully.

When they put the stocks in they had left a spot in the back where they had to raise and lower the stocks that was probably large enough for me to get out at this time.

Over the next few months I got to where I could walk again. They kept me in the cage, but let me out twice a day again, and I had all of the rice I wanted to eat and plenty of water in the bamboo tube, usually boiled weak tea of some sort.

I went to work on the stocks during the day whenever the guard was not watching, and I managed to get the bolt loose and on one rainy night in August 1966 I managed to get my feet out of the stocks, go out of the back of the cage, down the side of the hill, and then I fell off a hill, rolled down into a stream just below their kitchen.

I was recaptured again. They drug me back up to the cage, put me in the stocks, put a lantern in the cage this time and a couple of guards to watch me all night.

The next day an officer came up from the main base and interrogated me about the escape, and they put me in a hole and filled it up with dirt up to my neck in the hole.

I stayed in the hole for 7 days, receiving two cups of soupy rice during the 7 days, and when they took me out I was all covered with sores; it looked like a bad case of the dishpan hands all over me.

I was dragged down to a stream. I had lost a couple of toenails. They washed me off and put me back in the cage, where I was to remain in stocks for the next 2½ years, feet in the stocks during the day, my neck tied to the post in a sitting position during the day, and my neck tied down to the bed at night.

I was moved one more time to another cage, but only a short distance away. Apparently they didn't like the hillside they were on, they just moved their whole camp, because of the kitchen facilities and all had become contaminated.

I went through several periods of illness. In September 1967 they thought I was untied one night, or at least I had loosened up my ropes to sleep more comfortable. For that I went through a beating the next morning. And I took a blow to the head which subsequently resulted in a paralysis of my extremities, which gradually built up over a 2- or 3-week period.

I went through the winter of 1967-68 without taking a bath or without changing my clothes. I lost bowel control during that period.

In December 1967 I tried to commit suicide. I tried choking myself on the neck rope, and it didn't work; and all it did was put me to sleep.

I woke up in the morning and decided, well, I was going to come out of this alive somehow, so I was trying to live with it, as it was.

In March of 1968 a new unit took over that camp. The Thai and I are still the only ones in the camp. I can't see him, I haven't seen him for a couple of years, but I know he is in the camp because I could hear them taking him out occasionally.

In March of 1968 the new unit cleaned me up, gave me some clean clothes, shoes, cleaned the cage out, put fresh dirt in on the floor of the cage, and scattered ash water throughout the cage to kill the lice and the ticks which I abounded in at that time.

In October 1968 a man came to the camp that spoke English, and told me that he was going to take me to Hanoi, and there I would be put with other American prisoners.

I thought the war was over, we hadn't been bombed in that area, there hadn't been any antiaircraft fire since April 1968.

I asked him if the war was over and he said I would know the details when I got to Hanoi.

They took me out of the cage the next morning, put the Thai and I together, and he had to help me walk, the guards helped me walk; I was barely walking at the time.

We pulled out in a new Russian jeep, we rode out of the rice paddies down the valley out onto the road and I saw the first town we entered was the town of Moung Pon. That was the French headquarters during the battle of Dienbienphu in 1954, at the south end of the Dienbienphu Valley.

We were in the jeep, we rolled down the road in broad daylight. There were artillery pieces moving on the road, they were rebuilding the bridges, people were rebuilding the road and they were washing trucks in the streams we crossed.

I kept asking the man that spoke English if the war was over and he just would smile and shake his head and wouldn't answer me.

We got into Hanoi, we pulled into what I was later to know as Hoa Lo Penitentiary. We pulled right into the main courtyard through the tunnel-like door, and there they took us out of the jeep, the Thai and I were taken in and put in a room about the size of this one.

A little later an officer came in, later to be identified as the "bug," the camp commander of Camp Vegas, and he started interrogating me. He asked me where I had been captured, and I told him in Laos. He asked me who captured me, and I knew enough at that time to say I was not sure. He asked me where I had been held, and I said out west in the mountains some place. He asked me when, and I told him 1965, and at first he didn't believe me, he said this is 1968, when were you captured. I repeated in 1965, and he couldn't believe it.

Then he asked me about the Thai. He referred to him as a Thai pilot. I said no, he is not a pilot, he is a radioman, he was with me during the capture.

Then they took me out of the room, put me back on the jeep, and drove me around town for a while, and we pulled into the camp, later known as the plantation.

There I was put into a room on the back side of the building, known as the warehouse. I was given new pajamas, a bedboard, mosquito net, blankets, and a bucket for the corner, and was told to sleep on the bedboard. I was told not to go near the wall, not to pay any attention if I heard any noises.

The second day in the room I heard the signals on the wall. The first thing I heard was the old "shave and a haircut two bits" thing, and I thought that is nice, there are some Americans here at least.

I still had not gotten any word on what had happened to the war. It wasn't going on around me any more. So I didn't do anything on the wall at first.

I kept hearing this "shave and a hair cut two bits" and I finally gave two taps on the wall, and I heard the rattle of tapping on the wall, and I couldn't understand it.

A little later I started hearing a long series of tapping, and I started counting. After counting for a few minutes, I suddenly realized I shouldn't be counting, I should be saying the alphabet.

So listening to it again, I got the last word of the first message, and I got "w-a-l-l".

I didn't do anything, because I didn't really have any instructions on what to do. So I waited a little while and then it started again.

I got out and over to the wall and I realized I should have been putting my ear to the wall. So I worked around the wall and put my ear on it and I heard a voice on the other side saying "If you hear me buddy, knock three times." So I knocked three times and he got excited and he told me his name. John McCain, and his dad was an admiral, and he had been captured in 1967 and that he was in solitary confinement now, but he had had roommates.

He rattled on for about 5 minutes, he was really excited. He thought I was a new prisoner, for one thing.

Then he started asking me questions. He told me how to answer. One knock was "no," two knocks was "yes," three knocks was "I don't know." A rapid series of knocking would be "repeat." He then told me how he was talking to me, through his cup, by wrapping a shirt around the cup and putting it close to his mouth.

Being in solitary there was not to be any noise in his room. The guards turn off the lights during the day and it was dark, and if they raised the latch it would be hard for them to see in the corner. As long as he talked softly, he could use the cup.

He taught me the tap code. At first I didn't have a cup, so I couldn't answer him. He was probably more disappointed than anything that I wasn't a new prisoner, I didn't have any new news or anything else.

John and I were to remain in solitary confinement for the rest of 1968 and all of 1969.

In January of 1969 I made contact through my back window, which was slatted over, with Douglas Hegdahl, a Navy seaman released in August 1969. I gave him my whole story and he told me he had been offered release, he had refused it a couple of times, and that he had received instructions from Col. Ted Guy, and that if he were offered release again to take it, because he had some 250 names that were not published. He said he would take any name out when he went out, if he did.

In August 1969 he did come out. And that was probably the first official word that anybody had that I was alive in Hanoi.

In September 1969, Ho Chi Minh died, and the treatment got better. They released a list of names in November 1969 to peace groups, and my name, of course, was not on it.

At no time during my time in prison was I allowed to write or receive mail or packages, and I was never placed on a prisoner list until the day I came out, or maybe a few days prior, when they officially announced they had us.

In December 1969, John McCain and I were caught in a communications bust and were transported to Camp Vegas.

At Camp Vegas I made contact with Commander Ken Coskey, who I believe is working with this committee. He was my first contact in the camp. I told him who I was, and John McCain was in the other cell, we had been brought over the night prior.

In Camp Vegas at that time they apparently had most of the senior ranking officers, they had come from Camp Alcatraz, a lot of them, where they had been kept in stocks at night, and had just prior to our being brought over there, had been brought from Alcatraz to Vegas.

We entered the communications system in Vegas and later on that month I got my first roomate, Jim Bedinger, a Navy radar operator, who had gone down in Laos.

At that time we learned there were two others in the camp that had been also captured in Laos, Lt. Steve Long and Major Walt Stischer, both Air Force.

Later on in 1970 we were allowed to visit with Walt and Steve, and then in about Thanksgiving of 1970, we heard a lot of singing off in the distance, and through communications, when a couple of other people moved into the camp, Bud Day and Air Force Lt. Col. Pollack, we found that there were about 300 Americans in a camp called Camp Unity on the other side of Hoa Lo, within the Hoa Lo Penitentiary, in a different section.

They moved the four of us captured in Laos—we were using the code name Lulu at the time—over there, put us into what they termed the rawhide section, two men to a cell.

We made contact with Commander Leo Profilet. He had 30 men in the next cell block. This is the only time the prisoners were held in what could be called a compound situation, in Camp Unity.

We also received word through a Vietnamese pilot by the code name Max that there had been a commando raid somewhere in the vicinity of Hanoi, we assumed on a prison camp, because all of these prisoners had been brought into our penitentiary.

Over the next period of months a detailed census was taken of any name anybody had, of any person anybody had seen in a prison camp, of any prisoner who had ever been in the prison system, as we knew it.

On February 11, 1971, they had the Sunday church riot at Camp Unity, they busted up the camp, and some people went to the China border. The four Laos POW's were taken out and put in Ap Lo. American prisoners had been there prior to this, and they had named it the Briar Patch—this is all post-release information I received—and we called it LuLu's Hideway, since only the four of us from Laos were in that prison.

There were four solitary cells in a small compound. We were never let out of that compound; it was impossible, nor were other prisoners in that vicinity.

We were joined there by Major Norm Gotner in March 1971, and he had been captured in the Laotian invasion in February 1971. That made five of us at this time.

In July of 1971 they took the five of us back to what I knew as Camp Plantation, put us in there, and we made contact with Colonel Ted Guy the first night; he had disappeared from Camp Vegas back in 1969.

Most of Camp Plantation at this time consisted of enlisted men, warrant officers, captured in South Vietnam.

We were to remain in that prison until B–52's started bombing in late 1972. We were taken out of that prison, and prior to departing we wrote our names all over the wall.

While at that prison we were joined by Jack Butcher captured in Laos, and Ed Leonard, Major Ed Leonard, both Air Force. We went back to Camp Vegas, and they took the Laotian prisoners and put us on the back side of the camp, in what we knew as the Snake Pit, behind the Golden Nugget.

We still had communications with Colonel Guy and the others. They were put in a semicompound situation on the other side of what had been the old Camp Vegas. Vegas had been cleaned out, they had wiped out the wash rooms, opened a lot of what had been the Thunderbird and Desert Inn cell blocks, into large squad-type rooms.

So the enlisted men and officers were given a semicompound situation, but they still had us isolated from them.

We had communications with them through various means.

In January of 1973, they announced that there had been peace reached in Vietnam. As a spokesman for the group of Laotian prisoners, I asked the officer whether we would be going home with the rest of them.

At that time he said no, you were captured in Laos, you will go home only when there is peace in Laos.

By this time we were joined by Capt. Chuck Reiss, U.S. Air Force, and two civilian missionaries, one a Canadian, Lloyd Oppel, and Sam Mattix from Washington. That made a group of 10 of us, 9 Americans and 1 Canadian.

Over the period of late January, all of February, we entered many protests, we sent many communications to Colonel Guy, with what we could get back from the Commissar, which was the code name for the camp commander at that time, and Colonel Guy sent back a message that if he was released prior to us, he would take the word out we were there.

On March 24 they came into our compound, they told us that we were to be released on March 28, which we knew as being the last day of the release.

We were given sweaters, slacks, shoes, and taken out to the airport in a bus that morning of March 28.

We arrived at the airport, were about to get off the bus, cameras were going, a lot of people were watching us, and someone came running from the airport and told us to get back on the bus.

We got back on the bus and drove off the grounds to some trees and stayed there about 2 hours. Someone came out and told them to come back to the airport, so we went back to the airport, had our pictures taken, sat on some chairs and then saw Colonel Robinson, U.S. Air Force, in his uniform as the officer picking us up.

After we got in the 141 heading for Clark, we found that the Pathet Lao had asked Colonel Robinson to sign a release for us, stating he had hereby accepted the only prisoners held by the Pathet Lao. He had refused to sign it with the word "only" in there and they negotiated in front of the world press for about 2 hours, and finally they agreed to strike the word "only" and then Colonel Robinson would sign for the release.

Lloyd Oppel had been taken away earlier that morning, but when we got in the 141, he was there, with a Canadian representative.

We were taken to Clark Air Force Base, we spent 3 days there, and then I went to the Naval Hospital at San Diego, and spent just about 1 year in and out of the Naval Hospital in San Diego before I went back to work.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Brace. It is quite a report you have given the committee. We appreciate very much your sincerity in telling us what took place. I know it was quite an experience.

We would like to ask you some questions. The main mission of this committee is to find out if there are any Americans still alive in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

And the information you have given us will be helpful. I have only a couple of questions.

We were told by the CIA and also by Admiral Lawrence, a returned POW, that by cross-checking all of the Americans we knew were in prison, when you had your communications among the prisoners, that everyone you knew of was accounted for.

Do you agree with the statement, that everyone that you know of that was alive, in prison, or that you heard of might have been captured in Laos or North Vietnam, to the best of your knowledge were released?

Mr. BRACE. The census taken at Camp Unity—the Vietnamese made the mistake of bringing everybody together. But the census taken at Camp Unity was so effective that people like Ted Guy, who disappeared from Camp Vegas in 1969, was listed as missing was a prisoner.

Several others that had disappeared out of the prison system, we knew had died. But there was a mystery, like Col. Ted Guy, and it wasn't until 1971 when all of a sudden when we got back to Plantation here he is again.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it check?

Mr. BRACE. It checked.

The CHAIRMAN. Everyone you knew of or had heard of did return, is that correct?

Mr. BRACE. Right, everybody that showed up in any prison system was accounted for at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understood it, you were only in Laos when you were captured. How long did you stay in Laos before you were moved into North Vietnam?

Mr. BRACE. Just the period of walking, the 3 days at Mount Sai.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were captured by North Vietnamese, and 3 days later——

Mr. BRACE. I was captured by North Vietnamese, and following their battle, apparently they took a 3-day rest at Moung Sai, they turned me over to the local militia at Moung Sai and they turned me back to the same group that captured us and they took us to North Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. The group of prisoners from Laos, did you know of any other prisoners, or any other people shot down that could have been alive, other than your prison census system that you worked under?

Mr. BRACE. No. The thing in common among the nine of us that came out of Laos was that every one of us had been captured or immediately after capture had been taken over by the North Vietnamese Regulars. Not a one of us had been held for any period by the Pathet Lao.

Chuck Reiss, Christmas Eve of 1972, was involved in a collision over the Plain of Jars, got out, was picked up on the Plain of Jars, in a big Pathet Lao headquarters area, and brought straight to North Vietnam, out the east end of the Plain of Jars.

We had all been taken or immediately turned over to the North Vietnamese Regulars and we were the only ones that came out under those circumstances.

Klusman was shot down in March 1964, was taken out by defectors in November 1964.

The CHAIRMAN. What you are saying is even if you were captured by the local militia, they would turn you over to the North Vietnamese as soon as possible?

Mr. BRACE. If they were handy to turn over, probably. This is an assumption on my part. If it was improbable, if they didn't want to move you, I don't know what would happen to you.

The outfit that had me at Moung Sai for the 3 days, I was more scared of them than any other time I was in prison camp. They are a rag-tag young bunch of kids. They had an assorted bunch of weapons that they were not familiar with. All different types of ammunition. They had hand grenades hanging all over them.

But the North Vietnamese Regular troops were well-disciplined. The officers had control of them and they knew what they were doing.

But that outfit, for the 3 days, scared the hell out of me.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would the Pathet Lao hold you; do you know? That is one of the problems we are trying to solve: Why would they hold the Americans prisoners in Laos? Or why would they be holding you? Do you have any feel for that?

Mr. BRACE. I see no reason for the Laotians to be holding any Americans in Laos. There is no propaganda value. We were not workers. We haven't worked in the fields. We are pretty soft compared to their standards.

I see no reason for the Pathet Lao to hold Americans prisoners. There is nothing to be rebuilt in Laos that I can see, unless you want to rebuild the city of Vientiane, which was never really wrecked.

But I think as far as Americans being alive in Laos, I would say it is a possibility, but it is very unlikely.

The CHAIRMAN. A possibility, but very unlikely?

Mr. BRACE. Very unlikely. I see no political reason for it, I see no practical reason for it from the Laotian standpoint whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Schroeder.

Ms. SCHROEDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Brace, I do appreciate your testimony. You have incredible courage.

You were saying that the people you talked to who had been captured in Laos were taken to North Vietnam.

Is anyone aware of anybody, or has anyone ever heard anything about the Laotians keeping their own prison system?

Is there any way to know why you were all taken to North Vietnam, why you were quickly turned over?

Mr. BRACE. The only reason I could see initially is that if you were taken by North Vietnamese Regulars initially, that North Vietnam had this thing about prisoners, that the more they could get in, the more bargaining power they had.

In my case, when I got to North Vietnam they were surprised I was even there. I mean when I got to Hanoi. I had been in North Vietnam, Dien Bien Phu, but their prison system didn't know it in Hanoi. They had no knowledge in Hanoi I was out there.

Later on, in talking to an interrogator, I found the officer that picked me up had heard from another unit that there were a couple of prisoners down in the camp and the bombing was over, and maybe they ought to be taken to Hanoi now.

Ms. SCHROEDER. Were you taken by Laotians or North Vietnamese Regulars?

Mr. BRACE. North Vietnamese Regulars.

Ms. SCHROEDER. You are sure they were North Vietnamese Regulars?

Mr. BRACE. Yes.

Ms. SCHROEDER. And the other people that were taken to North Vietnam, are you sure they were originally taken by the North Vietnamese Regulars?

Mr. BRACE. Right; I lived with those people, the last few, just for a few months, but our stories all coincided, and the one thing we had in common is, we had all been taken by North Vietnamese Regulars or, in the case of Norm Gotner, I think, where some guerrilla-type people had gotten him out of the bushes, but the North Vietnamese Regulars were on top of him as soon as he came into the open.

Ms. SCHROEDER. So it was the initial contact?

Mr. BRACE. Yes.

Ms. SCHROEDER. So you really don't know if there was anybody taken by the Pathet Lao?

Mr. BRACE. I have no idea.

Ms. SCHROEDER. And they went somewhere else for some reason, for some other purpose that we don't know?

Mr. BRACE. Right; even before I was captured, in working with General Vang Pao and the hill tribe people and in working with the special operations group, there were rumors that they had prisoners up at Sam Neua. We knew they had caves at Sam Neua, and they were supposed to have prisoners there, but whether Americans, Laotians, or Thai, I don't know.

The Lao soldier that was captured with Harnavee and myself, we left him at Moung Sai. I never have been able to find out what happened to him. I didn't know his name at the time he was captured. He just got on the airplane at Xieng Lom, he was captured, and the other one was killed, and the wife was taken to the village, and that was it.

Ms. SCHROEDER. So I guess that's really the question mark: Did anything happen on the other side of the border?

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCloskey.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Brace, it looks like you enlisted in the Marine Corps at the age of 15?

Mr. BRACE. Yes, sir. I was shot down in Korea when I was 21.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Yes; I see your record here. I can understand why you were able to survive that 8 years.

Will you show me on this map roughly what you were talking about?

Mr. BRACE. Yes; on the map, Louangprabang is right in here. Here is the Mekong River, Warpubong; this is the Nam Ou River that runs up here.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. You were flying from where? Where did you cross the Thai border?

Mr. BRACE. I crossed the Thai border just west of Xieng Lom, I went to Xieng Lom, and then I went up into this valley here. [Indicating.]

After capture, I walked north to Moung Sai; we crossed the Nam Ou River—this river here, at Moung Keo and we walked across this way, and just before—in those days, in 1965, just before you got to the Vietnamese border, we started to see surveyors' stakes and an old French road across there.

And I actually kicked one stake out and they made me put it back while we were walking.

We crossed the border there—that is where I say the border sign—and I was held in this area here for the first 3 years.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. How many days' walk was that from where you were first shot down.

Mr. BRACE. That was 21 days, I believe it is. It is May 21 to July 11. The last 35 or 40 miles was by truck.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. When you were with this Lao unit for 3 years, you described it as a ragtag unit. Was it a guerrilla unit based in that particular area?

Mr. BRACE. It was what would be termed as the local militia. They were high-school-age kids armed with M–1's, grenades, pieces of captured parachute cloth tied over their shoulders. They lived there, they played with the M–1's, kept pointing them at me, clicking the trigger—things like that.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Trying to scare you?

Mr. BRACE. Yes.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Before you were captured, at the time you were with the Vang Pao people, were there any rumors or discussion of what happened to people when they were captured on the other side?

Mr. BRACE. Well, Mr. McCloskey, I had been in the business of taking prisoners myself to Vang Pao. Perhaps one of the reasons I survived is I had no self-pity for myself as a prisoner. I was a civilian; I didn't feel sorry for myself. I took prisoners to Van Pao's camp, and I turned them over to Vang Pao and I never followed up on what happened to them after Vang Pao received them.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. We had the impression in Cambodia in 1975 that neither side was taking prisoners.

Mr. BRACE. Vang Pao had people out taking prisoners for intelligence purposes, I know.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Do you know what happened to them?

Mr. BRACE. No, sir.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Do you know of any discussion among the Americans connected with our effort that Vang Pao was executing these prisoners?

Mr. BRACE. No. I know they had a school there where they did teach them somewhat. I know that they did have some of them working in the parachute loft there. And I know that one of them was actually driving a tractor to go out and pick up the supplies dropped into that valley.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. A prisoner?

Mr. BRACE. A prisoner. That is the only activities I know of the prisoners themselves. What they did with them over a period of time, I have no idea.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Well, as I say, we have had some information from sources that are very difficult to verify that the Pathet Lao maintained no facilities for prisoners and executed people when they were shot down.

Do you have any information that would corroborate or rebut that?

Mr. BRACE. Only the kinds of information you hear when you are in a combat situation, like don't let yourself be taken by the PL, because they will kill you. The hill tribe PL are the worst, because they are supposed to be over on Vang Pao's side, but they have crossed over to the Communists, so they will not take any prisoners, that type of thing.

I know many guys that carried weapons would say when you were in the Korean war I would use the last one to shoot myself before I would let myself be taken alive.

Myself, at the time I wasn't even armed. The Ambassador advised us not to carry weapons, so I wasn't even armed at the time I was taken.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. In the early days of the Korean war there was substantial evidence and some precise findings that the North Koreans had executed people.

Did we ever discover any people that had been captured who were shot there?

Mr. BRACE. Not that I know of at the time of my capture in early 1965.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join my colleagues in thanking you, Mr. Brace, for your painful narration of what occurred back a few years ago and your testimony I am sure will be extremely helpful to us in our work.

Have you been back to Vietnam since your release?

Mr. BRACE. Yes, sir, I went back in 1974 at the request of Shell Oil Co. to set up an offshore oil operation to fly the helicopter from Saigon out to the oil rigs. They were exploring for oil southeast of Saigon at that time.

Mr. GILMAN. And while out there, did you receive any further information about anyone being held in that part of the world?

Mr. BRACE. No, sir, I had close contact with the Director of Civil Aviation at that time and I asked him at one time if he knew of any other American prisoners, and he just smiled at me and said no, he didn't think there were any more Americans left north because the North Vietnamese would have killed them all.

Those are the words he used.

Mr. GILMAN. You mentioned something about the caves at Sam Neua. That was information you had received from Vang Pao or Vang Pao's forces?

Mr. BRACE. We had a little operations center there at Vang Pao's headquarters, and it was just general talk among the pilots, that some of these had seen these caves, and there were supposed to have been some prisoners up there.

There was just the general talk around the operations center there, stay away from that area, it is a hot area, don't go near Sam Neua, it is the Pathet Lao headquarters.

Mr. GILMAN. Had you ever discussed this with General Vang Pao at all?

Mr. BRACE. No, my personal or direct contact with Vang Pao was only on two occasions, once when I transported a group of people from Luang Pra Boung to the alternate site, and another occasion when I tore the tail wheel off my aireraft landing on his strip, and he came out to look at it.

But I never did discuss it with him directly.

Mr. GILMAN. While you were at the operations center did you hear any information about anyone being held up around that area.

Mr. BRACE. No; the big talk in early 1965 was the Navy pilot who had been a prisoner since March of 1964 and had gotten out in November 1964, how he had been brought out by defectors, apparently.

I asked one of the interrogators one time in Hanoi about Klusman, and he said that that had been arranged.

After release I asked about it again through the Navy Intelligence people and they indicated he had been brought out by defectors off the Plain of Jars.

Mr. GILMAN. Had you ever heard anything about a Colonel Shelton being held in the caves in San Neua?

Mr. BRACE. No, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. In your opinion could people survive for any length of time in Laos without communicating with a village? Would they be able to manage?

Mr. BRACE. Well, you could not cross country through the jungles. And if you picked fruit near a village, they are going to know it. Any edible vegetable you pick around a village, they would know it. It is like a garden in the backyard, if someone gets in there and even takes a few things, you are picking from it daily and you would know about it.

I think it would be impossible for a man to survive, without village contact of some sort, longer than 3 or 4 months, let's say, because you will come down with the various diseases.

Even the mountain stream water, you will come down with something out of that water. Some type of parasite, the leeches which have parasites, and the ticks, and the lice from the jungle.

You are going to get sick in that jungle unless you can get into a village. That is my feeling on it.

You might be able to last 3 or 4 months at the most in a survival type situation, rather than the crucial type thing. But sooner or later you have to get on one of those paths and sooner or later you will be seen by a villager.

Mr. GILMAN. You mentioned that some of our men were taken north. Were there any reports given to you about any of our people being taken up toward the Chinese border?

Mr. BRACE. Only after the Camp Unity riot of February 1971, that they formed the camp known as Dog Patch on the China border. There were rumors prior to this in the camps that there was a camp on the China border. John McCain even told me that at the Plantation in 1968, that he heard there was a camp clear up on the China border.

But if there was a camp up there, nobody from that camp ever got into the normal prison system as such.

There was too much cross-pollinization between camps, you know, it was a mistake on the part of the Vietnamese, but valuable to our side.

We had people who had been in every camp that had ever been created around there, Bird Jail, the Briar Patch, Plantation, every one.

Mr. GILMAN. Yet you heard no information, further information about the other cage you saw?

Mr. BRACE. No.

Mr. GILMAN. No further information about that?

Mr. BRACE. No; I asked many questions about that when we had Camp Unity, passed it through the system, and nobody had been in that particular situation in early 1966.

Mr. GILMAN. Did any of the prisoners you came into contact with while in captivity in Vietnam, were any of those people who could not, were not released?

Mr. BRACE. Every one of them except Stores, who we now know died in camp.

Mr. GILMAN. At any time did you see any prison burial grounds for prisoners?

Mr. BRACE. No; never.

Mr. GILMAN. At any time did you receive any information about any prisoners who had been killed or buried while in captivity?

Mr. BRACE. From Bob Craner and Guy Gotner through the wall that they had taken care of a sick prisoner by the name of Lance Sijan an Air Force Academy graduate; he had been taken out of the room very sick one night and they thought he was dying, and a few days later the camp officer told them the young man had died of pneumonia.

Mr. GILMAN. Were his remains returned, do you know?

Mr. BRACE. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Did you come into contact with any civilian prisoners that were being held?

Mr. BRACE. Well, Sam Mattix and Lloyd Oppel were two missionaries. Also Larry Stark, Manhart Ramsey. They were being held in that group from South Vietnam that were mostly captured in 1968.

Mr. GILMAN. Were they subsequently released?

Mr. BRACE. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Did you come into contact with any of the journalists?

Mr. BRACE. No, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Or hear any information about any of them?

Mr. BRACE. No, sir. I heard from, just prisoner talk, that Norm Gotner being captured in 1971 had a lot of, you know, stories about people captured in the South, and this stuff he had seen written in Stars and Stripes that he got from other pilots.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. Lloyd.

Mr. LLOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join with my colleagues in saying thank you very much for a very descriptive and informative presentation. I think that the subject of who was what, where, and when in the area has been covered very adequately, and I do not intend to belabor the point.

I would like to ask you to address yourself to a slightly different area, and that is the relationship of this committee to the situation at hand, the ascertainment of final determination of what has happened to the people and where they are.

In your obviously very emotional direct involvement, what would you like to see this committee do in order to achieve or accomplish that?

Mr. BRACE. Well, in order to resolve the question of North Vietnam, you are going to have to appease the North Vietnamese in their demands. That is the only way you will get anything out of them. Everything they had was directed at world opinion. If they had a prisoner alive prior to March 1973, they are not going to release him now.

I mean world opinion was their big weapon or gun during the war. In fact, I was told in interrogation we cannot win on the battlefield, you have the technology, but we will win it on the streets of the United States.

It is the same thing right now. They are not going to give you any help in identifying the dead or the missing in action until they get that ransom. I would call it, for the information, or whatever Mr. Nixon agreed to at the time we were released. If he did agree to it in fact.

Mr. LLOYD. But if we go forward using that as an example, if there were an agreement by the President at that time, if we were to go forward and fulfill those commitments, if indeed there was a commitment—and this is hypothetical, because I don't know of any commitments, personally——

Mr. BRACE. Well, I don't either.

Mr. LLOYD. Let's make the basic assumption, which we don't know, that is true, and that we go forward and fulfill those "commitments," as the North Vietnamese perceive it, do you think, then, that they will be more cooperative, or less cooperative, or will that just be a bait that will be held out in front of us forevermore?

In other words, are we being baited by them?

Mr. BRACE. I don't think you will ever get the answer to every question that you have on it. I know they had very detailed records. They had very detailed records of burial sites, and I am sure they have detailed records of any person or body that they pulled from an aircraft wreckage.

Mr. LLOYD. You think they did have?

Mr. BRACE. Yes, sir, I am certain the North Vietnamese have very detailed records of that.

But whether you will ever get it or not without conceding to their demands, is a question. They lived under the French prison system for so long—when I complained one time that I spent 4 years and 7 months in solitary, he laughed at me and said, "Our vice president spent 16 years in solitary."

They have no concept of what we would consider as being harsh treatment, or bad treatment, by Western standards. Their standards are different than ours. When a person dies in Asiatic countries, they have great respect for their ancestors, but he is gone. Or if he just leaves and never comes back, he is gone. And I don't think they realize, they do not feel by their standards what we feel in losing a person.

Mr. LLOYD. In other words, the commitment to human life is at a different level?

Mr. BRACE. Yes, sir.

Mr. LLOYD. And therefore, because of that, we can anticipate no cooperation, or a low level of cooperation and based only on what they perceive is a relative advantage to them?

Mr. BRACE. That is right. They will hand you three today, give you two more next year, and they will trickle out a little bit of information through the year, drop a hint here or there.

If you want information about POW's, I have been back in Bangkok several times since I got out, and if you take a wallet full of money over there, you can buy all of the information you want on POW's on the streets. They will give you pictures and everything else, introduce you to contacts, but when you try to run them down, they fizzle out somewhere down the line.

If you have got the money and go there, you can get information. But whether it is any good or not, that is the big question.

Mr. LLOYD. I continually ask this question and I presume my colleagues may be a little tired of it. We are in a limited time frame. Within that time frame—which is running out—what do you see as possible for us to achieve of the goals we have discussed?

Mr. BRACE. I think the question—if you don't come with the money for rebuilding of Vietnam, is to continue to use world opinion on our side as they use it on their side.

That is, the families deserve to know what happened to these men in North Vietnam.

As far as the Laotians go, from what I have seen of Lao administration, even in the Royal Lao Administration, the Air Force in Vientiane, I don't know if they kept any records for anything.

Mr. LLOYD. Anyhow, Mr. Brace, let's assume the gloomy picture that you have painted. As far as our achievement potential is concerned, do you think we ought to go out of existence and say, "That's it; there's nothing more than can be done?" Or do you think this should be an ongoing thing, ongoing committee?

Mr. BRACE. I think that the questions you are asking me, and the questions that you ask the next person, could be an ongoing thing indefinitely, because I feel there are people that have such strong family ties that they will just not give up. I have had personal letters

myself from many of them. I try to answer them as respectfully as I can, but my own feeling is that it is done, it is over, and that is it.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield? Say that last part again, please.

Mr. BRACE. I said I have had many letters from persons, myself, referring to missing persons, and I try to answer them as respectfully as I can, but my own personal feeling is that it is done, it is over, there is nobody captured prior to 1973 that is going to come out of North Vietnam at this time alive.

The CHAIRMAN. And how about Laos?

Mr. BRACE. Laos, as I said prior to this, I said a man in all probability could live in a village for a period of time, but I see no advantage to the Laotians to keep him in that condition. I think it is very unlikely we will see anybody come out of Laos over a period of years or any time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you again for this straightforward testimony, and your courageousness. We appreciate very much your coming to Washington to testify before the committee.

The committee now stands adjourned.

[Thereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the meeting was adjourned.]

Report on Special Meetings of the Select Committee

INFORMAL MEETING WITH JEAN PIERRE HOCKE, JANUARY 22, 1976

Jean Pierre Hocke, Operations Director of the International Committee of the Red Cross, met informally with the select committee. The importance of the MIA issue to the American people was discussed. Capabilities of the U.S. Central Identification Laboratory in Thailand for identifying remains were also discussed.

Mr. Hocke described ICRC efforts to facilitate exit from South Vietnam of foreign nationals. He was optimistic that U.S. citizens would be permitted to leave, but noted that the Provisional Revolutionary Government had not specified any time frame in which this exit could be expected.

INFORMAL MEETING WITH INTERPLAST SURGEONS, JANUARY 23, 1976

Members of the selecte committee met with Dr. Mark Gorney and Dr. Richard Dakin of the International Plastic Society—Interplast. The doctors described the surgical training and rehabilitation programs their organization had conducted in Africa, Central and South America, and South Vietnam. They offered to establish, at no cost to the U.S. Government, an Interplast program in Vietnam and Laos under the auspices of the select committee.

Members of the select committee were impressed with the surgeons' presentation. The committee arranged for a meeting between Dr. Robert L. Mills of Interplast and a representative of U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Arrangements were also made to forward to Hanoi and Vientiane documentation on the surgeons' proposal.

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES, JANUARY 24, 1976

Chairman Montgomery and Representatives McCloskey, Gilman, and Ottinger, the four members who had held discussion with Vietnamese officials in Hanoi in December 1975, addressed a national gathering of members of the National League of Families at the Key Bridge Marriott in Washington, D.C. Each member reported separately on MIA discussions in Hanoi, then responded to questions from league members.

The select committee took note of the league policy statement, part of which read:

> We reaffirm our long standing position that our government must not make any concessions to the governments of the two Vietnams and Cambodia such as approving membership in the United Nations, lifting the trade embargo,

granting reconstruction or other aid, without built-in safeguards that will ins
an honorable accounting of our men, military and civilian.

Further, we reaffirm our long standing position that the United States gov
ment should initiate talks with leaders of the new government in Laos
negotiation of the return of Prisoners of War, accounting of the missing a
return of remains of American war dead in that country.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FORD, JANUARY 26, 1976

Four members of the select committee met with President Ford o
January 26 to report on their discussions in Hanoi. The select com
mittee delegation included Chairman G. V. Montgomery, and Repre
sentatives Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., Richard L. Ottinger, and Benja
min A. Gilman, and staff director J. Angus MacDonald.

Chairman Montgomery reviewed the December meetings with Vie
namese officials. The President was interested in any trends the Mem
bers observed in Vietnam's international relations. Members com
mented that the Vietnamese said they desired good relations with th
United States, as they desired good relations with other countries.

Reciprocity to gestures of good will, as mentioned in the President
Hawaii speech, was discussed. The committee members inquired about
Executive initiatives to create a climate in which an accounting for
missing Americans could proceed. In this context, the President and
committee members discussed possible good will gestures toward
Vietnam.

The committee also reported on meetings with Lao officials. Because
of the nature of Lao needs, the members suggested that the Lao might
be responsive to humanitarian gestures.

The committee members emphasized the need to resolve the MIA
issue swiftly and honorably. The League of Families resolution urg-
ing safeguards on any U.S. initiative was mentioned.

The President was apprised of the effective help provided to com-
mittee members by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees on the occasion of the Hanoi trip.

MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER, MARCH 12, 1976

Members of the select committee met with Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger at a working breakfast to discuss recent efforts by the
committee to resolve the problem of Americans missing in Indochina
and not accounted for. The committee recommended that the Secre-
tary initiate a proposal to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that
direct discussions be undertaken between the two countries on the
POW/MIA problem and other matters of mutual interest.

The select committee inquired about a reconstruction aid program
mentioned in President Nixon's letter of February 1, 1973, to North
Vietnamese Premier Pham Van dong. North Vietnamese officials had
informed the select committee delegation of this correspondence when
committee members were in Hanoi in December 1975. According to

the Vietnamese, the Nixon letter referred to a preliminary study re-
flecting a $3.25 billion reconstruction program contemplated for North
Vietnam.

Chairman G. V. Montgomery stated that he had since discussed the
correspondence with former President Richard Nixon. Mr. Nixon had
assured the chairman that the reconstruction program which had been
under consideration for several years, was contingent upon Vietnam-
ese compliance with the peace agreement, responsible international
behavior, and congressional approval.

Dr. Kissinger stated that Democratic Republic of Vietnam negotia-
tors had been apprised repeatedly that any reconstruction aid de-
pended upon congressional approval. The Secretary was emphatic that
no flat, unconditional commitment to aid North Vietnam financially
had been made.

Considerable discussion was then devoted to the Bingham and Gil-
man amendments to the Foreign Assistance bill. The amendments
would lift the trade embargo on Indochina while providing a safe-
guard requiring that substantial progress be made on the MIA issue.
Dr. Kissinger stated that such legislation would impede the negotiat-
ing process by restricting executive flexibility. Members of the select
committee stressed that congressional action was the result of Execu-
tive inaction.

The Secretary and members of the select committee devoted con-
siderable attention to appropriate actions and gestures of good will.
The committee members' appraisal was that the Vietnamese were ready
for executive-level talks.

Members of the select committee attending the working breakfast
included Chairman G. V. Montgomery, Representatives Gonzalez,
Moakley, Schroeder, Ottinger, Lloyd, McCloskey, and Gilman, and
staff director J. Angus MacDonald.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES

In addition to the public hearings and special meetings, the select
committee held three executive sessions to review plans and progress,
analyze problems, plan hearings, evaluate alternative lines of action,
and discuss committee initiatives and goals.

On behalf of the select committee, chairman G. V. Montgomery
exerted considerable effort in the period January–March 1976, to estab-
lish and maintain communication with the governments of Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam. Included were five separate attempts to open a
dialog with the new Cambodian government, letters following up the
December meetings in Indochina, and several communications explor-
ing possible future discussions with Indochinese officials.

Committee members also addressed groups with special interest in
the MIA issue. Chairman G. V. Montgomery reported on the progress
of the select committee at the National Convention of the Veterans of
Foreign Wars on March 7 in Washington, D.C., and provided an arti-
cle detailing committee activities for the American Legion's National

Legislative News Bulletin (Feb. 27, 1976). Congressman McCloskey met with groups from the National League of Families in California and Ohio.

STAFF INVESTIGATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

During the period January-March 1976, the staff continued investigations begun earlier and broadened the scope of its activities.

Numerous private meetings were held with experts in various aspects of POW/MIA matters. Important background information was compiled and several potential witnesses were identified. The following were among those with whom the staff held discussions:

Lutheran World Relief

Mr. Bernard A. Confer, executive secretary of Lutheran World Relief, Inc., and Mr. Larry Minear, consultant on World Hunger for both Church World Service and Lutheran World Relief, explained the charitable and humanitarian goals of their organizations. Mr. Confer indicated that his group planned a trip to Vietnam during March and April 1976, in order to learn firsthand the needs of the Vietnamese.

The staff explained the purpose of the select committee, pointing out that the humanitarian work of Lutheran World Relief could create a climate for the select committee's humanitarian effort, and asking Mr. Confer to mention this humanitarian work to Vietnamese officials.

BioTechnology, Inc.

Dr. Martin G. Every, who has been doing research at BioTechnology, Inc., in Falls Church, Va., for the Office of Naval Research, briefed the staff on his studies of medical problems related to ejection from aircraft. The rate of serious injury among naval pilots who were recovered during the Vietnam war proved to be relatively high, raising serious questions about possibilities for survival for those who were not recovered.

Department of Defense Historian

Col. Fred Kiley, USAF, a Department of Defense historian writing the history of American POW experiences in the Vietnam war, spoke to the staff about variations in treatment of POW's at different times during the war; events that had a serious impact on treatment of prisoners; and the differences in treatment by north Vietnamese, Pathet Lao, and Viet Cong.

French POW Experience

Ms. Anita Lauve, who has published major studies on French POW/MIA experiences and is a recognized expert on the French POW/MIA experience in Indochina, provided insights into the French experience. Many aspects of that experience appeared directly pertinent to the work of the select committee.

Navy Center for POW Studies

Dr. John A. Plag, director of the Navy Center for POW Studies in San Diego, discussed the special psychological and social problems of MIA and POW families. The impact on family members of status reviews was also explored.

Four Party Joint Military Team

Col. William W. Tombaugh, USA, former Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Four Party Joint Military Teams discussed his role and experience in the negotiations conducted in Saigon in 1973 and 1974. He described the efforts by the U.S. delegation to provide general data and specific case summaries of individual Americans who were missing as a result of Southeast Asia combat operations.

Colonel Tombaugh discussed the liaison maintained between the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and the U.S. Delegation to the Four Party Joint Military Team. He assessed the negotiating tactics of the delegates from North and South Vietnam and their efforts to gain defacto recognition of the Provisional Revolutionary Government as a legal entity in South Vietnam. He pointed out that the Communists refused to permit American or other search teams to investigate known crash and grave sites located in areas controlled by the DRV and PRG. In addition, Colonel Tombaugh identified several documents that proved to be important to the committee's investigation.

Joint Casualty Resolution Center

Colonel John Vollmer, USA, director of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center in Thailand, met with the select committee staff to discuss the capabilities of the JCRC and problems related to recovery and identification of remains. The possibilities for crash and grave site investigation, casualty resolution, and new questions and approaches to the data were explored in detail.

Considerable time was devoted to investigating reports and rumors of Americans still held captive in Indochina. The staff met frequently with representatives of the intelligence agencies, to obtain general information and to conduct staff analyses of selected individual cases. The staff conducted its own independent investigations of many reports, tracking down sources, conducting interviews, and evaluating the reports. As part of this investigation, Staff Director J. Angus MacDonald traveled to California to pursue intelligence leads; staff assistant Dr. Job Dittberner traveled to Minnesota for the same purpose. The staff also contacted many POW's who returned in "Operation Homecoming" to discuss their experiences, and to identify potential witnesses.

Many MIA family members visited the staff offices to discuss the case of their MIA and the progress of the select committee. The staff

continued its ongoing review of individual MIA/POW cases, carefully studying the cases of the 36 American servicemen still classified as POW's, and numerous other individual cases. They met again with the Board of Directors of the National League of Families on March 6 to report on the committee's work, and arranged two briefings with legislative aides of committee members to keep them abreast of developments and investigations. The Staff Director addressed National League of Family groups in California and Ohio.

Throughout these activities, the staff was greatly aided by the liaison personnel of the National League of Families and Voices in Vital American (VIVA), Ms. Carol Bates and Mrs. Betty Miller, respectively, and by the liaison officers assigned by the Department of State and the Department of Defense, Mr. Moncrief Spear and Captain Kenneth Coskey, USN, respectively.

SELECT COMMITTEE LETTER TO PRIMARY NEXT-OF-KIN

The following letter was sent to the next-of-kin of Americans missing in Southeast Asia. It summarizes the activities of the select committee during its first 6 months, and provides a brief record of achievements and a look to the future.

U.S. House of Representatives

SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ROOM 3334, HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 2

Washington, D.C. 20515

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

G. V. MONTGOMERY, MISS., CHAIRMAN

On September 11, 1975, by a vote of 394 to 3, Congress formed the Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, with the purpose of investigating and, within one year, reporting to Congress on the problem of Americans missing or unaccounted for as a result of military operations in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

The Select Committee immediately initiated its investigations. The National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia has been of considerable assistance in these efforts. Unfortunately, to date, no hard evidence has been uncovered to show that live Americans are being held captive or residing in remote villages of Indochina or elsewhere. The Select Committee is, however, vigorously continuing to pursue this track of investigation and to seek an accounting for our men through national and international efforts.

While media coverage of Committee activities has generally been straightforward and factual, there have been some serious distortions. In addition, since the Committee has not sought publicity, many activities go unreported. I am, therefore, taking this opportunity, at the halfway point of the Select Committee investigations, to apprise you of some of our efforts and achievements. I trust that the attached description will be of interest to you, and wish to assure you that we are making every effort to resolve this painful problem.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely,

G. V. Montgomery

GILLESPIE V. MONTGOMERY
Chairman

GVM:kjs

Enclosures

Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia

A BRIEF RECORD OF EFFORTS

In the six months since it was formed, the Select Committee has:

-- held 25 open and closed sessions,
-- heard 21 witnesses,
-- met twice with President Ford,
-- met twice with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,
-- met with top-level Indochinese officials in Paris, Hanoi, and Vientiane at our own initiative. We hope to meet with them again in the near future,
-- held numerous meetings and have been in frequent contact with officials of international organizations with direct access to Indochinese countries. These organizations are the International Red Cross, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
-- conferred with U.S. diplomatic officials in Thailand, Laos, Paris, and Geneva,
-- met innumerable times with representatives of the National League of Families and Voices in Vital America (VIVA), also with family members and interest groups,
-- inspected the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) at Samae San, Thailand,
-- sent a staff member to Paris to talk to the leading French expert on MIA/POW affairs, and to Indochina, where he held extensive conversations with JCRC personnel and Lao officials,
-- had the Staff Director investigate an intelligence source in California where he also spoke to family members,
-- individual Congressmen are reviewing MIA cases,
-- the staff has reviewed all current POW cases and numerous MIA cases, a process they are continuing,
-- worked in close association with intelligence agencies to investigate reports and rumors concerning missing Americans,
-- made several independent efforts to communicate with the Cambodians; in Peking, China; Vientiane, Laos; Paris, France; and in Hanoi, Vietnam. We are still waiting to hear from them.

Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia

A BRIEF RECORD OF ACHIEVEMENTS

These activities have had positive results. No progress on the MIA issue had occured from 1973 through September of 1975. Since the Select Committee was formed, considerable movement has taken place:

-- 9 Americans and 5 foreign nationals were released from Hanoi on October 30th, of 1975,
-- South Vietnam, after initial protests, finally accepted the refugee ship carrying over 1,500 Vietnamese refugees from Guam,
-- our Select Committee received in Hanoi the remains of 3 Americans,
-- the remains of the two Marines who were killed in April of 1975 in Saigon, were returned in February of 1976,
-- the Chinese provided information on 24 Americans missing from the Korean war and the Indochina war. The Select Committee had asked the President and Secretary of State to discuss the matter with the Chinese when last they visited there,
-- the ashes of 2 deceased Americans were returned by the Chinese,
-- the Committee brought to the attention of top-level DRV and Pathet Lao officials the kinds of detailed information on MIA's that had been provided to their delegations previously. The Committee also provided those officials with several case summaries of missing Americans about whom the Vietnamese Government should have information,
-- we opened the door to Indochina just a crack by meeting with top leadership,
-- we have focused public and governmental attention on the MIA issue both in Indochina and at home.

A LOOK TO THE FUTURE

-- We will continue to press for an accounting and return of all missing Americans,
-- we have made it clear to the Vietnamese and Lao that we cannot negotiate foreign policy,
-- we found it necessary to listen to them in order for them to listen to our position on the POW's and MIA's,
-- the Committee seeks to create the climate and establish the mechanism through which the MIA problem can be resolved.

APPENDIX

Material Received for the Record

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. VERNON A. WALTERS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

U.S. Intelligence Efforts Focused on American PW/MIA's in Indochina

INTRODUCTION

1. Identification and collection of information on Prisoners of War (PW) and Missing in Action (MIA) has been given highest priority by the Intelligence Community since mid-1966. A review of the Intelligence Community's efforts and its current holdings shows that we have no sources or leads which have not been explored, and that we have no confirmed or confirmable information that additional American PWs are still being held in captivity in Southeast Asia. The Select Committee is acutely aware of numerous rumors and unconfirmed reports received within the past three years of sightings or meetings with American prisoners. Department of State and Department of Defense (DOD) have carefully studied these allegations and concluded that they are not based on fact and do not warrant further Intelligence Community effort at this time. Based on the debriefing of returnees, the Intelligence Community has concluded that all the men seen by the PWs in all the prison camps in which they were held have been accounted for.

2. During the early phases of American involvement in the Vietnamese war there were very few Americans detained by the Vietnamese and Laotian Communist forces. But beginning with the bombing of North Vietnam in 1964, North Vietnam captured increasing numbers of Navy, Marine and Air Force air crewmen. As direct involvement of ground forces increased in South Vietnam, Army and Marine personnel were also captured by both North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and National Liberation Front (NLF) troops. In June 1966, in retaliation for the bombing of North Vietnam, Hanoi announced there would be a public war crimes trial of the captured airmen. The announcement shocked American public opinion. The Intelligence Community in Washington revised upward the priority of PW intelligence. Interdepartmental liaison was greatly increased and gradually formalized in several committees and working groups, involving representatives of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the military services, Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and others from time to time. Collection requirements and dissemination procedures were reviewed and improved. All available information was analyzed, and estimates prepared of Vietnamese Communist objectives and techniques in the capture and exploitation of prisioners of war. Tasks were divided between the service intelligence units, as well as DIA and CIA, to insure that every scrap of available information was considered, and every avenue and channel of information carefully developed.

3. In Washington, DIA assumed leadership of the analysis effort. The DIA had been established on 1 October 1961 by the Secretary of Defense to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and major components of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Prior to mid-1966, DIA assumed limited responsibilities for PW/MIA intelligence analysis. In mid-1966, under USIB direction, DIA's effort regarding PW/MIA intelligence became more comprehensive.

4. Within the U.S. Government, DIA has provided direct PW/MIA intelligence support to the following organizations:

(*a*) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, specifically the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

(*b*) Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and specifically J–1 and J–3 of the Joint Staff.

(*c*) The Military Services, specifically the intelligence and casualty branches.

(*d*) CINCPAC.

(*e*) Joint Casualty Resolution Center.

(*f*) U.S. Delegation to the Four Party Joint Military Team.

(g) Department of State, specifically the Deputy Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs on matters pertaining to U.S. civilians and Third Country Nationals captured or missing in the Southeast Asia conflict.

5. DIA continues to be the focal point for all intelligence relating to PW/MIA matters. The Prisoner of War and Missing in Action (PW/MIA) Branch within DIA presently functions as the only national-level office whose capabilities entail a full-time effort directed toward the comprehensive review, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information relating to PW/MIA matters.

6. Communications intelligence was used to confirm shoot downs and truck movements and to provide information on movement of PWs.

7. The Select Committee is well aware that during the period of heavy American involvement in the Vietnam war, the Department of Defense accepted responsibility for and bore the heavy burdens associated with prisoner of war problems, including the difficult decision whether to attempt rescue in face of the obvious fact that the captors might choose to kill the prisoners—rather than see them rescued. Dr. Shields has for a number of years served as senior DOD policy maker for PW/MIA affairs, and has carefully reviewed all intelligence developments. The Central Intelligence Agency, by mutual agreement, has played a support role in the PW intelligence effort, collecting and channeling information as rapidly as possible, cooperating on intelligence estimates, advising on technical problems, providing local support bases and facilities when possible, sometimes providing guides and other local personnel for rescue operations. The Intelligence Community has taken as its primary rule that all the information obtained must be distributed to the services concerned as quickly as possible, and the services assisted to make all pertinent information available to the families.

8. The Select Committee's request for testimony is addressed to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, in his capacity as principal spokesman to Congress for the Intelligence Community. The response and supporting material for the record have been developed with the help of Commander Charles Trowbridge of DIA, and in consultation with both Mr. Frank Sieverts of State Department, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Economic Affairs and PW/MIA Affairs, Dr. Roger Shields. These gentlemen are well known to the Select Committee as spokesmen for their own Departments and Agencies.

I. PW/MIA Intelligence Efforts 1961–1973

A. Types of sources available

1. Aerial photography

(a) Except for permanent installations in the vicinity of Hanoi and Sam Neua (Pathet Lao capital in Laos), the enemy forces did not maintain PW camps in the popular sense, that is, large installations such as the German stalags in WW II or the Chinese Communist camps along the Yalu River in Korea. Any hamlet or village, or the transient encampment of a platoon or company could and did serve as places of internment in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

(b) As a result, aerial photography did not, by itself, provide exploitable information on prison camps and prisoners. Photography was of greatest help in evaluating portions of interrogation reports and developing rescue plans.

2. Communications intelligence

Communications intelligence was similar to photography in that it did not, by itself, provide exploitable information on prison camps and prisoners. Communications intelligence was of greatest value in confirming portions of interrogation reports and developing rescue plans.

3. PW/Rallier/Refugee interrogations

(a) Every American PW who was released or escaped prior to Operation Homecoming was debriefed for any knowledge he had on other Americans lost in Southeast Asia. Significant information was obtained from these debriefings regarding the fate of other Americans, including those PWs who were alive and those who had died in captivity.

(b) Similarly, indigenous PWs who managed to escape or were released, ralliers and refugees were debriefed for information they might have on captured and missing Americans. Captured enemy personnel were carefully interrogated. The debriefings and interrogations followed a systematic format outlined in DIA's collection requirements, and were performed by trained U.S. or indigenous debriefers and interrogators.

(c) For most purposes, American escapees and releasees were the best sources of information on prison locations and identity of PWs. There were so few of these, however, that the Intelligence Community relied heavily on debriefing and interrogation centers in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to produce a steady stream of reporting from friendly and hostile indigenous sources. These centers were developed through close working relationships between the U.S. Intelligence Community and the National Intelligence Services of Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia. Some of the sources, both enemy and friendly, were highly intelligent, knowledgeable, and cooperative. Their product was extremely helpful. It should be pointed out that the kind of information provided was sometimes vague and usually highly perishable.

4. Agents

Agent reporting occasionally produced leads which could be followed up. None of the leads, however, resulted in successful rescue of American PWs. Occasionally agent reporting provided documentary information not otherwise available. In general, the massive collection programs at the interrogation and debriefing centers and the captured document processing centers were more reliable and steady sources of PW information.

B. The flow of information

From mid-1966 to mid-1973 there was an immense flow of PW/MIA information to Washington through many channels. In addition to the military and diplomatic installations of the United States reporting from many parts of the world, there were friendly official, commercial, media and private persons providing information through whatever contacts they might have; intelligence units in Washington also received extensive reporting on Communist propaganda and information published on their radios, in their media, and through their diplomatic outlets. A large quantity of imagery from all types of reconnaissance photography, and a huge volume of daily battle information from American and allied military channels also flowed into Washington. All this had to be screened and coordinated at several command levels—Saigon, CINCPAC, Washington—for the purpose of locating and identifying American PWs. No formal system could insure complete coordination of such a wide spread effort. Cooperation was required, within a general framework of formal coordination. There is always some interagency coordination in progress concerning the problems of PWs—even in peace time. After American forces became engaged in Indochina, the coordination became intense.

1. PW/MIA Task Force—Coordination

(a) During the latter half of 1966 Ambassador William Averell Harriman headed an "Interdepartmental Group to Monitor POW Matters"; this was a policy group which also reviewed intelligence questions.

(b) An ad hoc interagency prisoner of war intelligence committee was formed by DIA in June 1966. In September 1966 CIA convened a Working Group as a subcommittee of the DIA Ad Hoc Committee, and regular weekly meetings were held. In August 1967 this Working Group reverted to DIA control and thereafter DIA played the principal coordinating role in Washington. A large and valuable exchange of intelligence took place within this interdepartmental ad hoc committee. The committee served to insure the collection, compilation, analysis, and dissemination of all-source intelligence concerning U.S. PW/MIA personnel. Detailed collection instruments were prepared and levied on all agencies having the capability to collect PW/MIA intelligence. These agencies included CIA, NSA, the military services and their intelligence collection elements, CINCPAC, USMACV, as well as selected Defense Attaches on a worldwide basis. This committee still convenes when necessary. In addition, the DOD PW Policy Committee, the DOD PW/MIA Task Group, and the DOD PW/MIA Task Force met on various levels to establish national policy and to coordinate PW/MIA related activities. These committees augmented and facilitated the flow of PW/MIA intelligence and provided a forum for the discussion and resolution of PW/MIA related problems and requirements.

(c) In December 1971 an Intelligence Task Force was established to supervise the intelligence aspects of PW problems and to provide more rapid and effective communication between policymakers and intelligence officials. Rear Admiral Donald B. Whitmire of DIA headed this interagency task force. The

task force met until the spring of 1973, when the prisoners were repatriated. A representative of the DCI attended these meetings.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency was a member of both the Interagency Prisoner of War Intelligence Ad Hoc Committee and the DOD Prisoner of War Intelligence Task Force. In addition, the Agency maintained full-time liaison with DIA in conjunction with PW/MIA projects.

C. PRIORITIES

In April 1966 the DIA forwarded to the CIA a request that information on U.S. prisoners of war and PW camp locations be given a higher priority, in fact, that it be designated as DOD highest priority. Immediate action was taken. CIA collectors were notified the same day, and in the subsequent weeks formal notices were published as a guide to the Intelligence Community. DIA published detailed interrogation guides in the form of collection requirements. These high level requirements initially stimulated a great deal of overlapping effort, both in Washington and in Southeast Asia. Interagency coordination gradually consolidated the efforts and eliminated unnecessary duplication, without detracting from the high priority of the requirement.

D. RECORD OF INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

1. Capabilities

For practical purposes, a list of intelligence sources is a list of intelligence capabilities. These sources have already been described. The Select Committee, however, might be interested in a summary of sources and the types of information that they furnished:

Aerial photography was used to confirm or deny the existence of PW camps, and for operational planning.

Reports of interrogation of enemy prisoners and debriefing of ralliers, refugees, and other indigenous personnel provided information on the sighting of American prisoners, of location of prison camps, treatment of prisoners, and location of crash and grave sites.

Reports based on the debriefing of U.S. personnel who escaped or were released prior to Operation Homecoming provided information on location of PW camps, enemy treatment of PWs, and identity of American PWs.

Communist news media—radio and press—frequently decribed air and ground battles in which Americans were killed or captured, occasionally identified killed or captured personnel, and included many tape recorded messages from PWs to their families—heavily laced with enemy propaganda.

Captured enemy documents (including motion picture film) provided PW intelligence in the form of statements by individual PWs, postcapture photographs of PWs, reenacted capture scenes, information on treatment and physical condition and PW identification. Photography that could not be identified was compiled in a publication for viewing by persons who possibly could assist in identification, including returned U.S. PWs and next of kin. Through the years a total of 115 photographs were included in the unidentified photo publication. Presently, six photos remain unidentified. Over half of the unresolved photos were identified as a result of Operation Homecoming debriefings.

Non-Communist open source documents and photography also carried names and identification data of a number of PWs, as well as information on the health of PWs, prison camp locations, and identification or pictures of prison guards and staff.

Operational loss reports from American military commands provided loss location, and if appropriate, survival, capture, and physical condition information. In some instances, the reported loss location was based exclusively on last radio or radar contact with an aircraft and as a result did not provide an accurate assessment of the actual loss location.

Reports of visits to PW camps by anti-war organization personnel and U.S. and foreign correspondents provided enemy propaganda, PW identification and their physical condition, and PW postcapture photography.

Communications intelligence supplemented other types of reporting.

2. Difficulties

The principal difficulty facing the PW/MIA intelligence effort was the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) policy of using PW/MIAs as pawns in contravention of the Geneva Convention on treatment of PWs. Viewing PWs as pawns, the DRV felt no obligation to provide information on a humanitarian basis. In addition to this basic obstacle, the following rather technical problems were encountered:

The time lag between the date of information and the date of reporting varied from a few months to several years. Information became less and less reliable as this time lag increased.

In many cases less than satisfactory information was obtained from the interrogation of sources. The sources sometimes had poor recall, poor observation abilities, or self-serving reasons for embellishing or fabricating information.

Enemy PW detention facilities in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were frequently moved and often located in dense jungle.

In North Vietnam some detention sites were difficult to recognize, being ordinary buildings or compounds converted to PW prison sites.

Sources of potentially valuable information sometimes could not be re-contacted for follow-up.

3. Types/examples of information gained

(*a*) The intelligence effort provided an accurate estimate of how many PWs could be released. DIA was able to identify in advance 91% (539) of the 591 U.S. personnel released at Operation Homecoming. Additionally, DIA was able to identify and confirm the existence of 9 of the 13 permanent PW camps holding U.S. PWs in North Vietnam—again, before Operation Homecoming. The debriefing of released PWs proved earlier estimates of the enemy's handling and treatment of PWs to have been highly accurate.

(*b*) In spite of the thousands of American soldiers captured during the Korean war and subjected to Communist style prison exploitation, very few American commanders or policy makers in late 1966 had any clear idea of Communist policy concerning capture, exploitation and release of prisoners of war. In order to establish a basic understanding within the Intelligence Community and make this available to commanders and policy makers, the Intelligence Community interviewed survivors of prison camps in Korea, carefully debriefed escapees and releasees from Communist detention in Vietnam, made contact with French experts, and analyzed everything in the daily flow of intelligence and overt media information for clues to Vietnamese Communist policy.

(*c*) The rapid build up of American forces led to massive screening of captured documents and the extensive interrogation program already mentioned. These two programs gradually provided the information for a reliable estimate of the Vietnamese Communist policy toward prisoners. There were occasional changes in policy, as the tides of battle changed, but the basic pattern remained uniform and largely inflexible. Before the end of hostilities several interrogators from the Communist forces had been captured; from them added details were obtained. The resulting intelligence picture of DRV policy and organization greatly assisted in interpretation of fragmentary information concerning capture and movement of American personnel, and in evaluation of alleged propaganda statements by American PWs.

(*d*) Several additional key bits of information were obtained when the Communist forces attempted to conquer all of South Vietnam in the spring of 1968. During the Tet 1968 offensive, communist forces captured approximately 30 Americans in extreme northern South Vietnam, two of whom escaped after several days march through the jungle. Information from these escapees, and from South Vietnamese military personnel who escaped later gave us definite indications that the North Vietnamese Army units in South Vietnam were marching some recently captured American prisoners into North Vietnam, contrary to public statements from Hanoi. With this definite knowledge in hand, the whole question of how many prisoners had been moved to North Vietnam was reviewed; although hard information was lacking, a great many more PWs were afterwards listed as possibly held in North Vietnam.

E. RECORD OF OPERATIONAL EFFORT

1. Rescue attempts (like Son Tay)—results

There was only one Son Tay raid. There were no unpublicized raids into North Vietnam on the order of Son Tay. On the other hand, in South Vietnam there were many attempts involving rescue forces of more than 100 men, but none involving detailed planning on the Son Tay scale, which stretched from

Washington to Vietnam and involved the training of specialized units in the United States. None of the other rescue attempts was successful in terms of pulling a captured American PW out of a prison camp. Several resulted in releasing indigenous civilian and military personnel. In at least one case, indigenous PWs escaped, reported false information about alleged Americans in the prison, and helped conduct a raid on the prison, in hopes of releasing more of their friends.

2. SAR assist

(*a*) Literally thousands of attempts were made to rescue military and civilian personnel within hours of the loss incident. This quick reaction effort, known as SAR, or Search and Rescue, resulted in saving thousands of lives. The Air Force alone, through its Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, accounted for 2,750 saves under hostile conditions and 1,328 saves in non-hostile areas. All the services and civilian agencies contributed to SAR efforts.

(*b*) In Laos indigenous ground reconnaissance teams operating in contested and hostile territory supported many aspects of the PW/MIA intelligence effort. The teams maintained safe site on hill tops.

Civilian and military pilots were given the locations of these safe sites, and on numerous occasions pilots were able to avoid capture by making their way to a safe site and waiting for exfiltration. On one occasion in 1964 a Navy pilot downed in northern Laos escaped from a Pathet Lao prison and made his way to a safe site, where he was recovered. The teams also participated in many SAR efforts, some successful, some unsuccessful. One team investigated a crash site and brought out the remains of a civilian pilot, thus changing his status from MIA to KIA. Indigenous reconnaissance teams followed standard procedures of checking out, if possible, all reported crash sites, prison sites and reported sightings of Americans. Some teams specialized in collecting intelligence, and produced disseminable information on sightings of American PWs.

F. CIA ASSESSMENT: WERE ALL LIVE PW/MIA'S RETURNED BY THE COMMUNISTS IN 1973?

1. The Intelligence Community, coordinated by the DOD PW Intelligence Task Force under Rear Admiral Whitmire, carefully assessed information furnished by repatriated prisoners and concluded that all men known by the repatriates to have been in the prison system had been accounted for either in the repatriation, or as having died in prison. There are cases where men were known to have survived their incident, but subsequent information on their fate is lacking. These names remain on the list for which we are still asking for Communist Governments of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to make an accounting.

2. Many debriefing and interrogation reports mention sightings which cannot be correlated to known American losses. It is expected that most of these reports will remain unresolved.

G. VARIATIONS IN THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT BY COUNTRY

1. In South Vietnam an immense intelligence structure developed. Many PW/MIA reports could be verified or at least carefully checked through different sources or by ground reconnaissance. This did not, however, resolve all the problems of PW/MIA information. Large areas remained outside effective government control, under heavy jungle canopy.

2. In Laos, although the U.S. mission enjoyed a great deal of cooperation, the sparsely populated, extremely rugged terrain provided even better cover for Communist operations than Vietnam. Prison locations in Laos tended to be concealed under jungle canopy, frequently in caves. In the case of permanent facilities, such as those around Sam Neua, the Pathet Lao Headquarters, it was possible to verify allegations as to presence of American captives in specific prison locations. On one or two occasions in central Laos, escapees only a few hours out of a prison camp led rescue operations which confirmed the camp location but failed to rescue any American PWs.

3. After the successful coup against Sihanouk in 1970, the new Cambodian Government cooperated in development of various intelligence collection programs, resulting in increased coverage of much of Cambodia. A national level debriefing and interrogation center was organized with U.S. help. Interrogators

were trained in Saigon. Cambodian officials were cooperative in pursuing PW/MIA leads, but reliable information on American PWs continued to be meager. When the PWs were released we learned that some of them had indeed been held in Cambodia for many months.

II. PW/MIA INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS 1973–APRIL 1975

A CHANGE IN CAPABILITY—PRIORITIES

1. Priority unchanged

(a) Reporting of information pertaining to American prisoners of war and missing in action remained a matter of top priority. Information on American PW/MIA was disseminated as rapidly as possible.

(*b*) Although in overt statements the public officials of the Communist governments in Indochina claimed that there were no more Americans being held as prisoners of war, the Intelligence Community included questions on possible PWs in its requirements for information to resolve the status of the remaining missing in Southeast Asia.

(*c*) The interrogation and debriefing centers in Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam continued to function even though the flow of prisoners and ralliers was somewhat smaller.

2. *Change in capability.*—The reduction of U.S. military presence in South Vietnam at the time of the Paris agreements eliminated most direct collection of information by U.S. personnel.

South Vietnamese military reporting therefore became the principal source of PW/MIA information for the Defense Attache Office (DAO) in Saigon. Reduction of U.S. military presence in other parts of Southeast Asia had the same effect—greater and greater reliance had to be placed on information provided by the host country intelligence organization. This information was not all of the same quality as that obtained through our own more sophisticated apparatus.

B. RELATIONS WITH JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

1. The Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) was established on 23 January 1973 upon dissolution of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center and is currently operating from Utapao Royal Thai Air Force Base in Thailand. JCRC is the U.S. military organization given the mission of assisting in resolving the status of U.S. Missing in Action (MIA) and Bodies Not Recovered (BNR) personnel, by conducting operations to locate and investigate crash sites and grave sites and to recover remains throughout Southeast Asia. In June 1975, following the fall of Saigon, the JCRC assumed the responsibilities of the U.S. Delegation to the Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT). The FPJMT had been established in April 1973 in accordance with Article 10 (A) of the Protocol on Captured Persons to insure joint action by the parties in implementing Article 8 (B) of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam.

2. DIA, as the DOD authority on PW/MIA intelligence matters, provided the following support to JCRC:

All information concerning crash sites and grave sites as it became available.

A detailed analysis of intelligence reports on a continuing basis, and a monthly follow-up report.

As a follow-on to the extraction of casualty information from all PW/MIA reports (which was previously provided to the services), participation in an on-going effort to declassify all information in JCRC files, except sensitive information concerning sources and methods.

Coordination between the Services and JCRC on the resolution of conflicting evidence regarding PW/MIA and BNR personnel.

Intelligence necessary to facilitate any official contact with the Communists governments of Indochina.

Other assistance as requested.

In summary, DIA made every effort to assist JCRC in the successful execution of its mission.

3. All reports relating to PW/MIA's obtained by any element of the intelligence community were automatically forwarded to the JCRC on a high priority basis to support its mission. There was an excellent working relationship between all elements of the intelligence community and the JCRC.

C. PRINCIPAL RUMORS/REPORTS

1. Cambodia

(*a*) Approximately 30 reports of U.S. PWs alive in Cambodia were received from 1973 through April 1975. Several reports were also received indicating that some U.S. personnel who were captured had been killed by their captors or died as a result of wounds sustained prior to or during capture. Since several U.S. personnel, who were known to have been captured in Cambodia, were never accounted for, these reports caused exceptional concern. Each of these reports was analyzed in detail, and, whenever possible, the sources were recontacted to clarify the information they had provided. Most of these reports were (1) related to known U.S. deserters and defectors; (2) refuted as fabricated or embellished accounts based on the former presence of U.S. PWs in Cambodia, PWs who had been released during Operation Homecoming; or (3) of limited value because they could not be correlated to any known Americans. When re-questioned, most sources changed their stories. As a result, the original sighting information became less credible.

(*b*) An example of a known deserter or defector is the case of PFC McKinley Nolan, USA. PFC Nolan had been associated with Communist forces since his desertion from the U.S. Army in South Vietnam in November 1967. After years of being associated with the Vietnamese Communists, Nolan and his "family" left them about October 1973. After his reported break with the Vietnamese Communists, he was observed with the Cambodian Khmer Rouge. According to U.S. returnees released during Homecoming, Nolan was located with his Vietnamese wife and family near the returnees' last PW camp in northern Kratie Province. The latest information, dated May 1974, indicated that PFC Nolan and his family were still located in Cambodia. Apparently, Nolan was not allowed free movement by the Khmer Communists.

2. Laos

(*a*) Between 1973 and April 1975, 13 reports from Laos mentioned U.S. PWs being held in Khammouane Province during 1973 and 1974, and 25 reports mentioned sightings of Mr. Charles Dean, U.S. civilian, and his companion, Mr. Neil Sharman, Australian civilian. These two men were seen or known to be in Laos together in September 1974, but then "disappeared."[1]

(*b*) Polygraph examination of sources of reports on U.S. PWs in Khammouane Province determined that the majority of these reports were fabricated, but that some were reliable. According to the apparently reliable information, Dean and Sharman were last seen alive at Ban Phontan, Khammouane Province, on 23 February 1975.

(*c*) The Pathet Lao have continually denied any knowledge of the two individuals. All diplomatic efforts to obtain information have been in vain. The Pathet Lao have consistently refused to provide information on any of the Americans not accounted for in Laos.

(*d*) Thai and Lao nationals released by the Pathet Lao in the prisoner exchange of September through November 1974 provided several reports of American PWs sighted earlier in Laos, and fragmentary information on crash sites. All of the sighting reports except one could be related to U.S. personnel captured in Laos, moved to North Vietnam, and released during Operation Homecoming. The one American who was released in the prisoner exchange, Mr. Emmet Kay, a civilian, had no information on U.S. PW/MIAs.

3. *North Vietnam.*—From 1973 until the fall of Saigon in April 1975, reporting on U.S. personnel missing, captured, or killed in North Vietnam continued. Ralliers, released South Vietnamese, and captured North Vietnamese were debriefed, and the information (similar in nature to that received prior to 1973) was analyzed in great detail.

Sources were reinterrogated, when required, to clarify specific locations, dates and sequences of events. During this time frame, no substantive reports were received to indicate that any U.S. PWs were still being held in North Vietnam. Of the approximately 20 reports per month received, most related to returned U.S. PWs or contained information that the U.S. personnel to whom the reports could be correlated did not survive their shootdown incident or were killed. The remaining reports could not be correlated to any American.

4. *South Vietnam.*—The volume of intelligence reporting after Operation Homecoming remained at approximately pre-Homecoming levels until the 1975 communist spring offensive in South Vietnam. The number of PW reports regarding Americans in South Vietnam received from the field during this time period averaged 15 to 20 reports per month. The majority of these reports referred to Americans who allegedly were sighted prior to 1973. No significant change in the reliability of the reporting was noted during this period.

[1] Detailed information on Charles Dean and Neil Sharman appears on pp. 282–286.

The validity of the reporting during the period between Homecoming and April 1975 was evaluated as follows: About 40 percent of the reports received were determined to be true based upon correlation with the data base or confirmation from other sources. About 40 percent of the reporting could not be evaluated for various reasons, such as: (1) insufficient casualty information in the report, or (2) the report contained information in partial conflict with the data base. About 20 percent of the reports were evaluated as doubtful or false. Although there were several reports alleging Americans were being held in captivity after Operations Homecoming, none could be equated to Americans who had not been accounted for. There is, however, one exception. An American was captured in Quang Nam Province, South Vietnam in 1965, but later "crossed over" to the enemy and possibly is still alive in South Vietnam. According to U.S. returnees who had contact with this individual, he was a legitimate prisoner from 1965 to 1967, before joining the ranks of the enemy. As collaborator with the enemy, this individual performed escort and guard duties and other camp chores associated with the confinement of the U.S. PWs. As both a PW and later a collaborator/deserter, he had contact with U.S. PWs until 1969. Intelligence reports confirm the activities of this individual as reported by the U.S. returnees. The last intelligence possibly correlating to this American indicated that he might have been operating with enemy troops in Quang Ngai Province, South Vietnam in August 1973, but the validity of the report could not be established.

III. PW/MIA Intelligence Efforts April 1975 to Present

A. CHANGE IN CAPABILITIES AND PRIORITIES

1. Impact of DRV takeover of SVN

(*a*) The Intelligence Community still gives high priority to the Indochina PW/MIA problem, and any new leads or allegations are aggressively pursued. DIA continues to carry out the function of centralized processing, analysis, and dissemination of new information. Because the volume of traffic on PW/MIA intelligence has dropped to a low level, CIA and DIA conduct their liaison on a regular basis through traditional channels. There is no longer a day to day exchange through a functioning interagency committee.

(*b*) Collection capability thoughout Indochina dropped radically after the fall of Saigon. Closing down of interrogation centers in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia dried up the most productive mechanism of collection. A small DAO mission remains in Laos, with greatly reduced collection capability. The U.S. mission in Thailand has a bilateral agreement with the Thai military for exchange of information.

(*c*) During the resettlement of a large number of refugees from South Vietnam after the fall of Saigon, DIA directed a screening and debriefing program for information on PW/MIA. Information on this subject which was surfaced was minimal and not useful for purposes of casualty resolution.

2. General comments on current capabilities

It is conceivable that as the DRV consolidates control in both the political and military fields, the U.S. Government will have increased contact with policy makers in Hanoi who know or can get the facts about MIA or BNR personnel.

B. RUMORS AND REPORTS ON LIVE AMERICANS

1. Sources, frequency of reporting, validity

Information received since April 1975 about captive Americans still alive in Indochina, may be summarized as follows:

(*a*) Cambodia: After the evacuation from Phnom Penh in April 1975, two U.S. civilians were unaccounted for. One unconfirmed report indicated that one of these individuals was seen being led away at gunpoint by Communist forces and that the other was executed.

(*b*) Laos: After April 1975, there were very few reports on Dean and Sharman, missing since September 1974. The last reliable report concerning them stated that they were being held alive in the Ban Phontan Area as of late February 1975. The Communist Pathet Lao assumed control of the government

on 23 August 1975; the Communist government of Laos has not furnished any additional information regarding U.S. personnel not accounted for.

(c) North Vietnam: Since the fall of Saigon in April 1975, no substantive reports have been received concerning U.S. personnel unaccounted for in North Vietnam.

(d) South Vietnam: Since April 1975 there have been many firsthand and hearsay reports of Americans still in South Vietnam. Analysis indicates that most of these reports refer to the American civilians who were not evacuated from South Vietnam in April 1975. The validity of the small number of fragmentary reports about Americans other than those known to have missed evacuation has been impossible to determine. The capability for follow-up on such reports is limited to re-questioning of sources who have departed South Vietnam, and questioning of any future escapees or persons allowed to leave South Vietnam.

2. Types of efforts to confirm or deny allegations

(a) DIA has thoroughly analyzed each report received, comparing it with information on known losses and with previous reporting. The results are indicated above.

(b) CIA has continued reporting whatever bits of information it received.

(c) State and military representatives have debriefed persons coming out of South Vietnam and sought information through diplomatic and military liaison channels.

(d) Where possible, allegations have been traced to a source and the source re-questioned and evaluated for reliability.

3. Summary

Since April 1975 there has been no hard evidence that American PWs captured before the fall of Saigon are still being held in PW camps or elsewhere in South Vietnam. There has been no new substantive information from North Vietnam. Reports from Cambodia and Laos have been few and not very informative. There remains the possibility that one American civilian is alive in Laos and one American deserter in Cambodia.

4. Any data on PWs being held in China or elsewhere outside Indochina?

(a) On September 17, 1975, Ambassador George Bush, then Chief of U.S. Liaison Office to the People's Republic of China, stated to the Select Committee that the Department of State was satisfied that no Americans were being held as prisoners of war in China. Ambassador Bush said that reports that American prisoners of war had been moved from North Vietnam to China were, in his view, false and that no such movement was possible without the Chinese knowing of it. There has been no change in intelligence to warrant a change in these conclusions.

(b) Nor is there any information other than speculation and rumor to indicate that Americans captured in Indochina are being held outside Indochina in some other country.

C. RUMORS/REPORTS CONCERNING FATE OR PLACE OF BURIAL OF PERSONS STILL CARRIED AS MIA

1. This question overlaps with questions concerning PWs, including paragraph D below, concerning information believed to be held by the DRV and other Communist governments of Indochina.

2. Reports indicated that Vietnamese Communist policy was to bury PWs who died in prisons at a site in or near the prison. Americans who were found dead or killed in action appear to have been buried at or near where they were found.

3. There were no reports indicating a common burial ground for unidentified American casualties. The release of 23 remains in one group indicates there may have been some consolidation of identified remains.

D. TOP-LEVEL ACTIVITIES, POLICIES, ETC., OF INDOCHINESE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNING PW/MIAS

1. Indications of probable actions.

(a) A State Department study of this problem in November 1975 concluded that "Vietnamese public statements have emphasized that U.S. aid is the

principal prerequisite to establishment of diplomatic relations, information on Americans missing in action, and the return of dead Americans."

(b) Our most current and clearest indication of the intent and probable action of the DRV as pertains to the issue of American MIA/KIA is the statement made by DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong to members of the delegation from the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia during their visit to Hanoi on 21 December 1975 to receive the remains of 3 persons who died in captivity. In this statement, Prime Minister Dong said that responsible DRV organs would continue searching for information on American personnel still missing, but he again called attention to Hanoi's long-standing demands for implementation of Article 21 of the Paris Agreement calling for U.S. aid in the postwar reconstruction of Vietnam.

(c) This same basic theme has been voiced publicly by DRV Ambassador to France Mr. Vo Van Sung and by DRV Foreign Minister Mr. Nguyen Duy Trinh. Foreign Minister Trinh, in a 21 January 1975 letter to Senator Edward Kennedy, stated that the DRV was taking positive action to find missing American and noted that there were specific DRV services responsible for such a task. Foreign Minister Trinh, in his 4 June 1975 statement to the DRV National Assembly, said that the DRV was ready to discuss all the sequels of war, such as the U.S. contribution to healing the wounds of war in both zones of Vietnam, and the search for Americans missing in action, as well as the exhumation and repatriation of remains of Americans killed in the war.

(d) In March 1974, a full year after the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement, the DRV returned the remains of 23 U.S. servicemen it had acknowledged as having died in captivity.

(e) The following year, in April 1975, the DRV provided Senator Edward Kennedy with the names of three Americans who allegedly died in North Vietnam as a result of their shootdowns. Two of these individuals had already been declared dead by their parent Service; the third was listed as MIA.

(f) Just prior to the August 1975 vote in the United Nations Security Council vote on admission of the two Vietnams, the DRV indicated willingness to hand over remains of the three Americans. After the U.S. veto, North Vietnam reversed its position, stating that the unfriendly policy of the United States toward the Vietnamese people prevented greater progress on the casualty resolution question. In December 1975 the DRV reverted to its earlier position agreeing to release the remains through the Select Committee.

2. Assessment of the amount and accuracy of information held by Indochinese Governments on PW/MIAs

(a) Government of Democratic Cambodia. The Communists in Cambodia have repeatedly claimed that they have no knowledge of any U.S. PWs held in Cambodia. As recently as December 1975, a senior Cambodian representative of the new Communist government told a U.S. official that his government held no American prisoners. There is no substantive information on which a rebuttal of the Cambodians' denials can be made. Although it is known that some U.S. unaccounted-for personnel (primarily journalists), were captured in Cambodia, there is no information that would indicate that their capture was reported above the level of the local unit commanders.

(b) Government of People's Democratic Republic of Laos.

(1) Following the last phase of the prisoner exchange in November 1974, there was hope that the Pathet Lao would provide information about U.S. personnel not accounted for. They failed to do so. Although it is reasonable to assume that the Pathet Lao have information relative to the fate of at least a small number of U.S. personnel who were known to have been captured in Laos, and not released during Operation Homecoming, the extent of their knowledge is open to speculation. On 26 September 1973, a U.S. Embassy official met with a high ranking Pathet Lao official. During this meeting, the U.S. official re-emphasized the importance that the U.S. Government placed upon the early clarification of the Americans unaccounted-for in Laos, and he asked the Pathet Lao official to convey this message to the Pathet Lao Central Committee in Sam Neua. The Pathet Lao official commented that the Pathet Lao Central Committee had been gathering information on U.S. missing-in-action personnel. He went on to warn that the Pathet Lao would probably only be able to provide information on a "feeble percentage" of the approximately 300 U.S. missing-in-action personnel.

(2) Information provided by a former Pathet Lao political cadre tends to confirm previously-held suspicions regarding Pathet Lao efforts to maintain

records on the fate and disposition of U.S. personnel unaccounted-for in Laos. This former Pathet Lao, who rallied to Royal Lao forces, was the political officer of an infantry battalion subordinate to Pathet Lao Saravane Province Headquarters. On the evening of 21 December 1972, he heard an aircraft explode, watched its descent, and observed the impact. This crash observed by the source correlates to a known U.S. aircraft downing. The source dispatched a group of men to check the crashsite for possible survivors. He directed an investigation of the crashsite and supervised the burial of the remains in the area. No survivors were found. Although this Pathet Lao political official prepared and sent two different reports to the Saravane Province commander concerning the crash incident, he received no comments or further queries from the province headquarters.

(3) The information provided by this political cadre is significant. Considering the position this source held within his battalion, he should have been well informed about Pathet Lao policy toward U.S. PWs and on the disposition of the remains of dead American personnel. He investigated the crashsite and buried the crew remains found in the area on his own initiative. He reported the aircraft downing to his province headquarters because it was an incident that occurred in his area of responsibility. In his reports, no specific burial details were included. He stated that he had no reporting requirements to keep track of grave site locations. Furthermore, he was not aware of any Pathet Lao intentions to engage in gravesite recovery operations. Although he submitted two reports concerning the crash, he received no queries about either report from his province headquarters. His information indicates that the Pathet Lao did not have an organized system or a requirement to account for enemy crashsites and gravesites.

(4) This former Pathet Lao's information is considered highly reliable in as much as the crash he described positively equates to the downing of a USAF AC–130 in the area on 21 December 1972. The report has been very valuable for casualty resolution pertaining to this incident. The reports were also extremely valuable in estimating the extent of Pathet Lao records on U.S. unaccounted-for personnel.

(c). Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

(1) There is no question that the North Vietnamese have knowledge concerning the fate of some unaccounted-for U.S. personnel lost over North Vietnam. A wealth of information on specific aircraft downings was published in the North Vietnamese press throughout the Vietnam war. At times, only the fact that the aircraft was downed in a specific province or district was broadcast; at other times, the fate of the pilot was mentioned. A locality or unit was oftentimes commended for capturing a U.S. pilot or downing a U.S. aircraft.

(2) A Communist source interrogated during the Vietnam war stated that the DRV intelligence and security services maintained central listings of all U.S. PWs detained in the DRV. This source also reported that in the DRV all data pertaining to the death and/or burial of an American prisoner, whether in the DRV or the South, was to be forwarded to Hanoi as quickly as possible, together with sketches of the burial site. It was reported that the policy office of the DRV Ministry of Defense, Enemy Proselyting Department, was required to examine and store all PW personal effects, documents, military clothing, hand-carried equipment, and dog tags. When the body of an American was recovered, or when a PW died in captivity in the DRV, all personal effects were turned in to the policy office for storage and the office arranged for burial of the American. Based on this information, and the known Communist proclivity for detailed reporting, it is believed that the DRV/PRG holds significant amounts of accurate information on former and current American MIA/KIA in Southeast Asia.

(3) A Communist source said that the DRV/PRG did not want to be held accountable in advance for any given number of PWs, since some might die in captivity. By withholding until the last moment the names and number of Americans detained, the DRV/PRG believed they would gain the upper hand in negotiations with the United States about release of PWs or settlement of the war. One of the reasons why the DRV limited the writing of letters by American PWs was to avoid identifying the names of the PWs. Revelation of a PW name immediately compelled special treatment and protection of that American, since at some future date, the DRV/PRG would be held accountable for him.

(d) Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.

(1) The PRG, and possibly the DRV, should have information on Americans lost in the South prior to 1973, although the extent of this information is unknown. In early 1973, the PRG released some Americans and provided a list of those who died in captivity, claiming this was a total accounting for all the Americans captured by the PRG. On 11 April 1973, the U.S. Delegation to the Four Party Joint Military Team asked the PRG by letter to indicate the earliest data repatriation of the U.S. died-in-captivity remains could begin. On 19 April 1973, the PRG, in a letter, pledged its intention to correctly implement Article 8(b), which addresses repatriation of remains. The PRG had acknowledged on 27 January 1973 that 41 Americans had died after capture by their forces. One of these, however, was actually an Australian and incorrectly included on the list. There is conclusive evidence that more Americans than the 40 reported by the PRG actually died while in the hands of communist captors in South Vietnam.

(2) Recently, the PRG handed over the remains of two Marines who had been killed during the April 1975 evacuation from Saigon. This is the only example of PRG cooperation concerning the casualty resolution matter since early 1973.

(3) It is apparent that the enemy in South Vietnam kept records on American battle casualties, U.S. PWs, and Americans who died after capture. Captured enemy documents include directives to local units for the collection of identification papers from the bodies of dead Americans.

(4) All the information available shows that in South Vietnam the enemy buried or left the bodies of U.S. KIA's where they were killed. U.S. PWs who died in PW camps or on the trail were buried near the camps or where death occurred.

(5) Regarding enemy records of Americans who died in captivity, some enemy authorities in charge of groups of U.S. PWs held in South Vietnam made attempts to record death certificates and have surviving PWs sign as witnesses.

(6) Although these are examples of enemy attempts to maintain records on deceased Americans, the enemy may not have promulgated directives on this subject to all levels and units, or may have been lax in efforts to maintain such records.

(7) In summary, one should not be overly optimistic with respect to enemy records on deceased Americans in South Vietnam.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERNEST CARY BRACE

Capture; May 21, 1965, Boum Lao, Laos, LS–174, 75 miles northwest of Luang Prabang

I departed Chieng Mai, Thailand with supplies for Border Patrol Police on Laos-Thai Border Posts at 0700. After the last stop on the Thai side of the border I crossed into Laos to pick up supplies at Xieng Lom for delivery to a Special Operations Group at Boum Lao. I departed Xieng Lom at 0830 with a Thai Special Forces radioman, Sgt. Chi Charn Harnavee, 2 Laos soldiers and the wife and child of one of the soldiers. Our cargo was rice, salt, and kerosene.

We passed over Boum Lao at 0900; observed signal, white "L" on the ground, and made normal approach and landing. We were hit by small arms fire and grenades upon landing. I attempted to turn around and take off, but A/C was damaged extensively and one Laos soldier had thrown open the door locking it against the wing strut making flight impossible. The soldier that jumped out was shot down about 25 feet from the wing tip. His wife was hit in the hip. The Thai, one Laos soldier, and I surrended under the wing of the A/C at about 0905 without resistance. We were unarmed, except for the Laos soldier that had been killed.

Troops in uniform took the three of us to a clearing about 500 yards from the airstrip. There were many dead in the vicinity of the airstrip. Most were in their underclothes which would indicate they had been surprised and overrun rapidly. The troops were well disciplined, armed with AK–47 rifles, and a new type automatic rifle that I had not seen before. Later we were able to ascertain that these troops were North Vietnamese regular forces. This was indicated by: (1) The uniforms, right down to their jungle boots. (2) Their collar and cap insigna which they put on after crossing into North Vietnam. (3) Their weapons. (4) Their discipline and organization, and (5) by their own admission, which included

showing Harnavee and myself a form of identification card which they kept in plastic.

In the clearing was a young Laos boy of about 15 being held prisoner. I had last seen him working for the team building the base at Boum Lao. After chopping off his little finger with a machete they released him to return to his village.

Transportation; May 24, 1965

We walked north to Moung Hoc; 3 prisoners and squad of 18 NVN troops.

May 25 and 26, 1965

We walked north to Moung Sai. I observed many other NVN troops at the place we stayed for the night. I had not seen any other prisoners.

May 27, 28, and 29, 1965

I was interrogated by NEO LAO HAK SET officer (Pathet Lao) at Moung Sai. A Buddhist Monk translated. There were NVN troops in the area but felt we had been handed over to Pathet Lao. The Buddhist spoke English with a British accent. He said he had visited the U.S.A. I asked him what happened to the other men at Boum Lao. He would not answer. I refused to sign a spy confession.

May 30, 1965

I was turned back over to NVN troops and we started walking northeast. The Laos soldier was left behind and Harnavee and I are the only prisoners being transported.

June 7, 1965

We spent the nights in villages heading northeast. I was able to talk with some villagers through Harnavee. We are the first prisoners they have seen since the French left. I attempted a run away type escape at about 0400 from an unknown village and was recaptured at about 1000. I was severely beaten. My nose broken and permanent bridge work knocked loose. Later I lost one tooth.

June 11, 1965

We crossed into NVN. I observed a road marker. After dark we were placed on a truck and driven east until almost dawn then turned over to a new unit.

First camp; June 12 to April 1966

I was placed in a bamboo cage 7 feet long, 5 feet high at front, 2 feet high at rear, and about 40 inches wide. I thought it was a temporary stop but was to remain there almost one year. Thai was placed in a similar cage at about 100 yards distance. The area had once been a stone quarry. Graded and sorted stones in piles were overgrown with elephant grass and bamboo. Our daily routine was: out of the cage early morning and late afternoon to use a hole in the ground. We always had a rope around our neck. Our two meals per day consisted on rice and boiled weeds or gourds. Rarely any meat. We slept on the ground, our feet tied to a post at the foot of the cage, our hands tied and rope stretched and tied at the foot of the cage. The neck rope tied to a post outside the head of the cage. The guard sat in a lean-to about 15 feet from the head of the cage. We were not allowed to exercise or stand in the cage during the day. The guards were of all types, indifferent, kind, arrogant, and offensive. The only time I could see any of the rest of the camp was when I went to the stream to bath, about every six weeks. I am certain that the Thai and I were the only prisoners being held in this camp. The guard relief signals, banging on bamboo gong, and other signals in camp substantiated this. The guard units changed about every 8 weeks. The new guards seem to have just come from the field. All indications are that this is a rest camp for NVN troops coming out of Laos.

Escape; April 17, 1966

I had aborted many escape attempts since arriving at Camp #1. On the night of 4/17/65, I finally forced myself to go. It was a rainy windy night and the guard had placed a section of thatch in front of the cage to keep the rain off of me. After getting untied I forced a bar up at the rear of the cage and taking my ropes, except for my neck rope, which I tied to a cage bar, my blanket, bamboo canteen and my cut off sneakers I slipped out and down the side of a small hill into the ravine. I crawled through underbrush most of the night. Near dawn I almost stumbled into another camp south of the one I had escaped from. *In the camp I observed a cage similar to mine with a lantern hanging on the front.*

I skirted the camp through a small stream bed. I spent the first day out sleeping and resting in a large weed and brush clump that I burrowed into. I could hear a lot of activity in the area. That night I crawled until coming upon a path I then walked southward through the hills until almost dawn. At first light I left the main trail on what appeared to be a small sub-path heading up into the elephant grass. I found some pomelo (wild grapefruit) and some small tomatoes. I filled my bamboo tube in streams. Continuing up the unused path I came to the top of a ridge line. I could see several villages off to the south. In an attempt to signal aircraft, which had been active in the area, I stayed on the hill for two days after stamping out a large block in the elephant grass. I ran out of water, my tongue and lips were swollen to the point I couldn't eat any more pomelo and I made the decision to strike out to the south and try to find more food and water. I was recaptured near a village that night while attempting to steal some food.

I was taken to another camp, where I saw no other prisoners. They held me until the unit I had escaped from came to claim me near morning. A severe beating followed my return. Stocks were placed at the foot of my new bed board and an iron hoop was fitted around my neck, which could be pinned to the bed board. Food was reduced to minimal and I was kept in the pinned down position about two weeks. When I did urinate there was globules of fat and blood in my urine. I could not walk when a new officer came to interrogate me about my escape.

Move to camp No. 2; May 1965

The officer that came to question my escape attempt arrived in a truck early one evening. After getting all the deails he had the soldiers carry me and my new possessions down to the waiting truck. I saw Harnavee for the first time in almost a year. He said that he too was now in stocks because of my escape. After driving about 4 hours we pulled off into a deep ravine. The soldiers wrapped me in a blanket, tied me to a bamboo pole and carried me about a mile up a small stream bed. There I was placed in a new cage, somewhat larger than my old cage, with a larger pair of leg stocks at the foot of a bamboo slat bed.

The new unit that I had been turned over to allowed some exercise during the day and the food went back to normal. At night I was placed in the stocks and my neck rope (I had managed to "lose" the iron hoop during the transportation) was tied to the head of the cage. Hands tied as they had always been at night.

Third escape attempt; August 17, 1966

I attempted to escape from the stocks on a windy night. Although I got out of the stocks and out of the cage I was recaptured before I could get clear of the camp. Punishment was seven days in a hole, buried up to my neck in dirt. I went out of my mind for about three weeks after being taken out of the hole. From this day on I spent 24 hours a day in stocks with my neck tied to a post in a sitting position by day, and tied down to the bed by night.

In September 1967, I was caught at night with my ropes loose. I wasn't trying to escape, my feet were still in the stocks. I was beaten, taking a severe kick in the head. A week later I developed a semiparalysis which gradually crept through all my extremities. I then lost bowel control. Since I could not walk and I smelled so bad they would not take me down to the stream for a bath. I went from September 1967 to March 1968 without a bath or haircut. In March 1968 a new unit cleaned me up, gave me some new (used) clothes and cleaned out my cage. I gradually developed my motor coordination back that spring. Even during my period of paralysis they kept me in the stocks and tied to the bed.

Hanoi; October 1968

An officer that spoke English came to the camp and told me he was taking me and the Thai pilot to Hanoi. I told him that the Thai was not a pilot. He would not believe me. We departed the next morning in a new Russian type jeep. I observed a road sign that read Moung Pon (a village at the south end of the Dien Bien Phu valley). I saw the Thai again during the ride to Hanoi. We were allowed to talk somewhat. He had been in stocks the entire time I had because of my escape attempts. At Hanoi's Hoa Lo Penitentiary they split the Thai and me up. He was to remain in Hoa Lo, while I was taken to the Plantation. Comdr. John S. McCain III made contact with me the first week in Hanoi. He brought me up to date on the war. He was in solitary as I was and was to remain for another year.

August 1968 to December 1969; Camp Plantation

Solitary confinement.

December 1969 to December 1970; Camp Vegas

My first roommate was Lt. Jim Bedinger USN, captured in Laos, joined by Maj. Walt Stischer USAF, and Lt. Steve Long USAF, captured in Laos.

December 1970 to February 1971; Camp Unity

Four man group captured in Laos same as above. Sgt. Harnavee is in the same cell block and living with other Thais captured in NVN.

February 1971 to July 1971; AP–LO (Briar Patch, Lulus Hideaway)

The four of us joined by Maj. Norm Gotner USAF, captured in Laos February 1971.

July 1971 to December 1972; Camp Plantation

Five of us joined by Lt. Jack Butcher and Capt. Ed Leonard both USAF, captured in Laos. Camp Planatation is now mostly enlisted men and W.O.'s, captured in SVN. The Laos group is kept isolated.

December 1972 to March 28, 1973; Camp Vegas

We were joined by Capt. C. Reiss USAF, and civilian missionaries Sam Mattix and Lloyd Oppel, all captured in Laos. Still isolated but in communication with other prisoners.

March 28, 1973; Released

Saw Sgt. Harnavee and his new roommate Napadom Wang Chom on day of release. We are last U.S. prisoners out of Hoa Lo Penitentiary as far as we can ascertain. Harnavee and Napadom were released in September 1974.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD DUDMAN, CHIEF WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: Your staff has asked me to appear today with the thought that my personal experience in Southeast Asia could be of interest to your committee.

I was captured in Cambodia in 1970 by Communist guerrillas, together with two other American reporters, while on assignment for my newspaper, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. We were held 40 days before being released. The experience provides a special basis for judgment as to how other missing civilians may have been treated, what were their chances of survival, and what possibilities there may be of learning what has happened to them.

We were captured on May 7, 1970, six days after the start of President Nixon's two-month invasion of Cambodia. I understood that the highway from Saigon to Phnom Penh was open and set out to drive there with Elizabeth Pond of the Christian Science Monitor and Michael Morrow of a small news agency called Dispach News Service International. We thought we were following a column of South Vietnamese troops. We evidently somehow got ahead of them and found ourselves in a no-man's land just beyond the town of Svey Rieng, in the Parrot's Beak. We were stopped by a young man who stepped out from behind a tree and pointed an AK–47 rifle at us. Villagers and guerrilla irregulars held us and questioned us most of the first day, but that evening regular soldiers took charge, commanded by what we understood to be a rather high-ranking North Vietnamese officer.

The villagers threatened us the first day, forced Mike and me to run blindfolded for a half mile while tied behind a motorbike, and clubbed us on the head. That sort of thing ended when the regulars took over. From then on, we were treated as well as seemed possible. Five soldiers assigned to guard us gave us the same food they had—mostly rice with bits of fish, meat and vegetable—and expressed concern about our health. Counter-intelligence officers questioned us sharply for several long sessions, asking repeatedly whether we were agents for the CIA. Finally they said they had decided we were legitimate news reporters and released us. We learned afterward that many prominent persons in this and other countries cabled and telephoned Hanoi to vouch for us and urge our release.

Health was one hazard. I had several bouts of dysentery, as did the guerrillas sometimes. Mike and I had boils on our legs; mine were diagnosed after my release as symptoms of an Asian disease called melioidosis, a bloodstream disease with a mortality rate up to 50 percent. The food was not really adequate, considering the limited amount of rice we could force down, to maintain the weight of a good-sized Westerner. We were held mostly in grass-covered shacks by day and traveled every few nights, by truck or bicycle or on foot, through areas that were under frequent attack by U.S. and South Vietnamese tanks and planes. Several times we heard and felt the deep pounding of B–52 raids in the distance. Our captors said they had survived several B–52 attacks, escaping direct hit.

Communications and record-keeping appeared to be very primitive. We sometimes saw our captors writing tiny messages to be carried away in the night by a courier on a bicycle or motorbike. At one house where we stayed, we saw one of the guerrillas reach into a hole in a palm-leaf wall and take out a tiny handwritten note, apparently left there by another group of guerrillas. It occurred to me several times that I could have died of illness or injury in a way that no one would ever find my body or a record of my death.

Basis for hope that any individual missing person has survived is bound to fade with the passage of time. But some Americans have survived for years under far worse conditions than we experienced. No one can be certain without a precise accounting, and in some cases that accounting may never be possible.

SUMMARY OF SIX REPORTS SUBMITTED BY CIA

Part I.—Attached is a summary of six reports of Pathet Lao representatives making statements about American PWs.

Part II.—Attached is a summary of reporting on a statement made on 11 November 1969 by Soth Petrasy to the Pathet Lao, to the effect that "the Pathet Lao actually had a number of prisoners in addition to the 158 given"—that is, shown on a list furnished by the U.S. Government to the International Red Cross and by the IRC to Soth Petrasy. The news reports to Soth Petrasy's statements misconstrued his words to mean that the Pathet Lao was holding more than 158 US PWs.

Part III.—Attached are files on five incidents between February 1966 and January 1970, involving nine men who went down in the vicinity of the Ho Chi Minh trail in Southern and Central Laos. In each case there is reason to believe that the indigenous forces on the ground, either Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese, were aware of the crash and could easily have identified the individuals concerned. A map showing the location of the crash sites is also provided.

Part IV.—Attached is a summary of relatively recent information on Americans known to have been in captivity in Laos. This information was included in material presented to the Select Committee on 17 March 1976.

Part I.—*Summary of six reports of Pathet Lao representatives making statements about American PWs.*

(*a*) In September 1968, Soth Petrasy told a U.S. official that "pilots are generally kept near the area in which their plane is downed and therefore may be found throughout Laos from the south to the north."

(*b*) During an April 1971 interview with a Swedish correspondent, Prince Souphanouvong, Chairman of the Lao Patriotic Front Central Committee, was asked to comment on the Pathet Lao policy toward captured enemy soldiers and American pilots. In response, Prince Souphanouvong made the following statement:

"The LPF (Lao Patriotic Front) has made public a concrete policy toward enemy soldiers or agents captured or giving themselves up, including GIs. All the American pilots engaged in bombings or toxic chemical sprays on Lao territory are considered criminals and enemies of the Lao people. But once captured, they have been treated in accordance with the humane policy of the LPF. The question of enemy captives, including U.S. pilots, will be settled immediately after the U.S. stops its intervention and aggression in Laos first, and foremost, ends the bombing of Laos territory."

(*c*) In a conversation with U.S. personnel on 1 May 1971, Soth Petrasy was asked why the Pathet Lao had not released a list of prisoners as North Vietnam had. He replied that the situation in Laos was different from that in North

Vietnam, because bombing of North Vietnam had ceased. In Laos, even under normal conditions, there was no means of communication between most villages. Because of U.S. air activity it was often not possible to reach the site of downed planes to ascertain the fate of the pilot and crew. For these reasons it was impossible for the Pathet Lao to compile a complete list. Soth Petrasy further stated that prisoners were being held in various regions in Laos, and were being well treated.

(*d*) In the course of a February 1972 interview, Soth Petrasy made a statement to the effect "that some tens of prisoners are presently being held" by Pathet Lao.

(*e*) On 21 April 1972, Soth Petrasy reportedly stated that "there are many American PWs held in liberated areas of Laos," but he would not provide specific figures. (Photocopy of *New York Times* article, 23 April 72, attached).

(*f*) In an interview with an AP correspondent on 26 April 1973, Soth Petrasy stated that if Americans reached the ground alive, they could still die without even being found, but if they were captured, they were released.

Prince Souphanouvong's statement, together with statements made by Soth Petrasy, indicates that the Pathet Lao were holding American prisoners. The ten "Laos returnees" during Operation Homecoming were captured and held by the North Vietnamese, not the Pathet Lao, and were moved expeditiously out of Laos to North Vietnam. Their experiences do not conform to the statements mentioned above. Therefore, if true, the Pathet Lao statements cited above refer to PWs other than the ten released during Operation Homecoming.

[From the New York Times, April 23, 1972]

P.O.W. Issue in Laos Linked to Bombing

Vientiane, Laos, April 22 (UPI)—The Pathet Lao Communist representative here said today that discussions on the release of American prisoners of war held in Laos could begin as soon as the United States ordered a "total" halt in the bombing here.

Col. Soth Petrasy, the Laotian Communists' permanent spokesman in Vientiane, said "there were many" United States P.O.W.'s being held by the Pathet Lao, but he would not disclose the exact number or their whereabouts.

"We are willing to discuss the question of United States P.O.W. release if the American imperialists would order a total bombing halt and let alone the Laotians to solve their own internal problems," he said.

Colonel Petrasy said that the prisoners were detained in caves in northern Laos.

"Although we regard them as criminals and air pirates, they are being treated humanely," he added.

Colonel Petrasy last year threatened to have the American P.O.W.'s in Laos tried as war criminals.

Observers here believe that Colonel Petrasy has a limited knowledge of the number and whereabouts of United States P.O.W.'s in Laos.

Part II.—Summary of reporting on statement by Soth Petrasy, 11 November 1969, re US PWs.

On 11 November 1969, during an interview with newsmen, Soth Petrasy produced a list of 158 names of U.S. personnel missing in Laos. The list was one which the U.S. Government periodically updated, and passed to the International Red Cross for transmittal to Soth Petrasy. Soth Petrasy, according to a UPI report, made no comment on the names appearing on the list, but stated that "the Pathet Lao actually had a number of prisoners in addition to the 158 given".

Western news media, however, reported that the Pathet Lao representatives in Vientiane had stated that "more than 158 airmen were being held prisoner in Laos."

In response to a cable inquiry from State Department, American Embassy officials in Vientiane spoke with Soth Petrasy on 13 November about his statement. The Embassy concluded that his claim, that the list of 158 names was incomplete, was based upon the Pathet Lao propaganda claim that 1,183 planes had been shot down since 1964. U.S. Embassay officials believed Soth Petrasy had never claimed to possess a list other than the list provided to him by the International Red Cross.

Copy of UPI News Item, Laos, November 11, 1969

Vientiane, Laos (UPI)—A Communist Pathet Lao official said today more than 158 American airmen are held prisoner in Laos. He repeated a threat they will be tried as criminals.

Soth Petrasi, Head of the Pathet Lao Delegation in Vientiane, told newsmen a new list had been made available Nov. 5 adding 33 names to the number of U.S. pilots shot down on bombing missions over Communist controlled areas of Laos.

"The United States and Laos have never formally declared war and therefore there will be no prisoners," Soth said. "They will be tried by a Laotian Peoples Court as criminals."

The threat of trials has been made several times in the past by the Pathet Lao, but there has never been any information on whether such trials are actually carried out.

For the first time, Soth said he would make efforts to forward letters and telegrams sent him by the relatives of U.S. airmen believed shot down in Laos. In the past, he has always rejected such requests.

The list that Soth displayed was one which originates from American sources and is forwarded to him periodically by the International Red Cross.

As in the past, Soth made no comment on the names appearing on the list but said the Pathet Lao actually had a number of prisoners in addition to the 158 given.

U.S. Officials have never admitted to any American air activity over Laos other than reconnaissance flights. But allied sources have disclosed that U.S. air strikes, including support missions for ground forces, involve as many as 500 planes a day over Laos.

Soth said that the list included 51 Americans shot down last year and 41 shot down over Laos between January and June of this year. The U.S. Command lists at least 400 pilots as prisoners in North Vietnam.

In addition, Soth said, the Pathet Lao was holding a large number of military personnel captured in Laos as well as about 30 South Vietnamese prisoners and some nationalist Chinese agents.

PART III.—LIST OF INCIDENTS

Date	Name		UTM coordinates	Geographical coordinants
Feb. 10, 1966	Hunter, R. P., Jr	Captain, USAF		XD 413458. 106-19, 16-42.
	Kiefel, E. P., Jr	do		
Feb. 15, 1968	Mauterer, O	Major, USAF		WE 761257. 105-43, 17-25.
May 20, 1968	Lane, G. O	SFC, USA		YD 258028. 107-07, 16-18.
	Owen, R. D	SSG, USA		
May 13, 1969	Scott, M. J	SFC, USA		YC 7803. 107-36, 15-23.
	Bessor, B. C	1st lieutenent, USA		
Jan. 2, 1970	Fryar, B. C	Lieutenant, USN		WE 689422. 105-38, 17-33.
	Brooks, N. G	do		

Part IV.—Summary of relatively recent information on Americans known to have been alive in captivity in Laos.

Charles Dean, U.S. civilian, and Neil Sharman,[1] Australian civilian, were last reported alive at Ban Phontan, Khammouane Province, 23 February 1975. The report was considered reliable. Either the Hanoi or Vientiane authorities must have information on the fate of these two men.

Debriefing of Thai and Lao nationals released by the Pathet Lao in the prisoner exchange of September through November 1974 produced one sighting report which could not be related to U.S. personnel captured in Laos and later released. Extracts from the report and the DIA evaluation are attached.

No information on missing persons has been received from the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Laos since it assumed power on 23 August 1975.

Part IV.—Attachment: Extracts from sighting report and from DIA evaluation.

[1] See pp. 282–286.

SIGHTING REPORT

Source was captured on 14 March 1972; in April 1972 he was held for three days at a Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese Army campsite at Phu Longmat (TG 8927, or 19-13/102-59E), near Ban Na (TG 8636, or 19-18N/102-57E). While at this campsite he observed a Caucasian PW on four separate occasions, twice daily for two days. All observations were under adverse lighting conditions and source was never close enough to obtain a detailed description. Source overheard the guards say they were going to send the "American" to Hanoi, Vietnam. Source presumed the PW was a flyer because he was wearing a gray flightsuit. Source did not see any patches or insignia on the flightsuit, and it did not appear to him that any had been torn off or removed. The caucasian PW was lying down during each observation, and he did not eat the Lao food given to him. Source assumed the PW was in poor health. The PW was described in approximate terms as: 140 pounds, 30 years of age, 70 inches tall, light brown hair—regular length, clean shaven, medium build, no glasses or visible jewelry, no distinguishing marks, scars or tatoos visible. After source's temporary stay at this campsite, he was taken to a permanent detention center at Phu Yen (WF 4884, or 18-50N/105-28E).

EVALUATION

It is not possible to identify the Caucasian seen by source, based on the limited descriptive information he was able to provide. The general descriptive data he gave fits several individuals who were lost within a time frame that could account for the PW being held at Phu Longmat.

It is certain, however, the Caucasian seen by source was not subsequently released. The U.S. PWs captured in South Vietnam and moved to North Vietnam for detention did not transit Laos as far north or west at Phu Longmat. Based on the month of the sighting (April 1972, which is believed correct since source was captured only in the preceding month), the sighting does not equate to any of the U.S. PWs captured in Laos and moved to North Vietnam, where they were subsequently released during Operation Homecoming. As of April 1972, all such U.S. PWs were already in North Vietnam, and the remaining months subsequent to April 1972 (Oppel/Mattix in October 1972 and Reiss in December 1972).

Part I.—Attached is a DIA summary of policy concerning protection of prison sites from bombing by U.S. forces.

Part II.—The Department of Defense is preparing a response based on computerized files of information on bombing in Indochina. The report will be ready by approximately 26 March 1976.

Part I.—Summary of policy concerning protection of prison sites from bombing.

During the war in Southeast Asia, all known detention sites holding prisoners of war were protected from any bombing action. When a detention facility was identified and confirmed as holding prisoners of war, all military commands were notified to insure that all safety measures would be accomplished and that no bombing of the facility would occur. In Laos, the one Pathet Lao detention site confirmed to have held American prisoners of war was located in the Sam Neua area. From time to time temporary bombing restrictions were imposed on other sites which current intelligence indicated might be detention sites for US PWs.

Part II.—Department of Defense information on bombing in Sam Neua area, and possible use of cave-seeking bombs and missiles.

The Historical Office of the U.S. Air Force indicated that Sam Neua was off-limits to U.S. air strikes from 1968.

The U.S. Navy initiated use of a guided weapons system in 1967. Research of considerable data available in DOD, however, uncovered no evidence that precision aerial weapons were used in the immediate area of Sam Neua, Laos. It is considered doubtful that any of these weapons was used in Laos. Computerized information for the period from 1970 through the end of hostilities, obtained from the Pacific Division J-3, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contained no indication of use of such weapons in Laos.

Part I.—Attached is a page-size reproduction of a map prepared by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center showing approximately 170 crash sites in Laos.[2]

Category One Sites (light blue dots) are positive locations. Category Two sites (dark blue dots) are probable locations. Category Three sites (red dots) are

[2] Map of crash sites in Laos appears on p. 349.

general locations whose accuracy is not known. There are approximately 84 Category One and Two sites, and 136 Category Three. (JCRC currently lists 235 crash sites.)

Joint Casualty Resolution Center has been asked to provide a printout of all crash sites in Laos, as carried in the JCRC computer files.

Part II.—Attached is a CIA map showing landing strips constructed in Laos up to October 1972, including those constructed by the French and taken over by American-supported forces.[1] Many of these strips passed back and forth between enemy and friendly hands with the ebb and flow of the war. The network of safe sites, or defended areas, was based on the landing sites in friendly hands. Some of the safe sites were remote from enemy forces, isolated by terrain and jungle. Some were hilltops surrounded by enemy forces, and safe only in the sense that they were well enough defended to permit landings by highly skilled air crews. Others were for some years the centers of relatively large defended areas and safe sites in the common sense of the term. It would not be possible to represent on one map the changing pattern of landing strips and safe sites except for a brief period of time, on the order of one week.

Safe sites maintained by CIA-controlled assets were made known to appropriate USAF officers at 7/13 AF Hqs in Udorn on a daily basis. In addition to safe sites, all locations of CIA-controlled intelligence teams were passed daily to appropriate USAF elements. These locations usually changed on short notice.

Any change in a safe site, such as one being overrun by enemy forces, or reoccupation of an enemy held area by friendly forces, was passed immediately via secure telephone to USAF elements. Changes were also included in the next daily briefing.

In addition to briefing USAF on current positions occupied by CIA-controlled assets, monthly briefings were also held on planned operations. This ensured that CIA-controlled assets did not intrude on areas where USAF was planning missions and vice versa.

In addition to routine daily updating of safe sites, when joint USAF/CIA missions were planned, such as infiltration/exfiltration of intelligence teams, USAF crews taking part in the operation were given detailed safe site locations in the planned operational area.

Part III.—Operational reports from CIA-controlled teams were assembled daily at the operations base, screened for reportable information, plotted for location of teams, and studied for immediate tactical planning. After important events had been extracted for monthly reports, the daily reports were destroyed. The abbreviated monthly reports would not permit detailed analysis of team activity. Detailed records can be recovered only in those relatively few instances where team activity was of sufficient importance to be reported immediately to Washington.

Part I.—DIA reviewed its files on MIA cases, and estimated they contained about 300 reports of sightings of American POWs alive in Laos.

The Central Reference Service of CIA produced a listing of intelligence reports which concerned PWs in Laos. From the titles it is estimated that approximately 150 out of the 250 listed reports mentioned sightings of American PWs in Laos. The same reports are probably included in the DIA collection of some 300 reports.

PART II.—RÉSUMÉ OF THE PROCESS OF EVALUATING AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND COLLATING IT TO PW, MIA AND KIA CASES

DIA holds approximately 300 reports of sightings of U.S. PWs alive in Laos; most of this information, however, cannot be correlated to unaccounted-for U.S. personnel.

In order to put these reports in the proper perspective, the following summarizes the process of evaluating an intelligence report and collating it to PW, MIA, and KIA cases.

The primary objective in analyzing an Intelligence Report (IR) containing possible casualty resolution information is to determine its validity and impact. Most simply stated, the analysis procedures utilized in evaluating an IR involve a comparison of the information in the IR against an appropriate data base. The analysis procedure may be something as fundamental as memory recall;

[1] Map showing landing strips constructed in Laos prior to October 1972, appear on p. 352.

however, it normally requires more complex methods, such as computer-assisted file searches.

On occasions, the analyst may require elaboration or clarification of information contained in an IR to best evaluate the report. When this is necessary, the analyst specifies his requirements to the collector, who then has the responsibility to initiate recontact with the source.

The end result of the analysis of an IR will fall into one of several categories: (1) The information may be evaluated as accurate and associated with a known individual. It is therefore necessary to file this report in each case file to which the information may relate, with hopes that subsequent reporting will resolve the true identity. (2) The veracity of the information may be impossible to evaluate due to the fact that the IR does not correlate to a known PW and a correlation cannot be made to an MIA or KIA. The report thus becomes an unidentified sighting or grave site. (3) The IR can be shown to be untrue. If there is litle doubt that the information has been fabricated or embellished, the report is not maintained in the DIA PW/MIA files.

After the analyst has completed his analysis of an IR, he records a summary of his evaluation for DIA's files and disseminates copies of the evaluation to the appropriate Military Service or to State Department for its use. JCRC receives copies of all DIA IR evaluations.

The ability of the analyst to sift through often vague, sketchy, or erroneous information is what the IR analysis and evaluation process is all about. Computer assitance has helped to make the analysis of an IR more efficient and accurate than it otherwise could be. However, the experienced analyst should never be underestimated. His accumulated knowledge and his "feel" for the subject matter are invaluable, since he evaluation process is not always void of subjective judgments.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEES TO FREE JOURNALISTS HELD IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,

Washington, D.C., April 30, 1973.

On the basis of Zalin Grant's April 11 report which I recently forwarded to you, I sent the following cable to Norodom Sihanouk:

"I have the honor to advise Your Highness that a representative of our International Committee to Free Journalists Held in Southeast Asia on April ninth interviewed a Cambodian rubber plantation supervisor who advised him that in June 1972 he had been held briefly in a regional headquarters camp of the National United Front of Kampuchea and that he saw there ten Caucasian detainees identified by camp guards as foreign journalists.

"This camp was four kilometers east of Kratie City in Kratie Province. We know of your continuing interest in the missing journalists and feel certain that you would like to pursue this latest information as to their possible whereabouts. Naturally we and the journalists' families will greaty appreciate anything you can do in this regard. Incidentally, Mrs. Lily Loomis asks especially that I convey to you her great respect."

Sincerely yours,

WALTER CRONKITE.

Early this week the following cable was received from Sihanuok:

"In reply to your cable 18 April inform you that at the time of my last visit to the liberation zone of Cambodia I personally interrogated the leaders of the internal resistance concerning the missing. These leaders assured me that our Funk and our Faplnk had not seen any of them. At the present time we do not have any prisoners here—American, European, or Japanese."

High Consideration,

NORODOM SIHANOUK,
Chief of State of Cambodia.

CBS Vice President Gordon Manning is now in China. He has the Grant reports and was advised before leaving Hong Kong of Sihanouk's answer. I asked him should he be able to see Sihanouk, to urge him to investigate the specifics of the Grant report. We await Manning's report.

Meanwhile, the Overseas Press Club has presented us with the President's Award (Jack Raymond) of $3,250 which is taking care of our indebtedness and

provides a small cushion for immediate needs. It is superfluous to say we are deeply grateful to the OPC.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER CRONKITE.

CBS NEWS,
New York, N.Y., February 1, 1974.

Mr. PIERRE DOUBLET,
President, Organisation Pour La Liberation Des Journalistes Detenus En Indochine, Paris, France

DEAR PIERRE: I have been most delinquent in keeping you advised of the activity of our American committee and for this I have a thousand apologies. I knew that Zalin Grant was in touch with you, but I should have maintained a closer liaison. I can only plead the usual lack of time.

Our committee has been quite active. You know about Zalin's interrogations of the returning Vietnamese and Cambodian prisoners and the information developed from them that gave us hope that as many as 10 Caucasian correspondents were held by the Khmer Rouge.

Last fall an American correspondent in Saigon received information from an official North Vietnamese contact which seemed to confirm that there were at least some correspondents held in Cambodia. What was then promised as an early return never materialized, however, but the correspondent is certain that the original information was accurate.

The release you say was based on this latest report, and it was made at this time after a determination by our committee that we should now embark on a more concerted publicity campaign to impress on the Khmer Rouge and their Hanoi and Peking sponsors that there is active interest in the return of these men.

Our determination to launch this campaign came after recent failures on the diplomatic front. Secretary of State Kissinger had taken to Peking on his most recent visit our presentation asserting our conviction that there were captive correspondents in Cambodia. He reported to us that he had brought up the matter with Chou En Lai and North Vietnamese and Cambodian (Sihanouk) representatives. The Chinese heard him out and received our presentation without comment, as did the North Vietnamese. The Cambodians gave the assurances that we have had before, from Sihanouk himself, that their investigations have indicated there are no correspondents being held.

We are still trying to get the United States government to make a stronger case for us, but so far have not received more than perfunctory aid.

Our new effort is taking the following form:

1. We expect to obtain, every month or so, the endorsement of a different international group decrying the continuing imprisonment of the correspondents.

In this regard we should coordinate our American efforts with yours, if you agree this is a valid approach.

Our first thought is a petition by an international committee of jurists. Former Chief Justice Earl Warren and former Justice Goldberg have expressed interest in signing for the American side: A suggested text and a list of some other possible signatories it attached. I'd like to have your opinion on both. (Not pursued—imminent end hostilities.)

2. We are suggesting to the Saigon bureau chiefs of the American news organizations that they might form their own committee there to pursue the matter and work with us. Perhaps this should be an international body and your people there would like to participate. If so, I suggest you advise them of our efforts.

3. We are studying the possibility of organizing an international committee of distinguished journalists to appeal to the Khmer Rouge for permission to enter their territory to meet with them and seek information and release of the journalists. Your name came up as perhaps the French representative, and I'd like your ideas on that and the value of the whole scheme.

I understand from Ernest Meyer that he is hoping to see the insurgent leadership under the banner of the IPI, and if that mission should come about it might obviate the necessity of our trying.

4. We have asked the bureau managers of our various organizations to establish liaison with the Japanese organizations whose correspondents are missing so that we can better coordinate action with them.

5. We are publishing a new brochure emphasizing the belief that there are correspondents alive and being held by the Cambodian insurgents. This pamphlet will summarize the stories of their capture and our evidence to date.

6. Recognizing the deteriorating situation for the Lon Nol government, we should be prepared to make high-level representations to any insurgent force that sets itself up as a new government of Cambodia. This may well require the dispatch of an international delegation of the caliber mentioned in (3) above, and we should have this stand-by group ready to go at a moment's notice.

As to finances, your offer is most generous. We have a like amount in our treasury, and I have little doubt that we can raise more if needed. I really think that this is the least of our problems.

I shall be looking forward to your thoughts on all of the foregoing, and let us hold the hope that the day is not far distant when Gilles and his compatriots in misfortune walk out of Cambodia as free men.

Sincerely your,

WALTER CRONKITE.

Enclosures.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEES TO FREE JOURNALISTS
HELD IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,
Washington, D.C., November 2, 1973.

Hon. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Our Committee's gratitude, and that of the families of the missing correspondents, goes out to you for your persistent pursuit of information regarding these men.

To aid you in presenting this case again on your forthcoming journey to China, and to provide information with which you might help us enlist other branches of government for a new concerted effort—dare we suggest a campaign—to obtain the release of the journalists, we have attached to this the following:

A. The Committee's original brochure with details regarding the seventeen journalists who disappeared in Cambodia in April and May, 1970.

B. A full list of the twenty journalists now on our list. This includes three men lost since the publication of the brochure.

C. A "mid-term" report compiled by our representative Mr. Zalin Grant, and Mrs. Dana Stone in July 1973, which reports some of the positive evidence we had compiled up to that date, and a graphic map of pertinent locations.

D. Supplementary information which has come from various sources and was compiled last spring by Arthur A. Lord, a NBC producer (P.O. Box 58568, Houston, Texas 77058).

E. What seems to be an important bit of intelligence from Gavin Scott, Time Magazine's Saigon bureau chief.

Additionally, on September 19, 1973, Mr. Grant met with six representatives from the Pentagon's Office of POW/MIA Affairs, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Public Information Office. (He had met earlier with officials from the Department of State.)

Mr. Grant summarized his findings:

A. No pertinent information concerning missing journalists was received during routine DIA interviews of returned American POW's, according to DIA officials assigned to the project.

B. The DIA has on file a report of foreign journalists being detained in eastern Cambodia possibly as late as May 1973. The intelligence reports is sketchy and of undetermined veracity. DIA analysts believe, however, all things considered, that the date of the reported sighting has been narrowed with reasonable accuracy to several months after repatriation of U.S. POW's under the 1973 cease-fire agreement.

C. The State Department has on file a separate reported sighting of "westerners and Japanese" held in eastern Cambodia, which was received from a VC POW in August 1973.

Additionally, Mr. Grant interviewed several of the U.S. POW's who had been held in Cambodia, including the ranking officer detained there, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond C. Schrump of Fayetteville, North Carolina.

Lt. Col. Schrump, who was captured in May 1968, believes that the chances of survival of the journalists was "extremely good" and, after reading the Committee's various reports, said: "I think they are alive. I really do."

As to their chances of surviving the B-52 strikes and other bombing, Lt. Col. Schrump said: "Based on my experiences, if they were in a camp with bunkers it would take a direct hit to kill them. We never had one casualty and we experienced strike after strike. I never saw one Vietnamese or American even wounded."

You see, Mr. Secretary, in contrast to the hopelessness and despondency which at one time I believe gripped us all regarding the fate of our colleagues, we now are convinced that the evidence is substantial that they survived their capture and were in comparatively recent days being held in a fairly well-defined area of Cambodia. With this knowledge, we are enlisting your good offices in an all out, unsparing attempt to achieve their freedom.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER CRONKITE.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 19, 1973.

Mr. WALTER CRONKITE,
International Committees to Free Journalists Held in Southeast Asia,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR WALTER: I want to let you know on a confidential basis that I have raised the matter of your missing colleagues in Cambodia with both Chou En-lai and Le Du Tho, as I promised in our conversation on November 2. I gave Chou En-lai all the materials which you provided, and I have sent a note to Le Du Tho asking him on a personal basis if there is any new information available to him. We have no way of knowing whether there will be a response one way or the other. Nevertheless I think it was worthwhile to raise it with them again now as a humanitarian matter, as we discussed.

Needless to say, I deeply share your hope that there will be good news.

Warm regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, December 4, 1973.

Mr. WALTER CRONKITE,
International Committees to Free Journalists Held in Southeast Asia,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CRONKITE: Dr. Kissinger has asked me to send you, for your own information, the request which we made of the DRV regarding U.S. journalists missing in Cambodia and their reply, which we received today. On November 17, we delivered the following message.

"A group of American journalists, representing many members of their profession from all political persuasions, have come to me to inquire if anything further could be done to determine the fate of some of their colleagues who have been missing in Cambodia. Investigations and searches that they have conducted independently have led them to believe that their colleagues might be alive. They asked me whether the DRV was in a position to assist in this matter. I told them that we had no basis for believing that these American journalists were alive, or that the DRV was in a position to assist. Nevertheless, I told them I would make one further inquiry.

"I do this, as I say, in a wholly unofficial capacity. These missing journalists are civilians and private citizens, not employees of the United States Government. The United States Government will make no public representation on the matter and will not treat this matter in propagandistic fashion.

"I recall that we received the DRV's assurance a year ago that you had been informed by your ally in Cambodia that there were no American captives held in Cambodia. Should we learn that these American journalists are indeed alive, we would treat this as welcome news and as a sign of goodwill on the part of your ally. We would receive this news in that same spirit.

"Any information from the DRV, or any wise advice from the Special Adviser about this part of Indochina with which he has a long familiarity, would be deeply appreciated by the American people."

Their reply of today is as follows:

"I would like to inform you that as far as we know, there is no American being detained in Cambodia and we have no information about the persons referred to in your message."

Sincerely,

BRENT SCOWCROFT,
Major General, USAF,
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs.

MISSING JOURNALISTS

UNITED STATES

Sean Flynn, born 31 May, 1941, freelance on assignment for Time Magazine, captured 6 April, 1970.

Welles Hangen, born 22 March, 1930, correspondent for NBC News, captured 31 May, 1970.

Terry Reynolds, age 30, on assignment for UPI. Captured on Saigon road 27 miles southeast of Phnom Penh, 26 April, 1972. (Witnesses saw Reynolds and Hirons taken away by what was identified as a Viet Cong patrol. Their jeep with cameras still aboard was recovered intact by UPI.)

Alexander Shimkin, photographer on assignment for Newsweek. Caught in artillery fire near Quang Tri City 12 July, 1972 (not believed to have survived).

Dana Stone, born 18 April, 1939, freelance cameraman on assignment for CBS News, captured 6 April, 1970.

JAPAN

Tomoharu Ishii, cameraman for CBS News, captured 31 May, 1970.

Akira Kusaka, born 1 January, 1943, correspondent for Fuji Television, captured 5 April, 1970.

Teruo Nakajima, on assignment for Omari Research Institute of International Affiairs, captured 29 April, 1970.

Kojiro Sakai, sound technician for CBS News, captured 31 May, 1970.

Yujiro Takagi, born 16 February, 1936, cameraman with Fuji Television, captured 5 April, 1970.

Yoshihiko Waku, born 16 April, 1937, cameraman for NBC News, captured 31 May, 1970.

Takeshi Yanagisawa, correspondent for Nippon Denpa News, captured 10 May, 1970.

Taizo Ichinose, born 11 November, 1947, freelance photographer and writer, captured November 22, 1973. (Northern Cambodia)

FRANCE

Claude Arpin, born 31 December 1940, freelance on assignment for Newsweek Magazine, captured 5 April, 1970.

Gilles Caron, born 8 July, 1933, photographer/reporter on assignment for Gamma Agency, captured 5 April, 1970.

Roger Colne, born 18 July, 1921, sound technician for NBC News, captured 31 May, 1970.

Guy Hannoteaux, correspondent for L'Express, captured 6 April, 1970.

AUSTRALIA

Alan Hirons, freelance on assignment for UPI, captured together with Terry Reynolds of the United States on April 26, 1972.

AUSTRIA

Georg Gensluckner, freelance photographer/reporter, captured 8 April, 1970.

GERMANY

Dieter Bellendorf, born 11 March, 1939, cameraman for NBC News, captured 31 May, 1970.

SWITZERLAND

Willy Mettler, freelance, captured 16 April, 1970.

STILL MISSING IN CAMBODIA—21 JOURNALISTS

The time: April 1970. Prince Norodom Sihanouk has been overthrown by a coup d'etat several weeks earlier. Cambodia's fragile neutrality was crumbling fast. Soon U.S. troops would cross Cambodia's frontiers in force.

Journalists dispatched to cover that news story found the capital city of Phnom Penh locked in confusion. Communication links with the countryside were broken. Cambodia's army was in disarray. Only by venturing outside Phnom Penh via rental car could journalists accurately report on what was happening.

The first correspondents to be captured in Cambodia were stopped at a Viet Cong roadblock on April 5, 1970. During the next two months a number of reporters and cameramen were killed or captured while driving the country's main roads. Some of the captured were released after being detained a few weeks.

21 Journalists Are Still Missing.—Five Americans, four French, 8 Japanese, one Austrian, one German, one Swiss, one Australian. 12 of the journalists worked for U.S. news media—three for CBS, four for NBC, one for Time Magazine, 2 for UPI, 2 for Newsweek.

An American committee of 12 journalists and publishers were formed in late 1970 on behalf of the missing. Officers of the committee are Walter Cronkite, chairman: Peter Arnett, secretary; Tom Wicker, treasurer. The executive committee includes Barry Bingham, Sr., Otis Chandler, Richard Dudman, Osborn Elliott, Murray J. Gart, Katharine Graham, David Halberstam, Ward Just and Frank McCulloch.

Information gathered by the U.S. committee strongly suggests the possibility that at least some of the journalists *are still alive* and in the hands of guerrilla forces inside Cambodia.

OTHER REPORTS FROM MORE OR LESS WELL SUBSTANTIATED SOURCES

(Compiled by Arthur A. Lord of NBC)

1. A Cambodian government undercover agent said he had twice sighted Dieter Bellendorf working as a road laborer in eastern Cambodia. (This agent known to and interviewed by James Sturdevant, former NBC cameraman in Phnom Penh.)

2. A returned South Vietnamese paratropper told Saigon intelligence officer in mid-1972 that near the Cambodian border town of Minot he saw six Caucasians marching under on armed guard. They had long hair and beards, but otherwise he was unable to identify them. His guards told him they were "imperialist journalists." (The intelligence officer's story obtained by Richard Pyle, Associated Press, Saigon.)

3. A Cambodian peasant told the CIA in early 1971 that he had spent the night in a house with journalists shortly after their capture. He identified them, partly from remembering names, partly from pictures, as Hangen, Colne, Waku, Ishii and Sakai. He had much detailed knowledge of them available only to someone who had met them. He said they were taken the next day to the pagoda at Wat Po and he lost further contact. (Also reported by Sturdevant.)

INITIATIVES TAKEN TO OBTAIN INFORMATION

I. CREATION OF COMMITTEES

1. Committee for the Safety of Foreign Correspondents in Cambodia.—Created on July 27, 1970, in Phnom Penh under the chairmanship of Arthur Dommen (Los Angeles Times), it gave the widest dissemination to a complete list of the missing journalists both within Cambodia and abroad.

2. International Professional Committee for the Safety of Journalists on Dangerous Missions.—Created in September 1970 in Paris, and with headquarters in Berne, on the initiative of IPI, it is composed of the International Federation of Newspaper Publisher (Paris), the International Federaltion of Journalists (Brussels), the International Organisation of Journalists (Prague) and the International Federation of Editors-in-chief (Paris). General Secretary: URS Schwarz (Switzerland). The European Broadcasting Union (Geneva) later joined this Committee.

3. American Committee to free journalists held in South East Asia.—Created in fall 1970 in Washington under the chairmanship of Walter Cronkite (CBS News) and with Peter Arnett (AP) in New York as Secretary.

4. Committee for Inquiry of Missing Japanese in Indochina (CIMJI).—Formed in Tokyo in 1973 with Shiro Ishikawa (Executive Director of News, Fuji TV) as the General Secretary.

5. Organisation pour la libération des pournalistes détenus en Indochine.—Created in Paris under the chairmanship of Pierre Doublet (L'Express).

II. INTERVENTIONS

These organisations as well as government officials, individual publishers and broadcasters appealed to all the authorities and groups of the countries involved in the South-east Asian conflict. The International Press Institute intervened at all levels and through different channels and addressed in particular appeals to the representation of the FUNK and the GRUNK (United National Front of Cambodia and Royal Government of the United Front of Cambodia), to the delegates of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, to the General Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, to the governments of South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The following numbered paragraphs are keyed to the map on the last page.

1. The missing journalists can be divided roughly into two groups. The first consists of approximately 10 journalists who were captured between 5–8 April 1970 on Route One in southeast Cambodia, about 10 kilometers from South Vietnam's borders.

2. The second group consists of five television journalists captured on May 31, 1970, about 53 kilometers south of Phnom Penh on Route Three.

3. A North Vietnamese officer who defected said that on May 30, 1970 he talked with two of six foreign journalists who were being held by the NVA in a house four kilometers north of Kratie. The defector was given a detailed debriefing by US Army Intelligence specialists and subjected to a lie detector test, which he passed.

Reference: Special Interrogation of Tran Van Hong, aka Pham Tien Vu (Combined Military Interrogation Center 0073–71); 3 March 1971; MACJ213–3; Saigon.

Reference: Polygraph Examination of Pham Tien Vu, aka Tran Van Hong; 23 February 1971; US Army 525th Military Intelligence Group; Saigon.

4. A number of ARVN prisoners of war released after the 1973 cease-fire said they had heard while in captivity from NVA–VC that foreign journalists were being detained within a 50-mile radius of Kratie as late as March 1973. The US committee dispatched an investigator to Indochina after the cease-fire to interview returning Vietnamese POW's for information about the missing journalists. The investigator, a Vietnamese linguist, talked with 3000 of the 4300 returning POW's, many of whom had been detained by the NVA–VC in prison camps in eastern Cambodia. Some 25 unrelated sources among the POW's had hearsay information about the missing journalists.

Reference: Report to Walter Cronkite, Chairman; US Committee to Free Journalists Held in S.E. Asia; March 20, 1973; Saigon.

5. ARVN POW Nguyen Van Thanh, serial number 69/001.405, saw six Caucasians on May 1, 1972 south of Snoul being moved northward by the NVA. Thanh asked his own guard if the Caucasians were military advisers. The NVA guard replied, "No, they are correspondents of the imperialist side."

Reference: Ibid.

6. Mr. Kong San, 45, a Cambodian national who formerly served as supervisor of a rubber plantation controlled by guerrilla forces, reported that he saw 10 Caucasians identified as journalists in June 1972. Kong San saw the journalists frequently during a two-week period while he underwent refresher training in rubber production at a Cambodian guerrilla camp three kilometers east of Kratie believed to be FUNK regional headquarters at map coordinates XU 154815. No NVA or VC observed in area.

Reference: Report to Walter Cronkite; April 11, 1973. Phnom Penh.





Chronology of the Four Party Joint Military Team, 1973–1975

The Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) was established in accordance with Article 10(A) of the Protocol on Captured Persons to ensure joint action by the parties in implementing Article 8(b) of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. Each of the four signatories; the United States (US), the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) had participant delegations. The Agreement, stipulating the mission of the FPJMT to be solely the implementation of Article 8(b), was signed in Paris on 27 January 1973.

General organizational aspects of the FPJMT were discussed and agreed upon during the meetings of the Central Joint Military Commission and the Prisoner of War Sub-Commission in late March 1973. The US DEL became operational on 2 April 1973 and the FPJMT initially met on 4 April 1973.

The mission of the US DEL was to negotiate with the other parties to obtain information about the location of graves of persons who died in captivity or were killed in action but whose bodies were not recovered, to arrange for repatriation of remains, to obtain entry rights for the search operations into areas in which remains were believed to exist, and to take such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

To accomplish its mission, the US DEL was authorized 44 personnel, to include 22 Americans and 22 South Vietnamese. The Chief of the US DEL was the chief negotiator and reported through the Defense Attache and the US Support Activity, Thailand, to the Commander in Chief, Pacific. He maintained direct coordination with the Commander of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) in Thailand. Policy guidance was provided by the US Ambassador, Saigon.

Initial Terms of Reference and Operational Guidance, provided during the first three months of operation, were initiated by Department of Defense and Department of State authorities. During the ensuing months, many of the original guidelines were subjected to de facto revision. The following are the Terms of Reference and Operational Guidance as they evolved from actual operations.

The US DEL had full authority to discuss with other delegations all matters which, in his opinion, had a bearing on the accomplishment of tasks specified in Article 8(b) of the Paris Agreement. The US DEL maintained close coordination with the RVN DEL to adopt positions compatible with both US and RVN desires and aspirations with any differing positions referred to the US Embassy, Saigon, for guidance and resolution.

Prior to adopting a position on issues not directly specified in Article 8(b), the US DEL coordinated with the Embassy. Overall strategy or tone to be adopted by the US DEL at FPJMT plenary sessions was determined by the Embassy, but this did not include the daily tactics employed in plenary sessions, in private dealings, or in routine memoranda, as long as these remained compatible with the directed strategy and did not result in disruption of negotiations.

The realignment of responsibilities necessitated by events in Vietnam left the FPJMT largely working on its own. Fortunately, all original members of the FPJMT were involved in the negotiations as part of the Four Party Joint Military Commission. This expertise was valuable in going through the protocol and establishing priorities for negotiations. One of the first efforts was an attempt to arrange for the return of the bodies of prisoners of war identified during the Paris negotiations by the DRV and PRG as having died in captivity.

The early phases of the FPJMT work were productive in establishing a framework for the exchange information, visits to grave sites, and returns of remains. As time progressed and various procedures became formalized, new problems emerged.

A major area of concern dealt with the formulation of a more effective system of strategy and tactics evaluation, analysis and formulation. During the first two months, the majority of the US operations were somewhat reactionary and overly optimistic. The Communist's dictum that "negotiations are but another form of warfare" made it vital that every initiative and position of the US DEL

be researched in depth to surface Communist vulnerabilities and alternatives open to the US DEL. That job, which would have challenged professional statesmen, had to be done by military men as the military structure was dictated by the agreement. The prospect of negotiating with the Communists was an unsettling one, particularly when the relative inexperience of the new US DEL members was considered. This was compounded by the recognition that the Communists had selected representatives with extensive political and negotiating background.

Another major problem was the necessity to coordinate the US DEL positions with myriad agencies and headquarters. Although the US Ambassador was recognized as the focal point for guidance, it was essential that the US DEL consider the views of individual agencies in matters related to their principal areas of cognizance.

The first session of the FPJMT, on 4 April 1973, was characterized by a sense of optimism and apparent cooperation. Based on the success of the Four Party Joint Military Commission, which had effected the release of American prisoners of war, it was anticipated that the accounting for the missing and dead could be rapidly accomplished. The DRV and PRG assured the US DEL that they intended to "scrupulously" implement Article 8(b) and would surrender information very soon. An aura of cooperation was exemplified by the rapid agreement on working conditions and the establishment of Privileges and Immunities. In retrospect, it is apparent that the Communists were simply establishing a position to interject their unrelated demands.

Early in the negotiations, the PRG initiated a ploy to tie repatriation of remains to recognition of the PRG as a legitimate government in the South. They continuously disrupted the FPJMT meetings with demands for the return of political prisoners, an issue clearly defined in the Paris Accords as one to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties. This was soon followed by an attempt by the DRV and PRG to link Article 8(b) to the totality of the Paris Agreement. These and other issues were repeatedly used by the Communists to avoid agreeing on an agenda or as reason for non-cooperation.

In an attempt to resolve the status of missing U.S. military, civilians and third country nationals, the U.S. Delegation prepared and gave to the other delegations lists of persons still missing in action (MIA) and those known dead, whose bodies were not recovered (BNR). A standard format was developed to provide the name, service number, rank, service branch, date lost, race, nationality, sex, vehicle in which lost (if applicable), last location in UTM coordinates, and country. The lists were in the form of computer printouts which were developed by the Casualty Data Division of JCRC.

Lists of U.S. and other foreign person MIA/BNR, along with letters reminding the other side of their responsibilities to provide information about the MIA/BNR, were given to the PRG and DRV Delegations on the dates indicated below. The lists are repetitive so the numbers are not cumulative.

Date	Recipient/ delegation	Persons on list
Apr. 17, 1973	RVN/DRV/PRG	104
May 8, 1973	RVN/DRV/PRG	1,444
May 14, 1973	RVN/DRV/PRG	1,114
June 13, 1974	RVN/DRV/PRG	2,558
Apr. 1, 1975	RVN/DRV/PRG	2,401

In August 1973, a folder program was begun. Individuals, about whom the Defense Intelligence Agency and JCRC could furnish convincing details concerning their loss, were included in the folders. In some cases the folder contained information about one individual; in others, all persons lost in a single incident were included in one folder. Information in the folders consisted of a photograph, personal data, a map showing the last known location, physical description, and unclassified details about the incident that indicate the DRV or PRG would have knowledge of the individual's status. The folders were prepared in English and Vietnamese. (An example of a folder is attached as Enclosure 1). Folders were passed to the DRV or PRG as follows:

Date	Folders	Individuals	Recipient delegation
Aug. 6, 1973	5	5	DRV
Aug. 8, 1973	5	5	PRG
Aug. 20, 1973	2	2	DRV
Aug. 22, 1973	3	3	PRG
Aug. 29, 1973	5	12	DRV
Do	5	5	PRG
Sept. 19, 1973	3	3	DRV
Do	2	3	PRG
Nov. 7, 1973	6	8	DRV
Do	5	12	PRG
Dec. 12, 1973	5	6	DRV
Do	2	2	PRG
Apr. 8, 1974	9	9	DRV
Do	3	3	PRG
June 7, 1974	7	7	DRV
Do	2	2	PRG
Feb. 26, 1975	10	17	DRV
Do	3	3	PRG

There were a total of 52 folders containing information on 69 individuals given to the DRV and 30 folders with information on 38 individuals given to the PRG. Follow-up letters on the folders and lists were passed to the other side, but no information about any of the requests was ever received by the U.S. Delegation.

As a part of their functions, the JCRC were to recover remains from crash sites. There were many frustrations on the part of the US that FPJMT could not expedite action and gain entry rights to those crash sites for the JCRC. The PRG would not guarantee the safety of search teams in PRG-held territory and the DRV would not discuss entry of US personnel into the North to look for crash sites. In early December 1973, all delegations were notified of a planned crash site investigation in Gia Dinh Province. On 15 December, Communist forces ambushed three clearly marked, unarmed helicopters engaged in this mission. One American and one Vietnamese were killed and several were wounded. As a result of the ambush and Communist's refusal to guarantee the teams' security, the JCRC searches were discontinued.

Early in the negotiations, the US arranged a weekly C–130 flight from Saigon to Hanoi to coordinate the return of the bodies of those who died in captivity and to permit the North Vietnamese to exchange information. It was evident in May 1973, after having visited grave sites in the North, that the DRV could return the died in captivity remains at any time; however, the eagerness of the US DEL, coupled with political pressures and disallowment of reconstruction aid for the North, motivated the DRV to delay.

Negotiations in Hanoi and Saigon were continued with the US DEL making repeated visits to the North to confer with–DRV officials. In May 1973 members of the US DEL were allowed to visit the graves of 24 US servicemen and one Thai in two cemeteries near Hanoi. Nine months later, the DRV requested a meeting to discuss repatriation of those remains. It became apparent the DRV was attempting to link this repatriation to the release of civilan detainees and was trying to coerce the US into forcing RVN cooperation. Although the US DEL made no such commitment, the timing made it appear there was a linkage between the two issues.

In March 1974, 23 US remains were repatriated from the DRV. Hanoi stated this was proof of their good will; however, they refused to repatriate the 24th body on the technicality he had died in an airplane crash and not in captivity. Therefore, he was not eligible for repatriation.

Later that month it appeared the PRG intended to release the 47 bodies they acknowledged having in their control. This offer was withdrawn when a dispute developed after an RVN crew member was killed by the PRG during a prisoner exchange.

Because of the death of the RVN air crew member and subsequent PRG refusal to guarantee safety, the RVN suspended some of the privileges they had granted the DRV and PRG. During April and May, the Communists paralyzed the sessions because of the situation.

In June, the RVN unilaterally restored the withdrawn privileges, but the PRG introduced a draft Minute of Agreement which, if approved, would amount to recognition of the PRG as a separate government. This, of course, was not acceptable and the DRV and PRG began their final boycott on 20 June 1974.

The US and RVN Delegations attempted to hold sessions of the FPJMT twice a week after the Communist boycott began in June 1974. The US Delegation still maintained correspondence with the Communist delegations. President Ford's appeal in September 1974 and the Uited Nations' Resolution in November 1974 were passed to them. Contacts also continued informally, principally during the weekly Saigon-Hanoi liaison flight which the US Government continued to provide. The US Delegation assisted in scheduling meetings between the Communist delegations and concerned US citizen groups, including a group of concerned youth and a group of MIA relatives.

The principal point for disagreement was the basic purpose of the FPJMT even though Article 8(b) clearly specifies certain obligations and responsibilities with respect to MIAs and the handling of remains. The US and RVN saw the FPJMT as a humanitarian organization designed solely to account for the missing and dead. The other side chose to use it as a vehicle for furthering their political gains.

When the fall of Saigon seemed imminent, the President decided all Americans should be evacuated. The last group of US DEL personnel departed Saigon on 30 April 1975. On 3 May, the team reassembled at Clark Air Force Base and departed on 4 May for Thailand, where they established the alternate Command Post at Same San. Upon the collapse of the Saigon government, the Four Party Joint Military Team was deactivated. The functions related to accounting for the missing were assumed by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center.

PERTINENT PORTIONS OF AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT PERTAINING TO M. B. VARNADO, USA

Country: Cambodia
DOI: June–August 1970.
Subject: Death of a U.S. Prisoner of War at a Viet Cong Hospital, Mimot District, Kompong Cham Province, Cambodia.
ACQ: Vietnam, Saigon (26 March 1974).

1. The source (a member of the security guard of a Viet Cong Hospital in Kok Hamlet, Mimot District, Kompong Cham Province, Cambodia) said that an American prisoner of war (POW) died at the hospital on about 26 August 1970. The following day, members of the hospital staff wrapped the corpse in nylon sheet and linen cloth and buried the POW in a grave (approximately 2 meters by 1 meter by 40 centimeters) located at about XU 224 142, 200 meters west of the Krabas Stream, Kok Hamlet.

2. The POW died from a serious wound in his left thigh, which he had received when his UH 1–A helicopter crashed in the Choam Kravien Area (XU 460 010), Kravien Village, Mimot District, on about 12 June 1970. Members of of the unit which captured the POW told the source that the POW's helicopter had been on a reconnaissance mission over the Kravien Village Area at about 1200 hours, when it was hit by 37MM artillery fire. The plane crashed at about 1215 hours, four of the men in the plane, two American and two Vietnamese, had remained inside the plane and died at the crash site. The POW had bailed out and landed in a large tree. About an hour later he was found wounded approximately 300 meters from the crash site. The capturing unit buried the four dead airmen in a hole near the crash site. They also removed the POW's clothing and documents, gave him first aid, and carried him to the hospital on the following day.

3. The source had the following information on the POW, which he had obtained while attending him in the hospital, and from the POW's medical description sheets, the POW was a Major in the U.S. Air Force. He was born in about 1947, was a caucasian about 1.70 meters tall and weighed about 60 kilograms. He had blond hair and brown eyes. He smoked and said "Thank You" in Vietnamese when he received food or cigarettes. The source said the POW's left thigh had been completely broken by a violent tearing of the flesh. The hospital did not have the necessary medication to properly treat his wound, and the POW died from an infection of his wound and from exhaustion. The

POW had been kept in a separate thatched structure and been assigned two guards to take care of him. He did not cooperate with the VC who interrogated him.

ROYAUME DU CAMBODGE,
Pékin, le 12 Janvier 1973.

MR. ET MRS. HOUSLEY VARNADO, FERRIDAY, LA. U.S.A.

MONSIEUR ET MADAME, Le Prince Norodom Sihanouk vient de recevoir votre lettre du 15 Aout 1972 an sujet de votre fils Michael Varnado. Le Prince m'a chargé de vous transmettre ses regrets de ne pouvoir donner des nouvelles demandées: la République démocratique du Vietnam ne nous a pas répondu au sujt de Monsieur Michael Varnado et nous ne savons donc pas ce qu'il est devenu.
Veuillez agréer, Monsieur et Madame, l'expression de mes sentiments distigués./.

SISOWATH METHAVI.
Directeor de Cabinet.

ROYAUME DU CAMBODGE,
Pékin, le 6 Juin 1972.

MRS. HOUSLEY VARNADO,
Ferriday, La., U.S.A.

MADAME: Le Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Chef de l'Etat, vinet de recevoir votre lettre en date du 4 Novembre 1971 Lui demand de transmettre votre missive à votre fils W-1 MICHAEL B. VA DO. Le Prince m'a chargé m'a chargé de vous assurer que vot lettre a été transmise aux autorités compétènes afin de fa le nécessaire.
Veuillez agréer, Madame, l'expression de mes sentimen distingués./.

SISOWATH METHAVI,
Directeur du Cabinet.

MADAME: Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Chief of State, acknowledges receipt of your letter dated November 4, 1971, asking him to forward your letter to your son, W-1 Michael B. Varnado. The Prince asked me to assure you that your letter has been given to the authorities competent to handle the matter.
Best wishes,

SISOWATH METHAVI,
Director of the Cabinet.

I have already asked the DRV Government to give me information about your son. I will tell you its response when I've received it.
Sincerely yours,

NORODOM SIHANOUK DU CAMBODGE.

SUMMARY OF CASUALTY STATUS EVENTS

CW2 Michael B. Varnado, SSN 437-70-1097

Summary of incident.—2 May 1970: CW2 Varnado was the pilot of a UH–1H helicopter that was on a logistic mission when aircraft was hit by enemy weapons fire. As a result, the aircraft caught fire and was forced to land. All passengers and crew members exited the downed aircraft with no apparent wounds or injuries. The enemy forces began to fire at will from all directions at the occupants of the aircraft. Private Tony F. Karreci, a member aboard the aircraft, managed to evade the enemy and returned to U.S. control 4 May 70. He stated that at least one passenger was taken alive and another was presumed dead. Subsequent searches of the area revealed the wreckage of the aircraft, however, none of the missing members could be found. Other missing members were WO1 Daniel F. Maslowski, SP4 Fredrick H. Crowson, CPT Robert M. Young, CPT Dale W. Richardson, SP4 Bunyan D. Price, Jr. and SP4 Rodney L. Griffin.

6 June 1970: Board of Officers Investigation convened and recommended that all of the above members be continued as missing in action. Information in the Board Report indicated that it could be reasonably assumed that at least three persons were captured, but their identity could not be ascertained.

17 July 1970: Chief, Casualty Division approved continuance of all personnel in a missing in action status.

15 April 1971: Intelligence report was received indicating that there was a sighting of SP4 Crowson by a Cambodian medic.

25 April 1971: Year and Day Review was conducted; based upon receipt of intelligence information, the status of SP4 Crowson was changed from missing in action to captured. The status of the other members was continued as missing in action.

17 May 1971: Chief, Casualty Division approved the above actions.

24 August 1971: Status of SP4 Bunyan D. Price, Jr. was changed from missing in action to captured. This change was based on information received through intelligence sources indicating that three members of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam who escaped from an enemy prisoner of war camp on 2 June 1971 reported that a US prisoner was also being held in the camp from which they escaped. The three ARVNs separately identified Specialist Price from a group of photographs.

10 November 1971: Status of CPT Robert M. Young and CW2 Daniel E. Maslowski was changed from missing in action to captured. This action was based on information received through intelligence channels in the form of enemy documents taken from a captured enemy soldier. The document indicated that three Americans were in the hands of the enemy. The individuals named in the document were CPT Young, CW2 Maslowski and SP4 Crowson.

4 April 1973: Based upon information received from returned prisoners of war indicating that CPT Robert M. Young died in a prisoner of war camp, Department of the Army made a determination that his status be changed from captured to deceased, remains not recovered.

11 April 1973: CW2 Michael B. Varnado's name appeared on the list of names provided to US negotiators 27 January 1973 indicating that he died in captivity on 21 September 1970.

5 March 1975: Following is the status of each individual who was involved in the incident:

WO1 Michael Barnado—died in captivity.
CPT Robert M. Young—died in captivity.
SP4 Rodney L. Griffin—presumptive finding of death issued.
WO1 Daniel F. Maslowski—returned to military control.
SP4 Fredrick H. Crowson—returned to military control.
CPT. Dale W. Richardson—carried as missing in action.
SSG Bunyan D. Price—carried as captured.

MARCH 20, 1975.

MR. AND MRS. HOUSLEY VARNADO,
Ferriday, La.

DEAR MR. AND MRS. VARNADO: This letter is in follow up to my recent visit with you regarding matters pertaining to your son, Michael.

As promised, the following is a verbatim account of the pertinent information contained in the intelligence report received by the Department of the Army as pertains to Michael: The source of the report believed to be indigenous (native) stated that, "Around 5 July 1974, a telegram from Khieu Samphan, Deputy Prime Minister of the Royal Government of National Union (GRUNK), was received by the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK) "Bureau Politique" in Peking stating that Michael had been captured and was being held by communist forces in the Khmer Communist area of Kratie Province, Cambodia, as of July 1974. The telegram was shown to Prince Noredom Sihanouk who read it and returned it to the Bureau. The telegram was only a few lines long and did not mention the health of the prisoner or any plans to move him from Kratie. It gave only the name and grade of the American and stated that he had been captured and was being held by the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces in Kratie. Cables of this nature regularly go from Cambodia to Hanoi, then to Peking, but this was the first time in three and a half years an American name was seen."

As you recall, I further stated that our intelligence analysts refute every aspect of the above information. However, please be assured that we will continue in our attempts to obtain factual data pertaining to Michael. May I reiterate that although this information is unclassified, it is considered sensitive in that wide public dissemination could jeopardize any chances in our effort to obtain additional information.

I have also attempted to gain additional information pertaining to a recent article appearing in the papers on Friday, 14 March, which stated that Senator Kennedy received a letter from officials in Hanoi concering MIA's. As of this date, a clarification or detailed information is not available from the Senator's

office. Rest assured that when information becomes available, I will forward it to you.

Please accept my appreciation for your warm reception during my visit and may your courage and faith continue to sustain you through this period of anxiety and uncertainty.

Sincerely,

C. J. BOBINSKI,
Colonel, AGC, Director, Army Casualty.

FIR-317/09138-74

Country: Cambodia.
DOI: July 1974.
Subject: Detention of two U.S. prisoners of war by Communists in Cambodia.
ACQ: 5-20 November 1974.

Around 5 July 1974 a telegram from Khieu Samphan, Deputy Prime Minister of the Royal Government of National Union (GRUNK), was received by the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK) "Bureau Politique" in Peking stating that Sergeant Glenn Harris and Sergeant Michael B. Varnado had been captured and were being held by Communist forces in the Khmer Communist area of Kratie Province, Cambodia, as of July 1974. The telegram was shown to Prince Norodom Sihanouk who read it and returned it to the bureau. (Source comment: The telegram was only a few lines long and did not mention the health of the prisoners or any plans to move them from Kratie. It gave only the names and grades of the Americans and stated that they had been captured and were being held by the Cambodian Peoples' National Liberation Armed Forces/CPNLAF in Kratie.)

FEBRUARY 12, 1975.

SUMMARY OF INCIDENT—MAY 2, 1970

Crew members and passengers on a helicopter on a resupply mission to a field unit of 25th Inf. Div. Enroute aircraft was hit by enemy weapons fire and caught fire, and landed under its own power. All aboard exited the helicopter. Enemy troops then moved in and captured two people wearing Nomex flight uniforms. Then other enemy troops, after firing into a cluster of bamboo bush, pulled a wounded person from the cluster and led him away. A short while later enemy troops returned and pulled another person from the bushes who appeared to be dead and left him there. One crew member successfully evaded the enemy by hiding in a ditch. Air and ground searches were conducted from 4 May until 14 May when the aircraft wreckage was located. The search party received hostile fire after aircraft was located and had to evacuate the area. However, no bodies nor graves were found. Extensive searches of the area were conducted from 15 to 20 May but no signs of the missing personnel could be found.

CURRENT STATUS

CW2 Michael Varnado—PRG stated he died in captivity 21 Sep 70 Status officially changed from MIA to DIC/BNR 4 April 1973.
CPT Dale W. Richardson—Currently carried MIA.
SP5 Frederick Crowson—RMC 12 Feb 73 at Loc Ninh, RVN.
SP5 Bunyan D. Price—Currently carried as PW.
CPT Robert M. Young—PRG stated he died in captivity 17 Sep 72. Status officially changed from PW to DIC/BNR 2 Apr 1973.
CW2 David F. Maslowski—RMC 12 Feb 73 at An Loc, RVN.
SGT Rodney L. Griffin—Status changed to PFOD 16 Jan 74.
SP4 Tony Karreci—Successfully evaded the enemy and was subsequently returned to military control on 4 May 1970 at LZ X-Ray (Grid Coordinates and Location of LZ X-Ray are unknown).
Grid Coordinates: XU 357 010—Province: Cambodia.

[From the New York Times, Sunday, Apr. 23, 1972]

P.O.W. ISSUE IN LAOS LINKED TO BOMBING

VIENTIANE, Laos, April 22 (UPI)—The Pathet Lao Communist representative

in Laos could begin as soon as the United States ordered a "total" halt in the bombing here.

Col. Petrasy, the Laotian Communists' permanent spokesman in Vientiane, said "there were many" United States P.O.W.'s being held by the Pathet Lao, but he would not disclose the exact number or their whereabouts.

"We are willing to discuss the question of United States P.O.W. release if the American imperialists would order a total bombing halt and let alone the Laotians to solve their own internal problems," he said.

Colonel Petrasy said that the prisoners were detained in caves in northern Laos.

"Although we regard them as criminals and air pirates, they are being treated humanely," he added.

Colonel Petrasy last year threatened to have the American P.O.W.'s in Laos tried as war criminals.

Observers here believe that Colonel Petrasy has a limited knowledge of the number and whereabouts of United States P.O.W.'s in Laos.

[From the New York Times, Mar. 27, 1976]

U.S. Invites Talks With Hanoi, Says It Hopes For Normal Ties

Washington, March 26—The Ford Administration has delivered a message to the North Vietnamese inviting discussion of all issues related to Vietnam that it says it hopes will lead to the eventual normalization of relations between the two nations.

The announcement was made early this morning by Representative G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Democrat of Mississippi and chairman of the House Select Committee on Missing Perons in Southeast Asia. It was confirmed by President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

Mr. Kissinger told reporters that the key issue for the United States was to get information and cooperation from Hanoi concerning the approximately 850 American servicemen still missing-in-action. He also stated that he was interested in discussing restraints on North Vietnam's behavior in the rest of Southeast Asia.

Mr. Kissinger said that Hanoi was free to raise any issue it wished but that there is not much prospect for American aid.

VITAL ISSUE TO HANOI

North Vietnamese leaders have stated that postwar reconstruction aid from the United States is a vital issue of principle. Congressmen who have talked to them in recent months have said that Hanoi is "realistic" in not expecting much aid but that it wants some.

Hanoi has said that former President Nixon pledged in a note dated Feb. 1, 1973, to give North Vietnam $3.25 billion in postwar reconstruction aid "without political conditions." North Vietnamese leaders have indicated that this was their price for having signed the Paris cease-fire accords at that time.

North Vietnamese leaders stated to visiting Congressmen in December that if the Administration was prepared to honor the principle of reconstruction aid, they would be helpful on the matter of Americans missing-in-action.

Various Congressmen and peace groups today stated their concern that the Administration's announcement of the opening to Hanoi really represented an attempt to head off Congressional approval of an amendment lifting the trade embargo on Hanoi.

Such an amendment passed the House of Representatives by a substantial margin and is now being discussed by a House-Senate conference on the foreign aid bill.

Senator Mark O. Hatfield, Republican of Oregon, said that the apparent shift in Administration policy must not be used "as a club to knock out provisions in the foreign aid bill that would open the door to trade relations between the two countries."

He added that if the provision is dropped by the House-Senate conferees, "we might find that the announced plans for talks with Vietnam will have been postponed indefinitely."

A similar warning was sounded by Friendshipment, an organization of some 40 peace and religious groups.

A high State Department official said that the Administration message, which was delivered yesterday by a member of the American Embassy in Paris to a member of the North Vietnamese Embassy was serious and in no way connected with the lifting of the trade embargo. He denied that Mr. Kissinger wanted to hold the prospect of trade in reserve as a bargaining issue with Hanoi.

"WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS"

The official said that the invitation to discussions was made "without preconditions on our part" and expressed the hope that Hanoi would respond favorably.

This official also maintained that the amendment lifting the trade embargo had little chance of passage. Others on Capitol Hill disagreed.

"I do not know what the Vietnamese reaction will be at this time," Representative Montgomery said in a statement issued by his office. "However, they told us last December they wanted to talk, and we can only hope this is still their position."

Mr. Montgomery and members of his committee had been seeking a meeting with Mr. Kissinger since January. Mr. Kissinger received them on March 12.

[From the Commercial Appeal, Mar. 27, 1976]

Talking to Hanoi

It is now almost a year since President Ford ordered the last American personnel out of South Vietnam, bringing to a close what he described then as "a chapter in the American experience."

It has been a year of watching and waiting for the United States. There were serious fears a year ago that North Vietnam would engage in recriminations in South Vietnam, that there would be "a bloodbath" of those citizens in South Vietnam who had engaged in the long struggle against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.

Fortunately, the Hanoi government has shown restraint. Reports coming from officials and correspondents who have been in Vietnam during the last year have given no evidence of widespread brutality.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Washington now is indicating to Hanoi that it is ready to begin exploratory talks on the possibility of improving relations between the two governments.

Refusing to open discussions with Hanoi surely would serve no useful purpose now. Such talks could prove useful to the United States. Surely there will never by any possibility of the United States influencing the Hanoi government in any way in the future unless some sort of relationship between the capitals is established.

There has been little indication thus far as to how successful any negotiations might be.

The announcement of the U.S. "feeler" toward Hanoi came from Rep. G. V. Montgomery (D-Miss.), chairman of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. Montgomery regards the proposed exploratory talks as "an important step forward in gaining an accounting" of Americans still missing in Indochina.

The fullest cooperation of the North Vietnamese in searching for those many missing Americans would have to be a prior condition to any reopening of relations, of course. Hanoi must agree not just to allowing American parties to visit selected areas of the country in such a search, but free access to all areas.

There has been some complaint from Hanoi about what it considers the failure of the U.S. to make good on claimed pledges by former President Richard Nixon to provide postwar economic assistance.

That question has been muddied considerably by events in the last couple of years. It is not at all clear whether Nixon really made any such promise of financial aid, but if he did it is not clear he had the authority to do so. Further, even if he had the authority and did make the offer, the indications are it was intended as a reward to Hanoi for that government's cooperation in honoring the Paris peace accords.

Hanoi, of course, did not abide by the Paris agreement, so the economic assistance pledges, whatever they might have been at that time, surely were invalidated

by Hanoi's actions. A renewal or relationships hardly can be made contingent upon such an agreement under these conditions.

Given such understanding and such preconditions, the efforts to reopen talks can proceed. The United States has demonstrated its ability to forgive nations with which it has been at war, and its attitude toward Hanoi now indicates a continuation of that ability.

[From the Washington Star, Mar. 27, 1976]

U.S. Opens Door for Hanoi To "Normalize" Relations

The United States sent a message to North Vietnam yesterday saying the Ford administration is prepared in principle "to normalize relations with Hanoi," Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said.

Talking to reporters, Kissinger said the message listed as "our principal concern" an accounting by Hanoi of the 2,000 Americans missing in action from the lengthy Indochina war.

State Department spokesman Robert Funseth said the message was sent to Hanoi through the North Vietnamese embassy in Paris. He said the text was couched in very general terms but listed the main American aims as the MIA accounting and the need for assurances of Hanoi's peaceful intentions toward neighboring countries in Southeast Asia.

Neither Funseth nor Kissinger ruled out specifically discussions with North Vietnam on the matter of an American economic aid program to help Hanoi recover from war devastation.

"They are free to raise any issue they wish," Kissinger told newsmen when asked if the United States would discuss Hanoi's demand for postwar aid.

"But I would not hold out much prospect for that," Kissinger added.

Hanoi has claimed it was promised $3.25 billion in war reconstruction assistance by former President Richard M. Nixon. Hanoi also has made economic help a condition for dealing with the United States.

In his comments, Kissinger went beyond the previous statement by Funseth in saying, "We are in principle prepared to normalize relations with Hanoi."

This statement had been made several months ago by President Ford and Kissinger, but it was the first time such a position was made known directly to Hanoi.

The United States has never had diplomatic relations with North Vietnam, and the questions of contacts with South Vietnam became moot 11 months ago when Saigon was captured by Communist troops.

Funseth said the message to Hanoi spoke only of contacts with North Vietnam and made no reference to re-establishing diplomatic dealings with Saigon.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1976]

Vietnam Talks Set by U.S.

Normalization of Relations, MIAs at Issue

(By Murrey Marder)

The Ford administration has authorized exploratory talks with Communist-ruled Vietnam on possible normalization of relations, it was learned yesterday.

Discussions are expected to take place in a third country in the near future to seek an accounting of American missing in action in the Vietnamese war and other issues in dispute between Washington and Hanoi.

This first official attempt to open a dialogue with Vietnam's rulers since the Communist victory in South Vietnam in April, 1975, is "a serious effort," an administration official said.

Administration planners were extremely reluctant to discuss the new move. However, in response to questions about Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's talks with members of Congress, State Department spokesman Robert L. Funseth acknowledged.

"We are prepared to meet with the Vietnamese to discuss all of the Vietnam-related issues. That includes the missing in action."

Officials declined to say where or when the meeting with Hanoi's representatives will take place, or who may participate. A possible site in Paris, which for

years during the Vietnam war was the center of public and secret diplomatic exchanges.

According to an administration source, the Ford administration, long reluctant to plunge into any discussions with Hanoi's leaders, is now prepared for "a dialogue" with Vietnam.

On March 12, Kissinger promised members of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, headed by Rep. G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery (D-Miss.), that he would consult with President Ford about diplomatic talks with Vietnam.

Vietnamese officials told House members during meetings in Paris and Hanoi last December that they seek normal relations with the United States.

Earlier, North Vietnam had insisted that a key condition for relations was U.S. postwar reconstruction aid for Vietnam, pledged in the 1973 cease-fire accord negotiated by Kissinger. A 1973 letter from President Nixon to North Vietnam mentioned a $3.25 billion postwar aid program, but the Ford administration, and Congress, blocked any aid on grounds that Hanoi grossly violated the ceasefire to conquer South Vietnam.

The cross-issues of aid for Vietnam, and a Vietnamese accounting for Americans missing in action in the war, are in legislation now pending in a House-Senate conference committee on foreign aid.

A House-passed amendment sponsored by Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham (D-N.Y.), who accompanied the Montgomery delegation, would partially lift the present U.S. embargo on trade with Vietnam.

Another amendment, by Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-N.Y.), a member of the Montgomery committee, would make relaxation of the trade embargo conditional on accounting of the Americans missing in action and return of remains of men killed in action.

The Ford administration is anxious to block the Bingham amendment to retain full diplomatic flexibility on its bargaining in talks with Vietnam.

Ngày 25 tháng 2 năm 1976

Thưa Ngài,

Tôi đã nhận được hai thư của Ngài đề ngày 26 tháng 12 năm 1975 và 17 tháng 1 năm 1976.

Tôi rất quan tâm về những hoạt động của Ngài và những đồng nghiệp của Ngài nhằm bình thường hóa quan hệ giữa hai nước.

Chắc Ngài đã hiểu rõ quan điểm của chúng tôi về việc bình thường hóa đó. Thái độ của chúng tôi là nghiêm chỉnh và thiện chí. Chính phủ Mỹ cũng phải có thái độ như thế thì mới tạo điều kiện thuận lợi cho việc cải thiện quan hệ giữa hai nước.

Tôi rất thông cảm mối quan tâm và những tình cảm của các gia đình những nhân viên dân sự và quân sự Mỹ còn coi là mất tích trong chiến đấu. Cơ quan tìm kiếm những người mất tích của Việt Nam dân chủ cộng hòa và của Cộng hòa miền Nam Việt Nam vẫn tiếp tục hoạt động nhằm góp phần giảm bớt sự đau khổ của các gia đình nói trên.

Tôi gửi lời chào Ngài.

Phạm Văn Đồng
Thủ tướng Chính phủ
Việt Nam dân chủ cộng hòa

Hanoi, February 25, 1976.

Dear Sir,

I have received your two letters dated December 26 1975 and January 17, 1976.

I take interest in your activities and those of your colleagues for a normalization of the relations between our two countries.

No doubt you have clearly understood our viewpoint on this normalization. We are of serious intent and good-will. The Government of the United States must take a similar attitude if favourable conditions are to be created for better relations between our two countries.

I deeply understand the concern and feelings of the families of those American civilian and military personnel still considered missing in action. The services of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the Republic of South Viet Nam in charge of seeking information about missing personnel are continuing their activities with a view to contributing to alleviate the sufferings of the above-mentioned families.

With best regards.

PHAM VAN DONG
Prime Minister
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam

To Mr. GILLESPIE V. MONTGOMERY
Chairman of the Select Committee
on missing persons in Southeast Asia,
U.S. House of Representatives.
Washington D.C. 20515.

AMBASSADE
DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU VIET NAM
EN FRANCE

2, Rue Le Verrier - 75272 Paris Cédex 06
TÉL. : 326.64.35 - 326.81.93

Paris, le 25 Février 1976.

Honorable GILLEPSIE V. MONTGOMERY
U.S House of Representatives
Washington D.C. 20515

Excellence,

Nous avons l'honneur de Vous faire parvenir ci-joint une copie de la lettre du Premier Ministre PHAM VAN DONG à votre adresse.

En vous souhaitant bonne réception de cette lettre, nous prions Votre Excellence d'agréer les assurances de notre haute considération.

P. L'Ambassade
Le Premier Secrétaire

Do Thanh

MAR 26 1976

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1976

The Honorable G.V. Montgomery
Chairman, Select Committee on
Missing Persons in Southeast Asia
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with the Secretary's remarks during his March 12 meeting with you and the Committee and our subsequent discussions, I wish to inform you that a letter has been sent today from the Secretary to North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Trinh expressing our readiness to open discussions between the two governments.

We will of course continue to keep you fully informed of further developments.

Sincerely,

Robert J. McCloskey
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

HANOI REFUSES TO DISCLOSE THE FATE OF THESE MEN

The following are narrative accounts of 14 U. S. airmen who were downed in North Vietnam. All 14 men were known to be alive, on the ground in North Vietnam, or were at one time actually identified by the North Vietnamese as having been captured. None of these men appear on the much publicized and so-called "complete list" provided by the North Vietnamese on December 22, 1970. These case histories provide clear evidence that the "list" is neither accurate nor complete. The deliberate withholding of information casts serious doubt on the credibility of the North Vietnamese Government and increases anguish of the families of men who are missing.



CAPT SAMUEL E. WATERS USAF

[illegible] CARD BELONGING TO CAPTAIN SAMUEL E. WATERS USAF PUBLISHED IN THE VIETNAM COURIER ON [illegible] DECEMBER 1966

CAPTAIN SAMUEL E. WATERS WAS DOWNED IN HOA BINH PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM ON DECEMBER 13, 1966. HE WAS SEEN TO EJECT AUTOMATICALLY AND TO DEPLOY A GOOD PARACHUTE. THE DECEMBER 30 1966 EDITION OF THE NEWSPAPER VIETNAM COURIER, PUBLISHED IN HANOI REPORTED THAT WATERS WAS CAPTURED ON DECEMBER 13, 1966. AN AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE REPORT OF DECEMBER 17 1966 STATED THAT CAPTAIN WATERS WAS KILLED ON DECEMBER 13,1966. ON JANUARY [illegible] 1967 A BULGARIAN NEWSPAPER NARODA ARMIYA CARRIED AN ARTICLE GIVING CAPTAIN WATERS AND INCLUDING A FACSIMILE OF HIS PERSONAL IDENTITY DOCUMENTS

HANOI REFUSES TO DISCLOSE THE FATE OF THIS MAN



LTJG WALTER O. ESTES, II
USN

LTJG JAMES E. TEAGUE
USN

WIRE PHOTOS OF IDENTITY CARDS BELONGING TO LTJG JAMES E. TEAGUE, USN, AND LTJG WALTER O. ESTES, II, ORIGINATED BY THE VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY AND WERE SENT FROM HANOI, VIETNAM.

LTJG WALTER O. ESTES, II AND LTJG JAMES E. TEAGUE WERE DOWNED NEAR HAIPHONG ON NOVEMBER 19, 1967. THEIR CO-PILOTS ARE ACKNOWLEDGED PRISONERS OF WAR ON HANOI'S LIST. AN AP WIRE PHOTO ORIGINATED BY THE VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY, NORTH VIETNAM, CLEARLY SHOWS THE IDENTITY CARDS OF ESTES AND TEAGUE. IN ADDITION, THE HANOI CAPTION PLAINLY STATES THAT LT ESTES AND LT TEAGUE WERE CAPTURED IN HAIPHONG.

HANOI REFUSES TO DISCLOSE THE FATE OF THESE MEN



CAPT FREDERIC M. MELLOR USAF

CAPTAIN FREDERIC M. MELLOR'S RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WAS LOST ON 15 AUGUST 1965 IN SON LA PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM. HE REPORTED BY RADIO THAT HE HAD SUCCESSFULLY LANDED WITHOUT SERIOUS INJURY. CAPTAIN MELLOR WAS ADVISED TO AVOID FURTHER CONTACT UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF RESCUE FORCES. WHEN THE HELICOPTER APPROACHED THE AREA AND AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO CONTACT THE DOWNED PILOT, THERE WAS NO REPLY. SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OPERATIONS WERE NEGATIVE.

HANOI REFUSES TO DISCLOSE THE FATE OF THIS MAN



MAJ ELWYN R. CAPLING USAF

MAJOR ELWYN R. CAPLING WAS DOWNED IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1965. OTHER PILOTS IN THE AREA OBSERVED MAJOR CAPLING'S SUCCESSFUL EJECTION AND LANDING ON THE GROUND. BY RADIO HE REPORTED HIS LEG WAS BROKEN AND REQUESTED HELP. RESCUE ATTEMPTS WERE IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA.

HANOI REFUSES TO DISCLOSE THE FATE OF THIS MAN



LCDR VINCENT D. MONROE USN

LCDR VINCENT D. MONROE WAS DOWNED IN NGHE AN PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM, ON MAY 18,1968. EMERGENCY RADIO SIGNALS WERE RECEIVED FROM LCDR MONROE AND HIS CREW MEMBER WHOSE STATUS AS A PRISONER HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY NORTH VIETNAM. RADIO HANOI ANNOUNCED THE CAPTURE OF TWO PILOTS AT THE TIME AND PLACE OF LCDR MONROE'S LOSS.

HANOI REFUSES TO DISCLOSE THE FATE OF THIS MAN



LCDR RANDOLPH W. FORD USN

[redacted]

HANOI REFUSES TO DISCLOSE THE FATE OF THIS MAN

CAPT JOHN M. BRUCHER USAF

CAPTAIN JOHN M. BRUCHER EJECTED FROM AN F-105D ON 16 FEBRUARY 1969 IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE NEAR THE LAOTIAN BORDER. HE REPORTED LANDING IN A TREE SUSPENDED IN MID-AIR AND UNABLE TO FREE HIMSELF FROM HIS PARACHUTE. HE LATER REPORTED HAVING A DISLOCATED SHOULDER. RESCUE EFFORTS WERE SUSPENDED UNTIL THE FOLLOWING DAY. WHEN THE RESCUE HELICOPTERS RETURNED NO CONTACT COULD BE MADE WITH CAPTAIN BRUCHER AND HIS PARACHUTE WAS STILL HANGING IN THE TREE, EMPTY.

HANOI REFUSES TO DISCLOSE THE FATE OF THIS MAN



LT JAMES K. PATTERSON USN

[illegible] JAMES K. PATTERSON WAS A CREW MEMBER IN AN A6A AIRCRAFT PILOTED BY LCDR EUGENE B. McDANIEL SHOT DOWN ON 10 MAY [illegible] IN HA BINH PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM. LT PATTERSON REPORTED BY RADIO THAT HE HAD A BADLY BROKEN LEG AND PARACHUTE COULD NOT MOVE. LCDR EUGENE B. McDANIEL IS ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE A PRISONER OF WAR ON A NORTH [illegible]

HANOI REFUSES TO DISCLOSE THE FATE OF THIS MAN



LCDR MILTON J. VESCELIUS USN

LCDR MILTON J. VESCELIUS WAS SHOT DOWN ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1965 WHEN HIS AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES. SUCCESSFUL EJECTION AND DESCENT WAS WITNESSED BY PILOTS IN THE AREA. THE PILOT WAS SEEN TO BE IMMEDIATELY SURROUNDED BY INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL. A RADIO HANOI BROADCAST ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1965 DESCRIBED THE INCIDENT AND STATED THAT THE PILOT WAS CAPTURED.

HANOI REFUSES TO DISCLOSE THE FATE OF THIS MAN



CAPT WILLIAM R. ANDREWS USAF

[redacted]

HANOI REFUSES TO DISCLOSE THE FATE OF THIS MAN



MAJ JOSEPH C. MORRISON USAF

CAPT SAN D. FRANCISCO, USAF

MAJOR JOSEPH C. MORRISON AND CAPTAIN SAN D. FRANCISCO WERE IN AN F-4D LOST ON 26 NOVEMBER 1968. BOTH OFFICERS ESTABLISHED RADIO CONTACT ON THE GROUND WITH RECOVERY FORCES. THE 2 PARACHUTES WERE SIGHTED WITHIN 700 METERS OF A NORTH VIETNAMESE ENCAMPMENT. CONTACT WITH CAPTAIN FRANCISCO WAS LOST WITHIN A HALF HOUR. MAJOR MORRISON EVADED SUCCESSFULLY THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT AND RE-ESTABLISHED RADIO CONTACT ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. RECOVERY WAS PREVENTED PRIMARILY BY WEATHER AND VOICE AND BEEPER CONTACT WERE LOST

HANOI REFUSES TO DISCLOSE THE FATE OF THESE MEN



CAPT ARTHUR L. WARREN USAF

HANOI REFUSES TO DISCLOSE
THE FATE OF THIS MAN

CONTENTS

TAB A

DATA PROCESSING LISTS PROVIDED BY FPJMT

Lists of U.S. and other foreign persons MIA/BNR, along with letters reminding the other side of their responsibilities to provide information about the MIA/BNR, were given to the PRG and DRV Delegations on the dates indicated below. The lists are repetitive so the numbers are not cumulative.

Date	Recipient Delegation	Number of Persons on List
17 Apr 1973	RVN/DRV/PRG	104
8 May 1973	RVN/DRV/PRG	1,444
14 May 1973	RVN/DRV/PRG	1,114
13 Jun 1974	RVN/DRV/PRG	2,558
1 Apr 1975	RVN/DRV/PRG	2,401

FRUS
File 7c

13 June 1974

FPJMT-NE

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEFS OF THE OTHER DELEGATIONS

SUBJECT: Request for Information

1. Enclosed are updated lists of all US and foreign personnel missing in action (MIA) in South East Asia (List Number 4), and those presumed dead in South East Asia, but whose bodies have not been recovered (BNR) (List Number 5). Previous lists were provided to all delegations on 8 and 14 May 1973, respectively.

2. In accordance with Article 8(b) of the Paris Agreement the US Delegation again requests the other delegations to provide the US Delegation with all available information about these missing, and assist in the recovery of the remains of all these dead.

WILLIAM W. TOMBAUGH
Colonel, USA
Chief

2 Incl
as

TRU SO
PHAI DOAN HOA KY trong TO LIEN HOP QUAN SU BON BEN
APO San Francisco 96393

FPJMT-NE

Ngay 13 thang 6 nam 1974

VAN THU KINH GUI: QUI VI TRUONG PHAI DOAN

DE MUC: Yeu cau cung cap tin tuc

1. Dinh kem danh sach moi nhat cac nhan vien Hoa Ky va ngoai quoc khac mat tich trong chien dau tai Dong Nam A (danh sach so 4), va nhung nhan vien duoc tin la da chet o Dong Nam A, nhung di hai cua ho chua tim thay duoc (danh sach so 5). Nhung danh sach truoc da gui den cac Phai Doan ngay 8 va 14 thang 5 nam 1973.

2. Theo Dieu 8(b) cua Hiep Dinh Ba Le, Phai Doan Hoa Ky mot lan nua yeu cau cac Phai Doan cung cap cho Phai Doan Hoa Ky nhung tin tuc san co ve nhung nguoi mat tich nay va giup do trong viec thau hoi di hai cua nhung nguoi chet nay.

Ky ten: WILLIAM W. TOMBAUGH
Dai Ta, LQHK
Truong Phai Doan

Dinh kem 2 ban

US DELEGATION TRANSLATION

LIST NUMBER 4 OF ALL PERSONNEL MISSING (MIA) IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AS OF 22 MAY 1974

DANH SACH SO 4 GOM TAT CA CAC NHAN VIEN BI MAT TICH O DONG NAM A, TINH DEN NGAY 22 THANG 5 NAM 1974

EXAMPLES ONLY

Name	Ser No	Grade	Service	Date Lost	Race	Sex	Natl	Vehicle	Last Location	Country
Ten	So Quan	Cap Bac	Loai Linh	Ngay Mat Tich	Mau Da	Nam Hay Nu	Quoc Tich	Phuong Tien	Noi Mat Tich	Quoc Gia
Doe, Joe	123456789	03	AF	01 Nov 67	C	M		F105	XJ513627	VN
Doe, John	987654321	E5	AR	01 Nov 69	N	M		Ford Tr	BR517403	VS
Doe, Judd	456789123	04	NA	01 Nov 71	C	M		A7B	OW	OW
Doe, Mark	789654321	02	MA	01 Nov 72	C	M			YD073682	VS
Doe, Noel	132468579	E3	AR	01 Dec 68	N	M		CH34	XD514397	LA
Doe, Tom	112233445	02	AR	01 May 70	C	M			XU240012	CB

TAB B

FOLDERS (Case Summaries) PROVIDED BY FPJMT

In August 1973, a folder program was begun. Individuals, about whom the Defense Intelligence Agency and JCRC could furnish convincing details concerning their loss, were included in the folders. In some cases the folder contained information about one individual; in others, all persons lost in a single incident were included in one folder. Information in the folders consisted of a photograph, personal data, a map showing the last known location, physical description, and unclassified details about the incident that indicate the DRV or PRG would have knowledge of the individual's status. The folders were prepared in English and Vietnamese. (An example of a folder is attached as Enclosure 1). Folders were passed to the DRV and PRG as follows:

Date	Folders	Individuals	Recipient Delegation
6 Aug 1973	5	5	DRV
8 Aug 1973	5	5	DRV
20 Aug 1973	2	2	DRV
22 Aug 1973	3	3	PRG
29 Aug 1973	5	12	DRV
29 Aug 1973	5	5	PRG
19 Sep 1973	3	3	DRV
19 Sep 1973	2	3	PRG
7 Nov 1973	6	8	DRV
7 Nov 1973	5	12	PRG
12 Dec 1973	5	6	DRV
12 Dec 1973	2	2	PRG
8 Apr 1974	9	9	DRV
8 Apr 1974	3	3	PRG
7 Jun 1974	7	7	DRV
7 Jun 1974	2	2	PRG
26 Feb 1975	10	17	DRV
26 Feb 1975	3	3	PRG

There were a total of 52 folders containing information on 69 individuals given to the DRV and 30 folders with information on 38 individuals given to the PRG. Follow-up letters on the folders and lists were passed to the other side, but no information about any of the requests was ever received by the U.S. Delegation.

FILE RECORD SUMMARY

JOHN JOE DOE

NAME JOHN JOE DOE

SERVICE/RANK USAF/MAJ

SERIAL NUMBER 500-22-3333 0123456

DATE OF INCIDENT 10 October 1970

COUNTRY Democratic Republic of Vietnam

PROVINCE Vinh Linh

LAST KNOWN LOCATION YD 012345

PHYSICAL DATA:

YEAR BORN 1932 HEIGHT 69 inches COLOR EYES Hazel

RACE Caucasian WEIGHT 153 pounds COLOR HAIR Brown

INFORMATION REGARDING THE ABOVE NAMED INDIVIDUAL: Major (MAJ) John Joe DOE was flying lead in a flight of F-105's on a combat mission over Vinh Linh Province, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), when the aircraft was hit and damaged by unidentified ground fire at 0845 local time. Other pilots in the area observed MAJ DOE eject and descend with a good parachute which was visually tracked into the trees approximately 2 and 1/2 kilometers north of Ben Quang Village. A good beeper was heard and MAJ DOE established voice contact with search and rescue forces during which he reported he had a pos[illegible]e broken leg. According to the pilots monitoring the transmission, MAJ DOE voice

FILE RECORD SUMMARY Continuation (Maj John Joe DOE)

was still strong at this time. During subsequent passes, search and rescue forces noticed the parachute had been pulled from the trees. Recovery efforts were halted after radio contact with MAJ DOE was lost.



BẢN TÓM LƯỢC HỒ SƠ

JOHN JOE DOE

TÊN HỌ: JOHN JOE DOE

BINH CHỦNG / CẤP BẬC: Thiếu Tá/KQHK

SỐ QUÂN: 500-22-3333 0123456

NGÀY NGỘ NẠN: 10 October 1970

QUỐC GIA: Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa

TỈNH: Vĩnh Linh

ĐỊA ĐIỂM ĐƯỢC THẤY LẦN CHÓT: YD 012345

ÁC CHI TIẾT VỀ HÌNH DẠNG:

NĂM SANH: 1932 CAO: 1m75 MÀU MẮT: Nâu sẫm

MÀU DA: Da trắng NẶNG: 69 kg MÀU TÓC: Nâu

IN TỨC LIÊN HỆ NHÂN VIÊN CÓ LÝ LỊCH KỂ TRÊN: Thiếu Tá John Joe DOE lái phi cơ hướng dẫn đoàn F-105 trong một phi vụ chiến đấu trên không phận tỉnh Vĩnh Linh, VNDCCH. Phi cơ của Ông đã bị trúng đạn và hư hại do hỏa lực (không biết loại gì) từ dưới đất bắn lên lúc 0845 giờ địa phương. Những phi công khác trong vùng đã quan sát thấy dù của Thiếu Tá DOE mở một cách an toàn nhưng bị vướng vào cây khoảng 2 cây số ruỡi phía Đắc xã Bến Quang. Một tiếng bíp rõ được nghe thấy và Thiếu Tá DOE bắt liên lạc với lực lượng tìm kiếm và cấp cứu. Ông báo cáo rằng có lẽ Ông bị gãy chân. Theo lời những phi công theo dõi máy truyền tin

(Xem tiếp trang sau)

Tiếp theo BẢN TỔN LƯỢC SỐ (Thiếu Tá John Joe DOE)
thì tiếng nói của Thiếu Tá DOE lúc đó vẫn còn rõ lắm. Trận
đường tìm kiếm lục lượng cấp cứu và tìm kiếm ghi nhận rằng chiếc dù
đã được kéo ra khỏi cây. Các nỗ lực tìm kiếm phải dừng lại khi mất
liên lạc với Thiếu Tá DOE

US DELEGATION TRANSLATION 2

TAB C

CATEGORIES OF MISSING AMERICANS

CATEGORY	CRITERIA	NVN	SVN	LAOS	CAMB	OTH
Strong evidence that enemy knows fate or burial site	Seen alive in enemy hands by US source					
	Photo, tape, media report by enemy					
	Letters received from MIA					
	Voice contact with MIA on the ground in reasonable condition					
	Multiple, credible intelligence reports					
	Observed being approached by enemy					
Evidence that enemy could know fate or burial site	Beeper signal					
	Crash site near village or hamlet					
	Unverified intelligence reports					
No indication that enemy has any information on individual***	Missing with no witnesses or other data					
	Crash or ejection in remote area					
Enemy unlikely to have information on individual	Crash or ejection at sea					
	Reported KIA(BNR) nonhostile					

***In many of these cases where DOD records are blank, the enemy forces will have specific knowledge of the circumstances, but these cases cannot be identified as such.



58034 3-68

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CASE OF MR. CHARLES DEAN, U.S. CIVILIAN, AND MR. NEIL SHARMAN, AUSTRALIAN CIVILIAN

This report provides a summary of the information that is currently known regarding Mr. Charles Dean, U.S. Civilian, and his Australian companion, Mr. Neil Sharman, who were captured in Laos in early September 1974. Reliable information indicated that these individuals were alive as of February 1975. Diplomatic efforts to obtain information from the Pathet Lao about the two detainees have been unsuccessful.

In early September 1974, Charles Dean and Neil Sharman departed Vientiane (see map, point A), Laos and boarded a boat bound for Thakhek (see map, point B). Reports indicate that while enroute to Thakhek they were captured by the Pathet Lao at the Ban Pak Hin Boun checkpoint (see map, point C). After capture, they were brought upriver by boat to Ban Thong Lom (see map, point D) where they were held for a short period. Generally, all the sources who reported sighting Dean and Sharman after this time agree that the two were subsequently taken to Ban Phontan (Kham Keut area, see map, point E) for detention, and they probably arrived there about mid-September 1974. The major portion of the sightings of Dean and Sharman in the Kham Keut area was provided by sources of two intelligence collection agencies.

The first collection agency was provided alleged sighting information concerning Dean and Sharman by a total of 16 sources. Information pertaining to some of these sources is as follows:

Two of the 16 sources stated that Dean and Sharman had given them photographs of themselves. One of the sources did have a confirmed photo of each of the two detainees in his possession at the time he reported his information. On the back of one photograph was writing in English which read: "Charles Dean, 1035 Park Ave., New York, USA." On the back of the other photo, "Nio Sa Man, Australia" was written by source. DIA was provided the negatives and copies of these photographs. (photograph copies attached.)

The other source apparently lost his photos during the escape. According to these sources, Dean and Sharman were still at Ban Phontan on 16 November 1974.

During January 1975, four of the 16 sources, who claimed to have escaped together from Ban Naliang (13 kms east of Ban Phontan also in the Kham Keut area) on 15 December 1974, stated that they saw Dean and Sharman in a truck that briefly stopped at Ban Naliang on 14 December 1974. These sources heard that the two detainees were probably being taken to Sam Neua (Pathet Lao Headquarters). One of these sources was in possession of photographs of Dean and Sharman that he said were given to him by the detainees. Another of the sources also claimed that he had been given similar photographs, but they were taken by camp authorities at Ban Naliang.

In late January and February 1975, five of the 16 sources claimed to have escaped together from Ban Phontan on 25 November 1974. Each of these five sources alleged that he saw Dean and Sharman at Ban Phontan, although there were discrepancies among them as to exactly when the two detainees arrived at the camp. According to each of these sources, Dean and Sharman were still at Ban Phontan when the group escaped on 25 November 1974.

In February 1975, another of the 16 sources reported that he had acted as an interpreter at the interrogation sessions held with Dean and Sharman at Ban Phontan. He stated that he had not personally observed Dean and Sharman at Ban Phontan since early November 1974, and he had been told that the two detainees had been taken to Sam Neua in mid-December 1974. This source was polygraphed, and at several points during the polygraph examination deception was indicated. Furthermore, there was a strong suspicion that this source was a Pathet Lao agent who had been assigned to determine how American intelligence was obtaining its information.

A subsequent source claimed he saw Dean and Sharman in a truck with eight Pathet Lao guards during the last week of December 1974 at Ban Phontan. He stated that the truck drove off in the direction of Ban Naliang, and he heard the two detainees had gone to "Sam Neua to see their ambassador." During the follow-on debriefings of this source, he admitted he had been approached by the previously-mentioned polygraphed source who asked if he wanted to defect back to the Pathet Lao. When detailed questioning of this source was attempted, it was discovered that he had

left the interrogation facility allegedly because of sickness. Due to this sudden departure, his information was looked upon with suspicion.

Information provided by some of the sources of the second collection agency indicated that Dean and Sharman were seen at Ban Phontan during January and February 1975. One of these sources claimed he observed two Caucasians at Ban Phontan on 23 February 1975. The source was polygraphed, and the results indicated that he had personally observed the two Caucasians. His report provided the most current reliable information concerning the status of Dean and Sharman.

U.S. overtures to the Pathet Lao regarding Dean and Sharman started even before the identities of the two individuals were known. These overtures gathered momentum when it was positively determined that one of the individuals was a U.S. citizen. Numerous contacts were made personally by former U.S. Ambassador Whitehouse, to the Lao Prime Minister and to senior Pathet Lao officials, as well as by diplomatic note, and ultimately by written communication from Secretary of State Kissinger to the Lao Prime Minister.

Despite the vast number of sighting reports received concerning Dean and Sharman and the concerted U.S. diplomatic effort to obtain information on the fate of these individuals, the Pathet Lao have continually denied any knowledge of these two individuals. To date, diplomatic efforts to obtain information have been in vain. It can only be speculated as to why the Pathet Lao have refused to acknowledge the capture and provide information about the fate of Dean and Sharman.

In the April 1975 time frame, despite all indications and efforts, there was growing apprehension in the Embassy that Dean and Sharman were probably dead. The Dean family had previously traveled to Vientiane in an attempt to uncover information concerning the fate of their son. Mr. Howard Dean stated that his family was reconciled to the likelihood that Charles died and assumed this was also applicable to Sharman. Consequently, Mr. Dean announced that on 24 May 1975 the family held memorial services for Charles and was initiating legal action to have him presumed dead. He placed a notice of death in the New York Times on 28 May 1975. A presumptive finding of death was issued by the Embassy in Vientiane on 11 June 1975. However, there has been no evidence to substantiate the death of either Dean or Sharman. The Australian Government's effort regarding



CHARLES DEAN

NEIL SHARMAN

this case continued even after Dean was declared dead. Sharman is still considered legally alive by the Australian Government.

In August 1975, the total Pathet Lao takeover of Laos eliminated any further intelligence collection activity on the Dean and Sharman case. However, the State Department continued its efforts to have the Pathet Lao provide an accounting of these individuals.

Currently, both the U.S. and the new Australian Governments have placed renewed emphasis upon negotiations with the Pathet Lao to obtain information regarding the status of Dean and Sharman.

THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

The Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) is a joint military task force located at Utapao Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand. It is an outgrowth of U.S. Government efforts to identify, document, and maintain records of Americans missing in action or who might be prisoners of war as a result of the conflict in Southeast Asia. Established on January 23, 1973, the unit consisted of a command element, an administrative division, a casualty data division, a logistics division, and a field element to control the search and recovery efforts.

The mission of JCRC is to assist in recovering and resolving the status of U.S. missing in action (MIA) and those servicemen who were killed in action but whose bodies were not recovered (KIA/BNR). To accomplish its mission the JCRC was directed to:

a. Conduct analysis of all available data to facilitate casualty resolution.

b. Act within the policy and guidance of higher authorities to negotiate with other governments and agencies regarding casualty resolution matters and to initiate activities throughout Southeast Asia to recover remains of American servicemen.

In an effort to resolve the status of missing servicemen, the JCRC conducts search operations to locate and recover the bodies. Small teams of unarmed American specialists, augmented by indigenous guides and laborers, conduct the searches.

Authority to conduct field operations was coordinated by the American Embassy with the local governments or by negotiating bodies established by international agreement. Prior to the collapse of the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the Four-Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) was responsible for those clearances in RVN. The FPJMT was established in accordance with Article 10(A) of the Protocol on Captured Persons to ensure joint action by the parties in implementing Article 8(b) of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. Each of the four signatories; the United States (US), the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) had participant delegations.

The mission of the US Delegation was to negotiate with the other parties to obtain information about the location of graves of persons who died in captivity or were killed in action but whose bodies were not recovered, to arrange for repatriation of remains, to obtain entry rights into areas in which remains were believed to exist, and to take such other measures as may be required to get information about those still missing in action.

Requests for U.S. search operations were presented to the delegation having control over a specific area. That delegation either approved or disapproved the request and informed all other delegations. Despite the existent agreements and repeated requests, the Communists never approved any JCRC operations in any territory they controlled. All searches in Vietnam were conducted in areas controlled by the RVN.

On December 15, 1973, an unarmed and easily recognizable JCRC team was attacked by hostile forces near Saigon although FPJMT delegations had been apprised of the mission in accordance with established procedures. One American and one South Vietnamese were killed and seven persons were wounded. Large scale operations were suspended after the ambush and the Communists' subsequent refusal to guarantee the safety of the teams. Later operations were normally conducted by South Vietnamese specialists with guidance provided by JCRC. To assist in the recovery and proper identification of remains, the Central Identification Laboratory, Thailand (CIL THAI) was established in March 1973 and placed under the operational control of JCRC. Administratively, the CIL THAI has two primary divisions, the Search and Recovery Division and the Identification Division.

Personnel from the Search and Recovery Division participate in all recovery operations. They are trained in disinterment procedures, care and safeguarding of remains, proper documentation, and have detailed knowledge of skeletal and dental anatomy. Such expertise is critical during initial recovery efforts to insure as complete a recovery as possible and to accurately document the procedures to enhance the later identification process.

The Identification Division endeavors through extensive examination to positively identify the recovered remains. This critical mission requires close coordination with physical anthropologists, forensic laboratories, and related institutions throughout the world. Records from the JCRC files are studied to determine which individuals were lost in the area from which a body is recovered. Data generated by the identification process is compared with the JCRC files to assist in identification. Among the records maintained for comparison are the missing men's health and dental records, dental X-rays, photographs, and various statistical summaries. When a favorable comparison has been made of the race, age, height, hair color, healed fractures, anomalies, dental anatomy and restorations, and any contradictions are resolved, the case file is forwarded to the Department of the Army Adjutant General. The Adjutant General presents the case to the Armed Services Graves Registration Office Board of Review. If that Board accepts the identification, the appropriate service is directed to take the necessary actions for the return of the remains to the next of kin and to make arrangements for final disposition as requested by the next of kin.

In May 1973, following several months of intensive training and preparation, U.S. manned field operations were initiated. Between May and December of that year, they conducted eighteen operations and recovered twenty bodies. Of those, nine were positively identified as missing American servicemen. South Vietnamese conducted the actual recovery missions after the ambush of the JCRC team in December 1973. The JCRC coordinated the activities and furnished technical support from nearby "Safe Havens." These combined activities resulted in the recovery of 163 remains, of which 50 have been identified as U.S. servicemen previously listed as MIA or KIA/BNR.

The JCRC was an active participant in negotiations begun in May 1973 by the FPJMT to repatriate the bodies of 23 U.S. prisoners of war who had died while being held captive in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The turnover was completed in March 1974 with representatives of JCRC and the FPJMT accepting the remains in Hanoi. All twenty-three were positively identified by the CIL THAI.

In July 1973, JCRC undertook sea salvage operations in an effort to locate at-sea crashes and recover the associated remains. After eleven weeks of operation, during which 140 dives were made and approximately 77 square miles were searched, the project was terminated. The meager results of this operation; nine aircraft located and several small bone fragments recovered; point up the almost impossible task of recovering remains at sea.

Collection of all available data concerning missing servicemen has been one of the major roles of JCRC. A working data base was constructed from information furnished by the Services, intelligence agencies, records, reports, and other sources. The result is a refinement of all available data concerning an individual being compiled in his individual file and being readily available.

All of this information is analyzed in an attempt to determine the best point from which to initiate a search for the individual's remains. This material is maintained in JCRC files for manual usage and has been placed in a computerized data bank for immediate recall and crosschecking.

When it became apparent that contested areas in RVN would not be accessible to JCRC personnel, a training program was instituted to train South Vietnamese to conduct search operations. Although these indigenous teams met with some initial success, the deteriorating military situation in South Vietnam forced cancellation of the program in 1975.

A public communications program was perfected and directed toward local populations in South Vietnam. Media used included radio, television, newspapers, handbills, posters, and extensive face to face contacts. This program solicited information about missing Americans and was being tailored toward specific casualty sites when the fall of South Vietnam terminated the effort.

After the fall of Cambodia to the Khmer Rouge, JCRC was asked by MACTHAI to establish and operate a Refugee Evacuation Center. Within 24 hours, a camp was operational at Utapao for 1500 refugees. The MACTHAI Support Group and the 635th Combat Support Group assisted JCRC in administering this activity.

The subsequent collapse of the Saigon government stretched this "short-term" task into seven months during which time, 6,904 Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees were processed.

Upon the evacuation of Americans from South Vietnam, the JCRC mission was expanded. The FPJMT was deactivated and JCRC assumed several of the functions of the US Delegation. This necessitated formation of a Negotiations Assistance Division within JCRC. Their task is to facilitate and support discussions with the various governments in Southeast Asia to resolve the issue of missing Americans.

Although the current unsettled conditions in Southeast Asia have had an adverse effect upon initiatives to achieve as complete an accounting as possible for the missing, the resolve to accomplish that goal has in no way diminished. Both JCRC and CIL THAI played major roles in recent repatriations of remains resulting from Presidential and Congressional efforts. These two organizations remain in Thailand, staffed and fully prepared, to immediately respond to any situation that may contribute to a satisfactory conclusion to this issue.

1 Incl
Significant JCRC Activities

JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

May 1973 - December 1975

	DATE	AREA	TYPE OPERATION	SUMMARY OF RECOVERY
1.	5-9 MAY 73	LONG AN	CSI	Items of personal equipment recovered.
2.	11-19 MAY 73	BAC LIEU	CSI	Aircraft parts recovered and identified. No remains recovered.
	17 MAY 73	VINH BINH		No crashsite found
3.	31 MAY - 4 JUN 73	PHU YEN	CSI	Aircraft parts recovered.
	1-3 JUN 73		CSI	Partial skeletal remains recovered.
4.	3-5 JUN 73	KIEN GIANG	TO	Skeletal remains recovered from idigenous personnel.
5.	3 JUN 73	THUA THIEN	GSI	A few skeletal remains were recovered.
6.	23 JUN 73	CAN THO	TO	Partial remains recovered from local inhabitant.
7.	26 JUN- 1 JUL 73	THUA THIEN	CSI	CH-46A and Air Vietnam DC-3 found. Both cases previously resolved.
8.	3-10 JUL 73	KHAN HOA	CSI	Seven remains recovered.

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9.	10 JUL- 29 SEP 73	DANANG (Offshore)	AT SEA	Operation lasted 82 days, 140 dives, 9 A/C located, small amount of bone fragments from one site.
10.	21-27 JUL 73	PHU YEN	CSI	Dog tag found. Partial remains recovered.
		PHU YEN	CSI	Possible UH-1H wreckage found. No remains found.
		PHU YEN	CSI	Possible O1A wreckage. No remains found.
		PHU YEN	CSI	No remains found
		PHU YEN	CSI	Skull found.
		PHU YEN	CSI	No remains found.
		PHU YEN	CSI	No remains found.
		PHU YEN	CSI	No remains found.
11.	8-23 AUG 73	THUA THIEN	CSI	Located UH-1. Case previously resolved.

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				Located light aircraft. Case previously resolved. Pilot had been rescued.
12.	13-22 AUG 73	GIA DINH	CSI	Recovered personal equipment and partial remains.
	13-22 AUG 73	HAU NGHIA	GSI	Partial remains recovered. Search and rescue team led to an abandoned well by local national. Skeletal remains recovered from bottom of well approx 18 feet deep. Also recovered partially deteriorated boots and socks.
	13-22 AUG 73	GIA DINH	GSI	Partial remains recovered.
13.	17-24 AUG 73	NINH THAUN	CSI	C-123 located. Case previously resolved. No remains found.
	17-24 AUG 73	NINH THAUN	CSI	F-4 located. Case previously resolved. No remains found.
14.	26-28 SEP 73	GIA DINH	CSI	Partial remains found.
15.	2-18 OCT 73	QUANG NAM	CSI	C-123 found. Partial remains recovered. Also recovered personal equipment, weapons, and aircraft parts.
16.	10-16	GIA DINH	CSI	UH-1B found. No remains found. Operation was aborted by an ambush resulting in 1 US KIA, 4 US WIA, 1VN KIA, 3 VN WIA.

17.	6 MAR 74	HANOI	TO	Received remains of 12 US personnel who had died in captivity.

18.	13 MAR 74	HANOI	TO	Received remains of 11 US personnel who had died in captivity.

19.	12 AUG 74	GIA DINH	GSI	Recovered 99% of a remains. Additionally, recovered personal effects, cigarette lighters and wallet.
			GSI	Recovered 3% of a remains including small bones, small portion of skull and one tooth.
			GSI	Recovered 75% of a remains including a skull and teeth.
			GSI	Alleged gravesite located in a well was investigated. Report proved unreliable. No remains recovered.
20.	11 SEP 74	GIA DINH	GSI	Revisited alleged gravesite in well because of new information received from alleged reliable sources. No remains recovered.
21.	16 SEP 74	HAU NGHIA	GSI	Multiple gravesite with comingled remains recovered.

22.	16 SEP 74	HUE	GSI	Multiple gravesite, with comingled remains recovered.
23.	19 SEP 74	BAC LIEU	CSI	Crashsite investigated, no remains recovered.
24.	26 SEP 74	SAIGON	GSI	Single gravesite investigated. One remains 60% complete recovered.

	DATE	AREA	ACTIVITY	SUMMARY OF RECOVERY
1.	1st week SEP 73	HON TRE ISLAND	TO	Group of US and Vietnamese on picnic discovered exposed bones believed to be human. Remains were exhumed and turned over.
2.	1st week SEP 73	QUANG XUYEN DISTRICT	TO	Remains were recovered by a Vietnamese Military Intelligence unit. Vietnamese personnel had heard of JCRC and recovered remains in an effort to be of assistance to the CR program.
3.	5 MAR 74	KONTUM	CSI	Recovered less than 1/3 skeleton, portion of skull, tentative SEA mongoloid. Recovered personal effects. Aircraft identified as an A-1
4.	11 MAR 74	PLEIKU	GSI	American representative observed Montagnards selling aircraft parts. When questioned they agreed to show where the parts had come from. Leading the American to a gravesite they then presented the following remains: skull, lower jaw, two vertebrae.
5.	19 MAR 74	BIEN HOA	CSI	Recovered 2 long bones: 1 femur, 1 tibia- both incomplete.
6.	27-30 MAR 74	KHANH HOA (NHA TRANG)	CSI	Recovered 2 comparatively complete skeletons. Also recovered ID tags and personal effects. Military equipment, survival knives, pistol, credit cards, boots.
7.	3 APR 74	QUANG NAM (DANANG)	CSI	Recovered approximately 1/3 of a skeleton, portion of skull, class ring, ID tags, and personal effects. Helicopter identified as CH-46.
8.	5 APR 74	BINH DUONG (LAI TIEU)	GSI	Recovered remains from a resettlement village. Remains were in eight separate concentrations within a 20' X 20' square area.
9.	12 APR 74	DARLAC PROVINCE	TO	Remains were turned in to a DARLAC Province representative, by a Vietnamese road survey crew. Remains were then turned in to a JCRC Desk Officer.
10.	26 APR 74	BINH LONG (AN LOC)	TO	Remains recovered by ARVN Ranger Battalion while on an operation vic AN LOC on 19 Apr 74. Remains and personal effects turned over to US reps at Bien Hoa on 26 APR 74.
11.	29 APR 74	QUANG NAM (DANANG)	CSI	Remains recovered from a resettlement village. Village Chief stated that the remains were uncovered during a bulldozing operation and subsequently reburied. The remains were disinterred and transported to the CONGEN's office. Remains included 3 teeth, pieces of skull and jaw, long bones, upper end of left and right, femur upper end of one tibia, several vertebrae, and a complete pelvis.

12.	9-11 MAY 74	NINH THUAN (PHAN RANG)	CSI	JCRC scuba divers conducted underwater exploratory activities in an attempt to locate an alleged aircraft crashsite. Multiple dives were made at several locations which were pointed out by a Vietnamese guide. Results were negative.
13.	22 MAY 74	LONG TOAN	GSI	Indigenous divers made three dives at the location of an alleged gravesite. Since the burial, the river reportedly had changed course and the site was underwater. No results were produced in the search of a 400X40 meter area.
14.	24-25 MAY 74	QUANG NGAI (TAP AN NAM)	TO	ARVN personnel turned over partial remains to JCRC Liaison Office, Vietnam and CIL representative located in Danang (safe area).
15.	27 MAY 74	HAU NGHIA	TO	Three sets of partial remains were turned in to JCRC Liaison Office, Vietnam (Saigon). Remains were recovered from what appeared to be a VNAF helicopter.
16.	12 and 18 JUN 74	NINH THUAN	CSI	US Navy C-47 site investigation recovered partial remains.
17.	16 JUN 74	KHANH HOA	CSI	Indigenous personnel located crashsite of C-123 tail # 64376. Returned on 23 JUN and recovered 17 bags of remains. Did not enter aircraft because of ammunition strewn about fuselage.

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18.	17-28 JUN 74	QUANG NAM	TO	Woodcutters located crashsite of U-17 tail number 67-14502. Recovered 3 sets of remains (1 caucasoid, 2 mongoloid). Remains turnover at Danang.
19.	26 JUN 74	QUANG NAM PROVINCE	GSI	Remains were recovered by a JCRC-LNS Operations Specialist after being led to the gravesite by a farmer.
20.	26 JUL 74	QUANG TRI	GSI #1	Unearthed alleged gravesite. Negative results.
			GSI #2	Based on reliable information a JCRC indigenous specialist accompanied an ARVN NCO and recovered partial remains consisting of shattered skull, 3 teeth (1 with filling) and other shattered bones. Also recovered personal effects and aircraft parts.
	9 AUG 74	QUANG TRI	GSI #1 (Contd)	After operations conducted on 26 July, local villagers initiated a search and located remains. JCRC was notified on 9 AUG, resulting in one set of remains being exhumed.
21.	7 AUG 74	DARLAC	CSI	F-100 crashsite investigated. No remains present. Canopy and ejection seat missing. Part number recovered.
22.	9 AUG 74	HUE	GSI	Two possible gravesites were investigated. One gravesite produced three sets of comingled remains.

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23.	26 AUG 74	VINH LONG	GSI	Exhumation by CIL specialist in knee deep tidal mud. Clavicle, long bones, vertebrae and mandible with teeth recovered. Femur, ribs, long bones, previously turned in.
24.	10 SEP 74	QUANG TIN	TO	ARVN personnel exhumed one remains with personal effects. Turnover operation conducted with formal ceremony at Tam Ky airfield on 17 SEP 74.
25.	7 OCT 74	GIA DINH	TO	Go Bap District officials delivered one set of remains.
26.	7 OCT 74	QUANG TRI	TO	One set of remains recovered by local woodcutters turned over to JCRC Area Desk Officer.
27.	5-6 NOV 74	QUANG TRI	GSI/ CSI	Operations conducted at the reported gravesite were with negative results. However, operations at the crashsite yielded human remains and identifying artifacts.
28.	29 NOV 74	THUA THIEN	GSI	Employing one ADO operations specialist and two JCRC indigenous investigators, a single remains approximately 50% complete was exhumed and transported to CIL.
29.	11 DEC 74	CAM RANH	GSI	Grave reported to contain remains of WWII aircrewman. Activity was conducted with negative results.
30.	11 DEC 74	QUANG TRI PROVINCE	GSI	JCRC operations received report of and investigated two gravesites. Recovered partial remains.
31.	23 DEC 74	GO CONG	TO	One partial set of remains picked up from ILO ILO ISLAND and turned over to JCRC Area Desk Officer. Remains were shipped to CILTHAI
32.	6 JAN 75	PHU MY DISTRICT	TO	Remains recovered by Vietnamese were turned in to JCRC Area Desk Officer.
33.	23 JAN 75	QUANG TIN	TO	Remains were turned over to JCRC Area Desk Officer in informal ceremony.
34.	4 FEB 75	CAM RANH	GSI	Gravesite reported to contain remains of body found in water. Site was explored with negative results.
35.	4 FEB 75	HAU NGHIA	TO	HAU NGHIA Province representatives turned over remains to JCRC Area Desk Officer. Remains forwarded to CIL.
36.	16 FEB 75	THUA THIEN	TO	Two South Vietnamese TPJMC representatives exhumed one set of remains and turned over to JCRC Area Desk Officer.
37.	27 FEB 75	QUANG TIN	TO	Province representative and TPJMC Dep Chief of TAM KY turned over one set of remains to JCRC Area Desk Officer.
38.	27 FEB 75	BINH LONG	TO	One set of remains turned over to USDEL FPJMT by Region 5 TPJMC representatives.

39.	4 MAR 75	KIEN GIANG	TO	TPJMC turned over several sets of remains to JCRC Area Desk Officer. Remains came from common gravesite at PHUOC HAU Hamlet.
40.	5 MAR 75	BINH LONG	TO	TPJMC Region 5 chief turned over one set of remains plus set of ID tags to Chief USDEL FPJMT. Remains reported to be from C-130 wreckage.
41.	6 MAR 75	BINH DUONG	TO	Hunter/woodcutter turned over one partial set of remains to CONGEN representative at Bien Hoa; remains eventually turned over to JCRC Area Desk Officer. Additionally, a flak jacket and A/C parts were turned in.
42.	15 MAR 75	HUE (CITADEL)	TO	Remains discovered by local people at the Citadel. Remains were reburied at Ba Don cemetary and eventually exhumed and turned over to JCRC Area Desk Officer.
43.	2 APR 75	BIEN HOA	TO	One set of remains turned over to JCRC Area Desk Officer.

44.	15 DEC 75	HONG KONG	TO	Two sets of remains turned over to JCRC Military Reps from American Red Cross from PRC.
45.	21 DEC	HANOI	TO	The remains of three U.S. Servicemen received by the Congressional Delegation in Hanoi were turned over to military control at Don Muang International Airport (Military Side)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

In reply refer to:
I-3091/76

8 APR 1976

Mr. J. Angus MacDonald, Staff Director
United States House of Representatives
Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Angus:

This is in response to Mr. McCloskey's request for my review of a portion of Admiral Moorer's testimony before the House Appropriations Committee during the summer of 1973. Mr. McCloskey asked if Admiral Moorer had said the South Vietnamese had violated the Agreements on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam that were signed in Paris on 27 January 1973.

I have reviewed the Admiral's testimony and it appears he stated that the South Vietnamese increased their overall control from 76 percent to 82 percent during the preceding year. This increase was in the 16 percent of the country where, as of January 1973, the South Vietnamese had influence but did not have complete control.

In addition, the Admiral pointed out that while the North Vietnamese had withdrawn some of their divisions, they had fleshed-out other divisions so there was an overall increase in the number of North Vietnamese and Vietcong in South Vietnam.

From my review of this testimony I believe the Chairman was merely summarizing rather than alluding to violations by all three parties, DRV, PRG, and RVN. There were, of course, numerous claims by all parties of violations by the other parties. Obviously all others wane in comparison to the DRV violations of 1975.

Sincerely,

Roger E. Shields

ROGER E. SHIELDS
Deputy Assistant Secretary

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

U.S. PW MOVEMENT TO NORTH VIETNAM

In South Vietnam, an analysis of all available data indicates that the PRG/DRV partitioned the country into five regions for purposes of administering U.S. PWs (see Figure 1). These five administrative regions were analogous to the PRG/DRV military regions in South Vietnam.

The few Americans who were captured by PRG/DRV forces in cross border operations in Laos or Cambodia came under the jurisdiction of the military region in South Vietnam closest to their capture locations.

Americans captured by PRG/DRV forces in the three northernmost regions in South Vietnam (i.e., north of approximately the 12th parallel) or in Laos were eventually moved to detention camps in North Vietnam, whereas those captured in the two southernmost regions in South Vietnam were held in South Vietnam or PRG/DRV-controlled areas of Cambodia throughout their captivity.

All Americans known to have been captured south of the Mekong River in South Vietnam (red-hatched area in Figure 1) remained within this area for the duration of their captivity. All Americans captured in this area prior to 1969 and who did not escape soon after capture were joined together as a group and held at camps located in one or both of the two red-shaded oval areas shown in Figure 1 at different times during their captivity. However, by the end of 1968, all these known U.S. PWs had either been released, had died or been executed in captivity, or had escaped. Only a small number of known Americans were captured here subsequent to 1968 and consequently the Communists apparently did not feel it was to their advantage to consolidate these PWs as they had done with the earlier-captured group. Instead, Americans captured in this area after 1968 remained in the general vicinity of their capture for the extent of their detention. Only one of the four known Americans captured south of the Mekong subsequent to 1968 survived, and he was released on 1 April 1973 in Vinh Binh Province, South Vietnam.

Most Americans captured in South Vietnam north of the Mekong to about the 12th parallel (purple-hatched area in Figure 1) and who were in captivity for any significant length of time were held in groups and confined in camps located in northern Tay Ninh Province or nearby in Cambodia. The purple-shaded areas in

Figure 1 indicate the general locations of these camps. Up to three main groups of U.S. PWs existed in these primary detention areas through early 1970, when the PWs were consolidated into two main groups and taken to locations deeper into Cambodia. This consolidation and relocation coincided with the incursion of U.S. and RVN forces into Cambodia and apparently was made to avoid the increased allied activity. The larger of the two groups was held north of Tay Ninh Province, and the smaller group was held north of Phuoc Long Province. In early 1972, both groups were joined at a location near the town of Kratie in Kratie Province, Cambodia. In February 1973, the remaining 27 U.S. PWs held near Kratie were trucked to Loc Ninh, Binh Long Province, South Vietnam, where they were released on 12 February 1973.

The main portion of the Central Highlands of South Vietnam comprised a third communist jurisdictional region (green-hatched area in Figure 1). Two camps were used as collection points for Americans captured in this region. Both camps were located in Cambodia just over the border from Kontum Province, South Vietnam, as shown by the elongated green-shaded area in Figure 1. One camp was utilized during virtually all of 1967, and the other camp was operated from 1968 until mid-1970. Between late 1969 and mid-1970, all the U.S. PWs held in this area were relocated to the Hanoi area via the infiltration/supply routes (Ho Chi Minh Trail), in Cambodia and Laos as shown in Figures 1 and 1a. The few Americans captured in the region subsequent to mid-1970 were moved to North Vietnam as expeditiously as possible over the same trail network.

Americans captured in the coastal provinces of South Vietnam from Khanh Hoa Province northward to and including Quang Nam Province were associated with a single group of U.S. PWs held mostly at several camps located in the mountains southwest of Danang, Quang Nam Province, as shown by the brown-shaded area in Figure 1. This detention area was utilized from at least 1967 until early 1971, when the remaining 12 U.S. PWs comprising the group were moved to the Hanoi area along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to North Vietnam as shown in Figures 1 and 1a. All of these 12 PWs were released in Hanoi during Operation Homecoming. No Americans are known to have been captured in this region after early 1971.

The fifth region included the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. The characteristic feature of this region with respect to U.S. PW confinement was that the PWs were not held in permanent camps in South Vietnam but were moved across the DMZ to North

Vietnam as soon as possible after capture. Figures 1 and 1a show the general route north for virtually all of these PWs. Sixty of the total 122 U.S. PWs released by the PRG during Operation Homecoming were captured in this northernmost region of South Vietnam.

Of the nine released U.S. PWs whom the DRV listed as having been captured by the "Pathet Lao" in Laos, seven were captured in the panhandle of Laos and taken immediately to North Vietnam along the same general infiltration/supply routes along which the PWs from South Vietnam were moved as shown in Figure 1a. The remaining two PWs were captured in northern Laos and were taken to Hanoi along the most direct route available as also shown in Figure 1a.



FIGURE 1



FIGURE 1A

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

In reply refer to:
I-4337/76

26 APR 1976

Mr. J. Angus MacDonald
Staff Director, Select Committee
on Missing Persons in Southeast
Asia
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. MacDonald:

This letter is in response to a request from the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia for unclassified information pertaining to U.S. PW camps in North and South Vietnam.

Enclosure one to this letter provides graphics and a short history of the 13 U.S. PW camps used for detention of U.S. prisoners of war in North Vietnam. Enclosure two provides graphics and brief description of PW camps outside of North Vietnam.

Sincerely,

Roger E. Shields

ROGER E. SHIELDS
Deputy Assistant Secretary

Enclosures

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

PW CAMPS IN NORTH VIETNAM

A total of 13 facilities in North Vietnam were used as permanent detention camps for U.S. prisoners of war. Five of these camps were located in Hanoi (see Appendix A), the remaining eight were outside the city (see Appendix B). With the exception of Hoa Lo Prison, the official Vietnamese names for the PW camps are not known. The camps are identified by nicknames given to them by the PWs. Note that although the SON TAY PW Camp nickname is Camp Hope, Son Tay became the popular name after the rescue attempt in November 1970.

DIA identified the following four trends within the dates of use to account for the opening and closing of the camps:

a. Isolation. This period, from 1964 to 1969, was marked by the existence of several small camps, such as the Plantation and Briarpatch, and isolation of the PWs in small groups within the camps.

b. Movement. This period, from 1968 to 1972, was marked by the movement of U.S. PWs from South Vietnam and Laos into North Vietnam for detention. With few exceptions, the personnel moved into North Vietnam were kept separated from the men actually captured in North Vietnam.

c. Consolidation. This period, from 1970 to late-1972, was marked by the closing of several smaller camps and the regroupment of the PWs into five major camps (Plantation, Zoo, Camp Faith, Hoa Lo, and Dogpatch).

d. Repatriation. In December 1972, the North Vietnamese began shifting the camp populations in anticipation of the release of the PWs. The prisoners in the first and second increments marked for release by the DRV were grouped in one area of Hoa Lo, and all personnel to be released by the PRG and the Pathet Lao were in another area of Hoa Lo. The PWs in the third increment for release by the DRV were moved to the Plantation, and the PWs in the fourth increment were held at the Zoo.

Following is a short history on each of the 13 PW camps in North Vietnam:

ALCATRAZ. (See Appendix C and C.1). The Alcatraz PW Camp, located in North Central Hanoi, became operational in October 1967 when 12 prisoners captured in North Vietnam were moved into this facility. These men were either high ranking PWs or PWs known to North Vietnamese as "troublemakers." In December 1969 the camp was closed, except for a six week period in the summer of 1970 when one prisoner captured in South Vietnam was held at this location prior to his release in August 1970.

BRIARPATCH. (See Appendix D). The Briarpatch PW Camp, located 33 miles west-northwest of Hanoi, was opened in September 1965, but within one week it was closed, reportedly because of U.S. bombing in the area. It was reopened in December 1965 and was used until February 1967 when its PW population was moved. It was reopened a second time in February 1971 to hold a small group of PWs captured outside North Vietnam. Briarpatch finally closed its gates in July 1971 when the last group of PWs was moved back to the Hanoi area.

CAMP FAITH. (See Appendix E). The Camp Faith PW Camp, located nine miles west of Hanoi, became operational in July 1970 when a major consolidation of U.S. prisoners began. Small and medium sized PW camps holding Americans captured in North Vietnam were closed, and many PWs were regrouped at Camp Faith. This was the first time the North Vietnamese allowed the PWs to associate in large numbers. A considerable improvement in treatment occurred at Camp Faith. At its peak, the PW population of Camp Faith was approximately 220 men. Three days after the Son Tay rescue effort, Camp Faith's U.S. PW population was moved to the Hoa Lo Prison in Hanoi.

DIRTY BIRD. (See Appendix F). Beginning in June 1967 several locations in the immediate vicinity of the Hanoi Thermal Power Plant (TPP) were used for the detention of U.S. PWs. Approximately 30 PWs captured in North Vietnam were held in the TPP area at the Dirty Bird Camp in a probable attempt to prevent the bombing of the Power Plant. In October 1967 all prisoners held in Dirty Bird were removed to regular PW camps. Dirty Bird was never again used for the detention of U.S. PWs.

DOGPATCH. (See Appendix G). The Dogpatch PW Camp, located 105 miles north-northeast of Hanoi, became operational in May 1972 when 220 U.S. PWs captured in North Vietnam were transferred from Hoa Lo to this detention facility. The reason for this move was probably to disrupt the U.S. PW organization

which was extremely strong at Hoa Lo. The camp was closed in January 1973 when the prisoners were returned to Hoa Lo for repatriation.

FARNSWORTH. (See Appendix H). The Farnsworth PW Camp, located 18 miles southwest of Hanoi, became operational in August 1968 when 28 U.S. PWs captured outside North Vietnam were moved to this location. Over the next two years, several groups of U.S. PWs captured outside North Vietnam were brought to this detention installation. By November 1970, 54 PWs were detained at this location. In a reaction to the Son Tay rescue effort, Farnsworth's U.S. PW population was transferred to the Plantation PW Camp in Hanoi in November 1970.

HOA LO (HANOI HILTON). (See Appendix I). The Hoa Lo PW Camp, located in downtown Hanoi, became operational in August 1964 with the capture of LCDR E. Alvarez, USN. The detention facility was used continuously since that time as a processing point for captured U.S. personnel and as a camp of permanent detention. All acknowledged U.S. PWs captured in North Vietnam were moved into Hoa Lo in November and December 1970 after the Son Tay rescue attempt. The camp was the staging/collection point for the release of the first and second increments of U.S. PWs captured in North Vietnam and for the release of all U.S. PWs moved from South Vietnam and Laos.

MOUNTAIN CAMP. (See Appendix J). The Mountain Camp/Retreat located 40 miles northwest of Hanoi became operational in December 1971 when one prisoner from Hoa Lo and eight prisoners from Skidrow were moved to this location. This camp was used until January 1973 when its PW population was permanently moved to Hanoi for repatriation.

PLANTATION. (See Appendix K and K.1). The Plantation PW Camp, located in northeast Hanoi, became operational in June 1967. This installation became a "showplace" for U.S. PWs captured in North Vietnam. Numerous films, still photography and interviews of U.S. prisoners were staged at the Plantation. The camp remained open until July of 1970, when a major consolidation of U.S. PWs occurred. From July to November 1970 no U.S. PWs were held at the camp. In November 1970, in a reaction to the Son Tay rescue effort, the North Vietnamese moved the majority of U.S. PWs captured outside North Vietnam to the Plantation PW Camp. The camp remained open after this movement. In January 1973 the camp's existing population was moved to Hoa Lo, and the Plantation became the staging/collection point for the release of the third increment of PWs captured in North Vietnam.

ROCKPILE. (See Appendix L and L.1). The Rockpile PW Camp, located 32 miles south of Hanoi, became operational in June 1971 when 14 American and foreign PWs captured outside North Vietnam were moved from the Skidrow PW Camp to this facility. This installation ceased to function as a PW detention installation in February 1973 when its PW population was moved to Hanoi for repatriation.

SKIDROW. (See Appendix M). The Skidrow PW Camp, located 6 miles southwest of Hanoi, became operational as a U.S. PW detention facility in July 1968 when U.S. civilian and military prisoners captured outside North Vietnam were moved to this installation.

In March 1971, 36 prisoners captured in North Vietnam were moved from Hoa Lo to this facility because the North Vietnamese considered them "troublemakers." However, prior to the arrival of these prisoners, the personnel captured outside North Vietnam were transferred to another section of Skidrow to prevent communications between the two groups.

In June 1971, 14 of the civilian PWs captured outside North Vietnam were moved from Skidrow to the Rockpile PW Camp. Due to the threat of floods at Skidrow, the "troublemakers" were transferred to Hoa Lo Prison in July and August 1971. In early September, 21 PWs were moved from Hoa Lo to Skidrow, where they remained until November 1971 when they were again returned to Hoa Lo. A small group of U.S. PWs were moved from Hoa Lo to Skidrow in December 1971 for two weeks and then were returned to Hoa Lo. At this time, the remaining prisoners captured outside North Vietnam were moved from Skidrow to the "Mountain Camp," north of Hanoi.

In December 1971, Skidrow ceased to function as a detention facility for U.S. PWs.

SON TAY/CAMP HOPE. (See Appendix N and N.1). The Son Tay PW Camp became operational in May 1968 when twenty U.S. PWs captured in North Vietnam were moved to the camp. Two subsequent groups of prisoners were moved to this installation bringing the total prisoner population to 55 men. In a routine move on 14 July 1970, the entire camp population was moved to the Camp Faith PW Camp. This move was the beginning of a major regroupment of U.S. PWs which occurred in the summer of 1970.

ZOO. (See Appendix O). The Zoo PW Camp, located in the southwest suburbs of Hanoi, became operational in September 1965 and remained open until December 1970, when all PWs were

transferred to Hoa Lo. The Zoo PW Camp was used for two short periods during 1971 when two men captured in Laos were detained temporarily there before moving to the Rockpile PW Camp. In September 1971, the Zoo was reactivated on a more permanent basis and used primarily to hold U.S. PWs captured after December 1971. It replaced the Plantation PW Camp as the "showplace" and remained the "showplace" through 1972. The Zoo as a "showplace" was similar in function to the Plantation. Films showing U.S. PWs playing basketball, volleyball, and preparing for Christmas were staged and used for external consumption only. The Zoo was used as the staging/collection point for the repatriation of the fourth and final increment of PWs captured in North Vietnam.

A synopsis of the information provided in the preceding paragraphs is provided below:

NAME	LOCATION	DATES OF USE
* Alcatraz	North Central Hanoi	25 Oct 67 - 9 Dec 69 1 Jul 70 -17 Aug 70
* Briarpatch	33 miles WNW of Hanoi	13 Sep 65 -20 Sep 65 1 Dec 65 - 2 Feb 67 5 Feb 71 - 9 Jul 71
** Camp Faith	9 miles W of Hanoi	14 Jul 70 -24 Nov 70
** Camp Hope (Son Tay)	22 miles WNW of Hanoi	23 May 68 -14 Jul 70
** Dirty Bird	Northern Hanoi	29 Jun 67-25 Oct 67
** Dogpatch	105 miles NNE of Hanoi	14 May 72 -31 Jan 73
*** Farnsworth	18 miles SW of Hanoi	29 Aug 68 -25 Nov 70
* Hanoi Hilton (Hoa Lo Prison)	Central Hanoi	11 Aug 64 -28 Mar 73
* Mountain Camp (Mountain Retreat)	40 miles NW of Hanoi	12 Dec 71 -28 Jan 73
* Plantation	Northeast Hanoi	6 Jun 67 -30 Jul 70 25 Nov 70 -16 Mar 73
*** Rockpile	32 miles S of Hanoi	21 Jun 71 -14 Feb 73

NAME	LOCATION	DATES OF USE
* Skidrow	6 miles SW of Hanoi	7 Jul 68 -19 Aug 71 9 Sep 71 - 4 Nov 71 16 Dec 71 - 1 Jan 72
* Zoo	SW suburb of Hanoi	20 Sep 65 -26 Dec 70 8 Feb 71 -10 Mar 71 14 Jun 71 -10 Jul 71 24 Sep 71 -29 Mar 73

* - Camps used for detention of PWs captured both in North Vietnam and outside North Vietnam.

** - Camps used exclusively for detention of PWs captured in North Vietnam.

*** - Camps used exclusively for detention of U.S. PWs captured outside North Vietnam and subsequently moved to North Vietnam.



Appendix A



Appendix B



Appendix C



Appendix C.1

Appendix D



Appendix E

DIRTY BIRD ANNEX



Appendix F

Appendix G



Appendix L



Appendix L.1

Appendix M

Appendix N



Appendix N.1

Appendix O



Appendix H

Appendix I

Appendix J

Appendix K

Appendix K.1

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

PW CAMPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA

The PW camps located outside of North Vietnam differed greatly from those permanent detention facilities located in that country. PWs captured outside of North Vietnam were usually held in caves or easily constructed native structures. Because of the thick jungle canopy the camps were often hidden from view (see Appendix A). In typical guerrilla fashion the Viet Cong, Khmer Rouge, and Pathet Lao forces frequently moved the PWs from camp to camp. Appendixes A.1 through A.6 are photographs of a typical guerrilla PW camp.



Appendix A.6

Appendix A



Appendix A.1

Appendix A.3

PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS IN CAMBODIA

In Cambodia, prisoners were detained by the VC/NVA in three separate areas along the eastern border with South Vietnam (Appendix A). The PW camps were generally small and constructed of easily obtainable local material or by modifying existing structures. The PWs held in these camps were often moved to prevent detection. These camps were similar in structure and function to the highly mobile VC PW camps in South Vietnam.

Virtually nothing is known about the Khmer Rouge PW detention system. It is assumed that if a camp system did exist, it was similar to the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao guerrilla type PW camps.

VC/NVA DETENTION AREAS



Appendix A

PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS IN LAOS

PW camps in Laos differed greatly from the permanent detention facilities and the attendant camp system in North Vietnam. The Pathet Lao had no discernable system for the movement and handling of PWs. Pathet Lao PW camps appear to be similar to guerrilla camps found in South Vietnam and in Cambodia. Guerrilla camps were usually constructed of locally obtained materials or existing structures were used to contain prisoners. In typical guerrilla fashion, camps were usually located in thick jungle cover to restrict observation from the air and ground. The Pathet Lao frequently moved camp locations for security against detection.

The Pathet Lao also made use of Sam Neua and the cave complex in the vicinity of Sam Neua to detains PWs. The Ban Nakay Teu Cave (Appendix A and B) is an example of a Laotian cave complex in the Sam Neua area.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

13 APR 1976

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

In reply refer to:
I-3826/76

Mr. J. Angus MacDonald, Staff Director
United States House of Representatives
Select Committee on Missing Persons in
Southeast Asia
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. MacDonald:

During Dr. Shields' testimony to the Select Committee on February 4, 1976, reference was made to the number of beepers that were heard on the ground. Specifically, of the 438 presently carried in MIA status, how many beepers were activated, and, of these, how many actual voice contacts were made.

The USAF Casualty Office provides the following information:

1. 104 beepers were heard.

2. 227 personnel were involved in these incidents (for example, a beeper related to a B-52 crash would involve 6 or 7 personnel).

a. 46 persons were talked to on the ground (21 of whom are still missing).

b. 55 persons were returned to military control.

Sincerely,

RAYMOND A. VOHDEN
Captain USN
Principal Advisor
PW/MIA Affairs

CRASH SITES IN LAOS ASSOCIATED WITH MIA'S.




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
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Lao Cai
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Thai Nguyen
Lang Son
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Tuan Giao
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Hanoi
Haiphong
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Houei Sai
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Muong Sen
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Tung-fang
Huang-liu
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VIENTIANE
Nong Khai
Udon Thani
Dong Hoi
Khammouane (Thakhek)
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Sépone
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Hue
Phitsanulok
Khon Kaen
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Saravane
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Nakhon Ratchasima
Warin Chamrap
Pakse
Attopeu
Prachin Buri
BANGKOK
Chachoengsao
Sisophon
Siem Reap
Stung Treng
Samut Songkhram
Battambang
Kratie
Pursat
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PHNOM PENH
Kompong Speu
Svay Rieng
Bien Hoa
SAIGON
Phan Thiet
Sihanoukville
Kampot
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

OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH

Final Report

BIOMEDICAL ASPECTS OF AIRCRAFT ESCAPE AND SURVIVAL UNDER COMBAT CONDITIONS

by

Martin G. Every
James F. Parker, Jr.

Contract No. N00014-72-C-0101
Task No. NR 105-667

March 1976

BioTechnology, Inc.
3027 ROSEMARY LANE • FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA

FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study is part of a program for the Office of Naval Research to examine the problems of combat escape and survival for Navy aircrewmen. This phase was undertaken to respond to operational requirements identified by Captain Frank H. Austin, Jr., MC, USN, Director, Aerospace Medicine Division, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and Program Coordinator for the Life Support Systems Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare), Washington, D.C. Dr. Arthur B. Callahan, Program Director, Medicine and Dentistry Program, Biological and Medical Sciences Division, Office of Naval Research, served as Technical Monitor during the course of the project.

The purpose of the study was to combine Navy prisoner-of war escape and survival event data, collected during an earlier phase, with detailed injury information associated with specific mishaps. The combined data were analyzed to determine the etiology of escape injuries as well as their consequences during later survival phases.

Special thanks must go to the 106 repatriated prisoners of war who took the time and effort to supply the event information about their mishaps, and to Captain Robert E. Mitchell, MC, USN, and his staff at the Naval Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory, Pensacola, Florida. Dr. Mitchell's time, patience, and medical records were invaluable in our obtaining the type of detailed injury information necessary for this study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The experiences of Navy aircrewmen forced to eject during combat operations in Southeast Asia represent a unique and invaluable data bank against which to evaluate the procedures and equipment used for aircraft escape, survival, and rescue. Missions flown by these aircrewmen frequently were into heavily fortified regions of hostile territory during which aircraft losses were significant. The ultimate outcome of these aircraft losses for the aircrewmen who were involved is shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Status of Navy Aircrewmen
Following Ejection Over Southeast Asia

Recovered	Prisoner of War	Missing or Killed In Action
39%	28%	33%

The numbers in Table 1 present a somber picture. Close to two-thirds of the aircrewmen forced to leave their aircraft either became prisoners of war or were subsequently listed as missing or killed in action. Less than 40 percent were recovered and, of these, 29 percent suffered major injuries. For an aviator forced to abandon a disabled aircraft in combat, the chances of returning with either minor or no injuries were less than 30 percent.

The combat figure contrasts greatly with peace-time statistics (CY 1973) in which 87 percent of all ejections were successful, in terms of the aviator being alive, and, of these, only 12 percent involved major injury. For an aviator forced to abandon a disabled aircraft in peace-time, the chances of returning with either minor or no injuries are slightly less than 80 percent. The difference between an 80-percent satisfactory outcome in peace-time versus a 30-percent satisfactory outcome in combat is striking. This provides ample justification for a critical review of the combat use of procedures and equipment required for aircraft escape, and for the survival and rescue of crewmen.

In October 1971, BioTechnology, Inc., under contract to the Office of Naval Research, with technical guidance provided by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, initiated a study program to analyze problems of combat escape and survival. The principal objectives of the program were to: (1) identify unique biomedical problems associated with the escape and survival of Navy

aircrewmen under combat conditions in Southeast Asia; and (2) develop a computerized data base for use in detailed studies of specific biomedical issues, especially those relating to ejection and survival injuries, escape equipment, personal protective equipment, rescue problems, and prisoner of war survival. The following technical reports were prepared earlier as part of this effort:

> Every, M.G., & Parker, J.F., Jr. A review of problems encountered in the recovery of Navy aircrewmen under combat conditions. Prepared for the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., June 1973.
>
> Every, M.G., & Parker, J.F., Jr. Aircraft escape and survival experiences of Navy prisoners of war. Prepared for the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., August 1974.

The data summarized in these reports delineate the escape conditions and types of injuries associated with ejection and survival following an air combat mishap in Southeast Asia. From analyses of these data, it was evident that the conditions of a combat ejection and the resulting injuries are, on the average, appreciably more severe than those normally encountered by aircrewmen during noncombat (operational) ejections. The severity of combat ejection injuries was often compounded during the landing, escape, and evasion phases of the survival. In many cases, these injuries made it extremely difficult to operate life support and signaling equipment, and in some cases, were so severe as to remove any possibility of evading the enemy and effecting a successful recovery. In many instances, the increased hover time necessary to locate and recover severely injured aircrewmen added to the risk for search and rescue (SAR) helicopters and crews.

Project Objectives

Earlier analyses of combat escape data showed the need for more specific injury information in order to establish precise injury cause-and-effect relationships during high speed escape. Using detailed injury data, specific injury causal agents in ejection equipment or in escape procedures might be identified. A precise specification of injuries sustained during the escape and survival phases could be used to evaluate the adequacy of life support, signaling, and rescue equipment. These injury data would further serve design engineers in their efforts to improve high speed ejection procedures and combat survival probabilities. The specific objectives of this project were to:

1. Draw upon and expand the data base developed earlier at BioTechnology, Inc. dealing with the specific circumstances of a large number of combat escapes from Navy aircraft. This information is referred to as the *event* data.

2. Work with the Naval Aerospace Medical Institute to use the very detailed medical information being obtained by that facility which describes the site and nature of specific injuries suffered by Navy prisoners of war. This information is referred to as the *medical* data.
3. Relate medical data to event data so that inferences might be drawn concerning the causal agents in combat escape which produce particular injury patterns.
4. Develop tabular and graphic presentations for the event/injury relationships, for individual cases and for group summaries, which might be used by military planners and by design engineers concerned with the development and evaluation of procedures and equipment for combat escape, survival, and rescue.

PROCEDURES

The first part of the project period was spent in updating and expanding the event data file developed by BioTechnology, Inc. as part of earlier efforts. This included adding questionnaires completed by some survivors who were solicited as part of the earlier project but whose responses were received too late to be of value at the time. Additional data describing ejection circumstances was obtained from the records maintained by the Center for Naval Analyses, Washington, D.C. Information concerning specific ejection seat use in the different combat aircraft was obtained through the offices of the Crew Systems Division of the Naval Air Systems Command.

Pensacola Prisoner of War Program

Data describing the precise injuries suffered by Navy POW aircrewmen was obtained principally from the medical files developed at the Naval Aerospace Medical Institute (NAMI), Pensacola, Florida, as part of the "Repatriated Prisoner of War Program." This program, in Pensacola, under the direction of Captain Robert E. Mitchell, MC, USN, is a joint effort between NAMI and the Center for Prisoner of War Studies, San Diego, California. The program was started in 1972 as a long-term prospective study regarding the cause and prognosis of disease in former prisoners of war.

Because no long-term data are available, a decision was made by the Department of Defense to follow the present group of repatriated prisoners annually for at least five years. Programs similar to that being carried on by the Navy are also being conducted by the Army and the Air Force.

The Naval Aerospace Medical Institute was selected as the most logical place for the conduct of this study for several reasons: first, the majority of the men were or had been aviation personnel; second, personnel at this facility have experience in following a similar group, the "Thousand Aviators," in a longitudinal medical examination of aviation personnel extending over a 34-year period; third, because of the need for uniformity of the examinations if the data are to be meaningful; fourth, because the records on each man will be concentrated in one place; fifth, because, hopefully, there will be some degree of continuity of examining personnel.

The annual follow-up examination of each man is including essentially the same studies as were performed in the initial examination, with deletion only of those tests which were done to detect captivity-related abnormalities. In an attempt to determine whether the results obtained in the repatriated group are related to the captivity experience, a control group of men matched by such variables as age, etc. will be started in April 1976.

The prisoner of war repatriates consisted of 141 Navy or ex-Navy men and 37 Marine Corps or ex-Marine Corps men, 140 of whom are or were aviation personnel. Tests conducted on these men included a searching interim history to determine how the man had fared in the interval since repatriation; a thorough physical examination; a complete battery of blood studies, including serologies for malaria and other Southeast Asia parasites, the latter being done by the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta; special x-rays; stress studies for heart disease; studies of lung functions; and studies of the organs of balance. The psychiatry half of the study, in addition to the usual psychiatric interviews, included extensive psychological testing. Special consultations were done on each man including dental, ear, nose and throat, eye, hearing, and such other specialties as were indicated. For orthopedics, surgery, dermatology, and urology, the man was referred to the Naval Hospital.

For those technical studies where feasible, documentation was by means of tape for computer analysis. Code sheets and mark-sense sheets were also used for computerized data processing. All records are being preserved on microfilm.

BioTechnology Data Retrieval

As the injury data were taken by BioTechnology personnel from NAMI files, each injury was coded in terms of the following: description, site, specific location, time, severity, and probable cause of the injury. The section of the BTI coding manual used in this process is presented in Appendix A. The coded medical data was then transferred onto 80-column punch cards and combined with prisoner of war event data already on file (see aviation casualty report Form BTI-73). The type, location, and degree of injury was cross-tallied with escape event data to determine relevant injury pattern relationships. In some cases, the injury data from recovered aircrewmen were combined with prisoner of war data. These instances will be noted, where appropriate, in this report.

When injury analyses comparing prisoner of war and recovered data were conducted, it was found that there were significantly fewer minor injuries recorded for the prisoner of war group. In all probability, this was due to the fact that the prisoner of war group sustained a much higher number of major injuries which led them to disregard minor injuries and also to the long period of imprisonment for many of the POW survivors which resulted in their forgetting the less significant injuries.

Injury classifications throughout this report were made using the instruction under Injury Classification of OPNAV INST 3750.6G (see Appendix B).

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Escape Conditions

This section summarizes escape conditions encountered during Southeast Asia air combat mishaps. Table 2 compares the ratios of aircraft type used in this study with total losses in Southeast Asia. It can be seen that the study sample closely approximates the actual ratios of Navy combat aircraft losses. The two groups in this study were composed of 104 recovered and 106 prisoner of war aircrewmen.

Table 2

Comparison of Total Navy Aircraft POW and Recovered Southeast Asia Losses with Aircraft Ratios Making up Study Group

Aircraft	Total Navy POW/REC Losses – SE Asia	BioTechnology Study Group Cases (POW & REC)
A-4	33%	39%
A-6	11%	10%
A-7	9%	7%
F-4	26%	24%
F-8	14%	13%
RA-5C	7%	7%

The mean speed at the time of initial aircraft damage for the recovered and POW groups was very similar. One major difference during the initial phase of the mishap, was the greater degree of structural damage suffered by POW group aircraft. The severity of this damage allowed POW aircrewmen much less time to slow and control the aircraft before initiating ejection (Table 3). The various aircraft attitudes at time of ejection are shown in Table 4. The higher number of adverse attitudes in the POW group attest to this group having less control over their aircraft at the time of ejection, and is significantly related to problems associated with body position at time of ejection.

If the 0- to 500-foot (takeoff and landing mishap) category is omitted (Figure 1), altitudes at the time of ejection for the prisoner of war group is similar to that for both the recovered and noncombat groups. Speed at time of ejection, however, shows very dissimilar curves (Figure 2). These differences are especially relevant in the high speed, critical injury range above 400 KIAS. A listing of ejection speed by aircraft type for the prisoner of war group and a comparison with

recovered and noncombat ejection speed ranges is given in Table 5. It can be seen from the data in this table that over 60 percent of the prisoners of war ejected at speeds greater than 400 knots, while only 5 percent of the operational (noncombat) group ejected at speeds that high. Eight percent of the prisoner of war group ejected at speeds in excess of 600 knots. Mean ejection speed by aircraft type for the POW group is presented in Table 6. The overall mean ejection speed for the entire POW group was 407 knots. This compares with an overall speed of 302 knots for aircrewmen recovered in combat and a speed of approximately 213 knots for noncombat ejections occurring during approximately the same time period.

Table 3

Mean Times From Aircraft Damage Until Ejection

Type	Recovered Aircrewmen Mean Time (Min)	Prisoner of War Mean Time (Min)
A–4	10.3	1.0
A–6	13.8	.5
A–7	2.4	1.0
F–4	18.6	1.6
F–8	10.6	.5
RA–5C	2.1	.2

Table 4

Aircraft Attitude at Time of Escape

Attitude	Number of Times Reported	
	Recovered Group (104 Cases)	POW Group (106 Cases)
Nose down	32	57
Rolling	13	31
Right bank	11	13
Left bank	13	12
Tumbling	2	12
Inverted	6	9
Disintegration	1	9
Straight and level	29	7
Nose up	30	6
Nose down spin	0	7
Oscillating spin	0	3
Flat spin	1	2
Mushing	3	0



Figure 1. Combat versus operational ejection altitudes.



Figure 2. Combat versus operational ejection speeds.

Table 5

Ejection Speeds for Nonfatal Mishaps

Speed (KIAS)	Prisoner of War Aircraft Type						Percent		
	A–4	A–6	A–7	RA–5C	F–4	F–8	POW Combat 1964 – 1973 (97 cases)	Recovered Combat 1966 – 1972 (102 cases)	Operational 1966 – 1970 (794 cases)
0 – 99							0	0	6.4
100 – 149					1		1.0	2.9	20.7
150 – 199	2					1	3.1	10.8	22.0
200 – 249	3		1		2		6.2	15.7	23.3
250 – 299	3		1		2		6.2	25.5	11.2
300 – 349	4		1		3	1	7.3	8.8	7.7
350 – 399	5	4			2	2	13.4	9.8	3.7
400 – 449	4	5	2	1	2		14.4	11.8	1.5
450 – 499	6	2	1		5	3	17.5	8.8	2.4
500 & over	8	1		7	8	4	28.8	5.9	1.1

Table 6

Mean Ejection Speed by Aircraft Type
(POW Group)

Aircraft Type	A-4	A-6	A-7	F-4	F-8	RA-5C
Mean Ejection Speed (KIAS)	378	408	337	403	420	588

Aircraft Escape Injuries

Table 7 gives a breakdown of major and minor injuries by location of injury and phase of the mishap in which the injury occurred. While serious injuries occurred during every phase of escape and survival, almost 90 percent of the major injuries (Table 8) were inflicted during the relatively few seconds between initial aircraft damage and parachute deployment. Ejection injuries, especially to the spine, extremities, and torso (torso injuries in this case are mostly shoulder injuries from flailing), comprise almost two-thirds of those incurred during the entire mishap.

Table 7

Location of Major and Minor Injuries Incurred by Prisoner of War Study Group
During All Phases of Mishap
(106 Cases)

	Head and Face	Neck	Upper Ext.	Spine	Torso*	Lower Ext.	General Overall	Total	Percent
Pre-Ejection	9	5	14	0	3	11	0	42	18
During Ejection	15	6	36	33	26	40	4	160	69
During Descent	0	3	0	1	0	2	0	6	3
During Landing	0	1	0	3	1	16	0	21	9
During Survival	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1
Total	25	16	50	37	30	70	4	232	
Percent	11	7	22	16	13	30	2		

*Torso injuries are predominantly shoulder injuries.

Nonfatal injury rates obtained from POW, recovered, operational, and Air Force data are compared in Table 9. The probable causes of the prisoner of war injuries (major and minor) are shown in Table 10. Enemy-inflicted and burn injuries were predominantly "in the cockpit" or pre-ejection injuries. Ejection seat "G" forces, extremity flail, and striking objects during escape caused the more serious as well as the greatest number of injuries. Parachute landings were responsible for a high number of injuries including fractures, dislocations, and severe sprains to the lower extremities. Unfortunately, it cannot be ascertained from these data the extent to which existing injuries were compounded during landing or escape and evasion. Considering the high number of severe injuries encountered during ejection, however, there is a likelihood that landing impact further disabled individuals, perhaps to the point of making survival impossible. This would be especially true if an injured aircrewman did not receive immediate emergency care either self-administered, from rescue personnel, or from his captors. Table 11 lists the types of major injuries sustained by the prisoner of war group during their mishap. Fractures and dislocations, most of which were incurred during the ejection sequence, were, by far, the most prevalent types of major injury.

Table 8
Major Injury Summary
(POW Group)

Escape Phase	Number of POW's Suffering at Least One Major Injury During Phase*	Total Major Injuries During Phase	Location of Major Injuries					
			Head and Face	Neck	Upper Extremities	Spine	Torso	Lower Extremities
Pre-Ejection	8	13	3	2	5		1	2
During or Probably During Ejection	44	60	1		17	12	12**	18
During Descent	1	1						1
During Landing	6	6				1		5
After Landing — Before Capture	0	0						

*2 pilots not included on this table suffered major injury during an unknown phase of the mishap.
**Predominantly shoulder area injuries — associated with arm flailing.

Table 9
Nonfatal Injury Comparison

	Major	Minor	None
Navy POW Combat	53%	24%	23%
Navy Recovered Combat[1]	29%	43%	28%
Navy Operational[2]	19%	37%	44%
Air Force Recovered Combat[3]	15–26%	–	–
Air Force POW Combat[4]	38%	42%	20%

[1]Every & Parker, 1973.
[2]Naval Safety Center, 1973.
[3]Till & Shannon, 1970.
[4]Shannon, 1974.

Table 10
Probable Cause of Known Injury
(POW Group)

	Percent
Flail	33
Enemy Inflicted	17
Ejection Seat G Forces	14
Struck Object	13
Parachute Landing	11
Fire	10
Parachute Opening Shock	2

Table 11
Nature of Major Escape Injuries
(106 Cases all Phases)

Major Injury	Number of Times Occurring
Amputation of Thumb	1
Burns	6
Contusions (Severe)	3
Dislocations	22
Simple Fractures	32
Compound Fractures	9
Spinal Compression Fractures	16
Severe Sprains	6
Torn Muscle or Ligament	9
Gunshot Wound	8
Severe Lacerations	3

Injury Occurrence by Phase of Escape

Pre-Ejection

The period of time from initial aircraft damage until ejection seat initiation is the pre-ejection phase. Table 8 in the previous section gave the location of injuries for the eight prisoners of war who sustained major injuries during this phase. The cause of four of these injuries was fire in the cockpit; the other four injuries were from gunshot or shrapnel wounds. All of these injuries were the direct result of enemy-inflicted damage.

Combining the minor pre-ejection injuries with the major injuries (Table 12) results in 42 injuries reported by the POW group for this phase. Seventeen of these injuries resulted from fire in the cockpit and 25 as a direct result of wounds caused by enemy ordnance.

Table 12

Location of Major and Minor Pre-Ejection Injuries
(POW Group)

Head and Face	Neck	Upper Ext.	Spine	Torso	Lower Ext.
9	5	14	0	3	11

There were no reports from the POW group of these injuries causing significant difficulties with ejection seat initiation. There were, however, some difficulties reported by the recovered group (Every & Parker, 1973), and preliminary examination of some MIA and KIA data indicates there are cases where nonsuccessful escape attempts may be linked to pre-ejection injury.

For both the prisoner of war group and the recovered group, the more severe lacerations and burns caused some problems during escape and evasion. Gunshot wounds and burns were particularly painful and troublesome during prisoner of war captivity.

Ejection

For those not familiar with some of the basic characteristics of the ejection seats which will be discussed in this section, Appendix C gives a brief description of each of the seat types utilized in the aircraft comprising this study.

The vast majority of serious injuries occurred during the ejection phase. Figure 3 shows the percent of prisoner of war survivors sustaining major ejection injuries at various ejection speeds. Typically, the more severe, multiple major injuries occurred during ejections executed in the upper speed ranges. Primary causes of these major injuries were:

- Flail — 60 percent
- G forces — 15 percent
- Striking equipment — 8 percent
- Unknown or other causes — 17 percent

Many survivors who reported "cause unknown" could not state the exact cause of their injury because they were unconscious at the time of its occurrence.



Figure 3. Percent of survivors sustaining a major injury v/s ejection speed.

The rate and severity of ejection injury showed some measure of fluctuation depending on aircraft type (Table 13). While injury rate was related to variables such as aircraft attitude at time of ejection, ejection seat "G" forces, and whether or not the canopy was jettisoned prior to ejection, the dominant cause was extremity flail. Each of these ejection problems will be discussed in turn.

Table 13

Major Ejection Injury by Aircraft Type

Aircraft	Number of Ejections	Number of Persons Sustaining a Known Major Ejection Injury (A)	Total Number of Major Ejection Injuries Sustained (B)	Major Ejection Injury Rate B/A
A-4	40	18	51	2.8
A-6	12	6	5	.8
A-7	6	2	2	1.0
F-4	27	9	15	1.7
F-8	11	3	3	1.0
RA-5C	10	6	13	2.2

Flail Injury. Figure 4 shows the increase in flail injury with increase in ejection speed in the prisoner of war group. As was found in the recovered group study, the 300- and 400-knot range seems to be the point where the injury curve rises sharply.



Figure 4. Incidence of major flail injury v/s ejection speed.

Windblast-induced flailing of extremities produced the greatest number of major injuries during the entire escape sequence. Windblast, also referred to as ram pressure or Q force, varies with the density of the airstream and, therefore, for the same true air speed, is reduced as altitude increases.

It is thus related to indicated airspeed rather than true airspeed and varies with the square of the velocity. The following formula for Q forces is from Ring (1975):

$$Q = \tfrac{1}{2}\rho V^2$$

Q = dynamic air pressure in Newtons/meter^2 (N/m^2)

ρ = air density in Kg/m^2

V = velocity in m/second

This relationship is expressed in Figure 5. Gillies (1965) states that the effects of these Q forces can be divided into those produced by direct pressure on the body, such as petechial and subconjunctival hemorrhages, and those produced by flailing of the head and extremities. Head flailing may cause unconsciousness or fatal brain damage, while flailing of the arms and legs can lead to fractures or joint dislocations. When the body is unsupported, a Q force of approximately 3×10^4 N/m^2 or more can lead to flailing that cannot be controlled by muscular effort. The onset of flailing can be so rapid that muscular reflex action is ineffectual even at Q values below 3×10^4 N/m^2. At Q values of 3.7×10^4 N/m^2, full abduction of the hip joints can take place in 1/10 second; at greater speeds, the loads of unsupported limbs may exceed the strength of the major joints. Where relevant, Q forces will be listed with ejection speeds through the remainder of this report so that comparisons can be made with other studies in the literature.



Figure 5. Dynamic air pressure vs. airspeed. (Ring, 1975)

It is important to note that it is not the Q force per se that causes the injuries associated with high speed ejection. Payne (1975) cites examples of persons exposed to 4.8×10^4 N/m^2 to 14.4×10^4 N/m^2 without serious injury. The problem lies in the two distinctive injury patterns associated with higher Q forces. The first, generally referred to as true windblast, normally results in only minor injury to soft tissue. The second type, commonly referred to as flail injury, results from the summation of forces over larger areas producing differential decelerations of the extremity relative to the torso and seat (Ring, Brinkley, & Noyes, 1975). The sudden stop of the extremity as a result of striking the seat structure or reaching the limit of the joint often results in severe extremity dislocation and/or fracture, examples of which are shown in Figures 6 and 7.

Major ejection flail injuries sustained by prisoners of war are listed in Table 14 by speed and Q force at the time of ejection. Eighty-two percent of this group reported ejection speeds of 400 knots or greater. Survivors who ejected at speeds below 450 knots sustained an average of 1.5 major flail injuries during ejection, while those ejecting at speeds above 450 knots had an average of 2.4 major flail injuries per ejection. Two ejection speeds were unknown due to unconsciousness at time of ejection. A summary of major ejection and flail injury types is shown in Table 15. The nonflail injuries are primarily attributable to striking some object during ejection. The general locations of major flail injuries are shown in Figure 8. Figure 9 presents the specific location of all known major ejection injuries sustained by the musculoskeletal system.

Appendix D lists ejection Q forces, ejection speed, method of initiating ejection, and degree of ejection injury sustained by all prisoners of war in this study. It is apparent from this listing that 50 percent of the survivors received major ejection injuries at Q forces above the value of 4.4×10^4 N/m^2, and 75 percent of the aircrewmen received major wounds ejection at Q forces above the value of 6.2×10^4 N/m^2.

Table 16 compares flail injury and aircraft type. The high mean ejection speed encountered by RA-5C aircrewmen accounts for the large number of flail injuries (50 percent). Both the A-4 and A-7 aircraft, however, show lower mean ejection speed than other aircraft, yet major flail injury rates for those two aircraft were relatively high. The A-4 and A-7 aircraft both use the Douglas Escapac ejection seat, which does not have lower leg restraints.



Figure 6. (Case 072) Injury – Segmental fracture of right humerus (healed with angulation). Cause – Flail during ejection.



Figure 7. (Case 074) Injury – Fracture dislocation of left shoulder (healed with displacement).
Cause – Out of position during ejection, followed by extremity flail.

Table 14
Prisoners of War Sustaining a Known Major Ejection Flail Injury*

BTI #	Ejection Speed KIAS	Ejection Q Force x 10^4 N/m^2	Aircraft Type	Major Flail Injury Description
56	735	8.7	RA-5C	Left shoulder dislocated, fracture neck left humerus, fracture left ulna
54	640	6.6	RA-5C	Torn ligaments left shoulder
24	620	6.2	RA-5C	Dislocation and fracture right elbow, fracture of ulna, unconscious
34	600	5.8	F-4	Dislocated left knee with torn medial ligament, dislocation right elbow
100	600	5.8	RA-5C	Fracture right humerus, unconscious
4	550	5.0	A-4	Torn ligaments right knee, possible fracture right tibia and right fibula
20	500	4.1	A-4	Bilateral shoulder dislocations, bilateral fractures upper humerus, fracture fibula
32	500	4.1	F-4	Bilateral elbow dislocations
42	500	4.1	A-4	Bilateral shoulder dislocations, fracture right humerus, knee dislocated, fracture left fifth metacarpal, unconscious, possible fracture at left knee
57	500	4.1	RA-5C	Two vertebrae in neck injured, severe strain neck muscles and tendons
72	500	4.1	A-4	Comminuted fracture left humerus, fracture right humerus, torn ligaments right knee, fracture femoral condyle
115	500	4.1	A-4	Right knee dislocated with torn ligaments
66	490	3.9	A-4	Right shoulder dislocated, fracture right humerus, dislocation right knee, laceration right knee
114	475	3.7	A-4	Fractured scapula, possible fracture left humeral head
74	450	3.3	A-4	Left shoulder dislocated, fracture left humerus, fracture left knee, dislocation left knee
96	450	3.3	A-7	Torn ligaments left knee, dislocated left knee
36	420	2.9	F-4	Fracture right elbow
117	420	2.9	A-6	Fracture right humerus
78	400	2.6	A-4	Torn ligaments in both knees, unconscious
125	350	2.0	A-4	Fracture left humerus
26	300	1.5	A-4	Right shoulder dislocation, fracture anterior neck right humerus
91	250	1.0	A-4	Left shoulder dislocation
89	Unk	Unk	A-4	Fracture dislocation left shoulder, unconscious
122	Unk	Unk	A-4	Fracture left shoulder, fractured ribs

*Eight individuals, not included in this table, sustained major flail type injuries. These cases were not included; however, because in six of the cases the aircrewmen was unconscious during the entire escape event and in the other two cases there was an equal probability that the injuries may have been caused by some other agent than flail.

Table 15

Types and Frequencies of Major POW Flail and Ejection Injuries*

Type of Injury	Flail Only Frequency	All Ejection Injuries
Dislocations	20	21
Fractures		
Simple	20	31
Compound	4	5
Torn ligaments or muscles or severe sprains	9	9

*Includes only known flail and ejection injuries; excludes all spinal-compression fractures.



Figure 8. General location of major flail injuries.

When flail injuries are classified by upper and lower extremity and compared against ejection seat type (see Table 17), it again appears that those seats with lower extremity restraints do offer more anti-flail protection than those without, especially at the higher speeds normally associated with combat escape. When similar comparisons of seat type versus degree of injury sustained over ejection speed ranges are compared, the results again favor those seats with lower extremity restraints (Table 18).

A Chi-square statistical test was made of the relationship between the two types of seats and severity of injury. The results of this comparison show a significant difference between the two seats (see Table 19). In all probability, the lower incidence of lower extremity flail (Table 17) is attributable to the lower extremity restraints on the Martin-Baker seat. The reason for the lower incidence of upper extremity flail with the Martin-Baker seat is unclear.

Specific Location of all Non-Vertebral Musculo-skeletal Major Ejection Injuries



* INDICATES EXACT AREA UNKNOWN.

Figure 9. Specific locations of all non-vertebral musculoskeletal major ejection flail injuries (composite from 24 POW's reporting known flail injuries).

Table 16

Percent of POW Survivors Sustaining Major Flail Injury by Aircraft Type

Aircraft Type	Mean Ejection Speed (KIAS)	Type Ejection Seat	Percent of Ejectees Sustaining A Major Flail Injury
A-4	378	D	36
A-6	408	M-B	9
A-7	337	D	17
F-4	403	M-B	11
F-8	420	M-B	0
RA-5C	588	N.A.	60

D = Douglas Escapac Seat
M-B = Martin-Baker Seat
N.A. = North American Seat

Table 17

POW Ejection Extremity Flail Injury Rates*

	Douglas Seat A-4 & A-7 45 Ejections	Martin-Baker F-4, A-6 & F-8 49 Ejections	North American RA-5C 10 Ejections
Upper Extremity Flail Rate	24%	8%	40%
Lower Extremity Flail Rate	20%	4%	0%

* % = (Number of persons suffering major flail injury / Number of persons ejecting with a specific seat)

Table 18

Comparison of POW Ejection Seat Major Flail Injury Rate by Air Speed

Ejection Speed KIAS	Percent Major Flail, by Ejection Seat Type	
	Martin-Baker 48 Cases	Douglas 41 Cases
0-300	0	14.3
301-450	8	25
451+	13	64
All Speeds	8	32

Table 19

Severity of Ejection Flail Injury Versus Ejection Seat Type

Ejection Flail Injury Severity	Douglas	Martin-Baker
Major	13	4
Minor or None	28	44

$\chi^2 = 7.81, p < .01$

The method of initiating ejection (face curtain or seat pan handle) was also compared against type and frequency of major ejection flail injuries sustained by the prisoners of war (Table 20). The incidence of major flail injuries among the prisoners of war was the same regardless of the ejection seat initiation method used. However, the incidence of *multiple* major flail injury was somewhat higher in aircrewmen who initiated ejection utilizing the secondary handle. While it is recognized that a number of causal factors go into making up the various types of escape injury, having the body out of proper position at time of ejection appears to increase the likelihood of injury occurrence or severity.

Table 20

Major Flail Injury Versus Method of Ejection Seat Initiation (POW Group)

Method	No. Using	Major Flail Injury Rate (Percent)	Percent Sustaining Multiple Major Flail Injuries
Face Curtain	60	22	12
Seat Pan Handle	36	22	17

Injury Due to Striking Objects During Ejection. A number of aircrewmen reported striking cockpit structures during ejection. While most of these injuries were minor, two groups appear to have had a somewhat higher major injury rate: (1) the RIOs and RANs in the backseat of two-place aircraft, who often were not ready for ejection and had extremities extended to strike objects; and (2) those aircrewmen ejecting through-the-canopy from the A-6 aircraft. This latter group appears to have had a disproportionate number of severe injuries. Combining prisoner of war and recovered

group data from survivors utilizing this method of escape reveals that, of the 16 through-the-canopy (primary sequence) ejections, 50 percent resulted in major injuries. Many of these involved severe lacerations. Of the five who jettisoned the canopy in this aircraft prior to ejection, there were no major injuries (see Table 21).

Table 21

Degree of Ejection Injury Versus Mode of Ejection for A–6 Combat (Recovered & POW) Mishaps

	Mean Speed	Degree of Ejection Injury		
		Major	Minor	None
Thru-the-Canopy (N = 16)	360	50%	25%	25%
Jettison Canopy (N = 5)	317	0%	60%	40%

Injuries Due to Ejection Seat G_z Forces. When an aviator is catapulted from an aircraft during emergency ejection, he experiences a high rate of change of acceleration. The peak accelerative force imparted to the aircrewman, while primarily related to the type of seat charge propelling the seat, varies as a result of a number of factors including the weight of the man - seat assembly, aircraft attitude, temperature, position of the man in the seat, etc.

The effects of accelerations of short duration with rapid onset such as those experienced in ejection seat firing are difficult to predict. The response of bone and organs to deformation or shearing varies greatly and injuries are not necessarily most severe at the site of application of the force (West, Every, & Parker, 1972). Spinal compression injuries are the most common spinal injury resulting from these forces (see Figure 10). This is primarily because the center of gravity of the upper trunk lies in the front of the spine and a bending movement is applied to the spine during ejection. The anterior lips of the lumbar or thoracic vertebrae are the most susceptible to fracture.

Sixteen of the prisoners of war sustained some measure of spinal compression fracture during the escape (Table 22). It is almost impossible to establish precise cause relationships for this type of injury. However, it appears that body position is one of the more important variables. Spinal fractures occurred almost twice as frequently in those initiating ejection with the seat pan handle as in persons using the face curtain. The incidence of *multiple* spinal compression fracture was higher by a factor of over five for those using the seat pan handle when compared with personnel using the

Figure 10. (Case 133) Injury – Compression fracture T-12 and L-1. Cause – Out of position at time of ejection.

face curtain. It must be noted, however, that in some cases the secondary handle was used in an extreme situation or when negative G's or some other adverse circumstance forced the survivor out of optimum ejection position. Table 23 summarizes spinal compression injury frequency by aircraft type.

Table 22

Known Spinal Compression Injuries Sustained During Ejection
(POW Group, 106 Cases)

Aircraft	Ejection Speed KIAS	Method of Ejection Seat Initiation	Seat Mod.	Spinal Compression Fractures Vertebrae Injured (Severity)*
RA-5C	550	Face Curtain	HS-1**	T-8(2)
RA-5C	Unk.	Sec. Handle	HS-1	T-10(2)
RA-5C	600	Unknown	HS-1	T-9(1)
F-8	350	Face Curtain	MK-F5	T-12(2)
F-4	420	Sec. Handle	MK-H7	Unk. (2)
F-4	300	Face Curtain	MK-H7	T-12(2); L-1(2)
F-4	Unk.	Unknown	MK-H5	T-11(1); T-12(1)
A-7	325	Sec. Handle	IC-2	L-1(1); L-5(2)
A-6	400	Face Curtain	GRU-5	L-4(2)
A-6	360	Face Curtain	GRU-5	T-10(2)
A-6	400	Face Curtain	GRU-5	T-8(1)
A-4	450	Sec. Handle	Unk.	T-12(1); L-1(1)
A-4	435	Face Curtain	Unk.	L-1(1)
A-4	450	Sec. Handle	Unk.	T-6(1); T-12(1); L-1(1)
A-4	450	Sec. Handle	Unk.	T-11(1); T-12(1)
A-4	300	Sec. Handle	Unk.	T-8(1); T-9(2)
A-4	350	Sec. Handle	Unk.	T-7(2)

*Severity: (1) Major Injury; (2) Minor Injury.
**See Appendix C for seat descriptions. (Unk. = Unknown).

Table 23

Spinal Compression Fractures
During Ejection by Aircraft Type
(106 POW's)

Aircraft Type	Number of Ejections	Spinal Compression Fractures	
		Percent Major or Minor	Percent Major
A-4	40	15	13
A-6	12	17	8
A-7	6	17	17
F-4	27	11	4
F-8	11	9	0
RA-5C	10	30	10

In the prisoner of war group, there were no major double upper extremity injuries which would have made it difficult to initiate ejection. During the ejection through landing phases, however, almost eight percent received major injuries to both upper extremities. The difficulties caused by these injuries were especially critical during the survival and escape and evasion phases, and will be discussed in following sections.

Sixteen of the prisoners of war reported losing their helmets during some phase of the ejection, while three reported removing their helmets during parachute descent. Several of the aircrewmen who lost their helmets suffered minor cuts or facial abrasions, possibly attributable to windblast. None suffered any major facial injuries. The mean ejection speed for those losing their helmets during ejection was approximately 470 knots.

Parachute Opening, Descent, and Landing

There is evidence in several cases that fracture of the jaw, severe face and head riser slap, unconsciousness, and neck injury may have been incurred during parachute deployment. The exact cause of many of these injuries remains unclear and probably will continue so due to difficulties in reporting the exact sequence of events at this time.

Opening shock was the cause of eight individuals sustaining missing or severely torn parachute panels. Six of these aviators, who knew their ejection speed, reported ejecting at speeds greater than 475 knots. The major landing injury rate for survivors sustaining missing or torn parachute panels was approximately 3½ times the rate of those with minimal or no damage to the parachute. Major landing injuries consisted of fractures, sprains, or dislocations to the legs or ankles, some quite severe (see Figure 11). One individual suffered a major double spinal compression fracture (L1 and L3) from landing impact. The relatively low rate of landing injury was perhaps due to the fact that many of the survivors made soft landings in water or water-filled rice paddies.

Escape and Evasion

The period of time between parachute landing and recovery, capture, or death represents the escape and evasion phase. This time interval is shown graphically in Figure 12 for the recovered group and in Figure 13 for the prisoner of war group. For the survivor coming down over land, the first few minutes of escape and evasion are crucial. In the recovered group, the fastest land rescue took 25 minutes. In approximately the same period of time, almost 90 percent of the prisoners of war had been captured. The most frequent cause of capture, which is unfortunately beyond the



Figure 11. (Case 107) Injury – Double compound fracture of right leg. Cause – Parachute landing on rocky terrain under windy conditions.

aircrewman's control, is the safeness of the area over which he is forced to eject following a mishap. Ejection location influences several survival factors including distance from friendly rescue vessels, enemy population density, type of terrain, amount of ground cover, and degree of air control.



**Excludes two escaped POW's who were part of this study group.

Figure 12. Comparison of time to effect land rescue versus time to effect water rescue.



Figure 13. Time until capture for prisoner of war group.

An important variable in escape, that could in theory be more effectively controlled in the future, is the degree of injury sustained by the survivor. This factor has a significant influence on an aircrewman's ability to effectively escape and evade, particularly during the first few minutes after parachute landing.

Unconsciousness may be the most important injury in terms of survival. Nine percent of the recovered group and 16 percent of the prisoner of war group reported being unconscious or dazed during the egress phase of the mishap. Fortunately, most of these individuals came down over land or regained consciousness prior to landing in the water. There are no statistics indicating how many did not regain consciousness or had major injuries to both upper extremities, landed in the water, and drowned because of their inability to inflate life preservers or clear themselves from parachute entanglement.

The large number of lower extremity injuries incurred during the ejection phase of a mishap limited many of the survivors in their ability to effectively escape and evade. Upper extremity injuries caused difficulty for survivors in inflating flotation equipment, extracting themselves from parachutes and anti-G suits, operating signaling equipment, and administering first aid. This was especially true in the prisoner of war group where almost eight percent of the survivors sustained major injuries to both upper extremities.

Any severely injured survivor in enemy territory greatly increases the hazard for search and rescue (SAR) aircraft and crews. During prolonged search and recovery operations, these crews can be subjected to heavy hostile fire. This situation intensifies when a survivor has sustained an injury which renders him unable to assist during the actual recovery. The very nature of combat recovery under "quick in – quick out" conditions exposes injured survivors to a situation where existing injuries may be compounded during the recovery process.

For the captured survivor, any injury takes on special significance, particularly under the conditions that were found in Southeast Asia. Medical treatment to major wounds, if given at all, was generally substandard. Many times, wounds were used for the purposes of torture and, in all probability, many aircrewmen died from what would normally be considered a nonfatal injury. Many of these injuries were so severe that prisoners of war experienced years of agonizing pain, serious infection, and, ultimately, permanent disability. Consequently, when capture and imprisonment are a possible outcome of combat operations, it is important to do whatever one can before the fact to minimize the potential for injury during aircraft escape.

SUMMARY

The combat ejection results in an appreciably higher rate of major injury than does operational escape. Combat injuries are predominantly fractures and dislocations of the extremities due to the Q forces associated with the high speed, relatively low altitude ejection. These injuries, while serious in themselves, also serve to complicate escape and rescue. If evasion is attempted, it frequently results only in compounding the injury.

The extent of ejection injury was compared for the various types of ejection seats used for escape. There was, among the various seat types, a significant difference in the severity of ejection flail injury, which tends to support the need for extremity restraints during high speed escape. The method of initiating ejection appears to have no significant effect on the percent sustaining flail injury. Those aircrewmen using the seat pan handle rather than the face curtain did have an increased injury rate for *multiple* flail injuries and almost twice the rate for spinal compression fractures. Ejection through the canopy resulted in a disproportionate number of severe lacerations. Lacerations and burns seem highly susceptible to infection, especially during escape and evasion in the jungle and during the early stages of captivity.

This study has shown that injuries associated with air combat escape have, both for recovered and prisoner of war groups, resulted in disabilities which adversely affected the use of survival and communication equipment, limited escape and evasion, and jeopardized rescue operations. In an earlier study, it was found that, for pilots fortunate enough to be recovered, over 25 percent could not be returned to flying status before 30 days due to the time necessary for recuperation from injuries. For aircrewmen who became prisoners of war, the consequences of injury were even more severe. In many cases, because of the lack of proper medical attention, they were forced to experience years of pain and, in some cases, permanent disability. But these groups were the successful ones. Undoubtedly, ejection-related injuries were responsible for many of the aircrewmen now classified as missing or killed in action. Many of the injuries to this latter group might well not have been classified even as severe had they occurred under operational conditions. Such injuries, however, in combination with the hostile conditions found in Southeast Asia combat, could easily prove fatal.

Results of this investigation demonstrate that the conditions under which a disabled aircraft is abandoned in combat are appreciably different from those found in noncombat operational flying. As a consequence, combat injuries are more serious and more extensive. The increased injury pattern, in turn, lessens the likelihood of successful evasion and rescue. Therefore, for moral as well as economic reasons, every consideration must be given to improving the conditions responsible for combat escape injuries in order to better the chances of survival for Navy aircrewmen.

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APPENDIX A

MEDICAL CODING FORMAT

Escape injuries were coded utilizing the following information



Injury Description

Abrasions	01	Fracture, Compound (displaced)	14
Amputation	02	Lacerations	15
Bite	03	Shock	16
Blindness	04	Sprain or Strain	17
Burn	05	Tear of Muscle or Tendon	18
Blast Injury	06	Tear of Ligament	19
Concussion	07	Unconsciousness	20
Contusion or Bruise	08	Wound, Gunshot or Fragment	21
Crushing Injury	09	Wound, Other	22
Cuts and Scratches	10	Spinal Compression Fracture	23
Dislocation	11	Unknown	98
Division of Nerves	12	No Answer or None	99
Fracture, Simple (undisplaced or unknown)	13		

Side of Injury

Right	1	Both	4
Left	2	No Answer	9
Not Applicable	3		

Specific Location

Head, Cranium	0100
Face	0200
Neck, nonvertebral	0300
Vertebral (column) (Vert. Not Spec.)	0400
Cervical (7)	0401 – 0407
Thoracic (12)	0408 – 0419
Lumbar (5)	0420 – 0424
Coccyx or Sacrum	0427
Shoulder (Clavical Scupula Area)	0500
Chest or Back	0600
Ribs or Sternum	0700
Arm (Specific Area Unknown)	0800
Humerus	081
Elbow	0820
Radius	083
Ulna	084
Wrist	0900
Fingers or Hand	1000
Hip (Ilium and Ischium)	1100
Leg (Specific Area Unknown)	1200
Femur	121
Knee	1220
Tibia	123
Fibula	124
Ankle	1300
Foot Bones or Foot	1400
Back (Torso)	1500
Front (Torso)	1600
General (All Over)	7777
Not Applicable	8888
No Answer or None	9999

See Vert. Col. Code Next Page

Proximal	1
Medial	2
Distal	3
No Ans.	4

Vertebral Column Codes

Cervical
- C – 1 = 0401
- C – 2 = 0402
- C – 3 = 0403
- C – 4 = 0404
- C – 5 = 0405
- C – 6 = 0406
- C – 7 = 0407

Lumbar
- L – 1 = 0420
- L – 2 = 0421
- L – 3 = 0422
- L – 4 = 0423
- L – 5 = 0424

Thoracic
- T – 1 = 0408
- T – 2 = 0409
- T – 3 = 0410
- T – 4 = 0411
- T – 5 = 0412
- T – 6 = 0413
- T – 7 = 0414
- T – 8 = 0415
- T – 9 = 0416
- T – 10 = 0417
- T – 11 = 0418
- T – 12 = 0419

Time of Injury

Pre-Ejection	1	After Landing During Survival	5
During Ejection (Prior to Chute Deploy)	2	During Capture	6
		Unknown	7
During Descent (Prior to Landing)	3	Unknown – Probable During Ejection	8
During Landing (Prior to Getting Rid of Chute)	4	No Answer	9

Severity of Injury

Major	1	None	3
Minor	2	No Answer or Unknown	9

Probable Cause of Injury

Ejection Seat Rocket "G" Forces	01	Parachute Entanglement	09
Struck Equipment	02	Impact with Ground	10
Equipment Malfunction	03	Fire in Cockpit	96
Loss of Equipment	04	Enemy Inflicted	97
Flail	05	Unknown	98
Parachute Opening Shock	06	No Answer	99

APPENDIX B

CRITERIA USED FOR INJURY CLASSIFICATION
(Extracted from OPNAVINST 3750.6G)

INJURY CLASSIFICATIONS
(To be used with Form BTI 72-No.)

Major Injury – Any injury requiring five days or more hospitalization and/or "sick in quarters." Also any of the following, regardless of hospitalization/sick in quarters time:

1. Unconsciousness due to head trauma (transient unconsciousness due to hypoxia, hyperventilation, G Forces, etc., are not to be classified as injury).
2. Fractures of any bone except simple fracture of nose or phalanges.
3. Traumatic dislocation of major joints/internal derangement, of the knee.
4. Moderate to severe lacerations resulting in severe hemorrhage, or extensive surgical repair.
5. Injury to any internal organ.
6. Any third degree burns. Any second degree burns involving more than five (5) percent of the body surface. Any friction burn regardless of degree that requires less than five days hospitalization or "sick in quarters" is classified as a minor injury.

Minor Injury – Any injury less than major which:

1. Results in the loss of 24 hours from full performance of regularly assigned duties, but less than five days.
2. Results in loss of regular working time for civilians beyond the day or shift on which injury occurs.
3. Hospitalization for observation not to exceed 48 hours from the time of admission is not classified as an injury.

No Injury – Minimal injuries which do not meet the criteria for minor injury.

APPENDIX C

DESCRIPTIONS OF EJECTION SEATS UTILIZED IN AIRCRAFT DISCUSSED IN THIS STUDY

North American Rockwell Ejection Seat, HS-1 and HS-1A

North American Rockwell HS-1 and HS-1A ejection seats currently used in the RA-5C aircraft provide an escape envelope at ground-level from speeds of zero velocity to 750 KIAS. The ejection thrust of the HS-1 seat is provided by a single-unit catapult rocket. During ejection, the catapult portion fires first, thrusting the seat clear of the cockpit; the rocket portion then ignites to provide continued thrust. Positive parachute extraction is provided with the NB-7E parachute which has been modified to incorporate the Stencil ballistic spreader gun.

The North American Rockwell seat possesses a rigid leg restraint system. During the initial phase of seat ejection, leg positioning and restraint and positioning of the lower torso are accomplished by lowering the seat bucket to bottom, lifting the knees, and locking the feet in foot wells. The knee-raising bar contacts the legs behind the knees. As the knees are lifted, the feet fall into the foot wells which are closed by hooks. If acceleration is being experienced, such that the feet will not fall into the wells, the closure hooks contact the lower legs pushing the feet into the wells.

In order to increase the trajectory altitude during straight and level flight, the catapult portion of the rocket in the HS-1A seat has been modified, increasing the impulse. This modification increases maximum acceleration from 12 to 20 G's. The rate of acceleration onset increases to approximately 250 G's per second.



Martin-Baker Ejection Seat, MK-5 and MK-7

Aircraft	Cartridge System	Rocket Pack
F-4	MK-H5	MK-H7
F-8	MK-F5	MK-F7
A-6	MK-GRU5	MK-GRU7

The low-level capability of the Martin-Baker MK-5 ejection seat is obtained through the use of a three-cartridge pyrotechnic, telescoping, long-stroke ejection gun which achieves an 80-foot per second seat ejection with maximum accelerations of 15 to 18 G's. Drogue parachutes are used to stabilize and decelerate the seat and to deploy the main parachute. This parachute, manufactured by Martin-Baker, has a 28-foot canopy and is positioned behind the crewman's shoulders. The leg restraint system consists of a garter worn by crewmembers, leg restraint lines with lock pins, snubber unit, and shear fitting secured to the floor.

The MK-7 seats differ from the MK-5 primarily through the addition of a rocket pack. The ejection gun used in the initial catapult contains cartridges of reduced charge to lessen acceleration forces acting on the spine during ejection.

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Douglas Escapac Ejection Seat, Series 1A through 1G

The Series 1C Escapac seat was the predominant seat used in A-4 and A-7 aircraft during Southeast Asia operations. This seat allows escape, during level-flight conditions, from zero altitude and from zero speed through 600 KIAS. The seat's ejection thrust is provided by a two-stage rocket catapult. Maximum acceleration with this system is approximately 12 to 15 G's. The rate of acceleration onset is approximately 250 G's per second. the NB-10 parachute has a 28-foot flat, circular canopy and is opened with an automatic release opener. Seat system stabilization is achieved during the initial part of the trajectory through a system consisting of two braking devices attached to the seat bottom which maintain constant tension on the nylon lanyards being played out as the seat rises. No Douglas Escapac seats are equipped with arm or leg restraints.

The primary differences between the currently-used 1G seat and the older 1C seat are that the 1G seat uses a lower impulse rocket catapult, employs a ballistic spreader gun in the parachute and has a rocket seat separator instead of nitrogen-inflated bladders.



C–4

APPENDIX D

COMPUTER PRINTOUT OF SEVERITY OF EJECTION FLAIL INJURIES VERSUS ESCAPE CONDITIONS

(POW's with known escape speeds)

Injury Codes

Injury = Degree of Ejection Flail Injury

1 = Major

2 = Minor

3 = None

Q-Forces = Newtons/M^2

EJ METH: Method of Ejection Seat Initiation

2 = Face Curtain

3 = Seat Pan Handle

9998 = Unknown

IAS = Ejection Speed in KIAS.

POW DATA---EJECT Q-FORCES IN DEC. ORDER

BTI NUM	INJURY*	EJECT-Q	MISHAP-Q	A/C TYPE	EJ METH	I.A.S.
56	1	87396.	87420.	RA-5C	3	735
131	3	67897.	49151.	F-4	3	645
54	1	66282.	72673.	RA-5C	2	640
24	1	62253.	40698.	RA-5C	2	620
28	3	61616.	61616.	RA-5C	9998	615
44	2	59421.	83906.	RA-5C	3	600
100	1	58702.	58617.	RA-5C	3	600
34	1	58302.	58265.	F-4	3	600
111	3	53562.	12240.	F-8	2	575
4	1	49664.	49664.	A-4	2	550
85	3	44397.	77229.	F-8	2	500
77	3	43766.	43822.	F-8	3	520
71	3	42972.	28682.	A-4	2	515
63	2	40863.	44904.	F-4	2	500
132	3	40685.	40464.	F-4	3	500
73	3	40501.	21276.	A-5	2	500
42	1	40501.	40572.	A-4	2	500
72	1	40497.	40455.	A-4	2	500
105	2	40497.	19827.	A-4	3	500
115	1	40497.	40501.	A-4	3	500
47	3	40473.	40444.	F-8	2	500
95	3	40464.	40928.	F-4	2	500
6	3	40464.	40867.	F-4	3	500
20	1	40462.	32795.	A-4	2	500
83	3	40462.	26194.	F-4	3	500
57	1	40454.	58493.	RA-5C	2	500
5	3	40454.	40454.	A-4	2	500
32	1	40444.	40462.	F-4	3	500
130	3	39812.	40650.	F-4	2	495
66	1	38870.	38843.	A-4	3	490
62	3	37314.	40455.	F-4	3	480
114	1	36574.	32769.	A-4	9998	475
43	3	36540.	32795.	A-4	2	475
41	3	33152.	38893.	F-4	2	450
2	3	33012.	33152.	A-4	3	450
134	3	33012.	33052.	F-4	2	450
64	3	32863.	32902.	F-4	3	450
31	3	32825.	25936.	F-8	2	450
101	3	32809.	32809.	A-5	2	450

*Two (2) Major Flail Injuries were incurred where ejection speed was unknown.

POH DATA---EJECT G-FORCES IN DEC. ORDER

BTI NUM	INJURY*	EJECT-G	MISHAP-G	A/C TYPE	EJ METH	I.A.S.
74	1	32795.	32795.	A-4	3	450
17	3	32795.	33425.	A-4	3	450
88	3	32783.	32825.	F-8	2	450
50	3	32776.	32776.	A-6	2	450
30	3	32769.	32774.	F-8	2	450
96	1	32760.	25923.	A-7	2	450
15	3	30652.	29242.	A-4	2	435
36	1	28915.	35961.	F-4	3	420
117	1	28797.	28797.	A-6	2	420
82	3	28716.	28961.	A-6	2	420
14	3	28577.	28550.	A-6	2	420
3	3	27320.	28569.	F-4	2	410
12	3	26409.	25891.	A-6	2	400
78	1	26126.	19997.	A-4	2	400
102	3	26120.	27370.	A-7	2	400
37	3	26072.	29425.	A-6	2	400
129	3	25920.	40462.	PA-5C	2	400
138	3	25920.	22244.	A-7	2	400
10	3	25912.	99999.	A-4	9998	400
121	3	25903.	25920.	A-4	3	400
39	3	23479.	23479.	F-4	3	380
29	3	23361.	23361.	A-6	2	380
46	3	22774.	25884.	A-4	3	375
49	3	20993.	20996.	F-4	2	360
25	3	20966.	20966.	A-6	2	360
107	3	20004.	99999.	A-4	3	350
33	3	19960.	19960.	A-4	2	350
135	3	19904.	19918.	F-8	2	350
137	3	19857.	17114.	A-6	9999	350
112	3	19857.	19845.	A-4	2	350
110	3	19839.	19839.	F-8	2	350
125	1	19839.	27598.	A-4	3	350
22	3	19823.	19827.	A-6	2	350
128	3	17195.	36574.	F-4	2	325
92	3	17092.	40464.	A-7	3	325
76	3	14856.	14664.	A-4	3	300
113	3	14691.	17210.	F-4	2	300
80	3	14623.	6567.	A-4	3	300
11	3	14586.	22750.	F-8	2	300
136	3	14586.	40462.	F-4	2	300

*Two (2) Major Flail Injuries were incurred where ejection speed was unknown.

POH DATA---EJECT G-FORCES IN DEC. ORDER

BTI NUM	INJURY*	EJECT-G	MISHAP-G	A/C TYPE	EJ METH	I.A.S.
106	3	14579.	32774.	A-4	3	300
26	1	14560.	25912.	A-4	2	300
58	3	12251.	14589.	A-4	2	275
99	3	11988.	99999.	A-7	2	250
91	1	10118.	32769.	A-4	2	250
8	3	10116.	19960.	F-4	2	250
27	3	10115.	19823.	A-4	2	250
120	3	10114.	14741.	F-4	3	250
84	3	8196.	28600.	F-4	3	225
126	3	7887.	32825.	A-4	3	220
87	3	7171.	15326.	A-4	3	210
65	3	6530.	32810.	A-4	3	200
51	3	6518.	14735.	A-7	2	200
109	3	6499.	33056.	F-4	3	200
61	3	5850.	26410.	A-4	2	190
48	3	5348.	20993.	F-8	3	180
97	3	5243.	32819.	A-4	2	180
67	3	1620.	26070.	F-4	2	100

*Two (2) Major Flail Injuries were incurred when ejection speed was unknown.

Additional analyses now have been conducted, primarily with repatriated Navy Prisoners of War, to establish some precise cause and effect injury relationships associated with high speed escape. The effect of escape injuries on subsequent evasion and survival is examined.

Special attention is given to the effectiveness of escape, personal protective, and life support equipment. The adequacy of this equipment is evaluated in terms of an individual's injury condition and his success in using such equipment under the arduous conditions of combat escape, survival, rescue and capture.

FACTORS RELATING TO THE SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) AND EVASION EXPERIENCES OF US PRISONERS OF WAR (PWs) IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

/Note.--Views and judgments contained in this report are those of the USAF analysts who prepared the report, and do not reflect an official position of the Department of Defense or the Air Force./

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Dated: February 197[illegible]

PREFACE

This report has been prepared by the 7602 Air Intelligence Group under the auspices of the Headquarters USAF Analysis Program for the Southeast Asia Prisoner of War Experience.

Views and judgments contained in this report are those of the Air Force analysts who prepared the report, and do not reflect an official position of Headquarters USAF. The report is intended only as an aid to further and more definitive research and analysis.

Inquiries, comments or requests for additional distribution should reference the series number and be addressed to:

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SECTION A

OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

1. (U) Introduction. Returned US PWs (RPWs) from Southeast Asia (SEA) represent an opportunity to examine combat search and rescue (SAR) and evasion and escape (E&E) "failures." Their failure usually was occasioned by circumstances beyond their control, but a brief analysis of those causes is instructive. This report represents an analysis of SAR and E&E failures involving NVN returnees.

2. (U) Purpose. The objective of this study is to:

a. Cite reasons for the failure of SAR forces to rescue downed aircrewmen.

b. Discuss reasons for the failure of RPWs to conduct successful evasions.

c. Discuss major problems attendant to SAR and E&E which were disclosed by returnees.

d. To offer certain conclusions regarding SEA SAR and E&E activities.

3. (U) Scope. This study covers only the SAR and E&E experiences of US Air Force, US Navy, and US Marine Corps aircrewmen who were captured between 1964 and 1972 and detained in North Vietnam. However, statistics are principally taken from US Air Force returnee debriefings; and, therefore, this study will be more pertinent to Air Force operations than to those of the Navy or Marine Corps.

4. (U) Method.

a. US Air Force statistics were derived from intelligence debriefing reports filed by Air Force debriefers during Operation HOMECOMING. A standardized data reduction and encoding system was devised to categorize and tabulate information.

b. US Navy RPW evasion times were obtained from BioTechnology, Inc. of Falls Church, Virginia. That firm was contracted by the Navy to conduct studies of aircraft combat accident/incidents in SEA, collecting information on evasion times in the course of those studies.

c. Other information was obtained from US Air Force, US Navy, or US Marine Corps HOMECOMING debriefing summaries, and/or transcripts, or from cited secondary sources and as indicated in section footnotes.

d. Evasion and Recovery Reports for the area of North Vietnam (NVN) were reviewed and compared with USAF Shootdown/Capture Debriefing Reports in an effort to determine what factors principally contributed to successful recoveries.

SECTION B

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION - I

CAUSES OF SAR AND E&E FAILURES

1. (U) Causes for Rescue Difficulties.

a. SAR Not Attempted. In 50.4% of the Air Force RPWs cases, SAR was not attempted because the shootdown occurred either in a high threat area (30.3%), was out of SAR range (18.9%), or because a SAR vehicle was not immediately available (1.2%). The cases in which SAR was not feasible (high threat or out of range) occurred well north of the Red River - Hanoi - Haiphong line with a majority of the shootdowns taking place within the Hanoi-Thai Nguyen-Kep triangle. The "out of SAR range" incidents occurred prior to July 1966 before the introduction of air refuelable helicopters. Analysis of the very limited number of instances (4) wherein the non-availability of vehicles was reported as the primary cause of SAR failure disclosed that they were cases in which the crewmembers were advised before the mission that SAR would not be available because of the nature of the mission.

b. Enemy Proximity. Taken as a general category, enemy proximity was considered as the primary cause of SAR failure in 39.1% of the Air Force cases. In this sense enemy proximity

includes the following sub-categories which are also shown separately in Table 1:

Immediate/Near Immediate Capture

Enemy Interference with SAR by Ground Fire

Numerous Enemy in Area

Enemy Proximity Prevented Radio Use

Other

While the individual sub-categories are of interest, it must be remembered that the "cause of failure" listed is based on the opinion of the RPW and distinctions between the sub-categories are not always exact. "Numerous Enemy in Area," for example, often resulted in enemy interference with SAR. Conversly, in some cases, enemy personnel refrained from moving in on downed aircrewmen who could have been immediately captured in order to lure SAR forces into a trap.

c. No Radio Contact. Failure to make radio contact accounted for only 13 (4.0%) of USAF SAR failures.

d. Other Factors. Three other categories totalling 20 cases were identified by the RPWs as causes of SAR failure.

TABLE 1

Reasons for SAR Failure - US Air Force RPWs

Cause	
SAR Not Feasible or Immediately Attempted - All Reasons	
Out of SAR Range	
High Threat Area	
Vehicle Not Available	
Enemy Proximity - All Categories	
Immediate/Near Immediate Capture	
Enemy Interference - Ground Fire	
Numerous Enemy in Area	
Proximity Prevented Radio Use	
Other	
No Radio Contact - All Types	
Malfunction, Broken Antenna, Dead Batteries	
Suspected Terrain Interference With Transmission	
Weather	
Darkness	
Injuries	

*Does not equal 100% due to rounding.

Ten failures (3.1%) were believed to have been caused by weather, including generally poor visibility and low ceilings in the touchdown area. Darkness prevented SAR efforts in six cases (1.9%). In these cases the aircraft loss occurred either during late afternoon, with darkness falling before SAR forces could reach the area, or during a night mission (with capture taking place before daylight). Injuries, primarily unconsciousness or inability to use the survival radio because of immobilizing injuries, resulted in SAR failure in 4 (1.2%) of the total cases examined.

e. Comment. Closer analysis of the causes for SAR failure as shown in Table 1 indicates that a true opportunity for recovery probably did not exist in practically all cases.

2. (U) Causes for Evasion Failures.

a. Enemy Proximity. Not surprisingly, proximity of the enemy accounted for 58.3% of all evasion failures. (Refer to Table 2). RPW recollections of precise causes for E&E failure are not exact. The reported variations of E&E failure are attributed to: Immediate/Near Immediate Canture, Sighted During Aircraft Egress and Soon Located, and Numerous Enemy in Area.

TABLE 2

Reasons Cited for Evasion Failures - Air Force RPWs

Cause	
Enemy Proximity - All Types	
Immediate/Near Immediate Capture	
Sighted During Aircraft Egress and Soon Located	
Numerous Enemy in Area	
Injuries - Generally	
Tracked and Found	
Inadequate Cover	
Remained in Parachute Landing Area and Located	
Terrain Interference	
Hunger/Thirst/Fatique	
Other Responses of less than 1%	
Total (Includes multiple reasons for failure)	

b. Injuries. Injuries were reported as the primary cause of evasion failure in 12.4% of the Air Force cases. The types of injuries which seriously hindered or precluded evasion included broken legs, back injuries, and head injuries which caused unconsciousness. Un-injured RPWs predictably fared better than injured RPWs during evasion (Refer to Table 3 and Figure 1). At least 10% more un-injured evading RPWs were still not captured and apparently available for rescue during most of the evasion time intervals. (Refer to Table 3 and Figure 1).

c. Tracked and Found. Only 7.5% of the RPWs reported that they were tracked or located by search parties. Some personnel were found accidentally after moving out of the immediate parachute landing area. Most, however, Were found by search parties of varying sizes after their parachutes were seen coming down or after the crewmember had been seen moving on the ground. Thus, most of the cases in this category are closely akin to the "Sighted During Aircraft Egress" and "Numerous Enemy in Area" categories mentioned above. Most of these crewmembers had concealed themselves when they heard searchers approaching. Concealment in many cases was excellent with the crewmember being discovered only after being literally

TABLE 3

US AIR FORCE RPW EVASION TIMES AS AFFECTED BY INJURIES.*

	INJURED	NOT INJURED	RATIO INJURED TO NON-INJURED
0-1 min	79	26	3.0:1
2-30 min	63	15	4.2:1
31-60 min	16	4	4.0:1
1:01-12 hrs	25	7	3.5:1
12:01-48 hrs	19	13	1.5:1
48:01 hrs +	5	4	1.2:1
OVERALL	207	69	3.0:1

*Table is tabulated from responses given by 276 returnees. Unknown responses were discarded from original population of 322 returnees.



Figure 1

stepped on or tripped over by a member of the search party.

d. Inadequate Cover. A few Returned PWs reported that they landed in open, grassy terrain or in areas with low brush and few trees. This resulted in their being quickly spotted by searchers or other enemy personnel in the vicinity. Efforts to conceal themselves in these cases were singularly unsuccessful. The importance of concealment and ways in which some personnel were able to use available camouflage material to avoid capture merits separate discussion.

e. Remained in Parachute Landing Area. RPWs who remained in the immediate touchdown area were quickly located. In some cases downed personnel who were uninjured and had the opportunity to move remained in the immediate landing area on the advice of airborne colleagues with whom they had radio contact. Others remained in the area (usually without concealment) on their own initiative. The most frequently cited reason for remaining in the immediate landing area was a belief that this would improve chances for rescue.

f. Terrain Interference.. Karst ridges, swampy areas and similar difficult terrain reportedly impeded evasion in a few cases. RPWs who cited terrain interference with evasion also reported inadequate cover in rocky areas or rice paddies

as a contributory reason for evasion failure. Additionally, many crewmembers had various injuries which were not severe enough to be a primary failure factor, but which were aggravated by rough terrain.

g. Hunger/Thirst/Fatigue. A small number of RPWs evaded for periods ranging from 2 to 12 days before being captured. Hunger, thirst, and/or fatigue were the primary failure factors in these cases. Detailed analysis of the experience of these long term evaders shows that they usually had some distinct initial advantages in that they did not land near concentrations of enemy forces and suffered few injuries. They appreciated the importance of concealment and generally made good use of available materials for cover. Their inability to find sufficient water, however, led to increasingly dangerous water finding forays which resulted in their being sighted and captured. The majority of crewmembers in this category were downed in rocky areas with little vegetation. Available water supplies were limited to small puddles between rocks which could be reached by using hollow reeds as straws and dew which could be licked from leaves. These water sources were not sufficient to support the men for extended periods.

h. Comment. A number of RPWs did not seem to appreciate the importance of concealment. A "textbook case" of the difference concealment could make is available in the case of the

crew of an F4D downed in the mountains west of Hanoi. Both crewmembers ejected successfully and landed on a hillside within one half mile of each other. The pilot disposed of his parachute, covered himself with leaves, and remained stationary (the aircraft crashed a considerable distance from their landing point). Although a search party was at times within 100 feet of his position, the pilot was not spotted and was subsequently rescued. The second crewmember did not hide either himself or his parachute. The same search party which had failed to find the hidden pilot sighted the other crewmember from a considerable distance and captured him some ten minutes before a rescue helicopter arrived. In this case of two men down in the same area, under the same conditions, with the same equipment, and SAR known to be on the way, the use of available concealment made the difference between freedom and captivity.

i. Comparison of Successful and Unsuccessful Recoveries. Analysis of successful versus unsuccessful recoveries was limited due to the comparatively small number of detailed successful recovery reports involving personnel on the ground in North Vietnam. Despite this, significant differences did appear in several areas in that recovered personnel were usually not observed during aircraft egress and did not land among or near enemy positions. They moved cautiously, during

other than peak daylight hours, and were careful to conceal themselves and their movements. They also were downed in areas where SAR was able to operate. Another excellent example of long term evasion was a crewmember who evaded for 22 days. Shot down in the hills northwest of Hanoi, he landed near a small village. Moving away from the landing and crash site, he found concealment among the vegetation on a hillside. Although a party of 80 to 100 villagers searched the area, he was not found. He attributed his success in hiding from the search party to knowledge gained through hunting, e.g., that a well concealed, motionless figure was extremely difficult to spot. By moving away from the crash area he succeeded in placing himself outside the area of the most intensive search. He moved at dusk and dawn, when there was sufficient light to see where he was going, but still dark enough to conceal his movements. Almost every night of the 22 day evasion, he made a leaf bed to sleep on and carefully dispersed the leaves the next morning. During rainy periods he obtained water by forming large leaves into funnels leading into a water bottle. At other times he tapped banana trees and obtained useable liquids. When tapping trees, he was careful to camouflage marks made so his presence in the area would remain unknown. Wrappings from anti-diarrhea tablets, peelings from fruit, etc., were also carefully disposed of. Water was a continuing problem, but the last few

days of evasion were spent near a creek. Eventually the lack of protein in his diet became his biggest problem and he began making plans to approach a hamlet to steal a chicken or goose. This plan was not carried out, however, because air strikes began occurring near his position. (During the period of evasion, he had moved some distance southward in an attempt to reach an area where SAR would be feasible). He also had kept his survival radio and carefully protected the batteries for use when he was sure of friendly air activity in the area. After contacting friendly aircraft, the evadee was recovered without further incident.

SECTION C

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION - II

PREDICTORS IN SUCCESSFUL VERSUS UNSUCCESSFUL EVASION

1. (U) Introduction. When a comparison was made between time on the ground for downed aircrewmen and the average population densities of their aircraft incident locale, a closer analysis of opportunities for potential recovery and potential durations of evasion was possible. To further explore the relationships between population density and evasion times Navy RPW evasion times were contrasted with AF RPW evasion times. A discussion of this analysis follows.

2. (U) Standard Population Densities. Population densities for North Vietnam have been austerely divided into three categories by the US Intelligence Community:

a. An average 520 persons per square mile.

b. An average 130 persons per square mile.

c. An average of 129 or less persons per square mile.

The geographic distribution of those population densities in North Vietnam is shown in Figure 1.

3. (U) Comparative Evasion Times and Rates By Population Density Areas. Comparing the evasion times for USAF RPWs for

POPULATION DENSITY IN NORTH VIETNAM[1]



Figure 1

these three population density areas, we note that by the time RPWs had been on the ground 30 minutes, approximately 50% of those who landed in the lowest population density areas had been captured, wheras more than 75% of those in the highest population density area had been captured. An analysis of capture rates (per hour) discloses the dramatic difference in evasion potential between the highest and lowest population density area. (Refer to Tables 1, 2, and 3). Comparative evasion times for each population density area are shown on Figure 2.

4. (U) Comparative Evasion Times for AF and Navy RPWs.

In order to further test the hypothesis that population density in the area of an aircraft loss was a possible predicator for evasion times and rates under conditions prevailing in South-east Asia, a comparison was made between the evasion times of Navy and AF RPWs. Because most Navy aircrewmen were downed in the heavily populated regions near the coast of North Viet-nam, in areas which frequently exceeded the 520 persons per square mile average, it was expected that Navy RPW evasion times would be substantially less, on the average, than those of AF RPWs. That proved to be the case. Within twenty minutes of parachute landing, 80% of Navy RPWs had been captured, versus 62% of AF RPWs. (Refer to Figure 3).

TABLE 1

US AIR FORCE RPW CAPTURE RATE IN AREAS OF NORTH VIETNAM WITH AVERAGE POPULATION OF 520 PERSONS PER SQUARE MILE (FROM A SAMPLING OF 274 US AIR FORCE RPW ACCOUNTS WHEREIN EVASION TIMES WERE ESTIMATED).

TIME ON GROUND (EST)	#	PERCENT CAPTURED	CAPTURE RATE
0-1 min	57	21	21 percent per minute*
2-10 min	21	8	46 percent per hour
11-20 min	3	1	7 percent per hour
21-30 min	1	-	2 percent per hour
31-40 min	-	-	no captures
41-50 min	1	-	2 percent per hour
51-60 min	5	2	11 percent per hour
1:01-2 hrs	7	3	3 percent per hour
2:01-288 hrs	13	5	not applicable
	108	40	(Total captured in this population density area)

*Actual rate not computed. Capture rates were calculated for each population density area by dividing the number captured during the time interval by the number of minutes in the interval and computing the per minute capture rate. That figure was in turn multiplied by 60 to obtain the per hour capture rate and divided by 274 to obtain the percentage per hour capture rate for each class interval in relation to the entire RPW population under study (274). As will be noted, the rates are higher for areas having greater population density, indicating that rescue opportunities are proportionately less, all other factors being equal.

TABLE 2

US AIR FORCE RPW CAPTURE RATE IN AREAS OF NORTH VIETNAM WITH AVERAGE OF 130 PERSONS PER SQUARE MILE (FROM A SAMPLING OF 274 US AIR FORCE RPW ACCOUNTS WHEREIN EVASION TIMES WERE ESTIMATED).

TIME ON GROUND (EST)	#	PERCENT CAPTURED	CAPTURE RATE
0-1 min	33	12	12 percent per minute*
2-10 min	15	5	36 percent per hour
11-20 min	11	4	24 percent per hour
21-30 min	4	1	9 percent per hour
31-40 min	1	-	2 percent per hour
41-50 min	2	1	4 percent per hour
51-60 min	5	2	11 percent per hour
1:01-2 hrs	8	3	3 percent per hour
2:01-192 hrs	25	9	not applicable
	104	37	(Total captured in this population density area)

*See note to Table 1.

TABLE 3

US AIR FORCE RPW CAPTURE RATE IN AREAS OF NORTH VIETNAM WITH POPULATION DENSITY OF 0-129 PERSONS PER SQUARE MILE (FROM A SAMPLING OF 274 US AIR FORCE RPW ACCOUNTS WHEREIN EVASION TIMES WERE ESTIMATED).

TIME ON GROUND (EST)	#	PERCENT CAPTURED	CAPTURE RATE
0-1 min	17	6	6 percent per minute*
2-10 min	6	2	15 percent per hour
11-20 min	5	2	11 percent per hour
21-30 min	4	1	9 percent per hour
31-40 min	1	-	2 percent per hour
41-50 min	3	1	7 percent per hour
51-60 min	5	2	11 percent per hour
1:01-72 hrs	21	8	not applicable
	62	22	(Total captured in this population density area)

*See note to Table 1.

AIR FORCE EVASION TIMES-FIRST 6 HOURS
(POPULATION DENSITIES OF 0-129,130 AND 520+ PERSONS PER SQ MILE)



Figure 2

COMPARISON OF US AIR FORCE AND US NAVY RPW
EVASION TIMES DURING FIRST 6 HOURS



Figure 3

NOTES - SECTION C

1. (U) National Intelligence Survey, North Vietnam, General Survey, January 1972, Summary Map, Figure 73.

2. (U) Navy RPW evasion times were developed from data furnished by BioTechnology, Inc., Falls Church, Virginia, which was based upon their study of aircraft accidents/incidents in SEA performed for the Navy.

3. (U) Ibid.

SECTION D

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION - III

DISCUSSION OF SAR AND EVASION FACTORS

1. (U) Categorical Problems. RPW recommendations on training and equipment which are relevant to this study were covered in an earlier Analysis Program report, USAF PW Comments on Training and Equipment, August 1973. Those recommendations will not be fully repeated here, but will be covered in context with problems RPWs encountered. RPWs considered the problems addressed in this report as more than simply situational problems or difficulties peculiar to SEA. In that context, the remedies they suggest have considerable cogency. While citation of those recommendations does not infer an official suggestion for their adoption, it does represent the existence of a valid concern or complaint. The following section on interpretation of findings will attempt to validate the requirement for recommended improvements.

a. Search and Rescue.

(1) Crewmember Complacency. The prevalence of a feeling that "it can't happen to me" was revealed by returnees. This feeling apparently persisted at combat theater bases, even after heavy losses; and may have contributed to a

lower level of crewmember preparedness for SAR, E&E, and captivity than was desirable.[1] Although complacency could have resulted from the common characteristic of aggressive persons in conditions of high stress to manifest denial tendencies, it represented a serious problem in view of the potential consequences of capture for harm to colleagues or the nation. For that reason training and unit briefings were viewed as essential by RPWs.[2]

(2) Over-Confidence. The corollary to complacency has been described by RPWs as being over-confidence. The comment "do not consider yourself rescued until it happens" was made by several returnees who unwisely discarded equipment or moved from hiding prematurely.[3] The complexity of an opposed rescue operation was vividly recounted by returnees who were involved in rescue attempts, and consequently the requirement for caution and prudence was strongly emphasized.

(3) Unit Training. Returnees also concluded that the units should emphasize the continuing program to assure that the aircrewmen would take the potentiality of capture seriously. That program was envisioned to include personal affairs counseling (to assure that wills, powers of attorney and allotments were in order). Some RPWs felt that sober preparation for mishap could make the offering of survival/evasion information more relevant.[4]

(4) The Impact of Injuries. With serious injuries, the probability of successful evasion and subsequent rescue declined. All returnees who sustained such injury noted the helplessness which gripped them and the immediate necessity of assistance for rescue. Although some aircraft ejection injuries may have been preventable, most returnees who were injured ejected under highly distressed flight conditions or at relatively high speed, thereby increasing the probability of injury. However, a number of returnees remarked that proper securing of their seat harnesses and life support gear might have prevented some injuries and obviated the loss of helmets, gloves, or survival kit items.[5]

(5) Survival Equipment Inaccessibility. The design of survival and evasion equipment was also questioned. For example, various RPWs complained that they found the equipment carried in the chute pack or flight suit difficult to reach during the parachuting phase. Because aircrewmen and life support offices were known to make local modifications of equipment placement and items carried in response to local conditions, the question of survival equipment inaccessibility appears moot at this time.[6]

(6) Landing Site Selection and Chute Maneuvering.

(a) RPWs generally had little opportunity to choose their parachute landing site. Substantial lateral drift (other than that obtainable with the recommended shroud line cut to attain maneuverability) would have been welcomed, according to some returnees, in order to remove them from the immediate area of their mishap.[7]

(b) Selection of high or low ground for landing became, in retrospect, another dilemma for some returnees. Following the generally advocated procedure for landing on, or seeking, high ground as an aid to rescue forces, some RPWs found themselves with no escape route or in terrain so rough (such as karst outcroppings) that travel was difficult or impossible. In addition a hillside landing was easier to spot if opposing forces were nearby. Several returnees noted that enemy forces immediately gravitated to their high ground hiding places on the apparent presumption that they would be there.[8]

(c) A few RPWs even made note of the parachute descent by recalling the depressing thoughts that were flooding their minds on the way down.[9]

(7) Actions upon landing.

Regaining composure. Care in landing and disengaging from the parachute were appreciated by the returnees, as might be expected; however, the sequece of events immediately following a successful landing made considerable difference for many. If enemy forces were not immediately present, many returnees advocated immediate steps to regain composure. Hiding the chute or other highly visible items was not always the immediate obsession of downed RPWs. Many remarked that a drink of water was the first and most pressing urge after landing, and they punctuated their need by advocating the carrying of as much water as possible into combat (preferably in specially designed, high impact containers).[10] For those who had time to plan their next move, a short period of time to slake thirst and reduce shock, before beginning the evasion sequence, seemed well advised. For those who had difficulty disengaging from their chute harness or gaining acces to their survival kit, the need to stay calm was especially great.

2. (U) Survival/Evasion Equipment. RPWs noted problems in the effective use of survival/evasion equipment by injured aircrewmen and the need to redesign, discard, or environmentally tailor certain survival equipment. The encounter with those problems was not unique to RPWs, and final determination of survival equipment deficiences depends upon data from other sources.

3. (U) SAR Procedures.

a. Commentary by RPWs concerning failures in SAR missions cannot be considered reliable owing to the generally short duration from mishap until capture.[11] The several RPWs who were apparently used as decoys for friendly SAR forces emphatically stressed the need for instruction in how to convey warnings.[12]

b. An instance of possible enemy use of direction finding equipment (ADF) to home on beepers was mentioned.[13] A number of returnees cited the need to turn off beepers as soon as possible upon landing to avoid such a contingency. Active communication of rescue information with the survival radio was viewed as preferable to continuing beeper broadcast, unless SAR force homing on the downed aircrewmen was facilitated by reactivating the beeper.

c. The involvement of strike aircraft in rescue operations introduced a new dimension to the rescue concept. Because the rescue mission was nominally humanitarian and unarmed, North Vietnamese were quick to exploit that vulnerability by attempting to set "flak traps" for rescue craft by using downed aircrewmen as unwilling decoys. This made the introduction of interdiction aircraft justifiable to protect both the downed aircrewmen and rescue personnel.

At the same time it raised the level of violence in rescue operations. The predictable enemy response to the use of interdiction in rescue operations was increased countering fire and entrapment.

(1) Discussion. Returnees usually describe any covering attempts by RESCAP forces in glowing terms. The question remains as to the effect that such action may have had upon enemy ground forces or civilians during subsequent opposed capture episodes. The meeting of provocation or violence with countering violence was a characteristic of "escalation" during the entire Vietnam conflict. Situationally applied to rescue operations, the potentially counterproductive effects of escalation are obvious, given the vulnerability of rescue helicopters and downed aircrewmen. The question of cost-benefit arises, particularly if the losses sustained in RESCAP are viewed as significant. No attempt to conduct such an analysis is contemplated by the Analysis Program.

4. (U) Evasion.

a. Introduction. Returnees often commented upon evasion by generally prefacing their account with self-recriminations for evasion failures. In fact many of their evasion failures are reflected upon with some degree of loathing for mistakes which RPWs characterized as avoidable. Examples are cited below.

b. Evasion Aids. Some devices provided to promote evasion received virtually no endorsement by RPWs, largely due to the fact that such aids were seldom used (mainly due to swift capture). Thus the limited commentary afforded by PWs on such items as the "pointee talkee," "blood chit" or assorted tools is not generally enlightening.[14]

c. Preparation for Evasion.

(1) One RPW noted the necessity of psychological preparation for evasion, including sober reflection upon the difficulty of the task when one is seriously injured.[15]

(2) A pre-coordinated evasion plan was advocated for crewmen of a two or more place aircraft. One such plan entailed an agreement that downed crewmen would not attempt to join up on the ground, but would individually attempt to vector rescuers. The first one rescued would then assist in the recovery of the other.[16]

(3) Training to make evasion tools was suggested by another returnee. His commentary included the suggestion that survival schools emphasize training in how to make simple tools, snares, weapons, and warning devices out of discarded items or rocks and plants.[17]

d. Evasion Procedures. Most returnees who had an opportunity to evade, critique their ultimate failure in terms of their own failures. However, it should be noted that their failures may be more accurately attributed to presence of adverse conditions for successful evasion, especially the presence of nearby hostile personnel. For purposes of this report, procedural difficulties may be categorized in the following manner:

(1) Non-Availability of an Adequate Escape Route. Being hemmed-in was both a function of enemy activity and the evasion locale. Those who chose a ridgeline or hilltop for landing (due to SAR considerations) in effect restricted their movement options and often were surrounded before leaving their immediate landing area. Others had no escape route through populated areas, and were predictably spotted. Still others could not move over the rough terrain or through the dense foliage of their landing area and were forced to seek watercourses or trails in order to move. That choice increased the chances for encounter with a hostile populace.[18] As an aid to evasion, several returnees endorsed training in overland navigation at night.[19]

(2) Decision to Move. Some returnees chose to move when their state of mind or physical conditions were not conducive to that movement. Others chose to move when the local populace was active,[20] or when they falsely assumed that they had been spotted.[21] As might be expected, decisions as to favorable light conditions for movement to secure food or water, or selection of a different concealment or potential rescue site constrained the outcome of evasion. While many of the "mistakes" were preventable, the subjective circumstances of their evasion made movement mistakes inevitable, and many did remarkably well considering those circumstances. Returnees who were captured because of movement emphasized the need to carefully consider local circumstances before leaving a position of relative safety.[22]

(3) Concealment. Inability to properly camouflage a hiding position was often mentioned as a factor in failure to evade capture. More instruction in this important aspect of evasion was frequently recommended. For example, one RPW reported exposing his white underwear after removing his flight suit, which contributed to his being spotted and captured.[23]

(4) Knowledge of the Habits of Local Populace. Trail movements, quiet hours, use of waterways, and wariness of strangers (Americans or not) by the local populace were all mentioned as factors in evasion failures.

e. SAR and Evasion Interface.

(1) The hope of recovery was dim in most of the cases involving returnees. Localized threat to SAR forces, proximity of population centers, and physical condition of downed aircrewmen often precluded even the pretense of rescue attempt or hope of successful evasion. Resolving the contradiction of knowing that rescue was unlikely with the confidence that a rescue effort would be attempted was a source of anxiety for RPWs who had successfully avoided capture within the first minutes of landing.[24] Time then began to weigh heavily upon the decision process as the diminished hope for rescue made desperation moves more inevitable (particularly in high threat environments). With emotions and anxieties running high, returnees noted the inability to make rational decisions, which further diminished their chances of successful evasion. "Keep cool" was an often spoken RPW admonition.[25]

(2) Evasion episodes, like SAR episodes, depended upon the presence or absence of many factors, decision-making sequences, and inherent and acquired abilities of the potential evader. That complex of factors was further affected by the contents of one's survival kit. In view of the differing geographic areas of USAF operation and

the difficulty in providing a kit which will suffice for all areas of operation, questions immediately arise as to the degree of specialized kit preparation possible and/or desirable. A review of survival and E&E aids in SEA would only serve to validate a requirement for that area, and as such will not meet any objectives of the Analysis Program.

NOTES - SECTION 'D'

1. (U) Selected US Air Force HOMECOMING debriefings. This was confirmed by numerous intelligence briefers who served in SEA.

2. (U) Selected US Air Force HOMECOMING debriefings.

3. (U) Ibid.

4. (U) Ibid.

5. (U) Ibid.

6. (U) Selected US Navy debriefing summary.

7. (U) Selected US Air Force debriefings.

8. (U) Ibid.

9. (U) Ibid.

10. (U) Ibid. Thirst of this nature may be evidence of shock.

11. (U) Note, Section B, Page 8.

12. (U) Selected US Air Force debriefings.

13. (U) Selected US Air Force debriefings.

14. (U) Selected US Air Force debriefings and US Navy debriefing summaries.

15. (U) Selected US Navy debriefing summary.

16. (U) Ibid.

17. (U) Ibid.

18. (U) Selected US Air Force debriefings.

19. (U) Selected US Navy debriefing summary.

20. (U) Selected US Air Force debriefings.

21. (U) Selected US Navy debriefing summary.

22. (U) Selected US Navy and US Air Force debriefings; interviews with selected RPWs, 1974.

23. (U) US Navy debriefing summary.

24. (U) Interviews with US Air Force RPWs, 1973.

25. (U) Selected US Air Force debriefings.

SECTION E

CONCLUSIONS

1. (U) Introduction. Any conclusions contained herein must be prefaced by emphasis of the fact that a comprehensive study of successful versus unsuccessful combat SAR and E&E is not possible due to the lack of detailed information on which a true comparative analysis could be based. While programmed equipment changes will most likely eliminate the basis for most RPW complaints concerning their life support, survial equipment, and evasion aids, a number of points have been exposed which may require some combination of actions, policy, and/or new operational capabilities.

2. (U) Discussion. Specific areas which merit further study and attention are as follows:

a. Equipment Factors.

(1) Recovery Vehicles.

(a) In light of requirements to minimize attrition, avoid having hostage PWs in enemy control, and minimize the potential loss of military information through enemy coercive interrogation, the recovery of downed aircrew from defended area becomes increasingly important.

Additionally, quick reaction, higher speed recovery vehicles would have possibly permitted rescue of the Air Force RPWs who were potentially available for rescue within the first half hour following their aircraft incident - especially in areas of low population density.

(b) Not only will future recovery vehicles have to operate in a defended area, they may have to operate with less support as the number of priority targets and attrition factors inhibit the diversion of strike aircraft to rescue covering operations (RESCAP) and rescue site interdiction.

(2) Communications. High quality communications between downed aircrewmen and SAR forces is essential.

(3) E&E/Survival Aids. The general utility of most E&E aids used in SEA needs to be closely examined.

(4) Avoidance of Crash Area. Some parachute maneuvering or ejection seat/capusle maneuvering capability is needed to increase the distance of a downed crewman's parachute landing from the mishap point as an aid to evasion.

b. Combat SAR Procedures.

(1) Discussion. Conclusions have not been drawn at this writing concerning potential or actual deficiencies in combat SAR procedures which may have been revealed by RPWs. The basic inquiry involves identification of the significant differences between a successful SAR mission and an unsuccessful one, and such a study must await a SAR mission analysis being conducted jointly by the Military Airlift Command and Air Force Systems Command. However, several questions and issues concerning combat SAR have informally arisen:

(a) When does the level of ground threat suppression by SAR forces become a threat to the person being rescued, both directly and indirectly (in the sense that an armed enemy may well retaliate against the downed crewman for ordnance delivered by his would-be rescuers)?

(b) How do multiple command and control nets impact upon the recovery process?

(c) What proximate ground threat constitutes an unacceptable risk for recovery forces and what options can a SAR force commander offer the downed crewman (considering that the downed member may not be rational due to shock)?

(d) What priorities exist for the recovery of downed personnel when all those who are down cannot be recovered?

(e) What procedures should be adopted to avoid or recognize entrapment of SAR forces by the enemy?

(f) How might increased interservice standardization of SAR procedures (under the provisions of AFR 64-3) or of equipment have improved the potential for a successful mission?

(2) Rescue Probability Prediction System. To more effectively manage SAR forces and assist the SAR force commander in determining the probability of a successful recovery, efforts should be initiated to gather information for future establishment of a Rescue Probability Prediction System. Recognizing that a number of factors with varying importance play a role in determining the outcome of a rescue effort, relevant mission factors would have to be determined, assigned appropriate numercial values in relation to other identified factors, and correlated to provide the relative probability of success for any given mission profile. Such a system, using relevant pre-determined mission factors in connection with confidence elements for the base data on a real-time basis, would greatly assist in maximizing the effectiveness of available SAR forces.

c. E&E Procedures.

(1) E&E procedures which would have been appropriate to the areas involved required considerably more knowledge of local habits, movement, and topography than possessed by the average evader. The only solution for that problem would have been a training regimen far too detailed and complex to be administered in-theater. However, two questions arose concerning basic E&E instructions given to aircrewmen. These included:

(a) Were instructions to select high ground parachute landing sites correct for medium to high population density areas?

(b) Was sufficient information with respect to E&E movement and procedures provided at the unit level?

(2) Since RPWs represented E&E failures, conclusions regarding E&E procedures cannot be appropriately drawn from that source. RPW evaders who spent an extended time evading ultimately failed for the familiar reasons - they made a mistake, their stamina failed, food or water was scarce, enemy presence was too great, etc.. All the proven procedures for evasion set forth in innumerable manuals and guides are apparently still basically valid.

Biographical Data of Witnesses

Adm. John S. McCain, Jr., U.S. Navy

John Sidney McCain, Jr., was born in Council Bluffs, Iowa, on January 17, 1911, son of Mrs. John S. (Katherine Vaulx) McCain and the late Admiral McCain, USN. He attended Central High School in Washington, D.C., prior to his appointment (at large) to the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, in 1927. He was graduated and commissioned on June 4, 1931, and subsequently advanced to the rank of Admiral to date from May 1, 1967.

From June 1931, he served for two years on the USS *Oklahoma*, a unit of Battleship Division ONE, Battle Force. He reported in July 1933 for instruction in submarines at the Naval Submarine Base, New London, Groton, Connecticut, and, after completing the course in December of that year, served successively in the USS S-45 of Submarine Force, Pearl Harbor, and the USS R-13 of Submarine Division FOUR, attached to the Naval Submarine Base, New London.

From June 1938 until May 1940, Admiral McCain served as an Instructor in the Department of Electrical Engineering at the Naval Academy. Following duty at the Naval Academy, he served in the submarine USS SKIPJACK until April 1941.

He next reported as Prospective Commanding Officer of the USS O-8, which was being refitted in the Philadelphia Navy Yard. He commanded her from her recommissioning until May 1942.

Ordered to the Electric Boat Company, Groton, Connecticut, he had charge of fitting out the USS *Gunnel*, and assumed command of that submarine at her commissioning August 20, 1942. Under his command, the *Gunnel* arrived at Fedala, French Morocco, a few days before the D-Day bombardment, in time to photograph the proposed beachhead and make a general reconnaissance of Casablanca and Fedala. Later, he took *Gunnel* to the Pacific, where he sank an enemy destroyer and sank or damaged additional Japanese shipping.

On July 14, 1944, he was ordered to New London, where he served briefly before reporting in October to the Electric Boat Company, to fit out another submarine, the USS *Dentuda*. He served as Commanding Officer her first (and only) war patrol in the Pacific; turning over command of the *Dentuda* at the cessation of hostilities on August 14, 1945.

For service in combat during World War II, he was awarded the Silver Star Medal, the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V" and two Letters of Commendation, with authorization to wear the Commendation Ribbon, Star, and Combat "V". One letter of Commendation came from the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and the other from Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

The Silver Star Medal was awarded for "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action as Commanding Officer of a submarine (the USS *Gunnel*) in enemy Japanese-controlled waters . . . (in which he) succeeded in sinking an important amount of Japanese shipping, including a destroyer. His bravery under fire and aggressive fighting spirit were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service . . ."

The citation to the Bronze Star Medal, awarded for "heroic service as Commanding Officer of the USS *Dentuda* during the first war patrol of that vessel in enemy Japanese waters of the East China Sea and Formosa Straits Area . . ." commends him for "sinking an enemy vessel of 4,000 tons and damaging two small crafts totalling 350 tons" and subsequently returning his ship to port.

The Letter of Commendation (CINCLANT) reads in part: "For meritorious service . . . during November 1942. Commander John S. McCain, by extremely skillful and daring handling of his ship performed special missions which contributed materially to the successful execution of an extremely difficult landing of a large expeditionary force on a strange and poorly charted coast. (His) successful performance of hazardous duty resulted in the unqualified success of future operations . . ."

Letter of Commendation (CINCPAC): "For distinguishing himself . . . during a war patrol . . . With a well planned attack, he sank more than 9,000 tons of enemy shipping . . ."

Returning to the United States in November 1945, he served in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., as Director of Records, until January 1949. Again ordered to duty afloat, he commanded Submarine Division Seventy-one for eleven months and then commanded Submarine Division Fifty-one for two months. In February 1950, he joined the heavy cruiser USS *St. Paul* as Executive Officer and in November of that year returned to the Navy Department. Reporting to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations), he served as Director of the Undersea Warfare Research and Development Branch until March 1953, when he became Commander Submarine Squadron SIX.

In July 1954, he assumed command of the U.S.S. *Monrovia* (APA-31), and in May 1955 was detached from command of that attack transport for duty as Director of the Progress Analysis Group in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

In August 1957, he was designated Commanding Officer of the then heavy cruiser, U.S.S. *Albany* (CA-123), and the following March was ordered detached for duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. On June 23, 1958 he reported as Chief, Legislative Liaison, Executive Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and on November 9 of that year was promoted to Rear Admiral. On August 10, 1960, he became Commander Amphibious Group Two, and on May 26, 1961, he assumed the duties of Commander Amphibious Training Command, Atlantic Fleet.

In September 1962, he reported as Chief of Information, Navy Department, Washington, D.C. He left that post one year later to assume, as Vice Admiral, the duties of Commander Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. While serving in that post the Admiral received his first Legion of Merit for his leadership of naval forces in the Caribbean during the crisis in the Dominican Republic. He received a Gold Star in lieu of a Second Legion of Merit for his outstanding performance as Commander, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet.

In June 1965 he reported as Vice Chairman of the Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, New York. At the same time he become Commander Eastern Sea Frontier and Commander Atlantic Reserve Fleet. In October 1966, with the reorganization of the Reserve Fleets, he was relieved of the latter command.

Immediately prior to his detachment as Vice Chairman of the U.S./UN Delegation, Military Staff Committee, in April 1967, he was awarded a Gold Star in Lieu of his Third Legion of Merit. The medal was for meritorious service during the period July 1965 to April 1967 while serving in that post.

After being detached in April, he assumed the duties of Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, on May 1, 1967 and for "exceptionally meritorious service . . . (in that capacity) from April 1967 to July 1968 . . ." he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. The citation further states in part: "Responsible for maintaining the United States Naval Forces in the European area at a high state of readiness, Admiral McCain anticipated U.S. requirements and prepared his command with great professional skill for contingency operations during the Middle East crisis, resulting in the strategic location of surface, air, and amphibious forces in the Eastern Mediterranean for the most effective utilization in any contingency . . ."

In July 1968 he became Commander in Chief, Pacific and in August 1972 was ordered detached for duty as Special Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.

In addition to the already mentioned decorations, Admiral McCain has the American Defense Service Medal, Fleet Clasp; American Campaign Medal; European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal with engagement star; Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal with three stars; World War II Victory Medal; Navy Occupation Service Medal, Asia and Europe Clasp; China Service Medal; National Defense Service Medal with bronze star; the Korean Service Medal; Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal; and the United Nations Service Medal. He also has the Korean Presidential Unit Citation Badge.

He and Mrs. McCain, the former Roberta Wright of Los Angeles, California, have three children, Mrs. Jean McCain Flather, Commander John Sidney McCain III, USN, and Joseph Pinckney McCain. Their official residence is Washington, D.C.

Adm. McCain, retired from active duty on November 1, 1972. Upon retirement he became a member of the Board of Directors of the United States Strategic Institute.

Rear Adm. William P. Lawrence, U.S. Navy

RADM William Porter Lawrence, USN, was born in Nashville, Tennessee, January 13, 1930, and attended the public schools there. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, in 1951 and received his aviator's wings at Pensacola, Florida, the following year.

In his first fleet assignment in Fighter Squadron 193, home-ported at NAS Moffett Field, California, he made two cruises to the Western Pacific aboard the USS *Oriskany*. Next he attended the Naval Aviation Safety School at the University of Southern California and the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School at the Naval Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland, where he was designated the Honor Graduate. Following graduation he served as a test pilot in the Carrier Branch of the Flight Test Division for two years and then as an instructor on the Test Pilot School Staff.

RADM Lawrence, as a lieutenant, served as the Aide and Flag Lieutenant to the Commander Carrier Division Six aboard the USS *Saratoga*, making one cruise to the Mediterranean and one to the North Atlantic. His next tour was assistant operations officer of Fighter Squadron 101, detachment alpha, at Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia, followed by an assignment as navigator of the USS *Newport News*, a heavy cruiser.

Next assigned as maintenance officer of Fighter Squadron 14, Naval Air Station Cecil Field, Florida, he made a cruise to the Mediterranean aboard the USS *Roosevelt*. RADM Lawrence then moved to the position of Senior Aide and Executive Assistant to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command, headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

A cruise to Vietnam aboard the USS *Ranger* as Executive Officer of VF-143, a fighter squadron, was followed by another cruise to Vietnam, this time aboard the USS *Constellation* as Commanding Officer of the same squadron. RADM Lawrence was shot down over North Vietnam on June 28, 1967 and was held as a prisoner of war until March 4, 1973.

After repatriation, RADM Lawrence spent five months of convalescence at the Naval Hospital, Memphis, then attended the National War College and George Washington University, both in the nation's capital. He received a master's degree in international affairs in July 1974.

After promotion to Rear Admiral in July 1974, RADM Lawrence served until May 1975 as Commander Light Attack Wing U.S. Pacific Fleet with headquarters at the Naval Air Station Lemoore, California. He is currently assigned as the Director, Aviation Programs Division in the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare).

RADM Lawrence is married to the former Diane Wilcox of Montoursville, Pennsylvania. They have four children: Bill, Jr., 22, Fritz, 20, Laurie, 20, and Wendy, 16.

RADM Lawrence's awards include: Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star, Air Medal, and Purple Heart.

Dr. Roger E. Shields

Present position: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Economic Affairs), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

Born: November 8, 1939 at Salt Lake City, Utah.

Schools: University of Florida, 1961, B.S.; 1965, M.A.; University of Virginia, 1969, Ph.D.

Career highlights: 1968 Interim Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Virginia. 1968–70 Assistant Professor of Finance, University of Texas at Austin. 1970–71 Economist, Professional Staff, TEMPO General Electric, Center at Advanced Studies. 1971–73 Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for Prisoner of War/Missing in Action and Eco-

nomic Affairs. 1973– Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Economic Affairs)

Others: Graduate with High Honors, University of Florida, 1961. Beta Gamma Sigma, Honorary Fraternity, 1960. Pi Sigma Phi, Honorary Fraternity, 1960. Phi Kappa Phi, Honorary Fraternity, 1961. Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, 1973.

LT. GEN. VERNON A. WALTERS

Vernon A. Walters was born in New York City on 3 January 1917. He lived abroad with his parents and attended St. Louis Gonzaga School in Paris, France, and Stonyhurst College in England.

His military career, most of which was spent in Intelligence, began on 2 May 1941 when he entered the Army as an enlisted man. His first assignment was with the 187th Field Artillery at Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont. In early 1942 he attended the Officers Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and graduated as a 2nd Lieutenant of Infantry on 29 May 1942. He was assigned to the 85th Division as Platoon Leader of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of Headquarters Company, 338th Infantry. Subsequently, he was given additional duty of Regimental S–2.

Late in 1942, he was assigned to the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, and went overseas with the 9th Infantry Division, taking part in the assault landing at Safi in Morocco on 8 November 1942. For his part in this action, he was awarded the Legion of Merit and promoted to 1st Lieutenant. After serving in Algeria and Tunisia, he returned to the United States as Chief of Section at the Intelligence School at Camp Ritchie. While serving there, he attended the Special Course for Brazilian Officers at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1943. Subsequently, he returned to Italy, serving as Aide to General Mark W. Clark, Commanding General of the Fifth Army. Upon the arrival of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy, Captain Walters was assigned as Combat Liaison Officer with the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division, remaining with them until the end of the war. He was then assigned Assistant Army Attache in Brazil. He served there from 1945 to 1948.

During the visits of President Truman, General Marshall and General Eisenhower, he served as Aide to interpret for them. In June 1948 he was assigned to Ambassador Averell Harriman as Assistant Military Attache-at-Large with duty station in Paris, and in 1949 he was appointed Army Attache-at-Large. Returning to the United States with Ambassador Harriman in June 1950, he became Military Assistant to the Special Assistant to the President. In January 1951 he accompanied General Eisenhower on his visit to twelve NATO countries, and in February 1951 he was assigned to SHAPE Headquarters in Paris.

He served there as Assistant Executive for National Military Representatives and, subsequently, as Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Administration. He also served as Assistant to the President at the Geneva Conference in 1953. Returning to the United States in January 1955, he was assigned to the U.S. Element of the NATO Standing Group as Public Information Officer and Special Projects Officer. During this period, he had additional duties as Staff Assistant to the President of the United States, accompanying President Eisenhower on all of his foreign trips and Vice President Nixon on his trip to South America in 1958.

In early 1960 he attended a Guided Missile Course at Fort Bliss, Texas, and a Nuclear Course at Sandia, New Mexico. In May 1960 he was ordered to Rome as Army Attache, serving there until October 1962 when he was transferred to Rio de Janeiro as Army Attache. In 1967 he served briefly in Vietnam where he was awarded the Air Medal. Subsequently, he served as Defense Attache to France until early 1972. He accompanied President Nixon on his trip to France, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain in 1969, and also accompanied Mrs. Nixon during her visit to the earthquake-stricken areas of Peru in June 1970. In late 1971 he accompanied President Nixon to the Azores.

Major General Walters was nominated by the President to be Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and to the grade of Lieutenant General on 2 March 1972 and confirmed by the Senate on 10 April 1972. He was sworn in to office on 2 May 1972.

WALTER CRONKITE

(CBS News Correspondent)

Mr. Walter Cronkite was born in St. Joseph, Mo., on November 4, 1916. He attended the University of Texas, where he was campus correspondent for the *Houston Post*, and later was a member of the state capital staff, the *Houston Press* and other Scripps-Howard newspapers. In his spare time, he was a sports announcer for a local radio station. He began his career as a full-time reporter with the *Houston Press*, did a year of radio work in Kansas City, and then joined United Press in 1937. He was with that wire service for 11 years.

As a World War II correspondent, Cronkite covered the battle of the North Atlantic in 1942, landed with the invading Allied troops in North Africa, and took part in the Normandy beachhead assaults in 1944. He dropped with the 101st Airborne Division in Holland, and was with the U.S. Third Army in the Battle of the Bulge when it broke through the German encirclement at Bastogne in December 1944.

After reporting the German surrender, Cronkite reestablished United Press bureaus in Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. He was chief U.P. correspondent at the Nuremberg trials of Goering, Hess and other top Nazis, and in 1946 was sent to Moscow, where he was chief U.P. correspondent for two years.

Returning home in 1948, he broadcast events in Washington for a group of Midwestern radio stations before joining CBS News, Washington, D.C., in July 1950.

Cronkite, long active in the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences, is the only newsman to serve (1959 and 1960) as national president of that organization. He is also a member of the advisory board of the University of Texas, School of Journalism.

CBS News Correspondent Walter Cronkite has been described as "the single most convincing and authoritative figure in television news" by *Time* magazine.

Currently serving as anchorman and managing editor of the CBS Evening News With Walter Cronkite, he has been anchorman of the nightly newscast since April 1962.

During the past few years, as Watergate and the conflict in the Middle East dominated the headlines, Cronkite conducted many timely, exclusive interviews with leading figures in both stories.

Mr. Cronkite has reported on numerous CBS Reports and CBS News Specials. These have included "Vietnam: 'A War That Is Finished . . .'," a 2½ hour retrospective of CBS News coverage of the conflict between 1964 and 1975, presented the night the South Vietnamese government surrendered to the communists (April 1975); "POWS: Pawns of War," which examined the status of American fighting men imprisoned in North Vietnam (June 1971); and "The Decision to Halt the Bombing" (February, 1970).

A veteran journalist for 40 years, the tirelessly energetic Cronkite has been on-the-scene for newsmaking events throughout the world. In March 1973, he traveled to North Vietnam to cover the release of American prisoners of war. Earlier visits to Vietnam, particularly during the Tet offensive in February 1968, resulted in a series of reports on the "CBS Evening News With Walter Cronkite," and a special broadcast, "Report from Vietnam by Walter Cronkite." Cronkite is now the chairman of the "American Committee to Free Journalists Held in Southeast Asia.

Cronkite was one of the correspondents to accompany President Nixon on his historic visit to the Middle East in June 1974, to China in February in 1972, and to the Soviet Union the following May. In November 1971, he accompanied the new delegation from the People's Republic of China on their transatlantic flight from Paris to take seats in the United Nations.

Cronkite has been the recipient of numerous awards and citations for his journalistic achievements. Early in 1974, he became the first newsman to receive the Gold Medal of the International Radio and Television Society as "the most trusted byline in broadcast journalism"; he also received the first Freedom Award presented by the John Marshall Law School (November 1974) and the National Press Club's first Fourth Estate Award, honoring members of the journalistic profession, which cited him for his "outstanding performance for more than 40 years in both the electronic and print media" (October 1973).

He was named "Broadcaster of the Year" by the International Radio and Television Society in April 1971, and in March 1971 received the Freedom of the Press Award from the George Polk Memorial Award Committee for "resisting a White House attempt to discredit CBS News' televised disclosure of an atrocity at Bau Me, South Vietnam." In the Second Annual Phillips-Sindlinger Survey of public opinion toward key television newscasters, conducted in May 1974, Cronkite was selected as the most trusted and most objective TV newscaster in America.

In spite of a rather peripatetic schedule, Cronkite in May 1971 had his first book published. "Eye on the World" (Cowles Book Co., 1971), is a compendium of CBS News' reporting on the major trends and stories of 1970 which he edited, also giving his overall analysis and commentary.

Cronkite is married to the former Mary Elizabeth Maxwell of Kansas City. They have three children: Nancy Elizabeth (born November 8, 1948), Mary Kathleen (born September 15, 1950) and Walter III (born April 22, 1957). The Cronkites live in New York City.

Mrs. Willena C. Varnado

Mrs. Willena Varnado is the mother of Chief Warrant Officer Michael Varnado, U.S. Army, who was captured in Cambodia on May 2, 1970. She currently resides in Louisiana.

Colonel Vincent Donahue

Colonel Vincent Donahue, a retired Colonel of the United States Air Force, is the father of Captain Morgan Donahue, who was lost in a mid-air collision over Laos in 1968. Colonel Donahue is currently a director of security for Pan American Airlines and resides in Florida.

J. Angus MacDonald, Staff Director, House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia

J. Angus MacDonald was assigned on 9 October 1975 as Staff Director for the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. The Committee is chaired by Congressman G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery of the 3rd District of Mississippi.

Angus MacDonald retired from the U.S. Marine Corps in 1973 as a Colonel after 31 years of service. He saw duty in the Pacific, North China, Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Southeast Asia. Other principal assignments were at Marine Corps Headquarters and with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is also a graduate of numerous career schools and the U.S. Army War College.

Angus MacDonald's background for this present assignment derives mainly from staff work accomplished during the Korean war. He was closely associated with the MIA problem and the program for receiving and processing U.S. personnel returned at the close of hostilities. Later he researched and wrote a comprehensive thesis that described and analyzed the experiences of Marines captured during combat operations in Korea.

In the mid-1960's, his lectures at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College included an assessment of the early POW/MIA experience revealed during hostilities in Southeast Asia.

Ernest Carey Brace

Ernest C. Brace was captured in Laos in 1965. Eight years later, after being interned primarily in North Vietnam, he was released.

At the time of his capture, Mr. Brace was a civilian pilot providing support for border patrol lines in Laos. On May 21, 1965, his plane was ambushed by North Vietnamese Regulars shortly after landing. Accused of spying, Mr. Brace was subjected to torture during interrogation. To prevent execution by a firing squad, Mr. Brace agreed to answer several vague political questions. This saved his life.

Three escape attempts proved unsuccessful. Again, he was tortured as reprisal. In October, 1968, he was moved into the formal prison system in Hanoi. On March 28, 1973, after some procedural debate at the point of release in Hanoi, the 10 Westerners captured in Laos, including Brace, were ostensibly released by the Pathet Lao.

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